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This thesis consists of six essays – framed by introduction and conclusion chapters – 
that develop possibilities for philosophy of education and pedagogy from the lens of bio- 
semiotics and edu-semiotics (biological and educational semiotics). These 
transdisciplinary inquiries have found commonality in the concept of learning-as- 
semiosis, or meaning-making across nature/culture bifurcations. Here, quite distinct 
branches of research intersect with the American scientist-philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s (1839 - 1914) pragmatic semiotics. I argue in these essays that the research 
pathway suggested by the convergence of edu- and bio-semiotics, reveals possibilities 
for developing a (non-reductive) theory of learning (and pedagogy generally) that puts 
meaning-making processes in a central light. A fully semiotic theory of learning implores 
us to take an ecological and biological view of educational processes. These processes 
explore the complementarity of organism-environment relations and the relationship 
between learning and biological adaptation. They also unravel new implications for 
education through the basic recognition that meaning is implicitly ecological. 
Understanding semiotic philosophy as an educational foundation allows us to take a 
broader and less dichotomized view of educational dynamics, such as: learning and 
teaching, curriculum design, arts and music education, inter/trans-disciplinary education, 
literacy (including environmental and digital literacy), as well as exploring the 
relationships and continuities between indigenous/place-based and formal pedagogical 
processes and practices. From this meaning-based and ecological perspective, what is 
important in the educational encounter is not psychologic explanations of learning 
stages, predetermined competencies, or top-down implemented learning-outcomes, but 
rather meaning and significance and how this changes through time-space and with 
others (not only human others) in a dynamic and changing environment. As addressed 
more directly in the conclusion chapter, these essays unravel the implications of this 
emerging approach to the philosophy of education, pedagogy and learning theory, 
specifically by providing conceptual/philosophical possibilities for integrating arts 
education, science education, and indigenous place-based knowledge into holistic 
educational approaches and programs. 
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To a reader, who takes the time to read this: 
 
When I communicate my thought and my sentiments to a friend with 
whom I am in full sympathy, so that my feelings pass into him and I am 
conscious of what he feels, do I not live in his brain as well as in my own 
– most literally? True, my animal life is not there but my soul, my feeling 
thought attention are [...] Each man has an identity which far transcends 
the mere animal; – an essence, a meaning subtile as it may be. He 
cannot know his own essential significance; of his eye it is eyebeam. But 
that he truly has this outreaching identity– such as a word has – is the 
true and exact expression of the fact of sympathy, fellow feeling – 
together with all unselfish interests – and all that makes us feel that he 
has an absolute worth.1 
 
- Charles Sanders Peirce (CP 7.591, 1866) 
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1 Please excuse the male-centred language in this passage. Of course, these are observations 
about humans in general. 
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These articles comprise a large amount of my published scholarly work during the period 
of my doctoral studies (2015–2020). Before continuing to introduce this research a few 
notes on the format are in order. 
 
This is an example of a ‘thesis by publication’ or ‘article thesis’. Unlike the 
traditional monograph model, a ‘thesis by publication’ comprises a collection of 
published, peer-reviewed academic articles (in this case 6), that are thematically linked 
and usually connected through introduction and conclusion chapters that frame the 
research project and its implications. The ‘thesis by publication’ format is relatively 
common in the natural and medical sciences, where graduate students are often 
engaged in and conducting scientific studies of their own. This model is becoming 
increasingly common in the humanities and social sciences, and is already relatively 
common in Europe. I have observed directly how it is being widely recognized and used 
across disciplines by Nordic and Northern European universities. 
 
I should also note that some of the formatting of the original articles has been 
adjusted to be in accordance with APA guidelines. Font type, formatting, spacing and 
figure numberings have also been adjusted to adhere to SFU’s required specifications. 
Beyond these minor changes, the content of the papers remains consistent with the 
published versions. 
 
The appropriate copyright permissions have been obtained to reprint these 
papers and have been submitted along with this thesis and are available upon request. 
The citations for the essays are as follows: 
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I was driven to this research because I was, throughout my formal schooling, dissatisfied 
with my educational experiences. As will be revealed gradually through the following six 
articles and conclusion chapter, outside of a few encounters with some passionate and 
driven teachers, overall and in general, my education lacked meaning. It failed to 
connect me to the place I was from, and the things and practices that seemed important. 
This was emphasized to me in the way art practices – the processes and rituals that 
seemed inherently full of meaning and significance – were often presented as peripheral 
and supplementary to the more primary educational focus on information-processing and 
problem-solving. The richness of learning, teaching and shared inquiry, seemed reduced 
to a determined and calculative performativity – not about learning, and the experience 
of meaning, but rather: getting the marks, passing the test. Many students certainly can 
adapt to these extrinsically imposed aims and outcomes. I, being dyslexic and a “slow” 
learner, could not so easily, causing me to withdraw from formal schooling (see Chap 2). 
My lifelong struggle with dyslexia has deeply informed my approach to learning and 
meaning-making. If anything, it has made me sensitive to the variable ways all humans 
and animals have of connecting to the world around them and communicating their 
experiences. It was not until I could direct and channel my own perception and 
dispositions, that I could go on learning anything – be it music, writing or philosophy. 
However, meaningful experiences, and teaching and learning driven by this experience 
of meaning, were quite simply not afforded through much of my formal education. 
 
But what was meaningful to me? 
 
Processes that I could, as a learner, directly engage with and participate in. 
Practices and processes that I could live in and dwell in – that seemed real, resonating. 
Anything, any study or practice, any discipline could constitute such a practice, but for 
2  
me, these meaningful experiences were revealed most directly by art and art-making – 
specifically music, literature, and engaging with the natural world. 
 
It was what we often call aesthetic experience that seemed to possess and offer 
wholeness, and thus form, to experience, from which learning could happen. A story, a 
song, an improvisation, a walk in the forest, a poem – these all seemed to me to say 
something true, in the sense that they stood in a real relationship to the world. Jan 
Zwicky (2019) says that this is simply the work of poetry: “It is the work of telling the 
truth, that is, of perceiving and responding to the real. In all ages and in all cultures, it 
springs from the discernment of complex, non-linear, integrated, and therefore resonant 
structures [forms] in the world” (p. 27). These meaningful practices, these forms of life 
and living, don’t just re-present the world – the thing, out there. Rather, they show a way 




This collection of essays elaborates the educational possibilities behind the basic 
recognition that learning (and living) is meaning-making, and that pedagogy should be 
driven by the experience of meaning. This perspective on education is indeed an ancient 
one, revealed in the opening lines of Augustine’s De Doctrine Christiana: “learning 
concerns either things or signs, but it is through signs that we learn what things are” 
([397AD], book 1, line 2).2 This is to say that there are not two types of reality, one 
external and one internal; one mind-independent and the other mind-dependent. Rather, 
we, and all living organisms, only come to know the things of our environment by 
bringing meaning and significance to them – by recognizing them as meaningful signs. 
 
Augustine’s discovery of the sign as an educational concept instantly blurs the 
persistent nature-culture bifurcation in Western philosophical thought. In fact, this seems 
to be an accident – stemming from his self-confessed ignorance of Greek. The Greek 
understanding of the sign (σημεῖον), meant something far narrower than Augustine’s 
“signum”– being confined to the connotation of mostly indexical signs, clues, tracks, 
signs of the weather, divinatory signs (cf. Deely (2001, pp. 212-223) for a comprehensive 
historical account). That is, the Greek understanding of the sign was tethered to so- 
 
2 See Olteanu and Campbell (2018, pp. 245-246) and the dialogue Olteanu and Campbell (2019), 
for a fuller analysis of this passage. 
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called objective, mind-independent reality (ens reale). As will be explained later, 
Augustine’s definition suggests an understanding that what is properly objective is what 
enters within the objective awareness of some organism’s perception: “Here is the 
recognition that humans and animals alike only know the mind-independent things of 
their environment through attributing meaning and value to them...” (Olteanu & 
Campbell, 2018, pp. 245–246). 
 
To live is to respond to and engage with the signs in your environment. For any 
animal, the failure to find meaning in the environment will eventually result in the 
opposite of living, that is death. But here is the central crux. There is no existence apart 
from an existence with others – and there is no meaning in isolated components 
divorced from the whole. This is to say that there is no thinking except through thinking 
like an eco-system (Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2019). As Heraclitus expresses in his debate 
with Parmenides: “All things think and are linked together by thinking” (translation as 
cited in Bringhurst, 2006, p. 139). 
 
On an ecological level, less plurality brings less life (see Chap 2 and Chap 7). I 
maintain that this basic orientation – to describe how meaning emerges through plurality, 
to think like and/through an ecosystem – also describes the educational relationship: to 
sustain and reveal meaningful relationships with the world, to call others and oneself into 
participation. This is adapted into a central educational theme in these essays: that the 
teacher calls meaning into presence, and furthermore, that teacher and learner are not 
substantive and bounded entities, but instead, enacted modes of being and forms of 
experience revealing, hopefully, what are real resonant relations in the world. The 
learner strives to form and enact their own way of relating to what is being “put on the 
table” through their education (see Masschelein & Simons, 2015, p. 88). It is not a 
relationship in our brains, nor in the environment, but specifically an embodied 
participation and co-evolution with the world. This is to observe that meaningful 
relationships are embodied in mimesis, which can be better understood as relational 
participation, rather than its more relativistic understanding as imitation or mere 
resemblance. Knowledge is anything meaningful to an organism in the here-and-now (cf. 
Stables, 2012) – the immediacy and situatedness of experience unfolding in an 
environment. In this sense, knowledge is never simply there (Hoffmeyer, 2018), in 
advance of our needing it – it is something evoked, enacted, in the act of coming to 
know and correspond with the world. 
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I also aim to show in these articles that this world-centred and ecological 
orientation toward knowing and learning follows from the “thinking through making” and 
the kind of “knowing from the inside” revealed by the work and practices of makers 
(Ingold, 2013; Sennett, 2008). The skilled practitioner knows what to do based on their 
aptitude for finding a richness of decision making in the continuity of their habitual 
practices. Indeed, it is through our habits, entrainments, practices, and rituals that we 
come to know the world at all. I will highlight that this perspective intersects with the 
kinds of being and knowing embodied by the arts and arts education, and indeed, all 
forms of creative making. The practices of artists, I argue, reveals that meaning emerges 
in the act of doing, from within – accentuating that poetry, poetics, stems from the Greek, 
poiéō, to make, and the notion of poiesis; the act that makes (and continues) the world. 
To be alive in the here-and-now (to be present) is to be in a process of becoming – it is a 
process of continually making the world (cf. Stables, 2012). 
 





This research was written principally between 2014 and 2019, coinciding with a fruitful 
period of renewed interest in finding shared meaning-based approaches between the life 
sciences and the humanities. These transdisciplinary4 inquiries have found commonality 
in the concept of learning-as-semiosis, or meaning-making. Here quite distinct branches 
of research intersect on the American scientist-philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
(1839–1914) pragmatic semiotics. 
 
 
3 Find a fuller treatment of this passage in Bringhurst (2006, pp. 139 –159). 
4 For more on the transdisciplinary nature of educational semiotics, see (Seif, 2017; Deely & 
Semetsky, 2017) and for the transdisiciplinarity of Peirce’s philosophical project and working 
method (see Campbell, 2020). As I expanded upon in a recent special issue I edited on improving 
access to Peirce’s Harvard manuscripts: “Why trans- and not just plain old interdisciplinarity? 
Because inter- is not enough – as Peirce demonstrated through his synechism and his semiotics 
(which some would consider a meta-discipline framing all learning and inquiry processes in nature 
and culture alike). We need integrated and holistic approaches that transcend the simple piecing 
together of “closed disciplinary perspectives” (Ingold 2017: 75): “In every case, the inter-, the focus 
on between-ness, is complicit in setting up the borders it is alleged to cross” (Ingold 2017: 75). 
Here, knowledge and inquiry appear “not as a continent divided into territories or fields of study but 
as a tangled mesh of ongoing pathways or lines of interest” (Ingold 2017, p. 74), pathways, we 
should add, moving together through time” (Campbell, 2020, p. 147). 
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Peirce is the founder of philosophical pragmatism – he was a close friend of 
William James and briefly, John Dewey’s logic professor at Johns Hopkins. Semiosis is 
the transformation, or action, between signs (CP: 5.473) – this is a triadic [non-dualistic] 
process that contains (1) a sign, (2) its object, and (3) an interpretant, that is in no way 
reducible to any one of these three parts. The important thing about this concept as it 
pertains to learning, is that it terminates not in individual mental states, nor in describable 
and determined outcomes, but in qualitative relations that mediate organism and 
environment interaction. Note, Peirce’s odd term “interpretant” and not interpreter. Signs, 
though central to cognition and ‘thinking’, are neither psychologically defined nor located 
in Peirce’s approach. From the 1907 “Pragmatism” manuscript, Peirce highlights how, 
“that because humans only know semiosis as a cognitive phenomenon [“a modification 
of consciousness”], we can easily miss that the former is not only inclusive of, but also 
more comprehensive than the latter” (Olteanu, Campbell, & Feil, 2020, p. 6): 
 
Although the definition [of semiosis] does not require the [...] interpretant 
[...] to be a modification of consciousness, yet our lack of experience of any 
semiosis in which this is not the case, leaves us no alternative to beginning 
our inquiry into its general nature with a provisional assumption that the 
interpretant is, at least, in all cases, a sufficiently close analogue of a modifi- 
cation of consciousness to keep our conclusion pretty near to the general 
truth. We can only hope that, once that conclusion is reached, it may be 
susceptible of such a generalization as will eliminate any possible error due 
to the falsity of that assumption. The reader may well wonder why I do not 
simply confine my inquiry to psychical semiosis, since no other seems to 
be of much importance. My reason is that the too frequent practice, by 
those logicians who do not go to work [with] any method at all [or who 
follow] the method of basing propositions in the science of logic upon 
results of the science of psychology – as contradistinguished from 
common-sense observations concerning the workings of the mind, 
observations well-known even if little noticed, to all grown men and women, 
that are of sound minds – that practice is to my apprehension as unsound 
and insecure [...]; seeing that, for the firm establishment of the truths of the 
science of psychology, almost incessant appeals to the results of the 
science of logic –as contradistinguished from natural perceptions that one 
relation evidently involves another –are peculiarly indispensable. Those 
logicians continually confound psychical truths with psychological truths, 
although the distinction between them is of that kind that takes precedence 
over all others as calling for the respect of anyone who would tread the 
straight and narrow road that leadeth unto exact truth. (CP 5.485) 
 
This is to assert that semiosis is a more general, and thus less limited, explanation of 
interpretation – not at all restricted to human cognition or conscious/intentional mental 
processes. From a (post-)Peircean perspective, semiosis is primary and, evolutionarily, 
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prior-to the emergence of anything like consciousness or cognition, being expressed in 
the actions of any living, meaning-seeking system.5 The category of meaning, as 
foundational to semiotics, offers a philosophical perspective from which to understand 
learning outside of psychologic reductions, which mostly conceive of learning as the 
expression of achieved behavioral outcomes or mental states, occurring within the brain 
of the subject. 
 
Recent interdisciplinary research has galvanized around this central orientation 
that life and meaning-making are co-extensive, referred to as Sebeok’s thesis (Kull et al., 
2011): 
 
The phenomenon that distinguishes life forms from inanimate objects is 
semiosis. This can be defined simply as the instinctive capacity of all living 
organisms to produce and understand signs” (Sebeok 2001, p. 3). 
 
Following from this recognition of semiosis as a basic criterion for life, a notion of 
semiotic learning has become a major focus in both biological and educational semiotic 
research (bio and edu-semiotics, respectively). In these discourses, learning is 
expressed broadly in the modification of sign-relations that result in significant change for 
the organism. For biosemiotics in particular, this research focus on learning-as-semiosis 
is ultimately a way to describe how adaptations occur through qualitative (meaning- 
based) means, and not solely through natural selection. Learning is these discourses is 
linked with the growth of significance, of meaningful action-possibilities, within a species- 
specific phenomenal world, or umwelt — a biological and ethological concept developed 
in the early 20th century by Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll (see 
 
5 A full discussion on this point will not be possible in this introduction. In place of this, I direct the 
reader to two important biosemiotic texts: “Perception, understood as the process of creating 
internal models of events or things in the surroundings, is a high level activity based on the 
integration of hundreds, thousands or, in some cases, even millions of semiotic interactions in the 
body and between the body and its environment and facilitates, in higher organisms, 
comprehensive mental maps of relevant aspects of organism surroundings… these endosemiotic 
tools are collectively responsible for the interaction of the organism with its social and physical 
world and constitute the fundament out of which so-called psychological reality, if any, of the 
organism will emerge” (Hoffmeyer and Stjernfelt, 2016, p. 9). And further in Stjernfelt (2014), on 
how signs are vehicles for thought and cognition in general, outside of the narrow scope of 
language and logic: “Thus, signs are not analyzed as derivatives of more primary perceptions […] 
Rather, many signs are indeed simpler than perceptions, as evidenced particularly by the 
biosemiotic sign use in simple animals without full perceptual field, sensory integration, central 
nervous systems, etc. Perception and consciousness are rather to be seen as evolutionary later, 
more complicated phenomenon, probably evolved so as to scaffold and enhance simpler cognitive 
semiotic processes already functioning [even, as shown in both these texts, at the level of mono- 
cellular organisms (Prokaryotes)]” (p. 4). 
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1957[1934], 1982[1940]), and a central concept in this collection of essays (see Chap 4 
in particular). 
 
As will be tracked, these insights follow from a resurgence of interest in finding 
meaning-based, ecological, approaches to many research domains over the last two 
decades, and in many ways, precipitated by the urgency of the climate crisis. Andrew 
Stables (2006), for example, laid out the foundation for a semiotic educational 
philosophy and theory by starting from the observation that “[i]f all living is semiotic 
engagement, then learning is semiotic engagement”, (p. 375). This broad concept of 
learning-as-semiotic engagement has stimulated much contemporary writing and inquiry 
into educational practice and theory, often under the banner of edusemiotics (see 
Semetsky, 2010, 2017; Semetsky & Stables, 2014; Stables & Semetsky, 2015; Stables 
et al., 2018; Olteanu & Stables, 2018; Olteanu & Campbell, 2018). 
 
In these essays, I argue that this broad focus of semiotic learning across 
nature/culture bifurcations, currently being explored at the intersections of edu- and bio- 
semiotics – again, a research pathway rediscovered in contemporary times through new 
and increased understanding of Peirce’s late semiotic philosophy — also provides 
possibilities for developing an ecologically informed, (non-reductive) theory of learning 
that puts meaning-making processes in a central light. I propose that this theory of 
learning will be useful in bridging conceptualizations across both the humanities and life 
sciences (see Campbell, Olteanu, & Kull, 2019), opening possibilities for 
inter/transdisciplinary research and practice in education (see Section 8.3). 
 
Semiotics has traditionally played an applied role in educational studies. 
Edusemiotics changes this, by recognizing an extensive and ancient philosophical 
tradition that sees the sign, or relational being, as ontologically basic. This is not 
semiotics applied to education, as a teaching tool, or method of research/analysis, but 
rather thinking semiotic philosophy as the foundations of educational theory at large. 
Hence the title of Andrew Stables’ and Inna Semetsky’s modern classic for this emerging 
field – Edusemotics: Semiotic philosophy as educational foundation (2015). Inna 
Semetsky (Semetsky and Campbell, 2018, p. 124) explained the significance of this 
research orientation in an interview with me: 
 
Take the concept of semiotics in education. More often than not, it still deals 
with objects – even those that play a somewhat mediating role such as 
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teaching “aids.” But edusemiotics purports to deal with signs, taking as its 
starting point the rejection of non-contradiction that says: If this is this, it 
cannot also be that. Logic as semiotics says it can, because “this” is always 
becoming “that.” People are also signs: In learning, in interpreting signs, 
they grow and become, as Peirce would say, more developed signs. It is 
the process of learning and evolving that brings together ens reale (reality) 
and ens rationis (our knowledge of reality). 
 
I hope to show that this perspective on education – semiotics as educational 
philosophy – can de-center taken-for-granted assumptions about what learning and 
educational experience entails and create new possibilities for research, theory and 
praxis in education. In these articles, I am specifically interested in the ways that 
understanding semiotic philosophy as an educational foundation allows us to take a 
broader and less dichotomized view of educational dynamics, such as: learning and 
teaching, curriculum design, arts and music education, inter/trans-disciplinary education, 
literacy (including environmental and digital literacy), as well as exploring the 
relationships and continuities between indigenous/place-based and formal pedagogical 
processes and practices (see Chap 8.3). 
 
From a semiotic account, meaning always implies a relationship, and therefore a 
mediation between organism and environment. Following from this, a semiotic theory of 
learning must ultimately be ecologically construed (see Olteanu & Stables, 2018), 
emphasizing the active abilities of organisms to reshape their environments through 
enacting and discovering sign-relations, i.e., to learn. I argue in these essays, that the 
educational sciences have in large measure, advanced disembodied and mentalistic 
theories of learning, which, by seeing human cultural-learning as distinct and separated 
from the broader forms of learning and knowing expressed by all lifeforms (plant and 
animal), has ultimately proliferated narrow educational perspectives and destructive 
ecological and social relations. A fully semiotic theory of learning implores us to take an 
ecological and biological view of educational processes – one that explores the 
complementarity of organism-environment relations, the relationship between learning 
and biological adaptation, and unravels new implications for education, through the basic 
(bio-)semiotic recognition that meaning is implicitly biological. 
 
Again, from this perspective, what is important to take notice of pedagogically is 
not precisely psychologic explanations of learning stages, predetermined competencies, 
or desirable learning-outcomes, but rather meaning and significance, and how this 
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In line with this broad outlook on education, I am fascinated by experimental pedagogical 
practices and exploratory research that reimagines what both teaching and research can 
be. Perhaps one of the main implications of a meaning-based (semiotic) approach to 
education is that it challenges the dichotomization of research-teaching and learner- 
teacher, reminding us that education is ultimately a process of studying with others in a 
shared and evolving world. 
 
My own teaching practice – whether in music, education, research practices, or 
philosophy – is shaped by the understanding that teaching and learning are essentially 
indeterminate and open-ended processes (see Chap 3). They cannot be constrained 
from the outside through a narrow performativity and drive for measurable evidence. I 
argue that learning cannot be determined or imposed from outside the pedagogical 
event (Chap 2). It is not something given in advance, but emergent in the significant 
event of new learning and the cultivation of shared experience (see the pedagogy of 
novelty, developed in Chap 5). In this sense, my approach to teaching focuses on 
cultivating a kind of continual knowledge discovery, where teacher and student alike 
strive to form meaningful relationships through the cultivation of shared practices and 
forms of gathering (Masschelein & Simons, 2015). 
 
Much of my research has focused on how the concept of learning is essentially 
empty without practices (Chap 2; Chap 8). As such, I emphasize a pedagogical and 
curricular approach that emphasizes learning through and studying within shared 
practices (see Section 8.1 for a fuller account of the significance of educational practices 
to this research). This orientation around study is important and deliberate. As Claudia 
Ruitenberg (2017) observes, while evidence of teaching and learning effectiveness must 
always “point beyond itself” to efficient and productive outcomes, in contrast “study [and I 
would also include practice], primarily points to itself, in the sense that the result of study 
is a transformed relationship between the studier and the object of study” (p. 
3). Conceived this way, teaching, learning, all blur into a kind of living re-search. 
Research is not conceived here as a solitary affair. It is always done with others and 
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involves acknowledging the relations that sustain us. In this sense, teaching is an 
essential part of research, not an added-on appendix – “a way of sustaining [a] relation 
of mutual indebtedness” to the world and the ‘others’ we commune with (Ingold, 2017, p. 
71). 
 
Journey to Tartu – why music, and why semiotics? 
 
Semiotics has always been a philosophy of learning for me. First, it helped me 
understand how I learned and—later, when I found myself teaching music at a young 
age—how my students learned. Through semiotic philosophy, I articulated and 
developed over the course of a decade as a music instructor what might be called a 
phenomenology of pedagogy: teaching in a variety of settings (classroom, private, 
ensemble, band), and to a wide demographic of age groups (from pre-school aged 
children, teens, to seniors). What I sought through this pedagogical philosophy was a 
connection to my actual creative practices of music and writing. I was seeking meaning, 
and thus, holism in life and pedagogy. My mission was to articulate the continuity 
between how I learned and inquired through my artistic practice and how students learn 
in a classroom – regardless of whether this classroom is a teen jazz ensemble, a music 
theory class, an undergraduate philosophy tutorial, or a Master’s seminar in curriculum 
and instruction. Specifically, I was pursuing a philosophy that orients us towards 
understanding (as well as enacting) meaning-making practices in situ. 
 
Again, rather than crafting or prescribing specific teaching strategies, my aim was 
to elaborate a basic pedagogical disposition and receptivity towards the ways that 
meaning emerges through continued and sustained practices. This is, arguably, simply 
the disposition of creative pedagogy. In their excellent review article, Abramo and 
Reynolds (2015) argue that creative pedagogy, and the practices and dispositions of 
creative pedagogues, can be used as a framework for pre- and in-service music 
teachers. They rightly observe, that though obviously different, creative pedagogy 
requires and shares many of the traits necessary for creative musicianship.6 This broad 
research orientation was driven by intuitions and insights stemming from my own 
 
6 “Approaching music teacher education as a process of becoming a creative pedagogue can serve 
as a complement to the cultivation of creativity in performance, composition, and improvisation. 
Stressing that the development of their creativity as a pedagogue is independent of, albeit related 
to, their creative music development allows students to nurture their teaching” (p. 48). 
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learning journey: I realised that it was only by entering into absorbed continuity with 
practices (to study) that I was able to achieve a sense of presence, of nowness. It was 
through cultivating an increased awareness of the present-unfolding, of the 
improvisatory movement/act itself, that I could overcome my dyslexia, anxieties, and 
inhibitions around many aspects of learning. 
 
I was drawn to semiotics at a young age because I craved a way of thinking 
about and talking about meaning-making across nature/culture, art/science, 
animal/human, mind-body bifurcations. I argue in these essays that semiotic philosophy 
provides an ideal outlook and conceptual toolbox for education as it is inherently a meta- 
science explaining the ways in which knowledge itself is created, evoked, 
communicated, and sustained. What got me interested in Peirce, as a young 
educationalist interested in learning, was precisely this basic orientation toward process 
and complementarity – expressed in the growth and evolution of signification (semiosis) 
and the way organisms come to know (or “model”) their world. In terms of Peirce’s 
pansemiotic cosmology (Chap 7.3), this is the process of interpretation conceived as 
broadly as possible – connected to the “generalizing tendency” of the universe itself – 
the tendency of meaning to grow. Learning here is neither narrowly symbolic nor 
anthropocentric, as the phenomenon is often treated in the legacy of Saussurean 
semiotics (often referred to as semiology). As noted recently by Semetsky (2020) the 
Peircean tradition “sees in semiosis a broader and much more fundamental process, 
involving the material universe itself in human semiosis and considering semiosis in our 
species a part of semiosis in nature” (p. 3). It was through turning to Peircean semiotics 
that I made sense of my own educational experiences, and found a theoretical outlook 
that could accommodate and reveal connections to my practices and interests. 
 
Semiotics has opened a lot of doors for me – it was one way that I connected 
with my supervisor Dr. Susan O’Neill (besides music education and aesthetics, of 
course). Dr. O’Neill runs a research group (MODAL), that I would eventually work for, 
centered, in part, on the social-semiotic approach of multimodality studies. Suzie was 
entirely instrumental in the development of this research; not only in terms of fast- 
tracking me into the PhD from a Master’s program, but also in providing me with 
extremely relevant and stimulating research experience as part of MODAL and the 
Canada-wide music-learning research project called the Creative Music Practice 
Program (CMPP). This project was an important site and laboratory for me and this 
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research – a place, where I could, in a flexible and open environment, try out and 
explore in depth the approach to creative music teaching that I had developed over the 
past several years working professionally as a music teacher. I worked closely with 
fellow teacher-researcher, classical vocalist and vocal instructor Siri Olesen, who, along 
with Suzie, I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to.7 
 
Semiotics was also one of the intellectual keystones (along with anthropology, 
music, teaching, art and philosophy) of my friendship with Dr. Michael Ling, whose words 
and ideas are spread through these articles and who continues to act as a guide and 
mentor to me. Not to mention other very significant people such as music education 
professor Dr. Maria Spychiger (University of Frankfurt), who I met and became good 
friends with while she was a visiting researcher for MODAL research group in the Winter 
of 2016 and 2017 – sharing MODAL’s office space, as well as exploring the city and 
snowshoeing in the mountains. Of note for this research is that Maria was one of the 
pioneers of semiotic approaches to music education (see Spychiger, 1997, 2001). 
 
In many ways, this research culminated with me travelling to the University of 
Tartu (Estonia) to work as a visiting doctoral researcher/lecturer in the Department of 
Semiotics in Spring 2019. Tartu has a long tradition of semiotics and biosemiotics, 
ecology and naturalism generally – this is in part revealed by the lineages of famous 
professors and students like Jakob von Uexküll, biologist and naturalist Karl von Baer 






7 Siri has taken the time and energy to document this process and the teaching relationship me and 
her formed through the CMPP, in her MA thesis Musical Dialogues: Narrative explorations of 
 Buber’s  ideas  of  ‘Meeting’  and ‘Living Center”  within  the creative  musical  collaborations  of a 
 professional singing group and a children’s after-school music program (2019). She presents an 
extended analysis of one teaching moment (event) I shared with a student late in the third unit of 
the program. Siri’s analysis is poignant (see pp. 69-72, and pp. 80-81) and I think expresses very 
directly what is at the heart of this teaching philosophy, something I learned just as much through 
watching her teaching through the program: “I discovered that this [pedagogical] goal wasn’t 
achieved by reading articles about teaching music to children, or by designing curriculum and 
lesson plans, or by personal reflection about what I was doing wrong. Through Cary’s example, I 
witnessed that connection was made because of Cary’s connection and commitment to music, and 
his sincere desire to create opportunities for the students to find these connections. It meant moving 
away from strategies and teaching concepts, to connecting to something that is living, in this case 
to music.” (pp. 80-81) 
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through my partner Marion Benkaiouche when we were 18 or 19, so it was meaningful 
that nearly ten years later we would travel there together. 
 
At Tartu, I worked closely with ecologist Timo Maran, on issues related to 
environmental literacy and education. I also collaborated with educational philosopher 
and humanities scholar Dr. Alin Olteanu, and biologist Dr. Kalevi Kull, on research and 
writing projects exploring ‘shared concepts’ across the life and the social sciences. One 
notable outcome of this research has recently been published in an article called 
“Learning and knowing as semiosis: extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics” 
(Campbell, Olteanu, & Kull, 2019). Here, we map in some detail the interrelationships 
between a host of learning-centered ecological concepts that have been used variously 
and inconsistently in different disciplines (specifically, learning, memory, resources, 
competences, affordances, and scaffolding). In this paper, we redefine these concepts 
as interrelated semiotic terms in the interest of developing a theory of knowledge with 
broad transdisciplinary relevance. A passage from this article (p. 356), describes this 
project, while also centering the larger scholarly context of these articles: 
 
The convergence of semiotic theory of education and the semiotic theory 
of biology reveals one of the most interesting features of semiotics in 
general: its implied theory of knowledge. Signs, as basic semiotic units, are 
not units of measurement, but rather refer to meaningful relationships that 
sustain, enable and constrain the organism’s interactions – thus, they are 
ultimately qualitative and subject to dynamic change and growth [...] 
Following trends in ecosemiotics and biosemiotics, it is possible to consider 
that semiotics itself is increasingly becoming a theory of knowledge, as it 
describes the diversity of models and modelling phenomena across 
different organisms’ umwelten, and thus the “forms of knowledge” (Sebeok, 
Danesi 2000) expressed by life’s diverse interactions. The interactions of 
living organisms and ecosystems create new forms (scaffoldings and 
resources) for meaning-making. These basic biological forms (scaffolding 
structures) appear to be signs (or, sign-vehicles) that organisms endow 
with meaning through coming to know them in their own species-specific 
ways. In this way, “biology accounts for a spectrum of meanings that a form 
affords within the horizon of an organism’s competences for meaning- 
making” (Olteanu & Stables, 2018, p. 411, [emphasis added]). 
 
From a post-Peircean bio-semiotic point of view, knowledge can be defined as 
everything meaningful for an organism. Knowledge is not conceived here, as Plato has 
passed down to us, as justified, true belief. Hoffmeyer explains: “knowledge is not 
something we have but something created [evoked] in the very moment of use” 
(Hoffmeyer 2018, p. 1). Implied here is that knowing is always primarily an embodied 
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activity, enacted and evoked from inside the continuity of an organism’s engagements 
with an environment. 
 
As I will continue to reveal through these articles, this orientation stems from 
deep-rooted and personal realizations. Conceptualizing knowledge as something pre- 
existing, disembodied, narrowly symbolic, and static – as many of my teachers did, 
explicitly or implicitly – was an impediment to my own learning and completely out of line 
with how I experienced and related to my practices of music, writing, and scholarship. It 
was through continually seeking to understand this central aporia and its manifestations 





A Pedagogy of the Event 
 
As alluded to, one central point in these articles is that teaching and learning are open- 
ended and essentially indeterminate processes. They are enacted through meaningful 
practices that cultivate the possibility of attention. I argue that from a semiotic and bio- 
existential perspective (see Chap 4), the significance of teaching and learning can only 
be sporadically realized and is not fully generalizable or determinable– emergent in a 
significant event (Chap 2.), and always spatially and temporally situated. 
 
A focus on events, and what might be called event-time (cf. Manning, 2016), 
orients us toward the experience of meaning, the realization of emergently enacted form; 
a wholeness (a gestalt) that cannot be reduced to its comment parts: “Gestalt thinking 
[the re-cognition of meaning] fundamentally involves the spontaneous perception of 
structure: not analytic order – one brick stacked on another – but what might be called 
resonant internal relations” (Zwicky, 2019, p. 19, [emphasis added]). The realization of 
these real “resonant internal relations” is the experience of enacting meaningful 
experiences. It is why such a pedagogical commitment is oriented toward the event, 
where resonant movements and relations provide the ground (see Chap 6.5.2) for the 
very possibility of significant experience. 
 
A focus on events orients us toward a focus on practices, in the sense that any 
notion of learning as significant change must be discerned within the practices that enact 
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it. Practices enact forms to be entered into relationship with, and these forms allow for 
the continuation of meaning. Stables (2016) notes clearly that the concept of “learning is 
empty without practices” (p. 48). So, learning can and is channeled through pedagogical 
practices, but it is not determined by them. In this sense, the teacher cannot ensure that 
their teaching will be received or understood – “teaching is always the giving of a gift that 
one doesn’t possess” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 52) – and because of this essential 
relationality we must practice a “pedagogy of the event” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 139). This 
is to say, it is only from inside emergent and sporadic events, where new possibilities for 
action and response (ways of being in dialogue with the world) can be re-cognized and 
granted meaning and significance. Thus, such emergent events sustain practices as 
living and dynamic processes. 
 
When learning equals the achievement of ‘good outcomes’, learning is reduced; 
in our actual educational experiences but also in educational policy (Chap 2). It refers 
not to an experiential transformation, for finding and enacting a richness of choice within 
the context of a significant practice or process, but a simple means-ends mechanism. 
This notably implies a curricular orientation that That Which Is To Be Learnt is a stable 
substance, and not an enacted significant relation, as implied in this account (among 
many others, cf. Stables, 2019a; Maran, 2020). Teachers within such an accountability 
model are often construed as ‘instruments of the state’, transferring an approved 
curriculum onto passive students. Such a reduction (learning = good educational 
outcomes, determined outside and in advance of pedagogical encounters) reifies 
learning from its experiential basis and feeds into a persistent performativity problem in 
terms of how teaching, learning, curriculum, and schools are evaluated.8 As Biesta and 
Priestley (2013, p. 36) noted in their classic article “Capacities and the Curriculum”: 




8 “For example, schools are deemed improvable if they adopt input measures that appear to have 
resulted in improved outputs elsewhere. If School, or School System A adopted innovation X and 
experienced output improvement I (AX – > A), it is assumed that X will have the same level of effect 
in school or system B (BX –> I). However, this is illogical as A and B remain different, B + X will not 
necessarily lead to I. There is no reason to believe that an intervention in one content will have the 
same effect as it did in another. Universal generalizations cannot validly be made from specific 
instances, yet performative policy making has nothing firmer to fall back on. Relatedly, in a sort of 
subversive desperation, correlations are often taken as cause-and-effect relationships, even 
though there is no logical reason to assume that they are…” (Stables 2019b, p. 29). cf. Daniels et 
al., (2019). 
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subject in education – that is the one who is supposed to study, learn, master, acquire, 
evaluate, judge, etcetera – to become the outcome of education”. 
 
Thus, I follow a particular orientation in educational thinking that connects 
emergent semiotic processes with the discovery of new learning opportunities. This 
orientation of course is nothing new, and educational theorists have long focused on the 
importance of social semiotics (e.g. Gee, 2005), event-based pedagogy (see section 8.1) 
and emergent curriculum (e.g. Jone, 2012). What is perhaps at least somewhat novel in 
my approach in these essays is my explicitly ecological and biosemiotic outlook that 
allows us to think about learning on a much broader scale; outside of being narrowly 
human, representational, or psychologistic. I argue through these essays that an 
ecological, meaning-based philosophy of education may help us recover from the 
stultifying and narrow performativity that results when the student (and their measurable 
competencies) becomes the outcome of the educative process and the teacher  
becomes the deliverer of knowledge approved and designed from above. My goal with 
these articles is rather to realize a way of responding to and describing teaching, 
learning, and curriculum that emerges inside the experience of meaning: a pedagogy 
sensitive to the emergent flow of signification, the essential openness of signs and how 
they are enacted inside events (see Chapter 3). 
 
I will argue that Peirce’s philosophy is important to this conceptualization 
precisely because it allows us to theorize the sign as a feature of an event, a process in 
becoming, not a static representation of a pre-existing entity: This is behind the basic, 
though often ignored, principle that the teacher cannot guarantee or determine learning, 
but can only channel it through practices (Stables et al., 2018, p. 18). Understanding 
learning as the growth of meaning requires the recognition that learning can never be 
completely pinned down, or operationalized. It is emergent in the practices that give rise 
to it. From a semiotic (meaning-based) perspective on pedagogy, we cannot, as 
teachers, afford to control or pin down these events. All we can do is continually practice 
our joint capacity for response and attention – for collective (and sustaining) study. 
Again, I am not claiming that thinking about pedagogy as a continuous, indeterminate 
and enacted process is anything new, just simply that a Peircean, biosemiotic outlook 
provides a fresh and, I argue, valuable way of thinking about and describing such 
processes beyond some of the dominant frameworks of educational theory and research 
and prevalent technocratic demands on education. 
17  
Learning as productive outcome 
 
This account of pedagogy is not about ensuring what a child ought to become, but about 
recognizing the sporadic event of becoming itself (cf. O’Neill, 2012; Stables, 2012) as it 
emerges inside meaningful teaching and learning practices. This perspective allows us 
to explore, what we can call an internal pedagogical perspective, that helps to expose an 
open morphology of educational processes – one that importantly draws no distinctions 
between informal and formal educational programs and prescribes no external 
functionality onto schools or educational institutions. Masschelein and Simons (2015) 
explain what a morphological approach to understanding the role of the school and 
schooling entails, in their article Education in Times of Fast Learning: 
 
We call this a morphological understanding of the school and we 
distinguish it from functionalist understandings (sociological or economic 
perspectives on the school in terms of functions, roles and societal needs) 
and idealistic understandings (philosophical ones in terms of ideas and 
meanings of education and schooling)… from a morphological perspective, 
the school is understood neither as an institution (obtaining legitimacy from 
a transcendent idea or ideal) nor as a (multifunctional) organization 
(obtaining legitimacy from the performance of functions), but refers to a 
particular form of gathering. ([emphasis added] p. 85) 
 
In response to common demands that teaching, learning, and schools, be productive (as 
determined by pre-defined measurable outcomes and competencies) this kind of internal 
pedagogical perspective (Masschelein & Simons, 2019) prescribes no external 
functionality onto educational institutions (schools), teachers, or the learning process in 
general. By recognizing that the telos and aims of education are enacted within shared 
rituals and practices (forms of gathering), we recognize a different way of thinking about 
the role of education and schooling in society. 
 
I consider that this orientation is an extension of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim – the 
recognition that meaning is in reference to a purpose, no matter how changing and 
dynamic such purposes may appear to be (CP 5.3 [1902]). Rather than forcing or 
manipulating attention on curricular outcomes or teaching/learning objectives, an internal 
perspective focuses on how meaning is created and sustained within ongoing 
pedagogical practices. Conceived this way, pedagogical practices, offer ways of being 
and doing that make attention possible, by offering experiential forms from which to 
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engage with the world and form relationships with it.9 Therefore, I consider that this 
educational approach recovers and elaborates an expansive (ecological/semiotic) notion 
of “learning-centered” that encompasses a much wider range of relationships to the 
other-than-human world than other seemingly analogous methods that focus on (what 
might be perceived as) isolated and clearly demarcated “learning environments”. 
 
By committing to narrow productivity models, features that can be easily 
measured and quantified, we have both unwittingly and deliberately created structures 
that atomize students from their peers, teachers, and community. By individualizing 
learning and imposing highly competitive evaluative structures, coupled with a gradual 
corporatization of many areas of education, educational institutions, policy, and society 
itself have adopted an essentially neo-liberal conception of education: In the learning 
environment, learner-consumers seek and extract positive learning outcomes in the 
interest of individual advancement. Put somewhat hyperbolically: they mine for learning- 
capital. Learning, thus construed, can become little more than a means to constantly 
keep up one’s employability in rapidly changing market conditions.10 Notably, these 
“learning outcomes” are created outside of unfolding pedagogical events, imposed from 
the outside, and very easily education (and more broadly, learning) becomes something 
that everyone is expected to undergo. This is often expressed in the language of life- 
long learning: that everyone can and should learn, and therefore, they must continue to 
learn through their entire life for this is the way they may preserve their societal worth in 
an accelerationist form of living. Essential to a bio-existentialist perspective is the 
recognition that “forms of life are also forms of meaning” (Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2018, p. 
90). Sociologist Franco Ferraroti (2003, p. 4) explains this sense of time-destroying 
urgency as a type of positivist research relationship, but most fundamentally as an 
existential state, or form of life: 
 
 
9 In contrast to this, we can observe that the commonly referred to learning environment is often 
not conceived of as a meaningful phenomenal world, or umwelt, as conceived by the biosemiotics 
informed approach to school-research presented in the recent School Design Matters: “The 
environment is a collection of significations not merely a mass of entities to which we are indifferent. 
Selection and values lie behind what we notice, find important, and like or dislike about where we 
are. This is not merely true of the human world: consider that the same blade of grass in a field 
may be a snack for a cow or a pathway for the ant. Semioticians refer to the environment of any 
organism as its umwelt” (Daniels et al., 2019, p. 3). 
10 This perspective is explained well by Biesta’s (2016[2013]) critique on learnification, Stable’s 
(Stables et al., 2018, pp. 17-30) recognition of “The Limits of Learning”. See also Chap 2 of this 
thesis for a fuller analysis. 
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I can’t think now; I’m in a hurry; I’ve no time. In the phrase, there is the idea 
of postponement, an indefinite one, until there will be time, until the hurry, 
the urgency will be over. However urgency and lack of time are interrelated 
concepts, terms, and existential situations. The greater the hurry, the less 
time one has. Urgency destroys time in advance. In the end, there is no 
more running toward, hurry with a direction, an aim, a telos; there is only 
the pure and simple act of running, not knowing where or why. This is pure 
urgency, made into an internalized habit and a way of life, without any aim 
which could give it meaning. 
 
Many of the first and second year undergrad students I’ve taught over this past year in 
the course Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, have expressed similar 
sentiments, explaining to me that they are stressed out, tired, unable to focus, anxious, 
often medicated, nervous, uncertain – “I can’t think now; I’m in a hurry”. Much of this 
anxiety stems from their increased awareness of the immensity of climate change, and 
their general disillusionment with technocractic ways of thinking about progress and 
development. These kids aren’t stupid: not only do they recognize the complexity of the 
issues – they see well enough, for instance, that no one in charge is swooping in with a 
last minute grand fix, as the prevailing ideology has promised – but also, that no one is 
even offering them meaningful suggestions about how to live through an era of climate 
crisis. 
 
I have observed that these young people are often eager for deep, nourishing, 
existential dialogue. And that’s what I try to do with them, as much as they are willing. 
The existential orientation to our conversations on climate-change and ecological issues 
frees us from reducing these complex phenomena to a problem that contains its fix. Not 
to offer solutions, but simply to wonder ‘how to go on living from here?’. There is no point 
in delaying or repressing our existential reckoning behind familiar and hollow vapidities: 
‘someday, somebody will invent something’ and we can keep living the way we always 
have: “To hope for a technofix is to imagine, yet again, that calculative rationality and 
control the world; it is hubris” (Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2018, p. 52). However, if we accept 
climate change as inescapable, and everything that this weighty recognition implies for 
us in this moment, then the question becomes “how do you want to spend today?” (p. 
30). 
 
What I envision through these essays is a society that allows for the possibility of 
teaching and learning to emerge; again, to let learning happen, and not impose it from 
above. The Tao Te Ching famously says plainly “If you don’t trust the people, you make 
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them untrustworthy”11. Such possible educational futures require a polis “ready to trust 
people enough to free them of requirements of productivity … [to] allow them to be 
teachers and students” (Masschelein & Simons, 2015, p. 93). As I’ll discuss in Chapters 
2 and 3 (Part 1), resisting this kind of productionist thrust in education requires renewed 
trust in the work of teachers and students and of no longer thinking of schools 
as learning environments whose main aim is to produce desirable (and economically 
justified) learning outcomes. This calls for a critique of how individualistic and essentially 
extractivist languages of learning are implicitly linked with technocratic and extractivist 
ways of being. As will also be developed, such a perspective of learning as 
productive/good outcomes aligns with the modernist account of the non-human world as 
standing-reserve – something to be used freely and without concern, for the sake of 
individual human advancement (whatever this may entail, culturally or environmentally). 
This suggests further relevance and implications of this ecological approach to education 
and learning theory. 
 
What is different in my account of learning (and, by implication, 
teaching)? 
 
Learning as I present it in these articles is expressed in the emergent event of new 
possibility – the growth of meaning and signification in a moment of presence and 
attention. Learning is thus expressed not with computation, but rather the realization of 
possibility, a richness of response, of choice. 
 
Kalevi Kull explains this notion of learning as choosing, and how it is 
fundamentally different than what happens in algorithmic or computational models of 
learning: “Processes without choice would be algorithmic transformations, or simply 
codes. In this sense, codes are both products and preconditions of semiosis, not 
semiosis itself. Meaning exists only within interpretation processes” (Kull, 2018, p. 455). 
In this sense, Kull (2018) shows how semiotic learning is fundamentally different than 
computational learning, for “[s]emiotic learning requires a choice between options” (Kull, 
2015, p. 225). It requires decision-making and “[d]escision making is not computing, it is 
choice” (p. 226). Choice, as meant here, is phenomenological: decisions are situated, 
 
 
11 See chapter 17, Mitchell’s (1991) translation. 
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taken by organisms in time and space. Important to recognize here is that decisions are 
always environmental/historical – the result of inhabiting a place, or being in-habit with it. 
For education, this implies that decisions in time and space, built up through habituation, 
become places of significance, and thus (possible) sites of learning. An important 
reminder of the importance of place and local knowledge in orienting pedagogy and 
curriculum (see Stables, 2019b). 
 
According to Kull (2015) – and as summarized and applied further into 
educational philosophy by Pikkarinen (2018) – semiotic learning requires two main 
elements: 1) a situation of logical incompatibility, in which a problem situation emerges 
for the organism, and 2) a phenomenal present (or species-specific nowness), “a 
subjective duration felt as one moment so that the options or choices, which 
computationally taken are always sequential, are seen simultaneously” (p. 444). Kull 
(2018, p. 455) explains further in a thought-provoking comment: 
 
A peculiarity of semiosis consists in its momentariness and presentness. 
Because optionality requires the simultaneous presence (co-presence) of 
possibilities, the existence of choice implies the existence of finite present, 
the nowness. Accordingly, semiosis [...] is what happens within one 
subjective moment of the agent […] Semiosis stops time – in the sense that 
the Now emerges in semiosis. Semiosis is choice-making. 
 
Such nowness emerges through establishing modes of relation – cultivating habits that 
enable future habit-taking, or, the cultivation of a semiotic freedom evoked and enacted 
within unfolding practices and events. The ‘result’ of learning is, in this sense, a richness 
of decision making and response in the environment. 
 
Accounting for the role of such nowness and its educational significance, is one 
of the main methodological reasons why these essays in this thesis argue for the 
expanded temporality of Peirce’s phenomenological categories of firstness, secondness, 
and thirdness. Again, signs are not positivistic units, but relations between an organism 
and the environment. What mediate learner and environment, in an edusemiotic 
account, are signs: “The sign […] acts as both confluence and influence, bringing 
together a set of habituated responses to similar although not merely identical situations, 
and thereby modifying future signification” (Stables 2018, as cited in Stables at al., 2018, 
p. 33). This self-referentiality is central to Peirce’s (triadic) semiotic, where ‘the possible’ 
(firstness), ‘the is’ (secondness), and ‘the would be’ (thirdness) all possess ‘real’ causal 
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efficiency and influence our actions in the unfolding present.12 This is the expanded 
temporality necessary to understand living, growing, creatures: the fact that an organism 
finds meaning in the world by anticipating and adapting to a future state of being (see 
Chap 7). 
 
One of my main goals with these essays is to outline a perceptual/semiotic theory 
of learning (derived predominantly, from Peirce’s categories of experience) that is useful 
in describing subtle pedagogical interactions phenomenologically. Hence my focus on 
developing tangible experiential concepts, like, for example, the indexical rub (discussed 
throughout part 2, and introduced in Ch. 6).13 I think of this as a pragmatic 
pedagogical/experiential form to channel (but not determine) learning – understood 
broadly as the emergence of new possibilities for action/response within communities of 
practice, or more technically, a taskscape.14 The sporadic event of new learning can be 
conceptualized through the way regularity and habit give way to new habits and new 





12 As Peirce says in a famous description: “First is the conception of being or existing independent 
of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, 
something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into 
relation… Feeling is First, sense of reaction Second… the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is 
First, Matter is second, Evolution is Third” (CP 6.32 [1891]; emphasis added). 
13 I’m very pleased that several researchers and teachers have found this terminology useful in the 
context of their own work, and that these ideas have been explored and carried forward in a number 
of publications and pedagogical contexts. Along with Winfried Nöth (Stables, et al., 2018, Ch. 5) 
who discusses my ideas around indexical pedagogy in the context of semiotic theories of learning 
and teaching, I’ll mention Dr. Maria Spychier in particular. In a yearlong seminar for music teachers, 
entitled Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Charles Peirce´ epistemologischen Kategorien als 
Zugänge zu Musik und Bildung, professor Spychiger, used my article Indexical Ways of Knowing 
(2016; Chap 5) as required reading for the course, in the context of applying Peirce’s philosophy to 
music education practice (Spring 2018). I was pleased and excited to see that several students 
found fascinating and interesting uses for this notion of ‘indexical rub” in their final projects. 
14 The taskscape concept was developed by anthropologist Tim Ingold (see the article “the 
Temporality of the landscape,” (1993), and the book The Perception of the Environment (2000). 
Musicologist Gary Tominlinson (2015, p. 65) describes how the taskscape is more properly 
sonically conceived, over and against the more static designation landscape and its implicit visual 
connotations: “the taskscape emerges from the varied actions of a social group, the mobile 
performance of these actions, their structuring of the lived environment, and indeed the sounds 
they make… the taskscape is not external and static but changeable and manufactured, it is not so 
much seen, in the manner of an unmoving tableau, as made and heard. The taskscape creates 
from the rhythms of action sequences that form it, its own temporality, one based on moments of 
mutual attention commanded among its participants by movement and gesture” ([emphasis 
added]). 
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Umberto Eco (a central figure in these essays, see Chap 3 and Chap 6) late in 
his own life, reconstructed these Peircean ideas, in an important passage that has 
deeply informed my own conceptualization of learning: 
 
The emergence of Firstnesses through their being opposed to one another 
(Secondness) starting from the regularity of the habit (Thirdness) for Peirce 
is an event (CP 6.200), i.e. a singularity, a point at which something 
occurs... In this way the spontaneity of Firstness, whose irregular and 
singular nature Peirce underlines (CP 6.54) turns out to be nothing other 
than an infinitesimal deviation from the law and from the regularity on 
whose basis it is produced (CP 6.59). (Eco 2014, p. 514) 
 
The ‘educative event’ I speak of in these essays, is expressed in a coming into presence 
with others, articulated by the emergence of previously unactualized possibilities for 
action and perception in a moment of presentness (nowness). In Peirce’s semiotic 
philosophy, this is emphasised by the experience of firstness – an underlying moment of 
pre-interpretative engagement, atemporal and singular (Chap 6), yet to come into 
interaction with a subject, not yet secondness (Chap 5), and not yet connected to the 
continuity of signs in our unfurling experience, or thirdness (Chap 7). 
 
As will be further unraveled throughout –in particular, the concluding chapter (8.1; 
8.2) – this view of the sign as a feature of an event has major educational implications. 
Stables (2019a, p. 783) locates the issue clearly in a recent article: 
 
Crudely, a view of the sign as a form of representation that stands for an 
object in relation to other objects has quite different implications for 
teaching and learning from a view of the sign, more simply, as feature of 
an event [...] If the sign is seen as merely a representation of an otherwise- 
existing entity, then the tendency is to regard the process of teaching as 
one of conveying objective truth, usually via language, into the subjective 
world of the learner: a view of teaching-matter as objective and fixed, of 
learners as subjective and unreliable, of teachers as deliverers, and of 
language as a vehicle. 
 
This highlights how Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics presents an avenue from which to 
transcend the persistent experience/language divide, characteristic of 20 th century 
philosophical debates (cf. Olteanu, 2019, p. 789). Learning as meaning-making across 
nature/culture divisions (that is, learning as semiosis) implies that learning as a process 
is not reducible to linguistic, or computational determinations, and following from this, 
that learning is emergent and enacted through significant experiential events that 
reconfigure and open-up experience. 
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As argued at length through Part 2, Peirce’s categories, and his general theory of 
signs, give educators and educational researchers the means to talk about and 
conceptualize aspects of the learning process that are not easily addressed, for they 
occur existentially prior to full intentional(/cognitive) awareness and rely on embodied, 
pre-verbal signification processes. The pure potentiality of firstness, that I argue is 
central to aesthetic experience and new learning, can only emerge from out of a prior, 
more general regularity (again, established through continuity in place and practice). To 
learn, we must be confronted with the world, and this is characterized by the way 
complex reality strikes us and causes a response (see Chap 7). This is the logical 
incompatibility Kull speaks of, presented to us through Peirce’s category of secondness, 
and the contiguous force of indexical signs (Chap 5). Learning how to meet this state of 
incompatibility (to learn from it) is to realize an underlying pre-supposition to respond to 
the world, stemming from our previous engagements (continuity) in the environment and 
our embodied morphology. However, to consider the categories experientially, and not 
metaphysically, involves recognizing that firstness is, by its nature, inaccessible to our 
conscious awareness (once we cognize it, it is gone). In fact, firstness is the pure 
possibility of the cognitive process (Chap 6). To learn from our unknowable first 
impressions is to realize these impressions as acting upon our senses (and thus already 
within the realm of secondness) and to relate these impressions to the continuity of our 
experience in the unfolding present. This is because all experience takes place 
necessarily within the realm of thirdness—our established ways of inhabiting (or being 
in-habit) a world. What is generally called ‘cognition’ seems to occur exclusively in the 
realm of thirdness, however, it is only through mindful attention to what I call in these 
essays the palimpsest-nature of experience (Chap 4, 6)—to the aesthetic bedrock of 
firstness and its embodied realization in secondness—that we can cultivate students 
receptive not just to subject matter or knowledge content, but more fully, to the various 
shades and continuities of the learning process itself. 
 
As I argue particularly in the second part of this thesis, these primary aspects of 
experience have been historically neglected by modern educational approaches. 
Furthermore, such ‘intuitive, ‘creative’, and ‘embodied’ aspects of learning are often 
associated with arts and making practices, which has led to a further devaluing of arts 
education in formal education (see Chap 6). When we try to understand the arts through 
the lens of computational and disembodied theories of learning they quite obviously 
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appear as inadequate for fulfilling dominant or mainstream (academic) aims of 
education, as represented by “core” domains of the curriculum. Does learning music 
make us better at math? Possibly, but is this the question we should be asking? The 
tendency at this juncture is to turn to expressivist justifications for the role of the arts in 
education – saying that the arts are central to self-expression and creativity, all those 
things that “core” components of the curriculum lack, and thus we must advocate ‘art for 
art’s sake’ (Winner and Hetland, 2009). However, as Biesta (2017) has recently 
observed in his short book Letting art teach, this move is only inevitable if we accept a 
productionist view of education as recounted in Section 1.3.2, accepting “that the only 
way in which we can speak meaningfully about education is in terms of its usefulness” 
(p. 54). He continues: 
 
Yet the educated person is not a thing or a product, but a human being with 
an altered outlook. This means that asking questions about the usefulness 
of education amounts to what philosophers refer to as a category mistake, 
where we apply categories that are inappropriate for the topic at hand or, 
in more plain language, that simply miss the point of the activity. Rather 
than asking what education produces, we should be asking what education 
means. And rather than asking what education makes, we should be asking 
what education makes possible”. (p. 54). 
 
Biesta makes the case that what the arts teach certainly goes beyond what can 
be captured and measured through productive outcome, but also goes beyond self- 
expression. Rather, the arts show us ways of being in- and sustaining dialogue with the 
world. Therefore, art is not an instrument for “education work, but that the work of art is 
this work, is the ongoing challenge of figuring out what it might mean to be in dialogue 
with the world” (p. 118). 
 
Like Biesta, reasserting and reviving the centrality of art-making processes for 
educational work in general is one of my major aims in this thesis. Using Peirce’s famous 
triad of icon-index-symbol, I can say that one of my main theoretical ‘moves’ in these 
articles exemplifies a turning away from an explicit emphasis on 
symbolic/conceptual/analytic aspects of learning, to recognize more fully the embodied 
and sensory foundations of indexicality and iconicity. For Peirce, a symbol is a sign that 
signifies its object/meaning based on a learned convention – that is, by habit. Rooting 
symbols in the principle of habit means that symbols are not abstracted, disembodied 
entitles – they are not algorithms, production rules, or sets of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. This perspective is, in fact, discontinuous with dominant approaches in 
26  
analytic philosophy of education, which claim a basic opposition of images from 
concepts: exemplified in the thinking of Richard Peters: “What is a concept? It is 
obviously not an image” (Peters in Dearden et al., 1973, p. 3). One of the main offerings 
of this work is thus a rethinking of some prevalent educational conceptions of symbols 
and symbolic thinking and learning. From a Peircean perspective, concepts and symbols 
are not over and above the world (rooted in abstracted/conceptual, social conventions), 
but fundamentally grown out of an organism’s modes of inhabiting (or being in-habit) with 
the world. Symbols are still a part of the world in the sense that every symbol possesses 
an underlying indexicality (signification based on direct presence and contiguity), and 
iconicity (signs that signify based on similarity and resemblance). Thus, this research 
can be seen as part of an iconic turn in contemporary semiotics (Boehm & Mitchell, 
2009) that recognizes the primacy and relationality of iconic signification, in place of 
symbolic and computational forms of reductionism, and what this has to offer educational 
theory. For instance, Lacković and Olteanu (2020) have recently observed various ways 
in which “abstractionist and conceptualist view[s] […] strongly influence […] the design of 
educational curricula and methods across educational levels” (p. 2) and present a 
methodological focus on iconicity in educational theory as a counteractive to the 
“common-place undertheorizing and marginalisation of the integral role of images in 
concept development” (p. 13). They observe, that: 
 
[l]ogocentric, excessively symbolic systems, dominant in the modern world 
initiated through the print medium, inculcate an illusion of both the 
distinctiveness of human cultures […] and humanity’s distinctiveness from 
the rest of nature that lies at the epicentre of the environmental crisis. Our 
approach finds relations between seemingly disparate things. It is a 
relational approach to thinking, learning and acting, rather than an 
approach of fierce individualism and differentiation that promotes various 
ideas of (human)exceptionalism” (p. 5). 
 
(I will explain the pedagogical and curricular implications of this imposed 
emphasis on a narrow conception of symbolic-learning, and the consequent exclusion of 
embodied and environmental ways of knowing, in conclusion, 8.1 and 8.2.) 
 
Educational philosopher Catherine Legg (2017, pp. 33-34) quoting Peirce, 
provides the following outline of icon-index-symbol that helpful in untangling these 
distinctions while highlighting the essential and primary role of icons in communication 
and learning: 
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Symbols, due to the repeatability of their defining conventions, give us 
general concepts. Indices, due to the brute actuality (directness) of their 
pointing function, connect us with particular objects in the world which we 
wish to talk about. If symbols give us the general and indices give us the 
particular, what is left for icons to signify? Icons, precisely due to the fact 
that their objects may or may not exist, enable us to exercise our 
imagination, and think about what is possible: “The value of an icon 
consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things regarded as if it 
were purely imaginary. The value of an index is that it assures us of positive 
fact. The value of a symbol is that it serves to make thought and conduct 
rational and enables us to predict the future” (Peirce, CP 4.448). 
 
Methodologically, it is important to stress here that pure icons and indices are marginal 
phenomena and in isolation, they signify nothing: “Such signs are indeed possible, but 
they remain limit cases, because neither the pure icon nor the pure index is able to 
communicate anything” (Stjernfelt, 2014, p. 143). Symbols always have an iconic and 
indexical dimension: “to be understood, a symbol must bear information in the shape of 
an icon and relate that information to an object by means of an index” (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 
143). In this sense, symbols are signs that might cause us to act a certain way in the 
future – representing the prior established habitual connections that make something 
appear as possible to an organism. Stjernfelt (2014, p. 142, [emphasis added]) explains 
further: “symbols are signs which are general as to their object, they possess an esse in 
futuro, referring to a potential continuity of future objects; they refer to their object by 
means of a habit, natural or cultural; they comprise icons for their understanding and 
indices for their object reference [...]” As Winfreid Nöth clarified in interview: “The reality 
of symbols is not the reality of embodied signs; it is the reality of signs in their 
possibilities of embodiment”.15 So, symbols are not the result of arbitrary signification 
rules, solely existing within mind-independent reality, or for that matter, the exclusive 
realm of human language, as is often conceptualised in analytic philosophy. They are 
not universal laws, like the laws of classical physics, but rather tendencies. Symbols, 
thus conceived, are not abstracted and disconnected from the world of nature – nor are 
they solely cultural. As already alluded to, this conceptual orientation is significant in 
educational philosophy, as an idea of human cultural learning as symbolic and distinct 
from broader ecological types of learning has a range of consequences, particularly in 
 
 
15 See my interview with Nöth (Nöth, et al., 2018), From Plato to Peirce: 
https://philosophasters.org/blog/2018/8/13/from-plato-to-peirce-an-interview-with-winfried 
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separating humans from the other-than-human world.16 (These issues around 
conceptualizing the symbol and symbolic learning and the implications for arts and 
specifically music education will be returned to in Chap 8.3.) 
 
Meaning doesn’t reduce to its component parts in a convenient process of 
reductionist fractionation, nor does it necessarily follow the combinatorial symbolic 
signification characteristic of human language. For Peirce, the sign is an evolving 
phenomenon (CP 2.302, 2.303). This inherent property of growth is perhaps its central 
feature. The meaning of a sign resides in some possible future interpretation. This is 
expressed in Peirce’s semiotic formulation of pragmatism by which a “sign is only a sign 
in actu by virtue of receiving an interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining another 
sign of the same object” (CP 5.569, [emphasis added]). In this sense, signs are 
necessarily underdetermined and general. In one of Peirce’s simplest definitions, “a sign 
is something by knowing which we know something more” (CP 8.332). This future 
orientation of the sign – that it grows and evolves and thus cannot terminate in individual 
psychological states – is representative of one of the most misunderstood aspects of 
Peirce’s anti-psychologism (see Stjernfelt, 2014, pp. 13-48). In this regard, Peirce 
argued that “a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning” (CP 
5.449) but that no single interpretation can possibly exhaust this meaning, for the simple 
reason that reality itself is always complex and continually changing (Chap 7). 
 
This anti-determinist orientation, is perhaps the central point in Peirce’s doctrine 
of continuity, termed synechism: “A true continuum is something whose possibilities of 
determination no multitude of individuals can exhaust” (CP 6.170). Synechism is a 
research program that strives to seek continuities in place of assumed discontinuities 
(body–mind, nature–culture, mind–matter, etc.). As explained in Esposito’s (2005) entry 
 
16 “The anthropocentrist idea of humans being distinguished by their potentiality to undergo 
education and, as such, of participating in a sociocultural life which is unknown to other animals 
originates in the early modern educational philosophy of contractualism (see Rousseau’s Emile, 
1911[1762]; Hobbes’s Leviathan, 1909 [1651]), inherent in turn of mind–body dualism. This 
assumption oriented much of the modern educational research to come, which, as particularly 
noticed in Piaget (1959 [1926]), has attributed particular cognitive capacities for learning to human 
infants. Thus, particularly the capacity of learning a language, as a specifically human capacity, 
came to be considered as the key to all learning, endorsing the linguistic turn, whereby knowledge, 
the object of learning, came to be understood as constructed entirely in linguistic categories. The 
semiotic approach to education challenges the assumptions for learning and education of the 
linguistic turn, claiming that learning processes occur more broadly in nature. In this view, learning 
is not construed as a matter of linguistic articulation but, more generally, as meaning-making 
(semiosis)” (Olteanu & Campbell, 2018, p. 248). 
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for “Synechism” in The Commens Encyclopedia: “As a research program, synechism is a 
scientific maxim to seek continuities where discontinuities are thought to be permanent 
and to seek semiotic [triadic] relations where only dyadic [mechanical] relations are 
thought to exist.” Interpretation that proceeds along a continuum can always be subject 
to error, to falsity, and it is precisely this fact that makes this a semiotic (triadic) process 
and not a mere mechanical (dyadic) one. Meaning is the inevitable process/result of 
organisms modelling their environment, and meaning is not static – meaning means 
more meaning (CP 2.92). It is in this vein that Umberto Eco (1976) famously said that 
semiotics is the study of anything that could be used to lie. More properly, Eco should 
have said: semiotics is the study of anything that can be mistaken, for it is fallibility that is 
the defining characteristic of semiosis – that the future is not determined and signs are 
always evolving and thus subject to error. Meaning-making on the biological level may 
be, for the most part, truth-seeking – as organism’s have it in their interest to fit to, and 
adapt to their environments, in meaningful ways (see Kull, 2020) – however truthfulness 
itself (in terms of verity) is not a necessary component or condition of meaning-making. It 
is in this sense that Eco (1979) said “semiosis explains itself through itself”, which is in 
itself not necessarily a relativist position. 
 
As will be picked up again in the conclusion, the main implications of post- 
Peircean semiotic-philosophy for education, resides in this commitment to synechism as 
a research program in education (Chap 1 and 3). 
 
A central plank of such a non-dualist semiotic argument must be that the 
signification processes of rational human beings, of other sensory beings, 
and of the inanimate are not entirely discrete. This is not to claim that 
people are the same as atoms, but that the processes that drive atomic 
activity and human culture can be understood on a single continuum, 
whether or not that continuum is interpreted as attributing superiority or 
merely difference to human practices. (Stables, 2019a, p. 780). 
 
A synechist perspective on learning would involve recognizing education as an 
institutional means to channel (but not determine) learning as adaptive responsiveness 
to the environment (cf. Gough & Stables, 2012). That is: to respond meaningfully to the 
world and, importantly, to continue and sustain this meaningful response through 
generations. By mapping the continuity of learning across nature-culture boundaries, this 
ecological, biosemiotic account of learning, in a sense “returns learning to education” 
(Ch. 2) by offering up new ways to think about learning beyond its reduction to 
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productive outcome, imploring philosophy of education to consider “education in terms of 
its service to learning and not the other way around” (Olteanu & Campbell, 2019). 
 
Chapters and Outline 
 
Each of the following essays were originally published as stand-alone articles in a variety 
of academic journals. As such, some overlap occurs as core Peircean and semiotic 
ideas are explained and introduced in each. However, each article develops these ideas 
in different ways, and thus, I hope that this overlap provides useful re-contextualizing for 
the reader, and is not overly tedious. 
 
Part 1. A meaning-based learning theory, for education 
 
Part 1 features two articles which together present the broad outline of a meaning-based 
philosophy of education. First, centered around the actual concept of learning and its 
use in both educational and bio-semiotic discourses. Secondly, as a general 
pedagogical value of openness that teacher/learner can cultivate in relation to their 
educational practices. 
 
Chapter 2. Returning Learning to Education: toward an ecological conception of learning 
and teaching. This chapter describes and outlines the implications for education of 
considering learning as adaptive semiotic-growth, in line with recent developments in 
(Peircean informed) biosemiotics. It was published as part of a special issue for Sign 
Systems Studies (the world’s oldest semiotic periodical, published by the University of 
Tartu) entitled “Learning and Adaptation: semiotic perspectives”, edited by Alin Olteanu 
and Andrew Stables. In line with a synechist research program, learning is approached 
on a broad ecological and evolutionary continuum – most generally expressed as a form 
of adaptation to the environment. Viewing learning through the criterion of signification 
(semiosis) means that learning is continuous across the entire biological realm. Both the 
life process and the learning process are expressed through forms of semiotic- 
engagement and involve continual adaptation and meaning-making. Thus, learning 
cannot be unique to humans. Learning is more broadly ecological before it is “cultural”. 
Thinking of learning on an ecological continuum means that learning cannot be “located” 
or pinned down easily in educational research or practice. Rather, learning has a 
sporadic identity –it is emergent in the specificity of events and must be discerned within 
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the practices that enact it. I argue that realizing learning as something emergently 
enacted in the educative encounter, and not something that can be determined and 
implemented, allows us to resist turning learning into an accountability tool that can 
easily be used towards ideological ends. 
 
Chapter 3. Educating Openness: A poetics of openness as pedagogical value. This 
article presents the basic aesthetic outlook at the root of this theory of learning and 
pedagogy, in mostly non-technical language. It was published in the interdisciplinary 
(sociology, anthropology, communications, semiotics) journal Signs and Society by the 
University of Chicago. The article mainly focuses on the work and ideas of Umberto Eco, 
and specifically showcases his slow and respectful convergence (Proni, 2015) with 
Peircean philosophy throughout his career. This is an aesthetico-critical perspective that 
recognizes that pedagogy should be oriented around the essential openness of 
signification processes. This openness is indeed an essential aspect of Peirce’s sign 
theory, often referred to as unlimited semiosis. The poetics of openness, as formulated 
by Eco in his pre-semiotic work The Open Work (1962), has already been useful and 
applicable to cultural studies and textual analysis. Here, I propose that this poetics of 
openness be applied to critical educational practices as well. I argue that a poetics of 
openness when coupled with active on-the-ground “critical public pedagogics” can 
provide a flexible framework for approaching the education of interpretation. Through 
this framework, a text or sign system is understood as ‘closed’ if it elicits univocal 
meanings: expecting a predetermined response from a generic/average reader. A text is 
‘open’ when it fosters a plurality of interpretative possibilities that actively engage the 
“existential credentials” of the interpreter. Aesthetic openness is part of adopting a 
semiotic perspective toward educational processes. Eco’s late theory of the model 
reader, and his Peirce-inspired minimal realism, pedagogically helps protect against the 
kind of radical constructivism this interpretative-pedagogical approach can seem to 
foster. Openness is not presented as a system or methodology in education, but as a 
pedagogical value. 
 
Part 2: A Peircean edu-semiotic philosophy 
 
This second part of the thesis specifically presents and elaborates the relevance of 
Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics for re-conceptualizing learning theory, pedagogy, and, by 
extension, educational theory and philosophy generally. 
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The first article provides a detailed overview of this approach. The subsequent 
three articles advance this outline by exploring the pedagogical importance and 
application of Peirce’s categories of secondness, firstness, and thirdness, respectively. 
This ordering of the categories, in some ways replicates the learning theory I outline, 
which emphasises the Peircean perspective, that learning (and inquiry) begin with a 
fundamental irritation (doubt), of being confronted with complex reality and novel 
experience – communicated pedagogically (in terms of teaching practice) in these 
articles through my notion of the indexical rub. Additionally, these last three (category 
centered) articles all explore the relevance of this theory for the actual teaching and 
learning of music, drawing upon my own experiences as a music teacher and musician. 
 
Chapter 4. Foundational Concepts for an Ecological Edusemiotic. This article was 
published in the journal Studies in Philosophy and Education published by Springer 
Nature. In this article, the details and methodological scope of a Peircean theory of 
learning and education are presented and summarized. It includes an extensive 
literature review and history of educational semiotic discourse, as well as a presentation 
of Peircean educational philosophy. In line with the convergence of edu- and bio- 
semiotic discourse, the ecological concept of umwelt is explored in relation to learning 
and educational theory. To address the conceptual and experiential foundations of the 
edusemiotic perspective, this paper focuses its attention on the basic semiosic 
processes that sustain the learner’s primary modelling system or umwelt—the world of 
meaning and sensory engagement that the organism is immersed in. This focus enables 
me to identify and explore four basic principles that an ecologically-concerned 
edusemiotic perspective can be said to rest upon: The Iconicity Hypothesis, the Principle 
of Suprasubjective Relation, the Natural Learning Flow Principle, and the Continuity 
Principle. The identification and elaboration of these basic philosophical orientations help 
establish the importance and relevance of the edusemiotic perspective for educational 
philosophy and theory in general. This task requires the methodological framework of 
Sebeok and Danesi’s (2000) Modelling Systems Theory (MST), which (a) provides a 
biosemiotically grounded approach to understanding the diversity of modelling 
phenomena across all species, and (b) contextualizes the specific focus of this study 
within the broader forms of learning and knowing encompassed by a semiotic theory of 
learning. My argument is that, such attention to the foundational principles of this new 
perspective, will encourage more educational research to take what Semetsky (2014) 
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has called the edusemiotic turn, providing new directions and possibilities for educational 
theory. 
 
Chapter 5. Indexical Ways of Knowing: An inquiry into the indexical sign and how to 
educate for novelty. This paper was published in 2016, in the journal Philosophical 
Inquiry in Education published by Simon Fraser University. It represents the earliest 
published piece in this thesis. In this article, I propose that the indexical sign can be used 
to derive a model for active (touching-and-feeling) learning and present the basis of my 
pedagogy of novelty. I argue that the implicit processes involved in the subtle reading of 
indices contain explanatory possibilities for understanding how students adapt to novelty 
in the learning process. Besides looking at how indexicality functions in human ontogeny 
and cognition, I also examine the human capacity for modeling our world through 
aggregations of systems of representations. Modeling systems (with their implicit 
recognition that the human is a semiotic animal) help us to conceptualize how novelty is 
assimilated in the learning process. I posit that the way we come to terms with new 
experiences (and new stimuli generally) is of an indexical nature. I am specifically 
referring to the site where “the new” comes from the outside (like a rain cloud signaling 
the coming storm) and acts upon us. We can recognize the rain cloud as an experiential 
pattern (as a semiotic entity) or not; the rain is still going to bear down on us regardless 
of the success of our interpretations. This existential realness of indexical signs is 
precisely their power as pedagogical tools, helping us assimilate and accommodate 
novel stimuli. The concept of modeling helps us conceptualize the process in which the 
new stimulus is absorbed and integrated into our cultural/semiotic systems. In short, this 
paper aims to explore what I call the indexical rub of learning; that initial friction or 
resistance felt when meeting a new experience. My hope is that this exploration can aid 
in the cultivation of a mindset in teachers, students and researchers that does not fear 
this resistance, but can use it to propel positive absorption and engaged learning. As 
demonstration, I apply this pedagogical theory to the process of ear-training and learning 
new music by ear. 
 
Chapter 6. In search of our beginnings: locating firstness in arts education in the service 
of advocacy. This article was published in the International Journal of Arts and 
Education, in early 2018 through PennState Libraries Open Publishing. The original 
name for this paper was “How does learning begin?”, and I have (slightly) retitled it for 
this collection as “How does learning begin – locating firstness in arts education”. This is 
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my study that explores the origins of perceptual-learning in terms of Peirce’s philosophy - 
- how does firstness (chance) somehow emerge out of the continuity of thirdness? As 
mentioned, attention to sub-conscious and pre-conceptual cognition is often neglected in 
educational research and theory, which, through failing to adequately conceptualize the 
emergence of perceptual learning, often inadvertently privileges a narrow and 
disembodied approach that emphasizes abstract symbolic processing at the expense of 
more sensory forms of knowing. This chapter focuses on a close reading of Umberto 
Eco’s (2000[1997]) Kant and the Platypus, a major book for Peirce studies and 
cognitive-semiotic discourses in the last twenty years. I argue that Umberto Eco's re- 
interpreted Peircean notion of primary iconism — understood as the terminus a quo of 
the perceptual/semiotic process — can offer educational discourses some needed 
conceptual clarity. This results in better understanding of the relationship between 
creativity and arts-based learning with everyday acts of perception. By considering this 
‘starting point of the emergence of learning’, I aim to bring renewed attention to two 
neglected aspects of educational scholarship, specifically: 1) the role of creative 
inference (or what Peirce called Abduction) in defamiliarizing our conventional processes 
and modes of schematization, and 2) an expanded (educational) account of 
consciousness, beyond what is actual and material, that can also recognize “the reality 
of potentialities not yet actualized, as Firstness” (Stables & Semetsky, 2015, p. 24). I 
hope such considerations can help sensitize researchers and arts practitioners to the 
importance of “imagistic and non-verbal semiosis as primary constituents of learning” 
(Titone, 1994, p. 129). Through this conceptual framework, I argue that educational 
researchers and practitioners might gain insight into aspects of learning often associated 
with imaginative or creative/artistic perception, that are not easily expressed through 
many theories of learning, and therefore this research is valuable for arts education 
research and advocacy. 
 
Chapter 7. Learning that reflects the living: aligning anticipation and edusemiotics. This 
paper was published in 2017, in the Public Journal of Semiotics. This journal is currently 
edited by Prof. Jordan Zlatev of Lund University Sweden; Zlatev took an active editorial 
role in this piece and was instrumental in its development. It is the last addition in the 
triad of papers that explore Peirce’s categories for education (along with the 
method/framing paper, Chap 4), and is aimed at understanding learning as emergent in 
the continuity of living (that is, thirdness). By ‘living’, I am referring to the integrated 
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dynamics of reaction and anticipation that is definitional of living organisms, as 
distinguished from (non-living) inanimate matter. This calls for a theoretical perspective 
that transcends the realist/idealist divides often inherent in educational theory; offering a 
possible middle way between the constructivist emphasis on mind-dependent reality, 
and the positivist emphasis on mind-independent reality. Such a theoretical approach 
must be able to account for interactions in states of becoming, and thus calls for a 
broader causality than reductionist methods or computationalist accounts allow. To 
approach this re-conceptualization, I explore the combined relevance of two theoretical 
perspectives: anticipatory biology and the edusemiotic understanding of learning-as- 
semiosis. To address how anticipatory systems research from biology can be applied to 
learning theory, I first explore Nadin and Rosen’s notion of (Gödelian) G-complexity, and 
how this contributes to an understanding of the living as complex. Secondly, I address 
Peirce's notion of semiosis as it is embedded in his categorical system and overarching 
cosmology. In conclusion, I consider the confluences and differences between the 
concept of semiosis (and the triadic relations that Peirce saw as fundamental to the 
origins of life), and the anticipatory processes that these theoretical biologists use to 
define living organisms, and examine how and if these two conceptions (taken in union) 
can potentially enrich theoretical accounts of learning. In this final analysis, these two 
perspectives are applied to an exploration of musical improvisation as an 
anticipatory/semiotic dynamic to demonstrate the possible pedagogical relevance of this 
theoretical alignment. 
 
Some concluding remarks 
 
Education then, from this meaning-based, ecological perspective, is concerned with the 
cultivation of semiotic freedom (the richness of response) that results from dwelling 
within places and practices endowed with significance through continual engagement 
and habituation. Much like the arts themselves, the work of education is driven by – and 
finds its internal motivations, forms and meanings – from within the in-act of the event 
(Manning, 2016; Ingold, 2017). In contrast to such an internal perspective, prevalent 
substance-dualism in much formal educational culture often results in learning, teaching, 
and curriculum which emphasize competitive advancement and abstract knowledge in 
place of significant, embodied, experiences and interactions in locally meaningful 
practices and places (Deely & Semetsky, 2017; Ingold, 2017; Ross & Mannion, 2012; 
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Stables, 2019b). Noted here, is how the ‘internal’ approach to enacting education from 
the inside is often more analogous to both the work of makers and artists and the 
educational practices of ‘traditional’ (long-standing, or Indigenous) peoples. I will argue 
(particularly in Chap 8.3.2) how dualistic and anthropocentric educational perspectives 
contribute to a further dichotomizing of informal and formal educational experiences and 
a devaluing of local place-based indigenous knowledge and pedagogy (Stables, 2019b; 
cf. Mead, 1943). Thus, a conception of education, and a corresponding pedagogical 
regime, emerges that is non-ecological, disembodied, anti-Indigenous, and separated 
from interactions in places endowed with significance. 
 
Rejecting the prevalent dichotomy of human (cultural) learning from adaptation is 
perhaps one of the central insights of recent semiotic theories of learning (see Olteanu & 
Stables, 2018). Understanding learning as continuous with adaptation reveals a 
perspective on learning that is embodied and environmental. It also means that human 
language, cognition and symbolic modelling cannot simply and reductively be our 
dominant models for understanding the process of learning in general. Like emerging 
post-humanist approaches in education, we must come to conceive of education beyond 
the limits of anthropocentricism and language-centrism. I argue that this is precisely what 
biosemiotics offers as a research program for education. Meaning is a dynamic 
relationship between an organism (or network of organisms) and a changing 
environment; it is thus essentially qualitative, growing and indeterminate. This is the 
challenge that biosemiotics offers educational thinking: to examine and explore how 
learning is distributed throughout ecosystems and the other-than-human world; to better 
understand the basic processes and mechanisms of meaning-making across living 
systems in the hope that this might reveal new curricular, pedagogical and even 
existential possibilities. Aligning learning with semiosis (meaning-making across 
nature/culture boundaries) implies that learning is, at least at a broad level of analysis, 
co-extensive with the capacities of communities and ecosystems alike to sustain and 
cultivate meaningful communication and engagement. 
 
We should observe further the connections of this educational philosophy to 
artistic practice: contemplating things this way involves “a certain kind of thinking” 
(Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2018, p. 31), akin to poetic thinking, that is often diminished by 
technocracy and its grasping, rapacious desires for managerial-like control: “letting 
something happen instead of forcing it to happen, and simultaneously letting yourself be 
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enlarged. Letting the facts form a poem in your mind is a way to practice thinking like an 
ecosystem, thinking like a planet, thinking like a world” (p. 31). To think like an 
ecosystem involves thinking about the more-than-human; not what distinguishes us 
humans from everybody else but the ways we are continuous with other life – how we 
can exist in plurality. This involves realising the limits of being human, and consequently 
the limitations of humanity, humbled in the face of a planet that will not bend to our will 
and power – a world that is clearly not standing-reserve for infinite growth and progress. 
Robert Bringhurst in many of his books and lectures (see Bringhurst, 2006, p. 55), 
recounts and observes that in Haida humans are “xhaaydla xhaaydaghaag” (surface 
people) and in classical Haida poetry and myth, “xhaaydla xhitiit ghidaay” (ordinary 
surface birds). This etymology evokes Raven’s encounter with the ‘first men’ he found 
crawling out of a giant clamshell (captured in Bill Reid’s iconic sculpture): pallid little 
creatures, flapping about, helpless and, quite frankly, pathetic. These beings are not the 
centre of the universe – Aristotle’s supreme, rational animal – they are “shallow rooted 
denizens” wishing, as Zwicky says quoting Aldo Leopold, to be a “‘plain member and 
citizen’ of the land community” (Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2018, p. 65). Similarly, challenging 
claims of human superiority in educational research and practice is a central aspect of 
this work. 
 
Broadly conceived, education is something communities (parents, teachers, 
neighbors) must undertake and enact in their own unique time and place, and thus it 
has, and always will have local significance. Following from this, educational issues 
cannot be judged and treated as general and absolute. This implores educational theory 
to look for new ways of thinking about and understanding learning, that acknowledge 
and honour both its ecological embeddedness, its connections to place-based and 
Indigenous knowledge, as well as its sporadic and indeterminate nature – the fact that 
learning cannot be determined from outside the pedagogical event. Thus, I reiterate that 
this research seeks an internal pedagogical perspective (Masschelein & Simons, 2019); 
a view within the unfurling events of learning and teaching. I will show also how such an 
internal perspective reveals a particular ethos or pedagogical responsibility (see 
Chinnery, 2015), rooted in, what I would claim are fundamentally ecological principles of 
being-with and seeking-out plurality, participation, and complexity: “the wider and more 
complete participation of all components in a whole.” (Bookchin, as cited in Hern, Johal 
& Sacco, 2018, p. 91). Ultimately, this is a kind pedagogical responsiveness that 
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requires teachers and students to call forth “a new way of being with and being for each 
other— […] a way of responding to each other that cannot be prescribed or predicted in 
advance, but which emerges only in the moment of response” (Chinnery, 2015, p. 9 
[emphasis added]). 
 
Here, my experiences as a practicing musician and music teacher are central to 
my analysis. I seek to carve out in these essays, a broad philosophical perspective (as 
well as concrete conceptual and experiential/pedagogical forms) that explain how both 
art-making and pedagogy alike find their telos from within the “forms of their enactment” 
(Biesta, 2017, p. 46). Again, what I am seeking is not a functionalist perspective on 
education – what education, what teaching and learning, are supposed to 
do/accomplish, or the various ways they can be read and interpreted (sociologically, 
economically, psychologically, etc.) – but what they already and implicitly are, inside the 
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Returning learning to education: Toward an 
ecological conception of learning and teaching 
 
 
The difference between anything meaningful and anything that 
has no meaning can be described as a difference between the 







To go on learning 
 
It is difficult not to consider life as a process of becoming plural. Plurality, after all, is the 
essence of growth and becoming. To become implies becoming something other than 
oneself – not a new entity altogether, but a growing into the other. 
From my earliest struggles with the mechanics of reading and maths, unable to 
focus on the symbols on the page or in my mind, I came to think of myself as a learner. 
Someone capable of undergoing transformative growth, someone capable of constantly 
adapting and varying their interactions and responses to the environment. I came to this 
understanding because I recognized a potential in myself. This was a belief that I did not 
need to take on authority, and in fact seemed to be counteracted and rejected by most of 
my teachers. Still, it was a belief that I intuitively knew and would continue to adapt to my 
 
 
17 Morten Tønnessen interviewing Kull: “M [Interviewer]: What kind of plurality are we talking about? 
K[ull]: The difference between anything meaningful and anything that has no meaning can be 
described as a difference between the unique and the plural, or one and many. Everything that has 
meaning is plural. M: So what is unique or unitary, what is only one, cannot be meaningful, because 
being meaningful implies multiplying of what is meaningful. K: The problem is that it is almost 
impossible – or at least quite hard – to imagine something that completely lacks meaning. On the 
other hand – this is exactly what physics has to do. M: A non-semiotic approach would treat an 
object of biology as one objectified object only, and not as a plurality, and would thus lose a lot of 
the meaning involved...” (Magnus, Tønnessen 2010, p. 7). See also Alin Olteanu (in Stables et al. 
2018, p. 117): “That plurality is the basic and necessary condition for learning […] implies the need 
for cultivating and enhancing plurality. Biological evolution provides clear examples of this 
enhancement, arguably driven by the rationale of learning. As explained, biological phenomena are 
driven semiosically, semiosis being the principle of pluralistic development itself.” 
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changing experience. Thinking back, this “learning” I underwent was never the result of 
acquiring new information, or data, nor the result of acquiring problem-solving strategies. 
No – rather, it was a process of realizing plurality through achieving presence. 
 
I knew that many of my struggles with dyslexia could be overcome if I could 
achieve some sort of presence of mind and body. I learned that if I could enter into the 
evolving grain of things – find a groove and hang on, so to speak, then I would be 
capable of spelling things correctly, reading (music or text) properly, etc. My dyslexia 
would become manageable and perhaps even assist me creatively in the educative 
process. It would not matter how many times a math teacher yelled at me in frustration 
(and I am sad to admit it happened frequently) to “just remember the formula!” If I failed 
to experience this “coming into presence” as I performed these computations, then I 
would have no hope of comprehension, and even less of retention. Through these 
failures and tribulations, I learned that to learn (or perhaps more accurately, to go on 
learning something) was to experience a simultaneous event of doing-undergoing; to 
have what you do in an environment lead into what you undergo in a continuous 
process. If doing did not anticipate undergoing in a finely tuned, self-referential feedback 
loop, then I would be out of the running before I even began. But, if I gave myself 
sufficient time and space, I could often find ways to enter into events. I would be able to 
“cleave the event from within” (Ingold 2017, p. 42), and through this freedom from being- 
in-habit, be able to follow down the words on the page; my dyslexia somehow, to my 
own surprise, remedying itself before me. 
 
Unfortunately, this was not the way I was taught by most of my teachers. Us 
students were mostly taught to perform drills, under the pressure of time. This was very 
important. We were often didactically “taught”, before experiencing things for ourselves, 
context-independent “rules of encoding and decoding”, from which we would deduce 
necessary answers. 
 
As you can imagine, this sort of approach to teaching does not work well for a 
dyslexic child. More importantly however, all of us who have ever experienced these 
sorts of educational practices, experience our world being divided into heavy dualities: 
mind/world, subject/object, culture/nature, content/expression, event/description, 
signifier/signified. The consequence of these educational – and more specifically 
pedagogical – failures, I argue, arises from a fundamental misunderstanding about what 
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learning is and its role in educational dynamics and organizations. This is often 
displayed in the way society collectively explains the role, purpose (telos), and results of 
the educational process. 
 
For this special issue of Sign Systems Studies, I will describe a notion of learning as 
adaptive semiotic-growth. I have advanced various dimensions of this ‘learning theory’ 
elsewhere and I will be referring to these other articles throughout. In line with the theme 
of this special issue, I argue that learning can be approached on a broader ecological 
continuum – most generally expressed as a form of adaptation to the environment. 
Viewing learning through the criterion of signification (semiosis) means that learning is 
continuous across the entire biological realm. Both the life process and the learning 
process are expressed through forms of semiotic-engagement and involve continual 
adaptation and meaning-making. Thus, learning cannot be seen as unique to humans. 
Learning is more broadly ecological before it is “cultural”. From here we can imagine 
educational institutions as forms of exaptation, that evolved naturally to channel learning 
more effectively. Thinking of learning on an ecological continuum means that learning 
cannot be “located” or pinned down easily in theory or educational practice. Rather, 
learning has a sporadic identity; it is emergent in the specificity of events and must be 
recognized within the contexts and practices that enact it. The ‘educative event’ I speak 
of, is expressed in a coming into presence with others, articulated by the emergence of 
previously unactualized possibilities for action and perception in a constantly evolving 
environment.18 This acknowledgement of learning as a sporadic form of continual 
becoming (cf. Stables 2012) ensures that we recognize the limits of determinist accounts 
in describing and observing learning. Realizing learning as emergent and sporadic, and 
not something that can be determined and implemented, allows us to resist turning 
learning into an accountability tool that can easily be used towards ideological ends. 
 
Learning, as I present it here, is: (1) rooted in processes of doing and making 
with others in a shared environment,19 and; (2) part of a larger (cosmic) process of 
semiotic evolution (the growth of meaning in its broadest consideration). This article is in 
 
18 I will show that, from a perspective rooted in Peirce’s semiotic philosophy of perception, the ‘event 
of learning’ (Section 4) emerges from a rupture in the continuity of habitual engagement with an 
environment (umwelt). This is the site of new semiotic possibilities, new habit-taking, new ways of 
relating to the environment. 
19 Or what anthropologists often call processes of enskillment, cf. Ingold (2000) and Wattchow & 
Prins (2018). 
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a sense a re-imagining of learning outside of the domain of formal education, on multiple 
levels: 
 
(A) In respect to the term’s common interpretations in educational and everyday 
discourses, as the attribution of significance to certain forms of change (Sections 
2 and 3). Then, 
(B) explored as a general biological attribute, co-extensive with the life process, 
but not strictly equivalent to it (Section 4); 
And, finally, 
 
(C) expressed in the growth and evolution of signification (semiosis), connected 
to the way organisms come to know (or “model”) their environ- ment – and, on a 
wider level, connected to the “generalizing tendency” of the universe itself, how 
the universe comes to know itself (Section 5). 
Through this gradual procedure of telescoping various understandings of learning,20 I 
hope to, as Olteanu says, explore the possibilities for “liberating the concept of learning 
from the domain of education, and rethinking education as a system or a program that 
works in the service of learning” (Olteanu, Campbell, 2017).21 
 
Through this inquiry, I will try to explain how learning is central to living a life that 
is meaningful. I will show that this basic alignment (learning with living) rests in a notion 
that both living and learning are continuous and embedded in related processes of 
growth and self-referentiality. This implies that humans and animals alike only know the 
mind-independent “things” of their environment through attributing meaning to them: by 
re-cognizing them as “signs” within their species specific phenomenal world (or 
umwelt).22 As we will be seeing, this requires conceptualizations that think of mind and 
 
20 An analogy for which I am indebted to Michael Ling (Simon Fraser University). 
21 Olteanu, Alin & Cary Campbell (2017). An interview with Alin Olteanu: Learning, signs, and the 
history of ideas. 
In: Benkaiouche, Marion(Ed.), Philosophasters.org/interviews. 
https://philosophasters.org/blog/2017/11/8/an-interview-with-alin-olteanueducationsigns- and-the- 
history-of-ideas (accessed 27 February 2018). 
This is not at all a rejection of formal education outright. But rather, as Michael Ling (personal 
correspondence) says, an “uncoupling” of “‘learning’ from ‘schooling’, so we can see more clearly 
what learning looks like in terms of human flourishing, both individually, and collectively”. 
22 This has been called the “Continuity Principle” which rests on Peirce’s doctrine of synechism. In 
my recent article “Educating semiosis: Foundational concepts for an ecological edusemiotic” (Chap 
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matter as continuous (synechism) and related – not as distinct entities. From this 
perspective, semiosis (the growth of signification) is what mediates the learner to the 




Sadly, learning in our society has largely become concerned with the achievement of 
good outcomes. Of course, ‘good’ is always a metamorphizing compendium of societal 
opinion and activity. At certain times in history, ‘good learning outcomes’ has meant and 
necessitated a transactional model of education which required ‘obedience and passivity 
to the teacher as a conveyor of knowledge’. In the modern corporate university, good 
outcomes are now generally concerned with making things easily consumable to the 
student. Italian cultural theorist Franco “Bifo” Berardi argues that this is one of the most 
pernicious and ubiquitous expressions of power in this “neo-liberal” historical moment: 
power, he says, referencing the words and ideas of Bill Gates, resides in “making things 
easy” (Berardi 2012, p. 15). One consequence of our modern consumer models of 
education is demonstrated within the social phenomenon of e-learning. In e-learning 
culture, excessive strain is put on facilitating learning. Learning has to be available when 
the student wants it, at any time, and more than this, be palpable and enjoyable on the 
student’s terms and conditions. 
 
It is notable that e-learning is now the dominant coinage, and not e-education. 
The rise in ‘e-learning’ culture, and its largely unquestioned acceptance in schools and 
universities, can be better understood through a lens of what the educational 
philosopher Gert Biesta labels, with a deliberately ugly term, learnification. Learnification 
refers to the effects of the prevalent language and ‘discourse of learning’ that has 
dominated educational discussions for around two decades. These effects are evident in 
several educational trends of the past two decades: the attribution of the ‘learner’ identity 






3; Campbell, 2019) I outline four basic principles that Peircean edusemiotic conceptualizations can 
be said to rest upon. These are: (1) the iconicity hypothesis (IH); (2) the natural learning flow 
principle (NLFP); (3) the continuity principle (CP); (4) the principle of suprasubjective relation (PSR). 
In this article I will be mainly discussing the CP and PSR, with some reference to the IH. 
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change from “life-long education” to “life- long learning”; and the rise in simplistic 
constructivist theories of learning, that undermine pedagogy and teaching. 
 
The English word ‘learning’ has two obvious distinguishing attributes: aside from 
being a process term, it is an individuating term. As just mentioned, the individualizing 
aspect of the language of learning has “shifted attention away from the importance of 
relationships in educational processes” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 63). Very easily, as Biesta 
points out, learning becomes a tool of neoliberal policy. Political problems quickly 
become “learning problems” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 67) and individuals are responsible 
for being ‘lifelong learners’, which in this narrow context basically means that they are 
“responsible for keeping up their employability in rapidly changing global markets” 
(Biesta 2016[2013], p. 67). He continues: “[T]he issue is entirely defined as a question of 
individual adaptation and adjustment – as a matter of learning – and not as one about 
structural issues and collective responsibilities” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 67). 
 
This discourse has major existential consequences for the very practice of 
education, according to Biesta (2013, p. 36): 
 
The quickest way to express what is at stake here is to say that the point of 
education is never that children or students learn, but that they learn 
something, that they learn this for particular purposes, and that they learn 
this from someone. The problem with the language of learning and with the 
wider ‘learnification’ (Biesta, 2010a) of educational discourse is that it 
makes it far more difficult, if not impossible, to ask  the  crucial 
educational questions about content, purpose and relationships.23 
 
This culturally mandated learner identity in one quick swipe undermines that important ‘- 
ing’ function. The fact that learning is a process. This process aspect of the term is 
 
23 Learnification, as expressed in much ‘e-learning’ that happens these days, is a market-driven 
expression of a far more prevalent cultural conviction; that learning should be operationalized in 
the service of society. The trend towards increasing standardization in the North American 
educational context has only grown since the 1980s and shows little evidence of slowing down. 
Doug Ford’s new conservative government in Ontario (Canada) is a depressingly topical 
testament to this. In just a few short weeks he has vowed to scrap the newly reformed Sex Ed 
curriculum, reverting it to its 1998 iteration, promising along with these changes the creation of a 
website (or “snitch line”) from which students and parents can report “problem” teachers who 
refuse to teach this newly reverted curriculum. Immediately following his election win, Ford 
promised a “back-to-basics” approach for his government’s reform of the province’s public 
education. As we have seen over and over again in the past, generally these pronouncements 
imply greater standardized measures (for students, teachers, and administrators) as well as less 




important for our societal conceptions of the role of education. As Biesta (2016[2013]) 
has outlined in The Beautiful Risk of Education, education is ambiguous, fundamentally 
unpredictable, radically open (cf. Campbell, 2018b), and existentially weak. While 
disagreeing with some aspects of Biesta’s critique on learning, I agree that the reduction of 
learning to something individualized and controllable (as displayed in most e-learning) 
runs antithetical to the (semiotic) understanding that learning is expressed in the growth of 
signification. Effectively, learnification makes exploring qualitative educational dynamics 
irrelevant, and has the unwanted effect of “naturalizing” the concept, presenting learning as 
something everyone implicitly does, without explaining why or how.24 
 
Because of the essential indeterminacy of education dynamics, I believe semiotics 
provides an ideal vocabulary and syntax, as it is inherently a metascience embracing and 
describing processes of mediation (i.e. signs). As Peirce says, semiotics is the “logic of 
vagueness” (cf. Chiasson, 20029). From this basic understanding, I will try to show how the 
‘event of learning’ is always sporadic; enacted in the growth of meaningful relationships with 
the environment. Learning, in this estimation, is not some sort of naturalizing force, but is 
always emergent, singular, local and occasional. From a pedagogical perspective, learning is, 
like the very practice of democracy ac- cording to Rancière (1999, p. 33), “a mere 
assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it”. It is according to 
this logic of vagueness, I argue, that we may embrace this defining indeterminacy of 
teaching and learning. 
 
I will also aim to show that understanding learning as the growth of signification 
means that learning can never be pinned down or operationalized. And in this sense, it is it 
is not something that education is required to put into service: 
 
The institution of education is about channeling learning rather than 
developing it. Thus, engagement in practices is all-important […] if teachers 
claim they are teaching students to learn in general, they are unwittingly 
 
24 This is not an argument between left- or right-wing political agendas, but rather, as we will 
particularly see in section 5, between top-down and bottom-up conceptualizations. Both the left and 
the right wish to improve their model of what ‘good learning is’ whenever they gain public office. 
The issue is the ideological cult of solutions, productivity, and accountability itself that destroys an 
appreciation of learning and teaching as emergent and sporadically enacted. Whatever the idea of 
progress happens to be, this operationalizing of learning in curriculum, policy and its various forms 
of expression, means learning can always run the risk of being reduced to an accountability tool. 
This is perhaps one of the ways in which Western democracies have largely, without necessarily 
intending to, robbed the majority of formal educational programmes of their truly ‘educative’ 
qualities. 
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exaggerating, for they are rather engaging students in activities that are 
designed to result in their being deemed to have learnt specific things. 
(Stables et al. 2018, p. 18) 
 
It is through this understanding of learning and its relation to education and teaching, 
that we can appreciate Maxine Greene’s (2001[1972]: 15, [emphasis added]) reflection, 
when she asks with Heidegger, 
 
Why is teaching more difficult than learning: 
 
Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it 
always ready. 
 
Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: 
to let learn. 
 
The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learning than – learning. His 
conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn 
nothing from him, if by “learning” we now suddenly understand the procurement 
of information. 
 
The educator teaches students not curricular “knowledge-objects”, but rather, ways to be in 
relationship with things (see Campbell 2017, p. 18), so that the learner may continually find 
new meaning. When learning equals the achievement of standardized “good outcomes”, 
learning becomes a simple means-ends mechanism. Teachers, within such a model, are 
construed as “instruments of the state”, actualizing and transferring a standardized curriculum 
onto passive students – as the above-mentioned Ford “snitch line” (Footnote 9) is testament 
to. It is almost needless to say (yet I shall say it anyway) that such a reduction (learning = 
good educational outcomes) reifies learning from its experiential basis. And the feeling and 
significance that we attribute and demarcate through this concept of learning has little 
connection to what is emphasized and enacted through formal education. 
 
Differing senses of education 
 
Of course, the concept of learning we have will be deeply connected to our underlying 
conception of education. There are two main Latin origins to the concept of ‘education’ 
itself, and both suggest different notions of what learning is. ‘Educare’ means to train or 
to mould, while ‘educere’ implies a process of leading, or drawing, out. Bass and Good 
(2004, p. 162) explain further: 
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[T]here is an etymological basis for many of the vociferous debates about 
education today. The opposing sides often use the same word to denote 
two very different concepts. One side uses education to mean the 
preservation and passing down of knowledge and the shaping of youths in 
the image of their parents [educare]. The other side sees education as 
preparing a new generation for the changes that are to come – readying 
them to create solutions to problems yet unknown [educere]…To further 
complicate matters, some groups expect schooling to fulfill both functions, 
but allow only those activities promoting educare to be used. 
 
‘Educare’ implies, for many authors, a logic of control, of passing down what is valued 
and indorsed from a dominant culture. On the other hand, ‘educere’ seems to imply an 
experiential transformation, where what has been passed down through social learning 
can be reborn, and reinterpreted by the new generation – so the infinite flow of 
signification may continue, advancing the adaptive capabilities of the social group. 
Additionally, the purpose or telos of educere implies growth and shared experience; not 
a shallow conception of individualized adaptation (bootstraps mentality), but a collective 
(arguably ecological) response to uncertainty, novelty, and ambiguity. 
 
Reflecting on a 40-plus-year career as an educator and anthropologist, Tim 
Ingold has recently explored the experiential aspects of this notion of educere in his 
book Anthropology and/as Education (2017). He explains his perspective in interview 
(Ergül, Ingold 2017, p. 8) 
 
Education, for me, is about what it means not just to live life but to lead it. 
The word comes from the Latin compound ex (out) plus ducere (to lead). 
Thus, to educate is literally to ‘lead out’. This is the very opposite of what it 
is commonly taken to mean today, namely to instill, into the minds of 
novices, the approved knowledge, values and mores of a society. 
Education in this majoritarian sense starts from the assumption that the 
novice is ignorant, therefore weak and vulnerable. To make our way in 
society, it is supposed, we need to be provided with the intellectual armoury 
to cope with the vagaries of experience, and the combative skills to hold 
our positions and defend them. Knowledge gives us strength and power. 
But it does not always make us wise. For the more we think we know, the 
less inclined we are to attend to what is there, to listen to other people and 
things around us, and to learn from them. Wisdom lies in not pretending 
that we already know, or that problems already contain their solutions. In 
the minoritarian sense of leading out, education is a process of becoming 
wise to things, and to the world. It teaches us to attend, and to learn from 
what we observe. Far from making us strong and invulnerable, this kind of 
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education disarms us: it leaves us feeling exposed, literally ‘out of position’. 
But it also allows us to open up to the truth of what is there.25 
 
As noted by a fellow anthropologist-turned-educationalist Michael Ling (personal 
correspondence), when students reflect back to their significant educative experiences, 
they often express a sense of transformation that they have been able to make meaning 
from, in the sense that it “maps” onto their previous knowledge and experience. He 
shares the following anecdote in relation to distinctions of informal and formal 
educational settings: 
 
In my undergrad course, one of the first in-class activities I ask them to do 
is identify and describe what their best and worst school experiences have 
been, AND, an example of where and what they have learned most in 
“formal” (i.e. school) settings, and where and what they have learned best 
in an “informal” setting (i.e., in the wider Lebenswelt that informs their 
umwelt). Time and again, the significant learning in “school” settings has to 
do with when they were able to actually chart out the learning trajectory 
themselves, and, time and time again, there is more significant learning in 
“informal” settings than in formal ones – if I was of a certain cast of mind, I 
suppose I could do a “study” on that – but for the moment, that informal 
“statistic” is enough for me. (Ling, personal correspondence) 
 
Stables, in the recent co-authored volume Semiotic Theory of Learning, presents a 
similar understanding of learning as “the recognition and attribution of significant 
change”: 
 
Learning is not, strictly, something we do, but something, it is deemed we 
have done as a result of certain actions and outcomes; while all of living is 
about signification, on a semiotic account, learning is about that which has 
become to be regarded as particularly significant in the context of a 
person’s life trajectory. (Stables et al. 2018, p. 18) 
 
In other words, for a semiotic account of educational practice things are-what- they- 
mean, and learning is located, not in the “mental state of the learner”, but in the habits of 
relationship they form with the world. Thus, I believe that our notion of learning we use 
as scholars must always be consistent to some degree with how the term functions in 
common usage. In this sense there can be “no observational test of learning, as learning 
is always revealed as a qualitative version of change, and change is ubiquitous” (Stables 
2016, p. 44). 
 
 
25 See also my interview with Ingold: https://philosophasters.org/blog/2018/4/15/tim-ingold-on- 
improv-writing-and-the-future-of-education. 
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It is when we ask such basic and fundamental questions about the “meaning of 
learning” in everyday life that we realize that this event or process we label learning, is 
always being perpetually deferred into time, and never seeming to “occur” at all. When 
we say things like “I’ve learned something” or “I think I’ll learn from that experience” we 
are really using the concept of learning as an attribution of significance that we either 
anticipate or project retrospectively. This is in itself an important example of how a basic 
tenet of semiotics – that a sign’s meaning (its interpretant) is perpetually lurking in 
possible future interpretations – can offer basic educational insights. Stables has 
emphasized this “deferral of learning” repeatedly in his work: 
 
Meaning [and thus learning] is deferred, […] that is, the meaning of every 
sign depends on its relations both spatially (to other signs) and temporally 
(to past experience and use). The point at which I learnt something is 
therefore not objectively measurable, nor, as my point in space-time is 
never yours, can my learning experience correspond exactly to yours. 
(Stables et al. 2018, p. 16) 
 
On a basic level, stating that learning is deferred means that learning can be 
neither temporarily nor spatially pinpointed. If learning is neither locatable nor 
measurable in any singular event, then how can we constantly refer to its occurrence 
(and perhaps more strangely, its outcomes, or results) in policy, research, and teaching? 
It is precisely because learning is so often reduced to “normative judgements about 
desirable change” (Biesta, 2016[2013], p. 60) that learning is obfuscated and 
operationalized in the service of ideology. I wholeheartedly agree that unquestioningly 
presenting learning as something natural, “something we cannot not do, runs the risk of 
keeping people in their place” (Biesta, 2016[2013], p. 60). But doing away with the 
concept altogether is not an adequate solution, as Biesta seems to suggest. I argue that 
a wider and more encompassing conception of learning is needed. 
 
But how do we reconcile this notion that learning is deferred, with the parallel 
experiential ‘feeling of learning’ that is implied in educere, and indeed the etymology of 
learning itself?26 The actual process of learning new knowledge and skills is often not 
experienced or expressed as an incremental “piling up”, but takes the form of a winding 
process of discovery, a “drawing out” that the learner has been able to make sense of 
 
26 The Old English word ‘leornian’ (associated with the term, ‘læran’ – ‘to teach’) has base roots in 
‘to follow or find the track’ (cf. https://www.etymonline.com/word/learn?ref=etymonline_ 
crossreference); inviting reflection on this notion of educere and education as a ‘leading out’. 
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and re-cognize through further experience. Ling expresses this in the following ‘quip’ to 
his students undergoing ‘Professional Teacher’s Education’: 
 
Teaching is not ‘rocket science.’ 
 
With all due respect to – and admiration for – the rocket scientists, it is 
actually a lot more complex than that. 
 
What it is is a way of relating to each other, and to oneself, perhaps even 
‘a way of being’ that is full of depths, nuances, and mysteries, a way of 
being that in a certain sense begins, and ends, with an ongoing desire to 
learn about learning. 
 
And so, if you can be receptive – and responsive – to those depths, 
nuances, and mysteries, if you can make learning about learning (which is 
to say, learning about the world, each other, and oneself, along with 
learning for each other and oneself) a central tenet of what guides us in 
being a teacher, 
 
then perhaps we can come to some understanding of what teaching is as 
a practice, what it has been, and what it can be. 
 
-Michael’s Quips, #1 (.m ling, Fall 2018, PDP PLC #9) 
 
For Ling just like Ingold, there is an important experiential aspect of learning that 
comes prior to teaching that we need to take notice of: “Learning precedes teaching, 
insofar as it goes on without formal teaching, often enough, and, that effective teaching 
has to be shaped by an understanding of learning, first and foremost” (Ling, personal 
correspondence). Again, as Greene (2001[1972]) said, teaching is so difficult because it 
involves learning “to let learn”. The pedagogical act of channeling learning implies that, 
although learning may be deferred (not fully locatable in space or time), learning still 
happens. Ingold (2013) arrived at this understanding that “learning precedes teaching” 
through reflecting on his early fieldwork with the Sami people of North Eastern Finland, 
when he was constantly told by his hosts to “know for yourself”. He eventually concluded 
that these people were not simply being unhelpful, but rather fostering his own process 
of “learning to learn” (Ingold, 2013); acquiring knowledge not through didactic 
explanation but through “a process of self-discovery”. “To know things” he says, “you 
have to grow into them and let them grow in you, so that they become a part of who 
become a part of who you are” (Ingold 2013, p. 1). 
 
In this sense, I have argued repeatedly that an understanding of learning can 
only be oriented around practices (I have written on this mostly in the context of music 
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education). We can say with Stables (2016, p. 48), that the concept “[l]earning is empty 
without practices”. This is also a reminder that we learn things for some purpose, even if 
this purpose is forever evolving and ultimately contingent upon further experiences. 
Being a teacher means bringing something from the outside, that was not there 
to begin with.27 In my own teaching, what I bring to the table is usually a particular way of 
expressing varying modes of relation; an expressive indexicality; a ‘look here’, and a 
‘let’s make sense of this together?’ The only way I have been fortunate enough to 
develop some personal and pedagogical awareness of these modes of relating, is 
because I have engaged in varying forms of praxis myself (music, pedagogy, writing, 
reading). These practices have taught me how to dwell in relational correspondence, 
and more importantly to dwell in processes of becoming. I believe that it is only through 
an awareness of becoming, and not being, that we can cultivate the pedagogical sense 
of educere discussed. 
 
As we will discuss in the following section, this is not ultimately a didactic force 
upon students, but the enacting of a ritualized process that can never be fully 
operationalized, as it changes from within and from without: through self- referential 
processes of collective habit-taking that extend beyond the confines of the individual to 
incorporate the wider community and environment. 
 
Learning is continuous 
 
In previous research, I have acknowledged more explicitly how this “quest for certainty” 
in describing and ensuring learning presents a serious challenge to dominant 
educational approaches. I have shown (Campbell 2017; chap 7 in this thesis), how 
learning (like the life process itself) appears to be expressed in an anticipatory dynamic28 
and is thus complex, and not complicated (as according to Nadin’s notion of G- 
 
27 In ecological accounts of educational dynamics, it can appear difficult to account for the role of 
the teacher as something more than just a facilitator of “good” learning environments (as in our 
accounts of e-learning above). Such an account of learning, while suitable to describe idealized 
constructivist scenarios, does little to escape the reification of learning that we discussed earlier, 
nor does it provide us a satisfactory account of “those great depths, nuances, and mysteries” that 
Ling expressed in his ‘quip’. 
28 “Within physics-based explanations, the current state of a system is determined by its past and 
is deterministically well defined, i.e., non-ambiguous. An anticipatory system is a system whose 
current state depends not only on previous states, and eventually its current states, but also upon 
possible future states” (Nadin 2010, p. 112). 
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complexity, built on Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorems). Anticipatory systems 
always preserve a certain degree of undecidability (vagueness). Through this criterion, 
scholars like Mihai Nadin have defined the difference between the living and the non- 
living as the difference between “undecidable complexity and decidable complication” 
(Nadin 2017, p. 154).29 The fact that learning is not reducible to formal reductions (that it 
transcends computation), ultimately points to another sense of deferral which we will be 
exploring in these next two sections. 
 
Understanding learning as the growth of signification, or semiosis, means 
learning necessarily extends beyond the individual (and beyond reductionist- determinist 
accounts) to incorporate the wider community, culture, and ecosystem. 
 
This is learning that possesses an “evolutionary telos” according to Olteanu (in 
Stables et al 2018, p. 112): 
 
In this conception, learning is therefore attributable to several agencies: to 
the individual, as it seeks its place in the environment, to neighbouring 
organisms, to its close groups, to its species, and to its relations to other 
species and to the entire phenomenon of evolution, both of its own species 
and of other species. As such, learning in the cultural sense is, at most, a 
sub-case of learning in the evolutionary sense, if not the same 
phenomenon altogether. 
 
Learning, in this grand Peircean estimation, is not in any way unique to humans, but 
ultimately occurring on a continuum with all living organisms and indeed the wider 
universe. Olteanu (in Stables et al., 2018, p. 112) quotes Peirce in discussing this 
principle of continuity: 
 
Specific human cultural learning and natural evolution are understood here 
as continuous, from the perspective of Peirce’s notion of continuity. 
According to Peirce, constituting parts of a continuum are “individually 







29 According to Gödel’s theorem: “[A] complex system cannot be fully and consistently described. 
All other systems (those that can be unequivocally specified) qualify either as simple or, at most, 
complicated. Within this view, complexity is not a matter of scale. Moreover, it does not accept 
degrees (the empty formula of “higher complexity” and the like). Since the living is characterized by 
complexity, it follows that any formal representation, including the modeling of the natural system, 
can be only a reduction” (Nadin 2014a, p. 78). 
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the parts distinguishable indefinitely, but yet not composed of individuals 
absolutely self-identical and distinct from the other”. (CP 1.499)30 
 
This is consistent with the understanding that learning transcends any 
reductionist process of fractionation (again it is G-complex, not complicated). It is 
deferred in the sense that it is never ending and reaches both forwards and backwards 
in time. Learning is therefore not something that can be broken down into constituent 
parts with the expectation that these parts can be consistently and completely described 
and used to construct formalized models that purport to explain the whole of the 
phenomenon. 
 
Dewey, too, saw ‘living and learning’ as co-extensive. For him, both learning and 
the life process are both rooted in principles of growth and continuity. Living, he says: 
 
[...] possesses continuity because it is an everlastingly renewed process of 
acting upon the environment and being acted upon by it [...] of relations 
between what is done and what is undergone [...] The world we have 
experienced becomes an integral part of the self that acts and is acted 
upon in further experience. In their physical occurrence, things and events 
experienced pass and are gone. But something of their meaning and value 
is retained as an integral part of the self. Through habits formed in 
intercourse with the world, we also in-habit the world. It becomes a home 
and the home is part of our every experience. (Dewey 2005[1934], p. 108) 
 
This experiential account of living leads Dewey to think of both learning and 
education through this broad criterion of habit: learning is the creation of habits that 
enable future habit-taking, and thus “the result of the educative process” can only be a 
capacity “for further education” (Dewey 2004[1916], p. 68).31 As Dewey recognizes here, 
to be in-habit in this manner, is to be open to the evolving and changing environment, 
and to be out-of-habit is to be closed to it. To in-habit the world from such a deeply 
 
30 The guiding principle that “semiosis and the life-process are coextensive” has been the great 
contribution of Thomas Sebeok’s (Sebeok 2001[1994], 2001; Sebeok, Danesi, p. 2000) biosemiotic 
project. This central idea has been referred to as ‘Sebeok’s Thesis’ by Kull, Emmeche and 
Hoffmeyer (2011, p. 2). This has encouraged some scholars and researchers in the emerging field 
of edusemiotics to say that semiosis and the learning process are co-extensive, along similar 
Peircean lines. 
31 Affifi (2014: 76) explains further: “For Dewey, growth occurs when possibilities open up for an 
organism, thereby “enhancing its ability to participate in its environment” (Gouinlock, 1972, p. 238). 
It is the process of developing habits that allow the organism to interact more spiritedly, 
responsively, and openly to arising circumstances. By contrast, a lack of growth limits possibilities 
of encounter, as the organism relies on preformed habits that stultify, ossify, and close it off to 
novelty […] growth is predicated on habits that enable future habit-forming, whereas the restriction 
of growth occurs when existing habits monopolize the operational domain […]”. 
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experiential place, is not to be in habit with a mind-independent reality “out there”. No – it 
is to in-habit and dwell in a phenomenal world (or umwelt). Dwelling precedes re- 
cognition, and re-presentation. For Dewey (and to an extent his teacher Peirce) habit is 
“the principle of production” itself, “whereby a self that dwells in its own practices is 
recursively generated by them” (Ingold 2017, p. 22). 
 
To inhabit an umwelt is to be receptive to the continual emergence of possibility 
and presence through habit. To come into presence, necessarily means coming into the 
presence of others (cf. Biesta 2016[2013], p. 143). To study with others is thus to dwell 
in overlapping and shared umwelten. To live, and more importantly, to live well, as a 
flourishing and adaptive organism, is to go on learning.32 Learning, then, from this 
perspective can be said to result in the creation of semiotic freedom that results from 
dwelling within habits of practice.33 
 
But how far does this conception take us? What does this criterion of the growth 
of habits that enable future habit-taking really imply? Addiction can only be considered 
addiction when it closes possibilities and solidifies or closes our potential for future habit- 
taking. And furthermore, habits can only open to new habits in the context of particular 
practices. Because there is no pure equilibrium of habits that open possibilities (all 
possible openings require a closure of others),34 learning must always to some degree 
be a qualitative judgement of value, that is “sporadically enacted” through the practices 
that enact it.35 As Stables (2006) notes: if all living is expressed as semiotic-engagement 
between the organism and its environment; and, if all living necessarily involves change; 
and, if learning entails semiotic engagement that results in change; then, it must be 
 
32 Following this Deweyan legacy, the emerging edusemiotic project has largely rallied behind the 
notion that we cannot separate education from life experience: “education is identical with the 
operation that is living a life that is fruitful and significant, the ultimate value which can be set up is 
just the value of living itself ” (Dewey cited in Stables, Semetsky 2015, p. 84). 
33 I have elaborated this pedagogy of dwelling recently in a forthcoming article called “Dwelling in 
music: The pedagogy of creative improvisation classes”. 
34 It is always dialectics of open and closed interpretations. For a fuller treatment of Eco’s poetics 
of openness in the context of pedagogy, see Chap 3 of this thesis and Campbell 2018b. 
35 Furthermore, we must tread carefully by making this alignment, questioning whether we are 
merely perpetuating the naturalization of learning that Biesta (2016[2013], p. 68) warns us about, 
a slippery slope where: “(1) learning first becomes equated with living, (2) then almost necessarily 
becomes a lifelong process, which (3) next moves to the claim that any normal human being can 
learn, (4) then easily moves to the suggestion that therefore every normal human being should 
learn, so that (5) in the end, there must be something wrong with you if you do not want to learn 
and refuse the learner identify”. 
62  
concluded that “there is no clearly identified ‘form of life’ (to use Wittgenstein’s term) that 
is learning” (Stables 2016, p. 48). 
 
Fully recognizing this line of reasoning and all that it implies, I am arguing that 
there is, however, practical value to expanding our narrow use of the term ‘learning’ (at 
least in the anglophone world). This expansion of what learning can mean is performed 
in the interest of developing flexible telos (not outcomes) that can connect this process of 
learning to a broader ecological and evolutionary continuum. “Expanding our notions of 
learning” is a way to take control over the corruptions that the concept can suffer under 
the prevalent discourse of learnification. Furthermore, I argue that this “conceptual- 
exploding” has specific insight into the actual forms of life (teaching and learning) that 
educational institutions are said to channel, but do not determine. 
 
Charls Pearson (2018, p. 412) notes that it is widely accepted by modern biology 
that “the essential attributes of life include functional autonomy, and self- reproduction”. 
According to Pearson, biosemiotics adds an additional criterion, semiosis, or semiotic 
causation (which we shall be treating in more detail in Section 5 shortly): “These three 
attributes partake of a common trait, that of having an essential self-referential structure” 
(Pearson 2018, p. 412). The connecting link between a notion of living-as-semiosis and 
learning-as-semiosis is found in the fact that both rely on such self-referential structures. 
What mediate learner and environment, in an edusemiotic account, are signs: “The sign 
[…] acts as both confluence and influence, bringing together a set of habituated 
responses to similar although not merely identical situations, and thereby modifying 
future signification” (Stables 2018, p. 33).This self-referentiality is central to Peirce’s 
(triadic) semiotic, which rests upon what he called an extreme scholastic realism; where 
‘the possible’ (firstness), ‘the is’ (secondness), and ‘the would be’ (thirdness) all possess 
‘real’ causal efficiency and influence our actions in the unfolding present. The sporadic 
event of new learning can be conceptualized through the way regularity and habit give 
way to new habits and new chance occurrences (how thirdness gives way to firstness). 
Umberto Eco (2014, p. 514) explains this aspect of Peirce’s categories: 
 
The emergence of Firstnesses through their being opposed to one another 
(Secondness) starting from the regularity of the habit (Thirdness) for Peirce 
is an event (CP 6.200), i.e. a singularity, a point at which something occurs 
[…]. In this way the spontaneity of Firstness, whose irregular and singular 
nature Peirce underlines (CP 6.54) turns out to be nothing other than an 
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infinitesimal deviation from the law and from the regularity on whose basis 
it is produced (CP 6.59). 
 
Inchoative in this paragraph is an entire theory of pedagogical and artistic practice (see 
Campbell 2018c). It implies the importance of education: (1) being oriented around 
shared practices, and; (2) as being toward significant events that may induce an 
awareness of presence and possibility in learners. These significant events should be 
learner-aware and not merely learner-centred,36 for they ultimately extend beyond the 
learners themselves to embrace a wider continuum of community and environment. 
 
I have argued before how a semiotic approach to pedagogy should ultimately be 
concerned with cultivating shared ‘habits of feeling’, a collective aesthetic 
responsiveness expressed in rituals of practice (see Campbell 2018a; 2018c) that aim to 
bring about significant experiences for students. For instance, many of the musical 
ensembles I teach orient around shared practices of music-making, not specific and 
determined music-learning outcomes. These shared practices gradually become more 
and more habitualized through time: the ensemble continuously “learns” to approach 
these practices with care and preparation, by growing into the ritual and having it grow 
within them. This is a ritualized mode of communing with others that involves developing 
shared modes of attention and engagement. Again, this is a pedagogy aimed not at 
instilling knowledge or moulding learners to hold specific viewpoints (educare), but 
rather, a process of finding a path and following it; leading learners out of their familiar 
positions and habits. We will only be ‘led out’ together if we are engaged in practices 
together. 
 
This requires, as educators, a sensitivity to what I have previously called the 
palimpsest nature of the categories. This is the principle that states that our experience 
is always necessarily triadic; how all three categories are always present, despite our 
level of awareness (see Campbell 2016; 2017; 2018c; 2018d). Thirdness – or the growth 
of possible interpretative responses and thus also the growth of action possibilities – 
occurs in perception to mediate between the processes of qualification (firstness) and 
 
36 “To educate for significant events involves placing the emphasis on student activity though with 
clear and significant responsibilities for teachers. Adapted as a template for teachers, it would result 
in an approach that is not “learner centred” in terms of putting the primary emphasis on “what 
students bring to the topic”, or in the student’s assumed intelligence or cognitive capacity, but is 
certainly “learner aware” in terms of having to ensure that new activities “map onto” what has come 
before” (Stables in Stables, Semetsky 2015, p. 41). See also Stables (2018, pp. 53-54). 
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sensory-impression (secondness) or, to put it more directly, to mediate the potential 
becoming actual in our ongoing experience (CP 1:429). As Torill Strand affirms, in this 
sense, “Thirdness is learning” (2013, p. 795). Thirdness is found in establishing new 
relationships to the world and expressed in the “emergent patterning” characteristic of 
life itself (Stables, Semetsky, 2015, p. 63). This is, on a basic level, the capacity and 
potential for an organism to grow the meaningfulness of its umwelt. It is in this way that 
we can understand learning in the abovementioned Deweyan sense as the creation of 
habits that enable future habit-taking – habits that enable the learner to go on learning 
within the context of specific practices, and in this sense also “the formation of habits 
that will engender a [future] receptiveness to novelty” (Campbell 2017, p. 17).37 Aligning 
learning with the growth of semiotic possibilities implies the necessity of life-long 
learning, but not in the narrow instrumentalist sense we discussed before. Again, this is 
the basic premise that learning is continuous, that “[t]he more an organism learns the 
more it still has to learn: education means more education and becoming more 
developed signs” (Semetsky in Stables, Semetsky 2015, p. 81). 
 
Peirce sees semiosis as bridging any distinctions of mind and matter, and thus 
connects what he considers “the irreducibly triadic nature of the universe” to the problem 
of the origin of life itself: 
 
[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world 
is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life 
first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of 
pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the 
suspicion that pure chance [firstness] may itself be a vital phenomenon. 
(CP 6.322) 
 
For Peirce, it is futile and fallacious to think of mind and matter as categorically distinct. 
Because we know that mind must have emerged from matter in some capacity, the 
relation can only be continuous (cf. Deacon, 2011). Living organisms in-habit their umwelt, 
by forming varying modes of relationship, “scaffolding” the conditions for their ongoing 
adaptation. 
 
This perspective is in line with the biosemiotic project, which has been said to 
examine “the processes and consequences of habit-making via sign activities in living 
 
37 For a fuller treatment of this ‘pedagogy of novelty’, see Campbell 2016, and Nöth’s discussion of 
my ideas in Stables et al. 2018, pp. 80–81. 
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beings” (Affifi 2014, p. 73). Biosemiotics rests upon the hypothesis (expressed by the 
above Peircean quote) that “there is a semiotic core seeding the emergence of biological 
systems, from cells to ecologies” (Affifi 2014, p. 74). From here we can understand the 
biosemiotic and edusemiotic project as shared, as both orientations concern themselves 
with the “processes and consequences” of semiotic habit- making; the emergence of 
genuine triadic relationships, that enable growth to occur. As I’ve discussed elsewhere, 
this is essentially how an organism’s “action in the world effects (through a constantly 
evolving anticipatory dynamic) how the organism will continue to act, and how through 
these actions the environment itself changes (by incorporating the actions of the 
organism into it and breeding semiosic plurality)” (Campbell 2017, p. 11). 
 
Throughout his life, Peirce gradually expanded and grew his concept of habit: 
first understanding the generalizing tendency as an essential law of mind (see CP 6.21, 
1891); and eventually extending this notion of generalization to incorporate not only the 
life of signs (CP 2.222, “a symbol is a living thing”), but more broadly, manifestations of 
“life in general, in the evolution, development and growth of organisms and their 
associations” (Fernández in print a). In his late semiotic philosophy, Peirce began to fully 
extend his concept of habit as the universal generalizing tendency itself, and it found a 
central place in his evolutionary cosmology.38 
 
I will now explore how this broad criterion of Peircean habit-taking as a “cosmic 
phenomenon” may allow us a viewpoint from which to consider first-order (physical) 
causation as continuous with second-order (final, or telic) causation. This interplay of 
 
 
38 According to Charls Pearson (2018, p. 395), expounding the legacy of his friend Eliseo 
Fernández in an overview memorial essay: “Peirce’s habit grew to become a centerpiece, not only 
of his mature semeiotic, but also of his prescient evolutionary cosmology”. According to Fernández, 
this consists in a generalizing of the concept of habit itself as being synonymous with the modern 
scientific notion of tendency. Eliseo’s “boldest move” says Pearson, consists in reversing the 
traditional hierarchy of substance – tendency, by arguing that from a fully semiotic perspective, 
tendencies are more basic than substances. As we’ve already alluded to, at this level of abstraction 
Peirce’s notion of Habit becomes synonymous with “a tendency to enact the same tendency every 
time the same precipitating circumstances are enacted. Therefore […] habits are simply higher- 
order tendencies that repeatedly release lower-order tendencies into action whenever similar 
circumstances are reenacted.” This is what Fernández claims is Peirce’s “mature evolutionary 
vision” (Pearson 2018: 396). Although it will not be possible to fully elaborate the details of 
Fernández’s biosemiotic approach to the philosophy of science, I believe that realizing this mature 
vision allows us a vantage point to consider seriously a fully pansemiotic perspective. The approach 
to habit as tendency is very much in line with the edusemiotic project; both reverse the traditional 
hierarchy of substances as the stable furniture of the world to recognize that “relation is ontologically 
basic” (Noddings 2010, p. 390). 
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matter and mind has been explored in biosemiotics research through the late work of the 
brilliant Argentine-American librarian/scholar Eliseo Fernández (from approx. 2008 till his 
death in 2017),39 most directly through his seminal notion of semiotic causation. I will try 
to show how, through such considerations, it is possible to view the environment, and 
the universe itself, as always evolving, growing, and, in a certain extension of the term, 
learning. 
 
Learning as semiotic evolution 
 
Learning is part of living. As Olteanu (in Stables et al., 2018, p. 105) says, “[l]earning is a 
vital symptom: we learn as long as we are alive, and we are alive as long as we learn. 
This mutuality of learning and living is meant to be understood in both existential and 
biological senses”. Both learning and living (understood through the criterion of semiosis) 
can be said to be teleological processes. They are processes oriented towards possible 
or “virtual” states of being. Peirce’s “grand vision” (see Footnote 35) implies that the 
teleologies displayed by organisms “have their evolutionary roots in final causation, 
which is present at all levels of nature.” (Fernández in print b). To explain how this 
continuity occurs, Fernández presents us with his seminal theory of semiotic causation 
(see Fernández 2012, 2017). Pearson (2018, pp. 399–400) summarizes this theory 
cogently in the above-mentioned In Memorium article (see Footnote 35): 
 
Biological causation may turn out to be a generalization of classical 
physical causation, in the sense that ordinary causation may then appear 
as a special, limit case of the forms of causation manifest at the level of 
living systems. This approach treats semiosis as a form of second-order 
causation; it causes changes, amplifications, or inhibitions upon ordinary 
processes of physical (first-order) causation. It does not act directly by a 
discharge of energy, as in physical causation. Instead, it changes the 
course of events by modifying the constraints that in all physical 
phenomena modulate the flow of energy towards its final dissipation. Peirce 
suggested that physical causes act by channeling the trending of energy 
towards its dissipation; a top-down explanation. Fernández suggests a 
heuristic approach to causal top-down explanations based on the interplay 
of three factors: 1) a source of free energy moving spontaneously towards 
its complete dissipation; 2) structures that resist, redirect, and channel the 
flow of energy in various ways (constraints); and 3) a tendency to 
 
39 This ground-breaking work has been presented in a series of eleven papers (seven published 
and four soon to be published), featured in Chinese Semiotic Studies’ ‘Peirce Section’ (previously 
created and edited by Pearson, and more recently edited by myself following Pearson’s retirement 
in late 2017). See Pearson (2018) for a summary and treatment of this series of articles. 
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reproduce similar effects every time similar energy flows and constraints 
are reproduced (habit). These three factors, spontaneity, constraints, and 
habit are instances of the Peircean categories of firstness, secondness, 
and thirdness. Based on this triadic conception of physical causation, he 
further proposes to treat semiosis as a form of second-order causation […]: 
semiosis causes changes in the causal action itself. It alters the way that 
energy is channeled by acting on the habits embodied in the constraints 
that guide the flow of energy towards equilibrium. 
 
As much edusemiotic research is concerned with understanding the dynamics of 
learning as semiosis it is important to consider how semiosis is continuous with, but still 
distinguishable from, first-order, physical causation: distinguishable, yes, “yet not 
composed of individuals absolutely self-identical and distinct from the other” (CP 1.499). 
This has been discussed in edusemiotics through the principle of suprasubjective relation 
(or PSR).40 The very principle of semiotic causation implies suprasubjectivity by nature of 
being a form of second order causation, dependent upon ordinary first-order causation (it 
is, as Pearson and Fernández note, triadic). More directly, this is to say that ‘signs’ are 
not divorced from the world, but dependent on the ‘things’ that furnish their existence. As 
Augustine famously opens De Doctrina Christiana: “learning concerns either things or 
signs, but it is through signs that we learn what things are” ([397AD], Book 1, Line 2). In 
this form of scholastic realism, historically culminating with Poinsot’s Tractatis de Signis 
(see Poinsot 1985[1632]), there is a reversal of the modern convention of defining 
subject-object relations antithetically. Here, objects are only objects if they are “objects 
within our awareness”. That is, if they become signs, signifying something (some 
meaning) within our phenomenal world or umwelt. What is subjective is that which “is 
what it is regardless of what we know of it”, thus it is of the order of mind-independent 
reality (or ens reale, a hypothetical “operational environment”, distinct from our “cognized 
environment”, cf. D’Aquili et al., 1979).41 This philosophical location of learning in the 
 
 
40 In the context of ecological edusemiotics, see Olteanu in Stables et al., 2018 and Campbell 
2018d. This notion of suprasubjectivity has been redeveloped in contemporary philosophy 
through the work of John Deely (see Deely, 1990). 
41 Deely (1990, p. 100) describes the revised (at least by the moderns) notion of ‘objective reality’ 
that semiotic causation illuminates, explaining why: “[a]ny attempt to restrict semiosis to cognition 
falls short at the level of theory for the reason that nature and culture mutually penetrate one 
another in the constitution of experience, so the objects of experience also reveal themselves more 
suited to some significations than to others in any given context or inquiry. The objective sphere 
reveals itself as neither closed nor closable upon itself absolutely […]. The full semiosis of 
experience, thus is never merely actual, but is suffused at every moment with elements and factors 
passing in and out of varying degrees of actuality and consciousness through the virtualities that 
remain in their own right semiosic [...]”. 
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growth of signs, which are them- selves dependent upon physical forms of causation, 
has major implications. Learning in this estimation is something that, despite its 
immateriality – its absence –, still impacts and influences the present unfolding. 
Responding and interpreting signs means that the organism is forming a relation to its 
environment; that it means something to it. Kull (2009, p. 82) similarly explains the 
Peircean triadic sign model through reference to anticipation and ‘absential phenomena’: 
 
The sign vehicle, or representamen (or sign, sensu stricto), stands for an 
object. This is the relation that is created by semiosis. The object, thus, has 
an interesting duality – it is both there and is not there – because it is both 
connected and anticipated. The relation of standing for is possible owing to 
the absence of what is referred to (the object) and, concurrently, there 
cannot be semiosis without the existence of a reference (an object) [...]. 
Semiosis is what makes anything plural. 
 
We can say that these immaterial “supra-subjective” relations, that make physical things 
plural, are the proper object of educational studies. Although possessing 
subjective/material fundaments (of the order of Secondness), these relations transcend 
“over and above” such spatial temporal terminus, reaching both forwards and backwards 
in time. This provides another way of understanding why ‘learning’ is always absent in 
our accounts of it: we can say, with Deacon (2011, pp. 2–3), “there is something not 
there, there”.42 From here we can better make sense of the alignment that learning is co- 
extensive with living, as both are expressed in processes by which an organism makes 
and finds meaning in its environment. With Augustine, learning is a term we apply to the 
of its environment into ‘signs’, signifying something beyond themselves, enabling the 
growth of meaning. It is through such a growth of meaning that the organism can adapt 
to and channel semiotic complexity in its umwelt, in the context of particular habits 
(practices) of engagement. 
 
This notion of semiotic causation as continuous across mind-matter distinctions 
shows us again that it is impossible to hierarchize or dichotomize organisms based on 
their presumed complexity: as each umwelt, no matter how seemingly deficient when 
compared to other “standards of life”, is full and complete in itself. No umwelt is lacking. 
 
 
42 “Each of these sorts of phenomena – a function, reference, purpose, or value – is in some way 
incomplete. There is something not-there there. Without this “something” missing, they would just 
be plain and simple physical objects or events, lacking these otherwise curious attributes. Longing, 
desire, passion, appetite, mourning, loss, aspiration – all are based on an analogous intrinsic 
incompleteness, an integral without-ness”. 
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The implication that “learning is suprasubjective” (PSR) implies that learning is not fully 
explained through cultural explanations cut off from biology or the environment. With this 
logic, neither can there be a strict hierarchy of intelligences at all, based on the all too 
common operational pedagogical belief that ‘the child = incomplete adult”. Education is 
not about ensuring what a child ought to become; it is about recognizing the sporadic 
event of becoming itself, as it emerges within our shared experience. Learning is 
ecological, a result of in- habiting an umwelt, and because of this it occurs on a 
continuum. 
 
To in-habit an umwelt implies responsibility towards it. To learn then, is to have 
some changing sense of what has come before (memory system, history) and this is, 
according to insights in biosemiotics, expressed in processes of semiotic scaffolding.43 
Scaffolding is the inevitable effect of an organism being in habit with its environment. Put 
directly, this is to say that the organism projects its own embodied morphology onto the 
environment and, through a self-referential process of action and response, both 
changes and is changed by it: “It becomes a home and the home is part of our every 
experience”.44 As semiotic causation is dependent upon an interaction with efficient 
causation it will ultimately always impact upon the world materially; by orienting and 
channeling energy differently. As Fernández (in press b) says in an introspective comment, 
“The telos of semiosis is the creation of an interpretant, and this is achieved by the 
transmission of a form”.45 From here, we may fully comprehend the significance of 
Olteanu’s (in Stables et al. 2018, p. 106) argument that learning can be understood as 
 
 
43 “The network of semiotic interactions by which individual cells, organisms, populations, or 
ecological units are controlling their activities can thus be seen as scaffolding devices assuring that 
an organism’s activities become tuned to that organism’s needs” (Hoffmeyer 2008a, p. 154). This 
concept has been developed throughout Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic project (see Hoffmeyer 2015), 
adopted and expanded from earlier educational research – see Olteanu and Campbell 2018, p. 
252–254 for discussion on this. Interestingly, Fernández (in print b) considered semiotic scaffolding 
as a corollary conception to his own theory of semiotic causation. 
44 I have explored this process in greater depth elsewhere (Campbell 2018c; Chap 6 of this thesis), 
through a revising of Eco’s notion of primary iconism, understood as the terminus a quo of 
perceptual learning. All learning begins from such a place of “primary iconism”, which is merely the 
presupposition to correspond to an object, prior to any encounter with it (a firstness). This is 
consistent with the view, expressed by Sebeok and Danesi (2000, p. 199) “that all modelling is 
initially guided by sensory processes”, also called the sense-implication hypothesis. See also 
Campbell 2019 (Chap 4 of this thesis) for more on how Modelling Systems Theory can be adopted 
in educational contexts, and the related Iconicity Hypothesis. 
45 I think we may read “form” in this usage as “model”; noting also that, according to Sebeok (2001, 
p. 23), the English word that most approximates the meaning of the German term “umwelt” is “model”. 
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the “telos of life”. Learning organisms are more open to the growth of signification in their 
umwelt; better able to ‘scaffold’ their environment, so that their actions in the world 
become more tuned to its needs. I believe, this notion of semiotic causation is 
conceptually powerful as it allows us an opening from which to consider a fully 
pansemiotic hypothesis where one can analogously come to think of the universe as both 
living and adapting, as Peirce in fact did. 
 
Although such conjectures about semiosis as a universal and cosmic force may 
be ultimately speculative, for the practical purposes of education dividing this line is not 
conceptually useful. Stables has advocated for just such a fully non-dualist perspective 
on the philosophy of education; one that recognizes that pragmatically there is no point 
in adopting anything less than a pansemiotic perspective.46 A notion of habit-taking is 
essential to this expanded conceptualization: 
 
The way we change through modulating habitual responses in new 
contexts is a complex version of what happens in simpler contexts. When 
a ball is repeatedly thrown against a wall, both the ball and the wall 
gradually change, although the latter generally more slowly than the former. 
Scaled up to the complexity of a human being (noting that we are bound to 
see ourselves as complex), the same principle can apply. We do not need 
separate operational categories for human action, such as reason or mind, 
for this to hold. (Stables et al. 2018, p. 46) 
 
Although semiotic causation is something characteristic of organisms, with their ability to 
re-channel and re-interpret their umwelt for their own evolving needs, we must also 
extend our notion of learning beyond the organismic level. From this pansemiotic 
perspective, the process of evolution is not simply a continuous growth in complexity. 
Another way to explain this: the simplest organisms (monocells, for example) are not 
actually simple, but rather a single component of extensive intercellular structures 
designed to perform complex semiotic operations. Research in endosemiotics has 
gradually confirmed this: plants not only communicate; they communicate on an 
intersubjective level far more complex than many have imagined possible. Again, all life is 
complex (G-complex, as for Nadin), only commutation is complicated. In this 
 
46 But is there any use to thinking of Peirce’s notion of semiosis, or semiotic causation, as what 
separates living beings from non-living things? From a fully Peircean perspective we should not 
divide this line, in order to preserve the principle of continuity. Although a scientist like Nadin will 
do so with the more specific purpose of researching and experimenting on anticipatory systems 
(see Campbell 2017, pp. 12–13). This is because, for Nadin semiotics remains fully a modelling 
theory, and not an attribute of nature in its own right. 
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understanding, more individualized organisms (non-plant and fungi lifeforms) represent 
more closely centralized concentrations of semiotic causation. They simply represent 
different modes and expressions of semiosis and not an increase in complexity. Olteanu 
(Stables et al. 2018, p. 105) explains further: “[…] on Peirce’s account, signification did not 
evolve from simple to complex, but that which is biologically simple presents complex 
semiotic structures, to which natural evolution itself adapted to recognise and use”. From 
this reasoning, we can recognize the process of evolution itself on semiotic grounds – 
where the universe can be understood as a never-ending process of inquiry and 
interpretation. In this manner, Peirce viewed the entire universe as a kind of evolutionary 
argument-structure. This understanding of “[s]emiotic evolution is then taken to rest upon 
the ongoing differentiation, articulation and subdivision of simple Argument structure, 
facilitating the growth of semiotic freedom and cognitive capabilities over the course of 
evolution” (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 9). A growth in semiotic freedom is inevitably expressed in 
the capacity of an organism to model its environment in its own species-specific manner; 
to learn (to “find the track”) within its umwelt. 
 
Organisms gradually evolve to use and recognize these signs through their life- 
span, and this type of competence47 is passed down bio-genetically as well as through 
social forms of learning and teaching. Some organisms, in order to meet semiotic 
complexity in their environments, may evolve to convert exosemiotic resources into 
endosemiotic ones. This refers to the evolutionary process by which complex 
intercellular and multi-species networks are progressively made interior, and eventually 
replaced with centralized nervous systems. This creates in turn more strongly 
individualized lifeforms that, as Olteanu points out, also have the honour of dying alone. 
Seeing learning as continuous with the life and evolutionary process allows us to 
conceptualize learning-as-semiosis radiating beyond the individual organism. This is an 
understanding that tries to make sense of this phenomenon on a much grander 
evolutionary continuum. Recognizing learning across a continuum of related 
interconnected processes is to recognize with Ling (personal correspondence), that “we 
each are elements, we each are ‘learning processes’ in a larger ‘cosmic’ process of 




47 See Campbell 2018d for a treatment of this notion of “competence” in terms of Modelling Systems 




We have now explored this concept of learning from various levels and perspectives: at 
the level of everyday educational discourses, exploring the ways the concept is co-opted 
and misused; its relation to different conceptions of education (educere – educare); its 
phenomenology or experiential basis; and finally, as a form of adaptation and evolution. 
 
Why then, have I insisted on using this concept of learning in orienting my own 
pedagogy and research? 
 
Well, on a personal level, because it was only through treating the way I learned 
seriously as a young person (learning to learn) that I was able to overcome my own 
struggles with dyslexia; because this notion served a pragmatic function, enabling me to 
adjust and adapt my own action and perception. And it is on this point that I differ from 
Biesta, while at the same time, hearing seriously his plea for considering the politics and 
power that is spread through learnification. 
 
My thinking, following this gradual telescoping of the concept, is that we must as 
educationalists and semioticians run towards learning as a “sensible” and meaningful 
concept – not away from it. This in fact may be the only way we can effectively resist 
naturalizing the concept, in both theory and practice. Realizing learning as something 
emergent and sporadic, allows us to resist turning learning into an accountability tool 
that can be used towards ideological ends. It also explains how learning is something 
felt, as our concepts themselves map a changing field of experience. Viewing learning 
through the criterion of semiosis means that learning is continuous in the entire biological 
realm and does not in any way begin with human beings, or what is sometimes called 
cultural learning. All living is expressed in semiotic-engagement and living necessarily 
involves continual adaptation and meaning-making, not just human meaning-making. 
From here we can understand the persistent insight from the anthropology of education, 
that social groups scaffold environments in which learning can happen in order to both 
sustain social-cohesion (educare) and ensure their ongoing adaptive capacity to 
uncertainty (educere). From a semiotic perspective, this is what schools and all 
educational institutions (no matter how “informal”) are pragmatically for. Educational 
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institutions are understood as instances of exaptation, that evolved naturally to channel 
learning more efficiently for specific social groups.48 
 
As we have already mentioned, teaching and learning, can only be sporadic; they 
emerge in the specificity of a moment and present themselves to reflection as an initial 
presupposition of what is educationally desirable (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 89). The teacher 
cannot ensure that their teaching will be received or understood – “teaching is always 
the giving of a gift that one doesn’t possess” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 52) – and because of 
this we must practice a “pedagogy of the event” (Biesta 2016[2013], p. 139) – because it 
is only in emergent and sporadic events that break through the walls of routine 
consciousness where novelty can find the possibility of being re-cognized and granted 
meaning and significance. We cannot, as teachers, afford to control or pin down these 
events; we can only practice our joint capacity for response and attention, and it is in this 
sense that educere is always about ‘leading out together’ and that a teacher in order to 
teach at all must also be able and ready to learn. Both teaching and learning alike, then, 
depend on a collective ability to develop “habits of feeling” (Campbell 2018a) that will 
enable our openness to changing and novel events. This is the power in the designation 
‘learner’ – not by subscribing or forcing a learner identity (no different than assuming that 
the role of education is in ensuring productive citizens), but by reminding us implicitly of 
the essential complementarity of teacher and learner. That we can only learn together; 
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48 Education can thus be understood as “an institutional means to influence the direction of ongoing 
semiotic engagement by learners with the world they inhabit. The role of education, broadly defined, 
therefore includes the preparation of learners to respond effectively, adaptively, and in collaboration 
or competition with others, to uncertainty, surprise and novelty” (Gough & Stables 2012, p. 370; 
[emphasis added], C. C.). 
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Too often a piece of art is approached with the notion that its entire meaning and 
significance exist solely within itself. This approach is what I remember of reading Robert 
Frost and Emily Dickinson poems in high school English class. The poem was presented 
as a conglomerated mass of metaphors and similes, rhyme scheme and allegory, that 
we were told formed a (secret) code. We were rarely expected to rely on our own 
experiences and ideas in our interpretation. No, the poem already had a solution. With 
this approach, knowledge was not something to enter into a relationship with, but rather, 
something hidden beneath the surface of the text. Thus, we pupils were nothing but 
humble sleuths trained to detect simple poetic devices, who, if surreptitious enough to 
piece these together and “crack the code,” were rewarded with the prize of validation. 
Needless to say, this process resulted in bored teenagers and what might have been a 
good poem had I discovered it elsewhere, being reduced to a riddle. 
 
This type of analysis rests on the antiquated conviction that the piece of art must 
be understood exactly as the artist created it—that, when the pencil is set down, so is 
the work. By subscribing to this iron-fist notion of authorial intention in education, we are 
ignoring the complex social and historical relationship between author and addressee, 
but also teacher and student, observer and observed. 
 
The poetics of openness, as formulated by Umberto Eco in his 1962 book Opera 
Aperta (The Open Work), has already been useful and applicable to cultural studies and 
textual analysis. I propose that this poetics of openness be explored for its (critical) 
pedagogical significance. As many have pointed out (Ellsworth, 1989, 2005; Sandlin and 
Milam, 2008), much scholarship in critical pedagogy has remained largely theoretical: 
critiqued for perpetuating “highly abstract and utopian ideals that reinforce repressive 
myths and perpetuate hegemonic relations” (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 298). In this essay, I 
79  
argue that Eco’s poetics of openness when coupled with active on-the-ground “critical 
public pedagogics”—such as culture jamming (cf. Sandlin and Milam 2008)—can provide 
a flexible framework for approaching the education of interpretation. 
 
Through this framework, a text or sign system is understood as ‘closed’ if it elicits 
univocal meanings: expecting a predetermined response from a generic/average reader. 
However, a work is ‘open’ when it fosters a plurality of interpretative possibilities that 
actively engage the “existential credentials” of the interpreter. Such a poetics of 
openness is part of adopting a semiotic perspective toward educational processes and 
thus can be understood as part of the growing edu-semiotic research movement (see 
Nöth, 2010; Semetsky [ed.], 2010, 2017; Stables and Semetsky, 2014; 
Campbell, 2017b; Semetsky and Campbell, 2018). It recognizes that meaning is always 
something discovered through the action of interpretative semiosis; that it is in a work’s 
dynamism, its openness, that we locate its aesthetic value: through the merging of a 
text’s “possible worlds” with our own collective and personal life-worlds. We will also 
address how a theory of model reader (Eco, 1990, 1994) pedagogically helps protect 
against the kind of radical constructivism and student-centered pedagogy this 
interpretative approach can (if not properly treated) foster. 
 
I am offering this poetics of openness not as a method of education, but as a 
pedagogical value, encouraging both educators and students to bring a perspective 
of critical openness to all the texts—taken in Eco’s broadest understanding, as being 
synonymous with any unit of meaning (or sememe), no matter how minute or global49 — 
they engage with. What I am proposing is in part a critical public pedagogy, one that 
encompasses art appreciation and reflexive engagement with pop culture. This is not 
analogous to encouraging an artistic elitism, or about providing students with the “right” 
interpretation. For as we shall see, this is not a simple binary of open and closed; for 
even texts that are constructed with closed intentions can breed interpretative openness. 
In fact, such an approach rejects the commodification of knowledge in formal education 
that pioneering scholars like Ivan Illich (1971) anticipated and warned against, and 
instead fosters the values of plurality: celebrating the intrinsic openness of the 
 
49 See my chapter “Exploring the Textual Woods: Umberto Eco’s Growing Concept of Text” 
(Campbell 2017a), where I explore Eco’s (1979) notion that a sign is a textual matrix and offer a 
more technical/theoretical account of semiotic openness. 
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interpretative process. In line with critical pedagogue Elizabeth Ellsworth (2005), such 
interpretative approaches are not concerned with an end result of interpretation—a 
distinct product of knowledge—but rather represent a form of continual engagement by 
the “learning self in the making” (p. 2). 
 
In this discussion, I will begin by reviewing the central elements of Eco’s poetics 
of openness as it is conventionally applied to aesthetics, historicism, and a critique of the 
mass culture industries and interpretation generally (all elements of Eco’s original study). 
I will conclude by deliberating on some educational perspectives and tools that could 
help realize this value of semiotic openness in educational practice by aligning these 
early pre-semiotic ideas of Eco’s with his later (post-1990) interpretative semiotic 
theories. 
 
Examples of the open work 
 
We have witnessed an aesthetic transformation over the latter half of the twentieth 
century, where the freedom to ‘read’ a multiplicity of interpretations from an art object, a 
text, or experience generally, has become a cultural value, even at times a rite of 
passage. Contained within this aesthetic orientation is a dialectic of open and closed 
texts (e.g., Eco [1962] 1989, 1979). In the way Eco ([1962] 1989) describes it, a ‘closed 
work’ is something that has limited channels of interchange between the channels of 
artist and addressee. In this sense the closed work encourages a limited or reduced field 
of interpretation. These two actors are viewed as autonomous, static components that 
either do not interact at all, or do so, but only minimally. Semioticians love the analogy of 
a traffic light to describe a closed system because a traffic light is very fixed in terms of 
the ways it can be interpreted. Its interpretation is solidified; reduced almost (but not 
quite) to the function of a signal. And even if this cultural convention stops being fixed in 
the mind of some imaginative (or deluded) driver, then the object merely stops 
functioning as a traffic sign. This is to say; it is no longer functioning within the same 
semiotic/textual system. 
 
This semiotic notion of openness is based on the realization that we perceive and 
communicate our reality through dynamic systems of signs that are directly conditioned 
by our acquired experiences (both personal and sociocultural) and our genetic/biological 
makeup. By signs we do not simply mean “signs that signify their objects based on 
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convention” (which Charles Peirce associated with symbols specifically) but anything 
that stands for something other than itself. Peirce frequently described his triadic sign 
model through the criterion of openness, saying: “a sign is something by knowing which 
we know something more” (CP 8.332). This fundamental principle in Peirce’s semiotics 
is already present within The Open Work, in which the role of the addressee is always 
present in this open stream of communication. As described by Eco ([1962] 1989, p. 3): 
“As he reacts to the play of stimuli and his own response to the artist’s patterning, the 
individual addressee is bound to supply his own existential credentials, the sense 
conditioning that is purely his own, a defined culture, a set of tastes, personal 
inclinations, and prejudices.” 
 
According to many literary theorists often associated with reader-response 
theories, works actually gain their “aesthetic validity precisely in proportion to the number 
of different perspectives from which they can be viewed and understood” (Eco 1979, p. 
49). To better understand the psychological disposition toward an openness of 
communication it can be helpful to use extreme examples: let’s think of the interpretative 
pleasures one can receive from reading a train schedule (the kind found in any train 
station, telling you what times trains are arriving and departing), in which the content in 
the specific context of a train station elicits a strongly coded and singular unequivocal 
reading. If this object is removed from its familiar setting (say placed on the wall of a 
studio or as part of an art exhibit), certainly the time table gains some enriched meaning 
through the increase in possible interpretations it now entertains. Although 
this defamiliarization (to borrow a term from the Russian formalists) in itself does not 
constitute a work of art, at least we are now faced with more than one interpretative path. 
At the very least we are wondering, “What the f$&@ is this train table doing here!?” 
 
Eco describes that the apex of this aesthetics of openness can be found in the 
world of music, as the channels of composer-performer-listener are interacting and 
communicating with one another to a greater (or at least more obvious) extent than the 
channels of writer-reader. Even if a piece is entirely composed and planned to the 
smallest detail, the performers’ interpretation, and even the location/environment of the 
performance, inevitably filters, plays with, and reacts to the ideas of the composer. Eco 
([1962] 1989, pp. 1–4) points to the indeterminate music movement of the 1950s for 
examples of this aesthetic. Indeterminate music can be understood as music that leaves 
at least some of its elements unscripted and open to chance. The piece as the composer 
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writes it is not complete; she presents only the basic materials while the remaining 
details are fleshed out by the environment and context the music is performed in as well 
as by the performers themselves. The composition is in flux, what Eco calls “works in 
motion.” Eco ([1962] 1989, p. 1) finds an excellent example of the work in motion in 
Stockhausen’s Klavierstück XI. In the piece, Stockhausen provides a sheet of small 
musical cells, which the performer is free to play in any order for any amount of time. 
The narrative structure of the piece is thus a dynamic creation of the performer in a 
specific time and space. 
 
Eco’s focus is on composers who come from the European concert music 
tradition, such as Stockhausen, Berio, and Boulez. Although the compositions examined 
provide fine examples of this conception of the work in motion, I think Eco fails to 
address a superior example of this aesthetic, that is, improvised music and more 
specifically jazz. A jazz composition is never fully complete; it is a harmonic and melodic 
sketch, a ground for further development, interpretation, and musical dialogue. Ornette 
Coleman’s “Lonely Women” is arguably more open in conception and expression than 
Stockhausen’s Klavierstück XI. The former is a group improvisation around a simple 
melodic framework; beside this melodic outline, the improvisation has the potential to 
venture into endless abstractions or melt into complete simplicity. Each time the piece is 
performed by any of Coleman’s groups, the individual personalities and styles of the 
performers as well as the venue, audience, and even the historical moment all 
synthesize and influence the formation of the piece. 
 
These examples of jazz and indeterminate music provide examples of the 
extreme embodiment of this poetics of openness, useful for the student or educator who 
may not be comfortable with formal aesthetic considerations. But this notion of openness 
certainly has broader implications. It is about recognizing that the work of art (generally) 
is not a structurally pure entity with the rigidity of a crystal, as Levi Strauss insisted, 
endowed with precise and objective properties.50 Through realizing the 
infinite recursivity of semiotic processes—verified by a theory of unlimited semiosis (see 
Eco 1979, chap. 7)—such as reading a text, we realize that the cooperation of (‘real’) 
 
50 Claude Levi Strauss originally made these comments in response to the newly translated French 
addition of Eco’s Opera Aperta. For Eco’s counter objection, see the introduction in Eco (1979, p. 
3). 
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empirical addressees with their unique textual competence and cultural background is a 
necessary feature in the actualization of any text. This is to say that openness, to greater 
or lesser degrees, is a structural feature of aesthetic texts in general, which always call 
out for a possible interpreter. As Eco (1979, p. 5) says: “So-called open-texts are only 
the extreme and most provocative exploitation—for poetic purposes—of a principle 
which rules both the generation and interpretation of texts in general.” 
 
The closed interpretation as kitsch 
 
My first music history professor once tried to summarize for our class the aesthetic 
differences between the Enlightenment and the Romantic eras. He pointed to a chair at 
the front of the lecture theater with a jacket draped over it: “If I were an Enlightenment 
scholar, I would look at this chair and talk about the various ways we can perceive it … 
the beautiful symmetry of the combined image … how the sunlight enhances the angles 
through the concentration and absence of light … if I were a Romantic scholar I would 
stab myself and throw myself upon the chair and slowly and dramatically bleed to death.” 
What this (probably badly paraphrased) anecdote demonstrates tongue-in-cheek is how 
cultural customs and aesthetics inevitably mold collective interpretation. Milan Kundera 
argues in his book of essays Testaments Betrayed (1995) that modern society still 
connects strongly to a Romantic nineteenth-century aesthetic. Devising a simple 
analogy, Kundera describes the development of the European novel and the parallel 
development of European music as separated, “like two halves of a football game” 
(1995, p. 59). Being children of “the second half,” we still have an affinity for the inner 
emotional experience ingrained in the Romantic aesthetic—the tragedy of joy and sorrow 
and passion. As I’ve seen with my own music history students and myself, this aesthetic 
preference can often make us unable to relate to art before the European 
Enlightenment. We are so often left feeling alienated by the early European novel like 
Cervantes’s Don Quixote, or even the mathematical precision inherent to a Bach fugue. 
Even such an erudite and venerable figure like Vladimir Nabokov cannot accept Don 
Quixote’s unbearable objectivity, calling it “overvalued, naïve, repetitive, and full of 
unbearable and implausible cruelty” (Nabokov, cited in Kundera 1995, p. 60). In a similar 
dichotomy, any piece from Chopin’s Nocturnes is instantly recognizable as being 
‘melodic,’ in the sense that it fulfills our preconceived expectations of what constitutes 
something melodic: a defined melodic peak followed by stark valleys, flowing scalar 
84  
runs, exaggerated use of dynamics and expression, and so on. A Bach fugue with its 
calculated extractions of one single kernel of motif does not fulfill this expectation to the 
same extent. These early works seem so totally measured and impersonal that we 
hastily label them as being devoid of emotional substance, because they do not gush 
forth from the heart. This binding emotional response provides an obvious (and 
relatable) instance of interpretation being limited due to historicism. By assigning strong 
emotional connotations to music or literature, we severely limit its potential interpretative 
fertility and thus our own aesthetic pleasure. 
 
Many scholars have tried to demonstrate (Kundera and Walter Benjamin among 
them) that this binding nineteenth-century romanticism has given rise to a very particular 
phenomenon in mass culture often referred to as kitsch. Kitsch is often characterized by 
an excessive use of easily packaged emotion passed off in the guise of art. It is charged 
with generalities, predetermined meaning, and redundancy. Essentially, kitsch attempts 
to provide the end result of art through the use of immediate effects—that is, without the 
difficulty or time required of careful hermeneutics. One of its most blatant features is the 
use of worn-out symbols to invoke excessive emotions of sentimentality, like a single red 
rose standing for unrequited love, or a torn nation flag blowing in the wind used to invoke 
feelings of nationalism. Kitsch can of course be much subtler, and even take the 
disguised form of simple textual mechanisms, such as a “panning out shot” in film, or a 
narrative arch in literature. While enjoying the latest summer blockbuster, kitsch can 
seem like a harmless and pleasurable indulgence, but to many, such as Kundera, it is 
more than just “junk art” (or art de pacotille) created in bad taste: it functions to suppress 
and rob art of its identity. Kitsch is made up of devices that are stolen from culture 
precisely because of their ability to elicit a controlled response in the interpreter. Eco 
([1962] 1989, p. 183) explains: “Given the way in which it articulates itself, like any other 
artistic communication whose project is not that of involving the reader in an act of 
discovery but that of forcing him to register a particular effect (in the belief that therein 
lies aesthetic pleasure) … or as Hermann Broch puts it, ‘the elements of evil in the value 
system of art.’” With this understanding, kitsch is pure imitation; it masquerades itself as 
art in order to conceal its ‘real’ objectives. It is this parasitical nature that allows kitsch to 
be so easily co-opted for ideological and manipulative ends. According to Walter 
Benjamin (1968), kitsch’s principle difference from art is this utilitarian function; it “offers 
instantaneous emotional gratification without intellectual effort, without the requirement 
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of distance, without sublimation” (Menninghaus 2009, p. 41). It destroys the necessary 
reflexive distance between observer and observed through the immediacy of effects. 
These devices, already precoded and conditioned by cultural practice, arrive at (or 
perhaps, strike) the interpreter with an efficiency of communication, a determined 
trajectory seeking a determined (closed) response. Such a device conveys a stable 
equivalence between form and content (signifier and signified), and it is this univocality 
of meaning that can make kitsch, when used carelessly, dangerously 
ideological. Pedagogically, the ability to recognize elements of kitsch in the works we 
engage with is crucial, as it is through the deciphering of kitsch that we render it 
harmless and rob it of its power over us. 
 
Of course, the very comparison of art and kitsch suggests some criterion from 
which we can make a distinction. Unlike some members of the Frankfurt school, I don’t 
believe that a strict delineation can be made, just as Eco insists that no strict delineation 
can be made between open and closed texts. In line with Eco’s own aesthetic theories, I 
would rather like to suggest that these judgments lie in the dynamic act/process of 
aesthetic engagement; that is, it is the addressee’s/learner’s personal responsibility to 
continually address whether their interpretative possibilities are being further opened and 
expanded, or rather, closed and restrained. A definition of kitsch cannot be attributed 
solely to the intent of the sender, just as aesthetic openness itself cannot be attributed to 
authorial intent. This will be further elaborated in the conversation to come, but suffice it 
to say, ready-made effects (elements of kitsch) are operative in all works of art, and that 
the openness potential of/within aesthetic experience has to do with the way the learner 
is able (or unable) to form meaningful relationships to this experience. This 
relationship—this cognitive mediation—not the objective stimulus itself nor the subjective 
experience of the addressee, is what in the end determines elements of kitsch.51 
 
Kitsch provides a bridge in this discussion: it highlights the tenuous relationship 
between a poetics of openness and the rise of mass media. Interestingly, kitsch in the 
twentieth century has grown up alongside this aesthetics of openness. At first glance, 
 
 
51 The reader is directed to Eco’s ([1962] 1989, chap. 9) essay “The Structure of Bad Taste.” Here 
Eco says: “At times, Kitsch is on the side of the message, at times on the side of the receiver’s 
intention, and more often than not, on that of the sender who tries to palm his product off for 
something it is not” (p. 214). 
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the mass culture industries have seemingly rejected this poetics of openness in favor of 
the “ready-made effects” of kitsch that can be sold to a “generic mass of consumers” 
(Eco [1962] 1989, p. 185). Yet closer observation shows that this is not an outright 
rejection but rather a subversion, for it is through the observation of trends in the art 
world that the culture industries generate these effects: through absorbing elements of 
“high art.” One can see how the musical systems of Ligeti have been co-opted by 
Hollywood in horror films, or how impoverished renditions of what the Russian formalists 
call narrative fabula have been employed in advertising. Certainly this proliferation of 
mass media has resulted in a diminished role for art in modern times. With some notable 
exceptions, modern art has, at large, regressed into itself, becoming increasingly insular 
and metaphysical—that is, increasingly concerned with its own processes, and less and 
less culturally relevant. 
 
Mass Media, Communication Theory, and Language 
 
What I have tried to show in the first part of this essay is that it is in a work’s dynamism, 
its openness,52 that we find its aesthetic value and interpretive pleasure: through the 
merging of fictional “possible worlds” with our own collective and personal life-worlds. 
Surely we seek greater enjoyment from the multidimensional poem “Le Front aux Vitres” 
by Paul Eluard than we do from a traffic light.53 The red traffic light conveys only one 
very simple direction in a very specific context, while the experience of reading the poem 
is an experience that grows richer with each additional reading—each time we uncover 
new significance and make new correlations. Its openness allows us to relate our entire 
acquired experiences to the poem, and as we change and develop throughout our lives, 
so does the way we relate to the work. Thus, the poem becomes something of a living 
entity in our minds. Likely, the way we react to and engage with the traffic light will 
remain fixed throughout our lives (one would hope!). To truly understand the implications 





52 Or at least the openness we bring to a work, for one cannot deny that even works that attempt 
to dictate a univocal interpretation can be approached in such a way that a reader can reel life into 
their rigid structures. This is a point Eco ([1962] 1989) makes frequently in the book; see, e.g., the 
essay “Analysis of Poetics Language” (chap. 2). 
53 This poem is an example Eco ([1962] 1989) uses in the book. 
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closed work), we must first understand something about information theory and the study 
of communication. 
 
The medium is not (strictly) the message 
 
Let us begin with a bare-bones version of Jakobson’s (1960) model of the 
communicative act.54 Although this model is for the most part outdated (and fraught with 
problems, especially in its application to pedagogy), understanding the separation of 
these components is still essential, for it is this sort of information processing account of 
cognition (and the familiar mind-machine analog) that still dominates much formal 
education (cf. Cunningham 1992, 1998), quite regardless of however advanced and 
progressive educational research may think itself to be. The channel is generally 
understood as such: 
 
The source creates a signal, which travels through a channel—and this signal is 
received and processed by the addressee through a receiver. This reduced model, 
however, ignores two crucial elements: 
 
• It ignores the codes that enable the addressee to process the message 
received, thus supposing the message as a preformed and static entity or 
product. 
 
• It does not demonstrate that as the signal travels through the channel, it is 
potentially disrupted by large or small amounts of outside disturbances, which 
information theorists have traditionally referred to as noise. 
 
Let’s start with the first point. Communication scholars, following the formidable influence 
of Marshall McLuhan, often overlook the importance of the addressee’s interpretation of 
the message. Their grand claims regarding mass media are thus hegemonic; they see 
the power residing with the source and the people who control the source, failing to 
recognize the significance of the addressee’s ability to receive and interpret information. 
This “overlooking” of the interpreter is well displayed in McLuhan’s (1967, p. 26) belief 
that “all media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, 
economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they 
 
54 I must further insist that this is a reduced understanding of Jakobson’s model that is often 
proliferated in educational contexts, and not nearly as developed or nuanced as what is proposed 
in the cited text (1960). 
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leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered.” If we follow a more interpretative 
semiotic perspective, it becomes clear (somewhat contrary to McLuhan’s famous 
aphorism) that it may be the medium that asserts the message, but ultimately the 
success of the message rests in the interpretation of the addressee. If the addressee 
fails to understand the way in which the message has been encoded by the source, or 
manipulates it through interpretation, the control the medium exerts is inconsequential.55 
 
It is undeniable that all communication mediums dictate content. The medium of 
radio certainly does prescribe certain limits on the people who utilize it. So too does 
music notation software. However, it may be an oversimplification to view such mediums 
as “wholly autonomous entities with ‘purposes’ (as opposed to functions) of their own” 
(Chandler 2002, p. 4) as suggested by McLuhan (e.g., McLuhan and Fiore, 1967). The 
content of a message and its medium are in constant conversation. The power may shift 
at times in the direction of one or the other, but the process still must be looked at 
as bricolage rather than an outright domination. 
 
Let’s move onto the issue of noise. Systems of communication, language being 
the most accessible for analysis, are vulnerable to corruption within high levels of noise. 
Eco ([1962] 1989, p. 50) explains: “[Languages] are organized systems governed by 
fixed laws of probability and likely to be disturbed either from within or from without by a 
certain amount of disorder, of communication consumption—that is to say, by a certain 
increase in entropy (meaning the loss of information) commonly known as noise.” The 
interreliance between ambiguity and communication appears to run contrary to the basic 
pragmatic functions of language. To ensure that a message is received and understood, 
it must be wrapped in high levels of redundancy—that is, we must send the same 
content in different reiterations in the same message. A popular linguistic formula (see 
Shannon, 1950) suggests that the English language is 50 percent redundancy, meaning 
that only 50 percent of a given message conveys the specific content of the message. 
An obvious example of this is the telegraph message that attempts to convey only the 
bare bones of a message and thus is devoid of syntax and grammar. Repetition ensures 
 
55 Due to space restraints, I cannot go into a detailed analysis of McLuhan’s theories of media. For 
a fuller critique of the shortfalls of McLuhan’s theories I direct the reader to Umberto Eco’s lecture 
and article “Towards a Semiological Guerilla Warfare” ([1967] 1986, pp. 135–45). Here Eco, always 
the aesthetician, returns primacy to the consumer/interpreter in shaping the media that they 
consume. 
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that despite the presence of noise, our message is properly relayed. Paradoxically, this 
attempt to be completely and absolutely understood becomes stifling in an aesthetic 
context. “The very order which allows a message to be understood is also what makes it 
absolutely predictable—that is extremely banal” (Eco [1962] 1989, p. 52). 
 
Ambiguity and the aesthetic message 
 
So, at least in a certain understanding, the clearer a piece of information is, the less 
meaningful is its content. This again illuminates the value and pleasure we receive from 
art that possesses a multiplicity of meaning. A Hallmark greeting card is very easy to 
understand, yet it tells us very little. It competes against a sea of other greeting cards, all 
with a very similar message, which must be understood by a wide array of people from 
diverse backgrounds. It is precisely because of its reduced content that the card retains 
this clarity, and it is this clarity that allows it to fulfill its utilitarian function. 
 
In fact, the ambiguity inherent in the aesthetic message—the tension between 
the externally and internally referential56; the ability “to call into the question the 
legitimacy of the code itself” (Eco 1979, p. 67)—is entirely necessary for language to 
transform and develop. Without the aesthetic dimension of language, it would not be 
possible to say anything not predetermined by the code, and thus only closed-circuit 
semiotic judgments would be possible, like those of Morse code. The open work evokes 
rather than proclaims. 
 
Any work of art can be looked at as a message to be decoded by an 
addressee. But unlike most messages, instead of aiming at transmitting a 
univocal message, the work of art succeeds precisely insofar as it appears 
ambiguous and open-ended … poetic language deliberately uses terms in 
a way that will radically alter their referential function. … It eliminates the 
possibility for a univocal decoding, it gives the addressee the feeling that 
the current code has been violated to such an extent that it can no longer 
help. … [The addressee is] thus forced to learn the code of the message 
from the message itself … ambiguity is not an accessory to the message it 
is its fundamental nature. (Eco [1962] 1989, p. 195) 
 
Unlike the greeting card, or the traffic light, or elements of kitsch, the open work cannot 
dictate or propose a univocal message. Its very structure and motivation embrace 
 
56 This is a pipe; this is not a pipe. 
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disorder and do not fight noise. In this regard, the open work cannot so easily serve a 
utilitarian function like the road sign, and cannot be marketable in the same way as 
kitsch art, and similarly cannot be as easily graded or tested. 
 
Many semioticians (following the lineage of Peirce and Bathkin) insist that 
interpretation (and the sign itself) is necessarily dialogical. Without getting into the 
theoretical underpinnings (cf. Campbell 2017a) behind this assertion, let me offer the 
following passage: “The original modality of being a sign is otherness and dialogue. In 
contrast with univocality, reiteration, and identity—which characterize signals—dialogue 
and otherness are the original, constitutive modalities of that which emerges as a sign in 
the proper sense. In other words, the sign exists and is characterized as a sign insofar 
as it is a response to, and in relation to, that which is other from itself” (Ponzio & 
Petrilli 2005, p. 382). A pedagogy of openness is necessarily a struggle against “the 
signalization” of communication alluded to in the above quote. This is exemplified by the 
reductive model presented at the beginning of this section, where a fully formed and 
objectively defined message is transmitted by a source for immediate consumption by a 
receiver. This model reflects, generally, the inadequacy of code semiotics to account for 
the complicated nature of interpretation. Ignorant to such debates in semiotics, North 
American schools by and large still teach interpretation though the lens of signalization.57 





I should clarify that I do not purport openness as a mere valuation—something 
synonymous with ‘the good’. Openness is an interpretative stance one can bring to 
various forms of communication. It is not a system or methodology in itself, but only one 
possible interpretative lens the student or educator can adopt. As mentioned, Eco 
asserts repeatedly that openness is a quality that exists to greater or lesser extents 
within the structures of texts themselves.58 This does not mean to say works that exhibit 
 
57 For more on the standardization of interpretation in formal education, see Apple (1996); Oliver & 
Gershman (1989). 
58 See Eco ([1962] 1989, chap. 2) for an examination of how “every work of art can be said to be 
‘open,’ how this openness manifests itself structurally, and to what extent structural differences 
entail different levels of openness” (p. 24). 
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closed qualities or intentions are of somehow lesser value artistically (in fact I would 
assert that often the opposite can be true). Rather, works that rely on this open 
collaboration between creator and reader stand as extreme embodiments of this process 
of openness. The examples both Eco and I use serve to elucidate the multifaceted 
dialogue involved in interpretation as they are embodied in concrete ‘works’. I recognize 
that using the concept of artistic ‘works’ as opposed to ‘processes’ has become 
problematic in recent educational and aesthetic scholarship, as it seems overtly situated 
in a Western/Eurocentric conception of art. I insist on using this terminology, not to 
undermine the various and distinct cultural and personal processes involved in 
experiencing and interpreting art, but as a way to distill a particular structural and 
experiential pattern that we can return to again and again for reflection.59 The work of art 
represents only a beginning, a terminus a quo, of these complex processes that starts 
when the author sets down her pen.60 
 
The very idea of the open work as Eco has pointed out is a sort of oxymoron, for 
a work is something finished, objectified, closed, and certainly many artistic forms do not 
even fit the concept of ‘work’ too closely. The very idea of work as it is used in this essay 
is a recognized construct—despite its artificiality, I think it proves to be a pedagogically 
useful one, as long as we recognize it for what it is. Apologetics aside, following are 
several concepts and approaches that the educator can use to foster a discourse of 
openness through their practice. 
 
Culture jamming through defamiliarization 
 
As I stated in the introduction, the aesthetics of openness that I am proposing is not 
paramount to some sort of artistic elitism where students are pushed to disengage with 
pop culture and the world of mass art. Robert Scholes (1982, p. 14) elaborates: 
 
59 For a further account of this process, which I deem mimetic learning, see my essay “Toward a 
Pedagogy of Firstness” (Campbell 2018a). 
60 As one of the principal applications of this poetics of openness is aesthetic education, I would 
have liked to say a few more cautionary words on the dangers of dealing with this ineffable and 
translucent stuff called the aesthetic. The notion of the aesthetic is, like openness, often reduced 
to a mere valuation of goodness and can at times seem like an artificial construct—manipulating 
intelligent discourse, acting as an invisible norm. For me, aesthetics is all-encompassing and not 
intrinsically good or bad, but rather simply the various ways in which sensible experience is 
distributed through life. 
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“Students need to acquire the interpretative codes of their culture, but they also need to 
see them as codes, so they can appreciate those texts that reshape accepted ideas and 
at the same time defend themselves against the manipulative exploitation of received 
opinion.” As Andy Warhol and his contemporaries understood, the immediacy of semiotic 
reactions implicit in mass communicative acts can be a powerful force. This force can be 
harmful and exploitative, as in the case of propaganda, but it can certainly be 
educational and introspective, depending on the interpretative approach adopted by the 
addressee. Warhol demonstrated this as he removed pieces of pop art from their familiar 
contexts in order to gain new insight into these objects and understand their broader 
societal implications. As I see it, this concept of ‘defamiliarizing’, as developed by the 
Russian formalists in the first half of the twentieth century,61 is central to the various 
contemporary movements that attempt to engage and challenge the culture industries’ 
hegemony. 
 
“Culture jamming” is a form of defamiliarization directly applied to counter passive 
consumerism and corporate hegemony. First and foremost, culture jamming, through the 
artful and political confrontation of daily consumer life, attempts to a give a voice to the 
ideas and peoples that have been marginalized by the commercial values exercised by 
societies’ dominant power formations. It does this, in one sense, through the 
emancipation of interpretation: empowering groups of people with the freedom to 
interpret mass media and consumerist messages in new and multifarious ways. A quick 
glance at the “about” page of Vancouver’s Adbusters magazine (http://adbusters.org) 
sheds lights on this important civil practice: 
 
[We culture jammers are] concerned about the erosion of our physical and 
cultural environments by commercial forces … dedicated to examining the 
relationship between human beings and their physical and mental 
environment. We want a world in which the economy and ecology resonate 
in balance. We try to coax people from spectator to participant in this quest. 
We want folks to get mad about corporate disinformation, injustices in the 







61 Carlo Ginzberg (2001) presents an excellent history of this concept and its various iterations, 
both literary and cognitive. 
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I must stress that the target of these criticisms is not simply mass media in its 
many forms, but rather mass media that, as David Robey (who wrote the introduction to 
the English edition of The Open Work) states, “reaffirms the public’s sense of the 
essential rightness of the world in which they live” (Eco [1962] 1989, xvii–xviii). Who can 
say that we must only engage with entertainment of the highest caliber? The “average” 
consumer is present in all of us. Certainly everyone can admit, even those select cultural 
gatekeepers, to having the desire to consume works that elicit quick and immediate 
sensations (Bondandello 1997, p. 53). This rejection resides more directly in mass 
culture that is deceptively ideological and motivated. This is media that is “dishonest,” 
such as kitsch, which attempts to pass itself off as art to mask its utilitarian aims. As 
Bondandello (1997, p. 52) explains, these forms of media only become dangerous when 
they are used by “a manipulative power structure to obfuscate reality and to conceal the 
power relationships present within our contemporary world.” The elitist cultural criticism 
exemplified by Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt school does not bring one 
closer to pedagogical truths. An outright rejection of pop culture and its conventions can 
be just as damaging as passively consuming mass media. 
 
Culture jamming is an active embodiment of the critical components of a 
dialectics of open/closed works. Just because a text is closed in its intentions (such as 
an advertisement) does not mean that the text cannot be read in an open way—that 
there are no learning opportunities to be gained through interpreting such a text. 
Sometimes culture jamming is entirely necessary to realize dormant meanings implicit 
within pop culture. The practice of culture jamming is purposely defamiliarizing,62 so it 
can “open up” and reveal what Ellsworth (2005) has referred to as pedagogical hinges. 
These hinges are simply aspects of learning spaces that are pedagogically 
transformative and that put “inside and outside, self and other, personal and social into 
relation” (Ellsworth 2005, p. 38). Sandlin and Milam (2008, p. 339) expand the 
connections between pedagogical hinges and culture jamming: “Pedagogy’s hinges 
create possibilities for both inside and outside—self and society—to be disrupted and 
refigured. We believe an important pedagogical moment—culture jamming’s pedagogical 
hinge—occurs when audience members as learners experience de´tournement (literally, 
 
 
62 Aspects of this pedagogy of surprise, exemplified by this defamiliarizing process, are explored 
under the guise of indexical learning and what I call a “pedagogy of novelty” in Campbell (2016, 
Chap. 5 of this thesis). 
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a “turning around”). All of the pedagogical tactics used in culture jamming attempt to lead 
the learner to a moment of détournement, where she is no longer who she used to be, 
but rather is caught off guard by the possibility of becoming someone or something 
different.” To provide a rather blunt example: placing an ad for Nike shoes next to a 
photograph depicting the working conditions of an Indonesian sweatshop in a public 
space can potentially “open up” learning possibilities: calling students to consider the 
athletic-consumer lifestyle symbolized by the ad in relation to broader social forces that 
they participate with in various ways. It is not simply a matter of rejecting the intent of the 
advertising or accepting it, but rather an opportunity to relate personally (but also as a 
learning community) to the ad from different levels and perspectives. With this 
understanding, education is a process aimed not at instilling knowledge or molding 
learners to hold specific viewpoints (as in the Latin educare), but rather, a process of 
leading learners out of their established positions (educere): leading out so that one can 
experience the world through direct perceptual engagement rather than through 
representations or mental constructions (cf. Ingold, 2017). Part of this engagement 
involves addressing how our interpretative processes themselves can be open or closed: 
do they continue the open flow of semiosis, or pragmatically and swiftly close thought 
and reflection? These practices of culture jamming help highlight that this dialectic of 
open/closed texts is a form of praxis that must go beyond mere recognition and proceed 
toward active confrontation and continual renewal.63 
 
Openness in union with critical pedagogy 
 
A poetics of openness builds upon the practice of culture jamming by emphasizing the 
interpretative and metaphoric undercurrent behind all communicative acts. This reflects 
the cognitive opening potential behind metaphoric thinking that Aristotle outlined in On 
Rhetoric (1991, 1412a 11–12), where he defines metaphor generally through the 
criterion of iconicity, as the capacity to see resemblances even between things that are 
far apart. With this understanding, a closed metaphor is a metaphor that limits and 





63 For a more thorough analysis of how culture jamming can function as a form of critical public 
pedagogy (with examples even from Adbusters magazine!), see Sandlin and Milam (2008). 
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existing knowledge structures.64 The closed metaphor rather forces an established 
course upon our thinking, controlling, and standardizing meaning-making. This closure 
can be (and often is) pragmatic (Eco 1984, chap. 3)—like the highly conventionalized 
meaning of traffic signs, or overcoded metaphors like “the leg of the table”—but, as we 
have seen with our brief study of kitsch, this closure can also be performed in the 
interest of ideology and dogma. 
 
A poetics of openness—because it is just that, a poetics—does not conceptualize 
this closure from a wholly combative or critical perspective, as a force to be usurped or 
attacked. And in this lies its pedagogical strength: by approaching issues of critical 
pedagogy from an aesthetic standpoint,65 the student has the capacity to rearrange 
qualitative possibilities and consider not only how texts may limit or reduce meaning but 
also how they distribute sensible experience (to borrow some coinage from 
Ranciere).66 Anthropologist Michael Ling spoke to me about the interpretative praxis 
implied in a poetics of semiotic openness, emphasizing that: 
 
although certain ideologies may attempt to close the interpretative space 
of possibilities, we nevertheless have the capacity to ‘read through’ or ‘read 
across’ (literally, dialogue) the limitations. I think this is significant as 
represented in how people have cognitively—and thereby in part, 
emotionally—survived oppressive sociopolitical regimes, by in effect, being 
able to engage that ‘openness potential’ even in the face of constraints and 
suppression of thought. See, for example, Josef Skvorecky’s essay “Red 
Music” on the importance of jazz under the anvil of two totalitarian regimes, 
Vaclav Havel’s appreciation for jazz and the experimental contemporary 
music of Frank Zappa, and the thread that runs through the film about East 
German surveillance of artists, “The Lives of Others” by Florian von 






64 For more on the metaphoric connectivity of sign systems, see Danesi’s (2013) excellent article 
from this journal. 
65 As I was reminded by a helpful reviewer, critical pedagogy is a polysemic term; that is, it can 
have different and sometimes contradictory meanings. Thus, I should emphasize that the form of 
critical pedagogy I am drawing parallels with is not the simple neo-Marxist project of exposing 
dormant power relations, nor is it solely about addressing authoritative claims to knowledge in 
general. As explained in this section, it is rather a form of aesthetic criticism that is informed and 
sensitive to issues of class, race, gender, ideology, and oppression. 
66 In “A Theory of Semiotics,” Eco (1979, p. 312) says that “semiotics helps us to analyze different 
ideological choices; it does not help us to choose.” 
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In my own teaching practice and experiences as a student, I have repeatedly 
seen critical pedagogical approaches (lacking this aesthetic sensibility) fall short in their 
attempt to empower students and challenge issues of domination in the classroom. I 
have come to believe that this failure occurs largely because of the didactic ways in 
which issues around empowerment are often framed, ways that do little to question the 
inherent power imbalance between teacher-student (or student-text) relations. By 
focusing on the careful and meaningful art/practice of interpretation, students can begin 
to approach critical issues, not specifically as critiques on political domination and 
repression, but rather from an interpretative-aesthetic standpoint. Since a poetics of 
openness—being nothing other than the fundamental property of the action between 
signs, or semiosis67 —is not a particular interpretative method, but fundamentally 
ontological in nature (i.e., a state of being and engaging with the world), students will be 
encouraged to seek out their own forms of emancipation and are not simply prodded (by 
the classroom environment) to follow a predetermined path of learning, which inevitably 
suggests a particular ideological underpinning.68 
 
But why is critique necessary at all, and could the practice of criticism potentially 
work against this value of pedagogical openness? I would insist that to address differing 
aesthetic orientations and perspectives, a certain degree of critique is necessary. This is 
not critique in terms of deconstruction, nor about using the text for specific political uses, 
but rather in terms of participatory aesthetic engagement: finding new ways to “read 
across” the text. David Robey (cited in Eco [1962] 1989, xiv) explains the stance of 
critical engagement that Eco elaborates in The Open Work—most notably in an essay 
entitled “Form as Social Commitment” ([1962] 1989, chap. 6): 
 
In one sense alienation is both necessary and desirable, in that we can say 
that we are alienated to something other than ourselves, and therefore lose 
full possession of ourselves, whenever we become involved in it. Losing 
possession of ourselves is not something to be lamented; it is simply part 
of the back-and-forth movement between self and the world that is the 
condition of a truly human existence. What we must do is accept our 
involvement in things other than ourselves, and at the same time assert our 
 
67 Again, for the theoretical side of this poetics, see chap. 7 of Eco (1979) and my recent chapter 
(Campbell 2017a). 
68 For more on some of the shortcomings of critical pedagogy, specifically its ingrained rationalist 
assumptions and how it can in practice proliferate the very relations it critiques, Ellsworth (1989) is 
still important and relevant. 
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selfhood in the face of the world by actively seeking to understand it and 
transform it. 
 
Asserting one’s selfhood is the “critical” aspect of this form of “engagement,” and 
the justification of my alignment with critical pedagogy. Without such assertions of self, 
there can be no meaningful learning engagement. Learners must present themselves in 
their learning encounters, for it is only through this presentation that they can (a) focus 
attention on the structures of the work/text itself, and (b) address how their perception 
reacts to and organizes these dynamic structures.69 It is through attention to the 
ambiguity in the aesthetic message that our normal modes of schematization are called 
into question (Eco 2000, p. 223), and we are led out of our familiar positions. Just like 
the dichotomy between traditional and contemporary art that The Open Work is 
predicated upon, pedagogy too must not “channel … [learners’] responses in a particular 
direction” (Robey, in Eco [1962] 1989, x) but rather encourage dynamic forms of 
participatory engagement. With this poetics of openness—unlike with many descriptions 
of critical pedagogy, which assert a critical approach/method a priori— 
engagement precedes critique, but once engagement is established, a certain degree of 
critique is inevitable. 
 
The model reader: protector against overinterpretation and 
radical constructivism 
 
Openness as a pedagogical value is not equivalent to extreme student-centered 
approaches where any possible interpretation is valid and accepted. Scholes explains 
in Semiotics and Interpretation (1982, p. 14): “Leaving the reader ‘free’ to interpret is an 
impossibility. The free reader is simply at the mercy of the cultural codes that constitute 
each person as a reader, and of the manipulative features of the text, the classroom, 
and the whole reading situation as well.” This ideal educational method should, through 
critical engagement (both intellectually and actively, i.e., through forms of culture 
jamming) address the underlying structures at work in the closed work. As discussed, 
closed works are texts that strive for a univocal reading by invoking predetermined 
responses through the use of ready-made effects. In this sense, they are “inflexible 
 
 
69 “Where a form is realised there is a conscious operation on an amorphous material that has been 
brought under human control” (Eco [1962] 1989, xiv). 
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objects” that yearn to be read a particular way, “pulling the reader along a predetermined 
path” (Eco 1979, p. 8) of interpretation. 
 
A well-organized text postulates an envisioned model reader who can activate 
the cultural codes that the author imparts in the text, both consciously and 
unconsciously. With this prerequisite knowledge, the model reader “can deal with the 
text interpretatively in the same way the author does generatively” (Eco 1994, p. 7). I 
must stress that this model reader is not the same as the empirical reader (who is simply 
you or me when we read a text) who instinctively relates the text to their prior knowledge 
and experiences. As Eco has said repeatedly, the model reader is a hypothetical 
construct: “a set of textual instructions displayed by the text’s linear manifestation 
precisely as a set of sentences or other signals” (Eco 1994, p. 16). Contrastingly, the 
closed text does not presuppose such a fully formed model reader, but in fact 
presupposes an average one in the same way advertising does (or for that matter, 
standardized testing) based on medium demographics. In this sense, these works are 
essentially speaking to everyone: “These texts that obsessively aim at arousing a more 
or less precise response on the part of a more or less empirical reader are in fact open 
to every aberrant decoding. A text so immoderately open will be called a closed one” 
(Eco 1979, p. 8). 
 
Eco’s model reader is not simply a means of upholding the intention of the 
author. The empirical author certainly has intentions for the way her work is to be 
received, even if this intention includes involving the active participation of the 
reader.70 But in Eco’s view the work takes on a life of its own, emitting its own intention 
(intentio operis), which is distinct from the authors, and it is this intention that we must 
use to guide us in the interpretative process.71 However, if we refuse to give a privileged 
 
 
70 As Eco ([1962] 1989) suggests was Joyce’s intention in crafting Finnegan’s Wake. 
71 See Eco (1992) for a further elaboration of the intentio operis and how it relates to and interacts 
with the reader’s intention (intentio lectoris), as well as the author’s intention (intentio auctoris). The 
following passage from these lectures is relevant in demonstrating Eco’s view that the reader’s 
interpretative efforts can be understood as a conjecture about the intenio lectoris: “A text is a devise 
conceived in order to produce its model reader. I repeat that this reader is not the one who makes 
the ‘only right’ conjecture. A text can foresee a model reader entitled to try infinite conjectures. The 
empirical reader is only an actor who makes conjectures about the kind of model reader postulated 
by the text. Since the intention of the text is basically to produce a model reader able to make 
conjectures about it, the initiative of the model reader consists in figuring out a model author that is 
not the empirical one and that, in the end, coincides with the intention of the text. Thus, more than 
a parameter to use in order to validate the interpretation, the text is an object that the interpretation 
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position to the author in interpreting her own work, we run the risk of arriving at the 
opposite extreme, where, as Todorov says jokingly, “a text is only a picnic where the 
author brings the words and the readers bring the sense” (Todorov, as cited in 
Eco 1994, pp. 23–24). This overtly deconstructionist attitude toward interpretation even 
might seem to be advocated by a theory of unlimited semiosis, 
where theoretically semiosis is an infinite process by which “the torch of truth” (an 
expression Charles Peirce was fond of; see CP 1.339) is continually handed off from one 
sign to another. Envisioning a text’s model reader protects against this infinite recursivity, 
which Eco has coined hermetic drift; that is, “the uncontrolled ability to shift from 
meaning to meaning, from similarity to similarity, from a connection to another” 
(Eco 1990, pp. 26–27). The model author is consistent with the approach to semantics 
proposed by Augustine (De magistro, CE 389), where the meaning of a word is not a 
platonic “dictionary-type” definition but rather a bundle of textual instructions for 
interpretation.72 The text elicits a multiplicity of interpretative pathways but 
not any possible pathway. “Thus the competence of model readers is determined by the 
kind of genetic imprinting that the text has transmitted to them … created in and 
imprisoned in the text they enjoy as much freedom as the text is willing to grant them” 
(Pugliatti, as cited in Eco 1994, p. 16). I believe this concept of the model reader has the 
potential to be a useful pedagogical device. Having this analytical goal to strive for can 
only be beneficial in guiding the student through the interpretative process, even if such 
a notion does not empirically exist, or if reaching such a level of textual competence is 
not possible. By envisioning and constructing a given text’s model reader, we can gain 
insight into its underlying motivation and can perhaps through this process unveil a text’s 
relative openness and closeness. This is useful to protect against the apparent 
limitlessness of interpretation that this aesthetics of openness can seem to encourage. 
The conception of a model reader reminds the student that although personal 
engagement with a text is a right that should be encouraged, there is certainly a point 





builds up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself on the basis of what it makes up as 
its result. I am not ashamed to admit that I am so defining the old and still valid ‘hermeneutic circle’” 
(Eco 1992, p. 64). 
72 For a fuller account of this semantic theory, see Eco (1984). 
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Openness as a model of lifelong learning 
 
This aesthetics of openness informs not only our interpretative processes and 
engagement with texts but also presents us with a model of lifelong learning. The term 
“field of possibilities” coined by the composer Henri Pousseur provides a fitting analogy 
of this pedagogical orientation.73 The notion of ‘field’ here is borrowed from 
contemporary physics and provides a “revised vision of the classic relationship posited 
between cause and effect as a rigid, one directional system: now a complex interplay of 
motive forces is envisaged” (Eco [1962] 1989, p. 58). The term possibilities in this usage 
shows an increasing trend in modern science, art, and philosophy: “The discarding of a 
static, syllogistic view of order, a corresponding devolution of intellectual authority to 
personal decision, choice and social context” (Eco 1979, p. 8). One can see how this 
analogy can be applied to the development of an educational philosophy that is in 
accordance with the examples of openness that I have presented, where each reading 
of a text is only one possible path of interpretation and certainly not the ultimate one. 
 
It is through fostering this poetics of openness whereby lifelong learners are 
created. Students who understand the power lurking behind every metaphor that 
expands their life-worlds consequently understand the power of imaginative learning. 
This kind of learning is not something unearthed and thus cannot be reduced to 
a surface-substratum metaphor, encapsulated well by that famous phrase of Bachelard, 
ironically adopted by the Althusserians: “There is no science … but of the hidden.” I am 
often dismayed how this search for “the hidden beneath the apparent” (Ranciere 2004, 
p. 49) is plaguing educational discourse. My main problem with this approach is that 
when one searches for something beneath the surface (whether that be the secret 
language of the body, Plato’s forms, an appeal to an essence or soul, a governing center 
outside of discourse, a god, the univocal meaning of a poem or story, etc.), a position of 
mastery is inevitably established. And suddenly we find ourselves thrust back into the 
dismal world of high school, with a teacher who knows “the code,” and a bunch of 
ignorant pupils grappling to find it. In short, such appeals work against the educational 
framework I have been elaborating. A pedagogy of openness must always try to operate 
not in terms of surface-substratum, but rather, as Ranciere says, in terms of “horizontal 
distributions, combinations between systems of possibilities” (2004, p. 49). The goal of 
 
73 This analogy is explored by Eco ([1962] 1989) throughout the book. 
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such education is to continually reimagine the conceptual frameworks that allow us to 
conceive these statements and oppositions, those conditions that allow for a particular 
distribution of the sensible “that causes a painting or a piece of music to make an 
impression, that cause reality to appear transformative or inalterable” (Ranciere, 2004, p. 
49). 
 
The fact that Eco ([1962] 1989, p. 24) says that “a work of art is never really 
‘closed’ because even the most definitive exterior always encloses an infinity of possible 
‘readings’” is precisely why texts constructed with closed intentions (like Dante’s Divine 
Comedy, a reoccurring example from Opera Aperta) should be read dynamically and 
openly. To reject these texts and the meaning to be discovered in them simply because 
of their author’s authoritarian strategies for semiotic control is no different from critical 
pedagogy that exposes power structures but then does not go further to understand how 
these structures can be reimagined or “opened up” through the growth of collective 
semiosis. 
 
As elaborated in the previous section, a pedagogy of openness is not about 
chasing authorial intention, but is rather about realizing a plurality of meanings 
inchoative within the structure of texts themselves—opening “fields of possibilities.” But 
these possibilities are only activated “locally” from certain empirical readers, with certain 
points of view at particular times in their life. Hence, the model reader proposed by the 
text is only ever achieved and brought to life in a certain “respect or capacity” (to use 
another Peircean turn of phrase). Eco explains that openness (and aesthetic experience 
generally) is not wholly subjective, nor objective, but rather activated in a relationship 
defined by the complementarity of observer and observed: “Neither Openness [of 
interpretative possibilities] nor [aesthetic] totality is inherent in the objective stimulus, 
which is in itself materially determined, or in the subject, who is in himself available to all 
sorts of openness and none; rather, they lie in the cognitive relationship that binds them, 
and in the course of which the object, consisting of stimuli organized according to a 
precise aesthetic intention, generates and directs various kinds of [aesthetic] openness” 
(Eco [1962] 1989, p. 39). Thus, this field of possibilities is dynamic and perpetually 
changing like the flow of semiosis itself, and thus it cannot be locked away in the idealist 
“casket of consciousness” (Deely 2009), nor in some reality “out there.” Openness— 
being validated by Eco in later years through Peircean semiotics (see Eco 1979, chap. 
7)—is in fact “semiotic openness” and thus constitutes the mediating relation between a 
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‘real’ (i.e., a mind-independent) reality, and a mind-dependent cognitive process. As 
emphasized in later works—most notably Kant and the Platypus (2000, 1.11)—Eco 
advances what he calls a minimal realism: the understanding that there are many ways 
of segmenting the continuum of experience, but that there are also “grains of resistance” 
that motivate how and in what direction we make these cuts. In this sense, the 
text(/world) tells us (through fallibilism, how it pushes back against our interpretations) 
what readings it supports and which it does not.74 What I thought was an open door will 
still break my nose if in fact it turns out to be a glass wall! 
 
Openness, as I have tried to display it, is a value that I feel is absent from much 
formal education: in the classroom but also at the levels of administration, policy, and 
curriculum. This is not a new educational method or a specific approach, for to prescribe 
this would be contrary to the type of education I am envisioning. To escape the clutches 
of standardization and the homogenization of learning, society must come to trust 
teachers in their ability to be flexible and not just display a blind adherence to method 
and curriculum. But also, and perhaps more importantly, we must trust students to 
question and engage with the texts and textual strategies that are set before them, and 
from this extrapolate to questioning the essential taken-for-grantedness of their lives and 
the societies that shape them; not from a place of blind expressionism, but from a place 
of reflexive and careful hermeneutic interpretation. This of course requires a massive 
societal swift, a great de-acceleration of schooling—of no longer thinking of schools 
as learning environments that produce desirable and profitable learning outcomes in the 
fast and certain march toward the future. This is a society that allows for the emergent 
space of the possible: “ready to trust people enough to free them of requirements of 
productivity … [to] allow them to be teachers and students” (Masschelein and 










74 Eco (2000, p. 53): “If the continuum has a grain … then we cannot say all that we want to say. 
Being may not be comparable to a one-way street but to a network of multilane freeways along 
which one can travel in more than one direction; but despite this some roads will nevertheless 
remain dead ends. There are things that cannot be done (or said).” 
103  
Openness as neo-baroque (in lieu of a conclusion) 
 
As Italo Calvino reminds us in his celebrated and uncompleted Six Memos for the Next 
Millennium (1988)—echoing the sentiments of his younger friend Umberto Eco—art in 
the last century has engaged in a poetics of openness, a celebration of multiplicity, 
which is embodied in the forms of serial composition, free jazz, abstract painting, and 
(so-called) postmodernist literature. This runs somewhat contrary to the values of 
previous eras, such as the medieval system of hermeneutics, and the romantic 
individualism we’ve explored earlier. “Medieval literature tended to produce works 
expressing the sum of human knowledge in an order and form of stable compactness, as 
in commedia, where the multiform richness of language converges with the application of 
a systematic and unitary mode of thought. In contrast, the modern books that we love 
most are the outcome of a confluence and a clash of multiplicity of interpretive methods, 
modes of thought, and styles of expression” (Calvino 1988, p. 116). This celebration of 
openness points to interesting parallels between our postmodern age and the baroque 
aesthetic.75 The classical Renaissance form tended to perceive art as having a definite 
interpretation: a single perspective from which the entire work could be perceived and 
understood. Dante wrote extensive treatises explaining precisely how his works were 
meant to be read, down to minute details of the poetic forms he utilized and the 
allegorical references he wrestled into these forms. Renaissance painting searched for a 
single divine vantage point, which could be plotted mathematically, from which all detail 
and meaning could be actualized in a frame. Such efforts were no doubt the result of a 
deeply religious society that perceived reality as possessing a divine author whose intent 
was always present. 
 
Contrastingly, baroque art attempted to dissolve such a “rigid, privileged, definite 
frontal view,” instead “inducing the spectator to swift his position continuously in order to 
see the work in constantly new aspects, as if it were in a state of perpetual 
transformation” (Eco [1962] 1989, pp. 38–39). The Bach fugue reveals this aesthetic: 
where a simple melodic figure embarks on a process of continuous metamorphosis, 
 
 
75 This connection between the baroque aesthetic and a poetics of openness was, three decades 
after the publication of the open work, explored by Eco’s Bologna colleague Omar Calabrese in 
his 1992 book Neo-Baroque: A Sign of the Times. In the forward to this text, Eco himself further 
elaborates these connections. 
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always in motion and never attainable in a definite solid state. This is a sentiment 
echoed by much modern science, which constantly reveals new knowledge to us about 
a universe that is charged with potentiality and in a state of continuous flux. 
 
As masterful as Dante’s verse is, the aesthetic pleasure we receive from his work 
is not in our ability to recognize his rigorous adherence to a system of medieval 
hermeneutics. Similarly, the sense of validation that students receive from “figuring out” 
that an Emily Dickinson poem with the title and author removed is about a garden snake 
or some allegory about the beauty of nature is fleeting and shallow. Probably such 
pleasure is more a result of students’ drive for monetary success (of learning that is 
tethered to productive time) rather than a delight in aesthetics. Aesthetic pleasure is at 
the center of this dialogue of openness, for it is when our active participation is called 
upon in a work that we truly engage with it. As Borges’s famous title reminds us, we 
delight in the garden of forking paths—not the superhighway that gets us from one point 
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Peircean edusemiotics: What is it? What does it do? 
 
Let it be clear from the outset, signs are not our focus here but rather; the action 
between signs, that is, semiosis. Donald Cunningham in his introductory essay 
to Semiotica’s special issue on Semiotics and Education (2007, p. 3) made the same 
point: “so signs are everywhere, but they only impact us if we take notice of them in 
some way. Learning to take notice is the key component of an education semiotic”.76 
 
Edusemiotics is a growing interdisciplinary research project that explores the 
relevance and possibilities behind understanding the doctrine of signs as the 
philosophical foundation for learning theory and educational philosophy (Stables and 
Semetsky 2015; Stables et al. 2018). People who study edusemiotics are joined by one 
central orientation: they conceptualize learning as semiosis, that is, as a signification 
process mediating learner and environment, and thus use this understanding of learning- 
as-semiosis to think about and practice education. Edusemiotics provides an integrated 
and “transdisciplinary” (Deely and Semetsky 2017) theoretical approach that can help 
educators and researchers ‘take notice’ of important aspects of learning that are difficult 
to express in our dominant explanatory systems. But take notice of what exactly? 
 
 
76 For some recent introductions to edusemiotics, see Nöth’s (2010) thorough literature review; 
Semetsky’s (2010) edited anthology outlining various approaches to edusemiotics from leading 
authors (of which Nöth’s article  is  included);  see  also  (Strand, 2013;  Olteanu, 2015;  
Campbell, 2016, 2017, 2018a, b, c) for the relevance of Peirce’s categories for philosophy of 
education; as well as the recent handbook (Semetsky, 2017). The term edusemiotics was coined 
by Danesi (2010) in the forward to the above-mentioned volume edited by Semetsky. The co- 
authored book Edusemotics: Semiotic Philosophy as Educational Foundation (Stables and 
Semetsky, 2015) has quickly emerged as a foundational text for this new research project. For 
more on the essential points of edusemiotics see the recent interview with Inna Semetsky 
(Semetsky and Campbell, 2018) and “A Short Introduction to Edusemiotics” (Olteanu and 
Campbell, 2018). 
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In a nutshell, many theories of learning cannot account for the role of: un- 
actualized potential, nor; anticipatory teleological processes. Thus, learning often gets 
reduced to either; (a) the attainment of psychological states inside the mind-brain of the 
learner, or; (b) in the processing or computing of (conventionalized) symbolic 
representations. Often, both these orientations are present simultaneously, and what we 
end up with is a confusing mix of constructivism and behaviourism, interpretism and 
positivism.77 Such a cocktail of contradictory forces has been detrimental to the 
pragmatic contributions of educational philosophy generally (cf. Carr, 1997; Stables and 
Semetsky, 2015, Ch. 3; Campbell, 2018c). 
 
A growing body of educational research that looks to CS. Peirce’s categorical 
semiotic philosophy has emerged to address some of these conceptual deficiencies. The 
strength in Peirce’s semiotic philosophy is precisely that it is triadic and non-duelist. It 
sets out to explain and conceptualize relation itself as an ontological modality. That is to 
say, that the theory of learning implicit in Peirce’s semiotic (see Olteanu 2015) will not 
locate learning within ens rationis (mind dependent reality), nor in a learner’s 
‘competence’ in ‘processing’ an external ens reale (mind independent reality). No. The 
event of learning always occurs in the complementarity and interaction of the learner to 
their environment; in the specifically triadic mediation of observer, the observing, and the 
observed. This interaction constitutes the pedagogical event that edusemiotic pedagogy 
orients itself toward. This is a step beyond substance dualism and the principle of non- 
contradiction (this is this because it is not that), to recognize the logic of the included 
(rather than excluded) middle (this is always becoming that), and its implied ontology. 
This perpetual emergence and unlimited growth potential that is characteristic of 
educational processes, is conceptualized through the action and growth of signs 
(semiosis), presented to us in terms of a theory of unlimited semiosis (cf. Eco, 1979). 
 
At the centre of this conceptualization, is the enlarged tripartite conception of 




77 See Cunningham (1988, 1998), and Shank (2008), for more on the implications of this 
methodological confusion for educational research, and the role semiotics can play in addressing 
this confusion. See also the special issue on “Data” from the journal Cultural Studies (Vol 13, issue 
4, 2013). 
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First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. 
Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction 
with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first 
and second are brought into relation… Feeling is First, sense of reaction 
Second… the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is 
second, Evolution is Third (CP 6.32 1891; emphasis added).78 
 
Much of the (Peircean oriented) Edusemiotic research of the last two decades suggests 
that one of the main applications of these categories for education is that they offer the 
ability to describe and understand learning without operationalizing it and reifying it from 
its experiential origins. Learning-as-semiosis is a form of conceptualizing continual 
emergence, and thus goes beyond what is reducible and describable through 
philosophical or mathematical reductions. Learning-as semiosis, must account for the 
reality of: 
 
1. “a domain of mental structures and processes which influence experience, 
thought, and action outside of phenomenal awareness and voluntary control” 
(Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 21), hence the focus on Peircean concepts like 
abduction and firstness (cf. Semetsky, 2005; Stables and Semetsky, 2015, pp. 
16–30; Campbell, 2018a, c); 
 
2. The “forceful, dyadic consciousness of ‘resistance’” (Strand, 2013, p. 754; 
Colapietro, 2013; West, 2015; Campbell, 2016; Nöth in Stables et al., 2018, Ch. 
5) to new learning (secondness), as well as; 
 
3. The growth and generativity that results through mediation; a first coming into 
relation with a second—this is the growth of habits that beget future habits. This 
is what underlines pedagogical growth (in the Deweyian sense) and learning 
itself (Strand 2013; Affifi, 2014; Campbell 2017; Nöth in Stables et al., 2018, Ch. 








78 The abbreviation “CP”, as per convention, refers to the 8 volume Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1931–1966). The numerals represent volume and paragraph, respectively. 
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Finding our foundations 
 
Many edusemiotic writers have begun to closely align edusemiotics to the biosemiotic 
research project; the basic logic being that if living biological processes can be defined 
and understood through semiosis, so can learning (cf. Stables, 2006; Olteanu, 2015; 
Campbell, 2017). As more and more Edusemiotic research connects its agenda to 
biosemiotics, and because biosemiotics has followed in recent years a predominantly 
Peircean orientation, much edusemiotic research follows or adheres to a Peircean triadic 
philosophy. However, it would be misguided to assume that all edusemiotic research is 
inherently Peircean, nor necessarily seeks its philosophical guidance from the Peircean 
canon. In fact, much research in edusemiotics (including some of the work of the two 
main edusemiotic scholars Andrew Stables and Inna Semetsky) seeks and explores 
many non-Peircean perspectives. Just a look at the new Routledge volume Semiotic 
Theories of Learning (Stables et al., 2018), presents a diverse and rich field of influence, 
with at least two of its five authors presenting semiotic conceptions that draw prominently 
on non-Peircean ideas (Eetu Pikkarainen and Sébastien Pesce). 
 
In this article, we will be more specifically treating the conceptual foundations of 
Peircean edusemiotics in particular, not assuming in the least that all edusemiotics is 
inherently Peircean. More specifically, we will be following Olteanu’s (2015) approach of 
extracting and developing the philosophy of learning that is implicit in Peirce’s semiotic.79 
Taking seriously Biesta’s (2016 [2013]) important caution about not reducing philosophy 
of education to a philosophy of learning (something much edusemiotic research could 
potentially be charged of) we must remember that this orientation towards understanding 
the dynamics of learning on a bio-semiotic level, is always performed in the service of 
imagining future possibilities for informal and formal educational networks and programs. 
Understanding all learning and living as semiotic engagement presents us with 
 
the possibility for “liberating the concept of learning from the domain of 
education, and rethinking education as a system or a program that works 
in the service of learning” (Olteanu and Campbell 2018). This orientation 
suggests a more ecologically and biologically minded approach to 
 




education that resists separating humans from animals, culture from 
nature, recognizing that because ‘[l]earning is continuous, occurring in 
every life form… any Umwelt has educational potential” (Olteanu 2016, p. 
586). (Olteanu & Campbell 2018, p. 254) 
 
We can say then more specifically, that this article is also a study into the dominant 
conceptual frameworks of a biosemiotics informed edusemiotic, and not solely a 
Peircean one. 
 
Perhaps the most important non-Peircean idea explored in this study is the 
ecological and biosemiotic concept of Umwelt (the organism’s phenomenal world, as 
opposed to the more static designation, environment). Umwelt philosophy has come to 
be a central area of investigation for edusemiotics; allowing theorists to address learning 
and living concurrently, from the perspective of how an organism discovers (not only 
constructs!) meaning and significance in a dynamic and changing environment. This 
article will focus primarily on the basic semiosic processes that sustain the 
learner’s primary modelling system (or umwelt). This is the world of meaning and 
sensory experience that the organism is immersed in. Not the world as it is, the 
hypothesized ens reale, but rather, the ontologically real phenomenal world of the 
learner. 
 
This focus enables us to identify and explore four basic hypotheses’ (all 
previously explored and elaborated upon) that a Peircean informed edusemiotic 
perspective can be claimed to rest upon. These are: 
 
• The iconicity hypothesis (IH); 
 
• The natural learning flow principle (NLFP); 
 
• The continuity principle (CP); 
 
• The principle of suprasubjective relation (PSR); 
 
The identification and elaboration of these basic philosophical orientations will hopefully 
help further establish the importance and relevance of the intertwined bio-semiotic/edu- 
semiotic perspective for both educational theory and practice. I will argue that this task 
requires the methodological framework of Sebeok and Danesi’s (2000) Modelling 
Systems Theory (MST), which: (a) provides a biologically grounded methodology to 
understanding the diversity of modelling processes across all species, and; (b) 
contextualizes the specific focus of this study within the broader forms of learning and 
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knowing encompassed by a general semiotic theory of learning.80 This reach across 
species is important, for it is emblematic of the continuity principle (CP), which rejects on 
pragmatic grounds, essentialist distinctions between humans and non-humans; but also 
mind from matter, and body from mind. 
Hopefully such attention to the conceptual foundations of this new edusemiotic 
perspective will encourage more educational research to take what Semetsky (2014) has 
tongue in cheek referred to as ‘the edusemiotic turn’. 
 
Alignment and divergence between modelling systems theory 
and Peirce’s categories 
 
Peirce hypothesized that forces in the universe progress from states of chance 
indeterminacy (firstness, chance), to states of total generalization and 
interconnectedness (regularity, law-as-tendency, thirdness). He concurrently described 
this as the growth of relation itself, and thus a form of evolutionary and cosmological love 
(Rose 2016; Campbell 2017, pp. 9–12). Although his grand cosmology is not verifiable a 
priori, this categorical progression has shown to possess relevance in recent studies into 
human development and cognition.81 
 
In a series of recent papers (2016, 2017, 2018a, b, c) I have attempted to show 
the usefulness Peirce’s categories can have for re-conceptualizing educational praxis 
and theory. The experiential basis of these studies comes from my work over the last 
10 years as both a music teacher and educational researcher. Following these 
experiences and refection, it is my belief that education, to: (1) align itself with the way 
we actually learn in the world, and; (2) to create ethical and responsible humans who 





80 Cf. Eco (1984, pp. 1–13) for the distinction between general and specific semiotics. See Stables 
et al., (2018) for more on semiotic theories of learning. 
81 See, for example, the cognitive/ontogenetic perspectives of Zlatev (2009, 2013), Zlatev and 
Andrén (2009) and West (2015, 2018). Noted is how this research in cognitive semiotics and 
cognitive linguistics generally notices and observes a consistent developmental progression from 
firstness to secondness to thirdness, or iconic modelling to indexical modelling to symbolic 
modelling. These more empirical (clinical) studies continue to deeply inform edusemiotic 
conceptualizations. 
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5.12) —must come to embrace what Danesi (1998, p. 61) calls the Natural Learning 
Flow Principle (NLFP). 
 
This principle refers to the flow of semiosis within ontogeny, and rests upon the 
recognition that human sign use begins with the senses and in the body—hence 
Danesi’s (1998) apt title The Body in the Sign. This principle rests upon a central tenet of 
MST called the Sense-implication Hypothesis (SIH); the “view that all modelling is initially 
guided by sensory processes” (Sebeok & Danesi, 2000, p. 199). 
 
The sense-implication hypothesis (SIH) posits that all sign-making efforts 
are initially grounded in the experiential realm of the senses. In this 
conceptual framework, semiosis is considered to constitute a 
transformation of bodily experience, converting the external world of the 
senses into an internal one of representation (Danesi, 1998, p. 17). 
 
The NLF principle follows from the acknowledged sensory beginnings of 
semiosis, asserting that the human child proceeds from a stage of: 
 
• iconically modelling their environment (that is, simulating the referential 
domain internally: forming “mental images” of a referential domain that 
is isomorphic with pre-existing internal structures and processes); to a stage of 
 
• indexical modelling: extending this basic iconic competence into the 
environment through acts of deixsis and ‘indicative’ mimesis—visual, gestural, 
and aural); to finally, 
 
• a stage of symbolic modelling: using socially-verified (and thus 
conventionalized and stipulated from specific contexts of occurrence) sign 
systems to cognize referential domains). 
 
This flow from iconicity–indexicality–symbolicity mirrors the progression, 
within the human use of signs (anthroposemiosis) of primary modelling–secondary 
modelling–tertiary modelling: 
 
Primary modelling, for instance, is “knowing through simulation”. 
Secondary modelling is “knowing through extension and indication”. This 
implies that the SMS does its handiwork, by and large, after the  PMS  
has completed its own, in a manner of speaking. Further extensions of 
forms lead eventually to highly abstract, symbolic (tertiary) systems of 
representation. The PMS is the default system, while the SMS and TMS 
respectively are extensional systems… (Sebeok & Danesi, p. 167) 
 
Modelling Systems Theory is applied not only to human ontogenesis, but also 
towards species-specific modelling behaviour generally; the forms of knowledge that 
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determine how an animal knows something, and the ways in which these forms are 
represented (internally and externally). As we will discuss further in Sect. 3, this 
approach to learning finds its origins in ethology and the “Umwelt theory” initially 
developed by Jacob von Uexküll (1957[1934], 1982[1940]). In terms of Peirce’s 
categories, this is equivalent to the progression from firstness (indeterminate sense 
impressions/qualia, as yet atemporal and unrelated to anything) to secondness (the 
dynamic ‘imprinting’ of these impressions acting/resisting upon an organism’s sense 
perception, in space and time) to finally, habitual modes of perceptual action and 
reaction with the environment (thirdness).82 
 
We can in fact say that Modelling Systems Theory corresponds grosso modo to 
Peirce’s categorical outline, enriching the significance of this theoretical alignment for 
edusemiotics: 
 
The child’s earliest strategy for knowing an object with his or her senses is, 
in fact, a firstness strategy. The modeling system that translates firstness 
sensory forms into models is the primary modeling system (PMS). The 
PMS can be defined as the instinctive ability to model the sensory or 
perceptual properties of referents. Needless to say, Peirce referred to this 
process as iconicity. The child’s subsequent attempts to refer to the object 
through vocal imitation and/or manual indication constitute a secondness 
knowing strategy. The modeling system  that guides these attempts is   
the secondary modeling system (SMS). The SMS can be defined as the 
capacity to refer to objects with extended primary forms and with indexical 
(indicational) forms. Finally, in learning to use a culture-specific name to 
refer to an object, the child is engaging in a thirdness form of knowing. His 
or her  ability  to  do  so  is  dependent  upon  the tertiary  modeling 
system (TMS), which can be defined as the capacity to acquire and utilize 
the symbolic resources of culture-specific abstract systems of 
representation (Sebeok & Danesi 2000, p. 10). 
 
Peirce’s categories, and his general theory of signs, give educators and 
educational researchers the means to talk about and conceptualize aspects of the 
learning process that our not easily addressed, for they occur existentially prior to full 
 
82 The following outline from Sheriff (1994, p. 2) is useful in conceptualizing some of the prominent 
dimensions of each category: 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness; 
Possibility, fact, law; 
Quality, reaction, symbol (representation); 
Feeling, effort, habit. 
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intentional(/cognitive) awareness. However, to consider the categories experientially, 
and not metaphysically, involves recognizing that firstness is by its nature inaccessible to 
our conscious awareness (once we cognize it, it is gone). In fact, firstness is the pure 
possibility of the cognitive process (cf. Eco, 2000). To learn from our unknowable first 
impressions is to realize these impressions as acting upon our senses (and thus already 
within the realm of secondess) and to relate these impressions to the continuity of our 
experience in the unfolding present. This is because all conscious awareness takes 
place necessarily within the realm of thirdness—our established ways of inhabiting (or 
being in-habit with) an umwelt. 
 
This is to say, that although the PMS can be considered loosely a firstness 
‘strategy’, it is not strictly equivalent to that singular atemporal totality that constitutes 
firstness in the Peircean sense, and not how firstness is conceived of 
phenomenologically. What is generally called ‘cognition’ seems to occur exclusively in 
the realm of thirdness, however, it is only through mindful attention to what I have 
previously called the palimpsest-nature of experience (cf. 2016, 2017, 2018a, c)—to the 
aesthetic bedrock of firstness and its embodied realization in secondness—that we can 
create students receptive not to subject matter or knowledge content, but rather, to the 
various shades and dimensions of the learning process itself. Strand makes this same 
point by saying authoritatively that “(t)hirdness is learning” (2013, p. 795). She quotes 
Peirce who explains that: 
 
‘Thirdness essentially involves the production of effects in the world of 
existence, —not by furnishing energy, but by the gradual development of 
Law’ [(Peirce, 1903[1998], p. 271)]… So, in addition to the immediate, 
incommunicable perception of the qualities of ‘pure presence’ (firstness) 
and the forceful, dyadic consciousness of ‘resistance’ (secondness), 
thirdness entails ‘learning’, or ‘the felt sense of personal transformation (of 
acquiring a new habit or at least of having one’s present habits 
strengthened, refined, or in some other way modified)’ (Colapietro, 1999, 
p. 23). Thirdness contains firstness and secondness, but it is by no way 
reducible to the two. 
 
Because of this non-reducibility, we must replicate this tripartite fullness of 
experience in educational settings (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 4.1. The palimpsest nature of the categories 
 
As noted by many (cf. Danesi 1998; Ponzio, 2002; Petrilli and Ponzio, 2005, pp. 
223–230; Campbell, 2016; Yu, 2017) one of the main offerings Sebeok’s MST brings to 
education is the understanding that “the semiotic [meaning-making] capacities of the 
learner…—rather than the subject matter to be learned—should be the focus of 
education” (Danesi as cited in Petrilli and Ponzio 2005, p. 229). It is in this sense that we 
can understand Petrilli and Ponzio’s (2005, p. 229) assessment that “the main 
implications of Sebeok’s modelling theory for education is of a methodological nature”. I 
would also add, following Yu (2017), that this is also one of the central contributions that 
edusemiotics (as a new research program) brings to educational philosophy: a re- 
orientation and re-considering of the philosophical foundations of education.83 
 
Learning is, in some sense, always being deferred and never occurring in a 
single moment of space and time. It is this constant deferral (and an inability to 
conceptualize it) that leaves the concept vulnerable to obfuscation by political or 
ideological interests. This failure to locate learning, or rather to reduce learning to a set 
of repeatable circumstances and structures, functions to operationalize the concept; 
 
 
83 As noted in particular by Olteanu (2015), there is a strong historical case for the connecting of 
educational philosophy and semiotics, which is evidenced quite clearly, by the fact that the book 
that is often considered the foundational text of liberal education and the foundational text of 
semitoics are shared in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana. The first lines in this ancient text reveal 
this deep historical tie: “learning concerns either things or signs, but it is through signs that we learn 
what things are” ([397AD], book 1, line 2). 
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turning it into little more than an accountability tool. Peirce’s triadic account of 
consciousness does allow us to, in some sense, ‘locate’ learning in the perpetual 
‘opening up’ of virtual potentialities (firstness’); for its capacity to account 
for emergence.84 Such a relational account, recognizes an “ontology that asserts the 
reality of potentialities not yet actualized, as Firstness” (Stables and Semetsky 2015, p. 
24). This allows us to explore an aspect of learning consistent with what Dewey 
associated with pedagogical growth (see Dewey, 1916); as the growth of habits that 
enable future habit making. In Peirce’s phenomenology (which he called phaneroscopy) 
this is expressed by the emergence of firstness (the possible) through a rupture in our 
habitual modes of being-in-relation to the environment (thirdness). This rupture is ‘felt’ by 
the learner through the encounter with resistance (the ‘indexical rub’, cf. Campbell 2016), 
where anticipated models fail to fully account for the fullness of experience; this 
constitutes a ‘Firstness event’ (Campbell 2018a).85 
 
All in all, category theory approached phenomenologically (and not 
metaphysically), presents us with non-reductionist learning theory that can account for 
indeterminacy, riskiness, uncertainty, and openness; all of those essential educational 
qualities as argued by Beista (2016[2013]) in his important book The Beautiful Risk of 
Education. 
 
Structure and Method 
 
Now with our basic theoretical orientation of edusemiotics clarified with its 
alignments to biosemiotics and MST expressed, we can explain more directly the 
objectives for this study. My task is twofold: 
 
First, to address how signification processes emerge on what anthropologist 
Michael Ling (personal correspondence) refers to as the bio-existential level. The focus 
of this first line of inquiry is the basic components and processes involved in 
 
 
84 Cf. Rose (2016) for more on the Peircean notion of emergence. 
85 Eco (2014, p. 514) explains this aspect of Peirce’s categories: “The emergence of Firstnesses 
through their being opposed to one another (Secondness) starting from the regularity of the habit 
(Thirdness) for Peirce is an event (CP 6.200), i.e. a singularity, a point at which something occurs… 
In this way the spontaneity of Firstness, whose irregular and singular nature Peirce underlines (CP 
6.54) turns out to be nothing other than an infinitesimal deviation from the law and from the 
regularity on whose basis it is produced (CP 6.59)”. 
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the emergence of the perceptual process; that is, the terminus a quo of finite semiosis 
(semiosis in the organism) and thus also the emergence of embodied sense-based 
learning. These are (proto86) semiosic process that help to explain how our initial 
sensory impressions (firstness) are realized through a process of adaptive fallibillism; 
their resistance and impression upon an organism’s perceptual system. This is fallibilism 
as expressed by the coming-into-being indexical interaction of secondness: how a 
primary iconism is only realized through a primary indexicality (that takes the form of a 
‘shock’ towards sign re-collection and re-cognition). This self-sustaining (and auto- 
poeitic) process of realizing the iconic properties of the environment through indexicality, 
forms the basis of pre-conceptual sensorimotor perception, that is, the organism’s 
processing of its umwelt through its internal structures (innenwelt) in a circular feedback 
loop (see Fig. 3). 
My secondary task will be to draw out several fundamental principles from this 
analysis that a Peircean theory of learning necessitates (the above 
mentioned IH, PSR, CP, and NLFP). To reiterate, my goal will be, not to explain the 
extensional modelling systems in any significant detail (the SMS and TMS respectively), 
but rather to address the main concepts and principles that can help educational 
researchers address the fundamental aspects of perceptual engagement, representative 
of what we are here calling the proto-semiosic sustainment of umwelt.87 
 
By narrowing our focus to the basic conditions that make perceptual learning 
possible, we can hopefully gain insight into some of the central claims of edusemiotics. 
Only through such careful attention to beginnings can we, as Danesi (2010) says, help 











86 “Proto”, as this is not yet a genuine triadic interaction, we are still at the footholds of genuine 
thirdness; there is only the possibility of future mediation. Cf. Eco (2000, 2014, pp. 508–530). 
87 This model is in several ways a synthesis of Nesher’s (2001) model of abductive perception and 
learning, and the Vichean model of mind presented in Danesi (1993). 
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Proto-semiosic Sustainment of PMS 
 
The Primacy of Iconicity in Learning 
 
Many edusemiotic writers (myself included) have followed what has been called 
the iconic turn in semiotics, largely following a new reading of Peircean ideas presented 
in Eco’s (2000) Kant and the Platypus. Olteanu (2015, p. 76) has articulated this 
orientation cogently, saying “icons are the signs that afford learning, all signification 
having an iconic ground.” This is obvious in everyday teaching and learning situations. 
No two people learn something in the same way: A trumpet student who knows basic 
piano will possess a very different relationship to harmony, then one who does not; a 
physics student learning about the concept of force who knows how to swim, will have a 
very different relationship to this knowledge then another student who doesn’t, etc. 
Olteanu (2015, p. 75) clarifies: 
 
What happens when learning, is that structures of signification (what needs 
be apprehended) have to settle on already existing structures of 
signification: a learner. In their interaction, these signs will find their own 
compatibility and the probability for this to happen in the same manner in 
two different cases is too small to be considered. 
 
Within a Peircean informed edusemiotic, both individuals and generals are 
admitted to have causal efficacy. The ‘general’ idea of some-thing is recognized as real, 
in the sense that this materially absent idea impacts upon our actions and responses in 
the phenomenologically ‘real’ present. This is to assert the reality (and in fact 
the causality) of teleology itself (or what Aristotle called final cause). From this we can 
better understand our nominalist leanings in popular learning theory, which whatever 
(more or less) materialist or (more or less) behaviorist, are distinctly dyadic, thus giving 
way to determinist explanatory frameworks. Thirdness—or the growth of interpretants 
and thus the growth of action-possibilities—occurs in perceptual learning to mediate 
between the processes of qualification (firstness) and sense-impression 







88 “We only know the potential through the actual, and only infer qualities by generalization from 
what we perceive in matter” (CP 1:429). 
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sense that we can understand learning in the Deweyian sense (1916) as “the formation 
of habits that will engender a [future] receptiveness to novelty” (Campbell 2017, p. 17).89 
 
Learning in this understanding is expressed in an anticipatory 
dynamic (Nadin 2009, 2010, 2014, 2017), where the anticipation of a future state 
changes and mediates the learner’s relation to the present as well as the 
past.90 Education understood through such a triadic philosophy, consists in the 
deliberate cultivation of this anticipatory response and mindset. Such an account of 
learning involves the ability to conceptualize oneself as a semiotic entity, as a sign in a 
process of continual unfolding (cf. Olteanu 2015, p. 74), undergoing continuous growth 
simply as being part of the life-process. Teaching then, from an edusemiotic perspective 
is not about finishing things off, or closing and solidifying a worldview, but rather about a 
continual opening-up to a future not yet determined; and the school itself can be 
imagined as a place of continual and sustained suspension, where this form of semiotic 
emergence can occur (cf. Masschelein 2010; Stables et al. 2014). 
 
What we can call the primary modelling capacity in the organism/learner, is, in its 
most basic description: a basic iconic/mimetic attention to the environmental surround as 
expressed in perceptual action and emergent patterning. This has been referred to 
simply as the iconicity hypothesis (Danesi 1994, 1998). This is the process by which 
an organism, through continuous acts of semi-instinctual and mostly pre-conceptual 
inference produces and emits models (in the form of meaning-bearing sign vehicles) to 
adapt to dynamic environmental conditions. Edusemiotic analysis has shown that this 
basic level of receptivity can be expressed in educational discourses by 
adopting abductive models of learning (Nesher, 2001; Shank and Cunningham, 1996; 
 
 
89 Affifi (2014, p. 76) explains in the context of his “biological pedagogy”: “For Dewey, growth occurs 
when possibilities open up for an organism, thereby “enhancing its ability to participate in its 
environment” (Gouinlock, 1972, p. 238). It is the process of developing habits that allow the 
organism to interact more spiritedly, responsively, and openly to arising circumstances. By contrast, 
a lack of growth limits possibilities of encounter, as the organism relies on preformed habits that 
stultify, ossify, and close it off to novelty… growth is predicated on habits that enable future habit- 
forming, whereas the restriction of growth occurs when existing habits monopolize the operational 
domain” (see also Dewey 2004[1916], pp. 44–48). Aligning this understanding with Eco’s 
(1962[1989) pre-semiotic poetics of openness, we can say that this is an aesthetic-oriented 
philosophy of education, in the sense that we locate learning in the aesthetic pleasure and 
sensibility involved in this perpetual opening to future semiosic unraveling (cf. Campbell 2018b; 
Chap 2., this thesis). 
90 I have aligned the science of anticipation to edusemiotics in depth elsewhere (Campbell, 2017). 
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Shank, 2008; Semetsky, 2005; Stables and Semetsky, 2015, pp. 16–30; 
Campbell 2018a), in place of common (in theory and practice) deductive and inductive 
models, which are generally characteristic of information processing (as well as banking) 
models of learning.91 
 
How Mind Emerges from Matter 
 
Iconicity provides the very foundation for understanding how semiosis and learning can 
be conceived as co-extensive and is thus one of the central concerns of edusemiotics. 
All my examples so far have focused on how iconicity functions through organisms. This 
is in line with the broadly ethnological and zoological aims and history of MST. However, 
I want to argue that we can better understand the educational significance behind 
the iconicity hypothesis92 by understanding how and in what ways these processes are 
first operative in the physical world. To demonstrate this, I will adopt the approach to 
Iconicity outlined by Thom (1973) and elaborated further by Sebeok (2001[1994]). 
 
First, let’s consider how icons frequently occur in the natural world: the result of 
an effector system imprinting a replica of itself upon a receptor system. Consider the 
following examples, all first presented by Thom: 
 
• a person’s shadow, 
 
• a shape reflected in water, 
 
• a footprint in sand. 
 
In the first two examples the image is impermanent, based on a temporally fleeting 
specular model. It is a copy that is dependent upon the immediate presence of the 
effector under specific environmental conditions. However, in the third example, the 
receptor system possesses a degree of (what Thom calls) plasticity, which enables the 
footprint to not simply disappear once the impresser has come and gone. We can say, 
 
91 Abduction is, at its basis, a process that extends iconic forms outwards into the environment; 
“abduction transforms overall iconic structure into overall symbolic structure” (Pearson, 2017, 
Sect. 1.5). 
92 The IH rests on the NLFP; the understanding that all indicational (indexical), and extensional 
(symbolic) modelling is rooted in primary (iconic) forms that stem from the organism’s sensorimotor 
perception. 
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that the stimulus has transformed the receptive system in some way. “The formative 
stimulus alters the equilibrium of the receptor system when impressing the shape of the 
model; here the image becomes a memory trace (Sakitt 1975)” (Sebeok 2001 [1994], p. 
112). The dynamic process involved in the imprinting of this iconic caste from effector to 
receptor is what Thom refers to as competence. Competence requires models to make a 
“irreversible temporal interaction”; without such an ability to persist through time there is 
little or no possibility of the future attribution of semiotic value. And Peirce frequently 
emphasised, Semiosis always requires time. 
 
These examples of dyadic (or mechanical) iconicity provide a proto-semiosic 
window into the thoroughly triadic (teleological) processes displayed by living biological 
systems. According to a Sebeokian/Thomian view, life itself is the result of such primary 
iconism: 
 
A living being L fabricates at some temporal remove, another living being 
L^, L^ will soon supplant L. Thom claims that this feature of plasticity 
activates the genetic code, giving rise to a self-replicating, mutable 
molecular system that is also environment-sensitive… It becomes 
particularly plain in embryological development, which may be among the 
most dramatic forms of iconization: it is nature’s design for unfolding the 
growth and differentiation of a structure isomorphic with the parent by virtue 
of a spatial–temporal translating operation (Sebeok, 2001[1994], p. 113). 
 
As explained in the introduction, largely thanks to the bridging and pioneering 
work of Thomas Sebeok, the edusemiotic project and the biosemiotic project are coming 
together. Considering instances of primary iconism in both physical and biological 
processes alike brings us closer to understanding the enormous implications of this 
theoretical alignment for educational philosophy, specifically in orienting us towards a 
more pansemiotic perspective rooted in synechism, discussed in this study as the 




93 Peirce’s synechism is the doctrine that mind and matter cannot be logically considered distinct 
from one another. It has emerged as central to the edusemitoic orientation. Esposito (2007) has 
summarized the essential points of synechism, with reference to the Peircean corpus: 
(1) “the doctrine that all that exists is continuous” (CP 1.172); 
(2) the rejection of atomism and the existence of ultimate elements; 
(3) the view that continuity of being is a condition for communication (CP 7.572); 
(4) the view that to exist in some respect is also to not exist in that respect (CP 7.569); 
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Iconicity in Perception and Development 
 
To illustrate and motivate the foundational orientations of edusemiotics, we may carry 
Thom’s theories of iconicity to the other end of the ontogenetic ladder; to the 
phenomenon of perception. At this level of analysis, we can form a more adequate 
account of the basic requirements of perceptual-learning, here “regarded as a 
modification of dynamic competence by the sensory impact of external reality…”. 
Sebeok (2001[1994], p. 113) offers further clarification of this definition, reiterating 
the Sense Implication Hypothesis: 
 
Any competent system, for example, the mechanical and hydrodynamic 
components of cochlear partition and the acoustic cortex, or the retina and 
the visual cortex, etc., rapidly recovers its percipient virginity, indispensable 
for total and permanent competence, while its plastic faculty guarantees 
that the sense impressions remain stored in [some form of] memory. 
 
Following this account of iconic competence, we can now say that, for a minimal 
threshold of learning (as transformative growth) to occur the receptor system must in 
some way be transformed by the effector system. This transformation occurs through 
the receptor systems plasticity and dynamic competence, which is essentially the 
learner’s basic capacity to adapt to and assimilate novel stimulus-patterns. As I have 
shown elsewhere this can be understood as a re-iteration of a central Piagetian axiom, 
expressed here by John McManus, that, “For transformation to occur dis-adaptation in 
some form must occur in the attempted match between internal structure and its 
environment” (in d’Aquili et al., 1979, p. 196). This is almost paradoxical when made 
to conform to current materialist frameworks, as it implicitly says, that for learning as 
semiotic growth to occur, the modelling relation must not be completely determined, but 
 
 
(5) the view that "all phenomena are of one character" consisting of a mixture of freedom and 
constraint that tends in a teleological manner to increase the reasonableness in the universe (CP 
7.570); 
(6) the view that consciousness has a bodily and social dimension, the latter originating outside the 
individual self (7.575); 
(7) "the doctrine… that elements of Thirdness cannot entirely be escaped" (CP7.653); 
(8) a theoretical synthesis of pragmatism and tychism (the doctrine that chance events occur); 
(9) the fallibilist view that our scientific facts are continually subject to revision; 
(10) "a purely scientific philosophy [that] may play a part in the onement of religion and Science" 
(CP 7.578). 
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rather involve a minimal threshold of dissimilarity, or isomorphism, as Sebeok specified 
above. 
 
What is additionally made clear and emphasized by Thom’s descriptions of 
iconicity, is that this transformation occurs only to such a degree that the organism 
is capable (that is competent) enough to absorb and integrate the iconic imprinting with 
its existing internal structures (innenwelt). Thus, such primary iconicity is deeply tethered 
and dependent upon forces of indexcalilty (the effector cue) and is in fact only realized 
through the dynamical imprinting of iconic forms upon a receptor system. It is in this 
sense that we can follow Sebeok and Ayer in insisting that “there are no pure iconic 
signs; in fact, ‘no actual sign is an icon’ (Ayer 1968, p. 140)” (Sebeok 2001[1994], p. 
110), another prominent reminder of that central aspect of Peirce’s categories we just 
mentioned, that “firstness can be precinded (logically) from secondness but cannot occur 
in its absence” (Eco 2000, p. 190).94 Iconicity and Indexicality are deeply tethered in 
sense perception; and it is only the synthesis of their interaction that ensures the 
conditions for the subsequent creation of habits of perceptual action that form the basis 
for symbolic forms.95 
 
Primary Iconism and Abduction 
 
Primary iconism is distinct from relative forms of iconicity, as it is merely the 
presupposition to correspond, and not yet an established relationship of similarity; “and 
therefore the icon is a likeness, not in the sense that it is like something else, but 
because it is the phenomenon that founds any possible judgement of similarity, without 
being founded by it” (Eco 2014, p. 512). It is a pure Firstness and therefore not 
something that can ever be intentionally realized in awareness, yet however still 
profoundly impacts upon perception and cognition in the form of the semi-automatic and 




94 See also Ransdell (1979, p. 59). 
95 Within the domains of neuro-anthropology this has been referred to as the symbolic function (cf. 
Laughlin et al., 1990; Laughlin, 1992) which put simply refers to “the property of the nervous system 
by which partial information about the operational environment derived from the senses is 
associated neurologically with a far greater field of cognitive associations” (Laughlin, 1998). 
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In Kant and the Platypus (2000), Eco, in a brilliantly detailed study, addresses 
this hypothesized firstness of experience and how we may come to learn of it, 
concluding that all knowledge (even knowledge of primary iconism) must be attained 
through resource to a text, “an organizing principle whereby an element can be identified 
insofar as it is not the other, which by evoking it, it excludes” (2000, p. 111). This is to 
say that learning—in its most simple form—cannot occur without this encounter with 
the other, a minimal level of primary indexciality, and that it is through this responsibility 
to meet this ‘other’ that unrealized potential is realized and ‘educative’ events are 
created and enacted. Abduction represents this “move from what is known to the 
unknown” (Stables and Semetsky 2015, p. 25). Unlike deduction or induction, abduction 
merely tries to realize what is possible. Abduction reflects a tri-relative sign-model that 
paradoxically, through its constant closing in on itself (its circularity and self-reference), 
always opens new (virtual) possibilities. Kull (2009, p. 82) explains this reaching into the 
possible that constitutes the semiosic event: 
 
The sign vehicle, or representamen (or sign, sensu stricto), stands for an 
Object. This is the relation that is created by semiosis. The object, thus, 
has an interesting duality—it is both there and is not there—because it is 
both connected and anticipated. The relation of standing for is possible 
owing to the absence of what is referred to (the object) and, concurrently, 
there cannot be semiosis without the existence of a reference (an object) 
[…] Semiosis is what makes anything plural. 
 
What we realize through Peirce’s semiotic is that potential states weigh upon learning 
just as much as actual or future states do; these virtual ‘absential phenomenon’ 
(Deacon, 2011) are very present and ontologically ‘real’ in both biology and experience, 
despite their semiotic immateriality. Eco’s (2000, 2014) explorations of primary iconism 
remind educational philosophy that what we in fact uncover through the fallibility of 
indexicality, is that there was something inside us (yes, a pure potential to react and 
respond) that called out for us to attend to and learn about the world. The ‘will to carry on 
living’ is here co-dependent with the ‘will to learn’ (cf. Dewey 2005[1934]). 
Conceptualizing this metaphysical concept of firstness allows a vantage point from which 
to envision a beginning, a terminus a quo of learning (a beginning that precedes 
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cognitive awareness), or more precisely, to an imprint; an impression left by an 
impresser that is no longer accessible to us.96 
 
Meeting the unknown 
 
Thus, realizing an “implicit philosophy of education” (Chiasson, 2005; Olteanu, 2015) in 
the Peircean corpus, involves in large part cultivating what I have previously called “a 
pedagogy of novelty” (2016, 2018a). This stems from the understanding that all learning- 
growth is the result first and foremost of a student’s willingness and ability to rise and 
meet the unknown; to find, through an abductive leap, the familiar in the new: “If A is B, 
and C can be signified by B, then maybe A is a sign of C. As a hypothesis-bearing 
statement, abduction asserts its conclusion only conjecturally…” (Stables 
and Semetsky, 2015, p. 20). Within this pedagogical orientation, a teacher’s primary role 
is to develop an attention and receptiveness to the indexical rub of learning; “that initial 
friction or resistance felt when meeting a new experience” (Campbell 2016, p. 17). 
Peirce’s philosophy reminds us that the art of teaching involves, not principally the 
transmitting of knowledge, but fostering this basic receptivity in learners. Learners who 
are receptive to novelty, to ambiguity, to risk, will continue learning their entire lives.97 
 
MST posits that the way organisms model their innenwelt (inner model) after the 
umwelt (outside model) is iconic, in the sense that a model is “essentially a reductive 
analogy, and therefore ultimately a kind of icon” (Sebeok 2001[1994], p. 140). Petrilli 
(2003, p.71) explains this notion of ‘diagrammatic reasoning’ that was so central to 
Peirce’s (post 1890s) thought: 
 
[T]he model is an icon, a kind of diagram, where the most pertinent relations 
are of a spatial and temporal order. These relations are not fixed once and 
for all but can be mixed and modified and fixed again, in correspondence 
(a resemblance relation) with the innenwelt… of the human organism.98 
 
 
96 These ideas are expanded upon in my article “In Search of Our Beginnings: Locating Firstness 
in Arts Education in the Service of Advocacy” (2018c). 
97 See Yu (2017, p. 374), for more on how edusemiotics when coupled with MST strongly suggests 
the “inevitability of life-long education”. 
98 See also Legg (2017) for more on diagrammatic teaching and learning. 
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It is through this impression-caste metaform99 (cf. Danesi, 2013) outlined above 
that we can understand semiosis as the modelling competence of a species, that is, “as 
the capacity of a species to produce and comprehend the specific types of models it 
requires for processing and codifying perceptual input in its own way” (Sebeok and 
Danesi, 2000, p. 5).100 I have shown elsewhere (2016) through the specific examples of 
‘learning music by ear’ and ‘learning new words’ (building from Nöth, 2010), that the goal 
of a pedagogy of novelty, is in large part to encourage and guide students to reflect 
deeply on their own resistances to novel experiences and feelings, by honing their 
creative powers of abduction, the capacity to imaginatively infer a frame of reference to 
account for the new learning. As represented by Fig. 2 below, this involves finding, 


























99 A metaform is essentially the non-verbal component of a conceptual metaphor: “A “metaform” 
can be defined as the form that is connected interpretively (semiotically) to a conceptual metaphor 
as a consequence of the metaphor being distributed throughout the cultural network of meaning” 
(Danesi, 2013, p. 35). 
100 This is concurrently the general picture that emerges from Piagetian approaches to 
development, which purport that “all stimuli in the external world are defined and given meaning in 




Figure 4.2. How learners adapt to novelty (adapted from Campbell 2016, p. 26) 
 
After a space and state of mind is created that enables the student to live 
in and tolerate this indexical rub they must raise themselves to the 
challenge of meeting it. This type of education requires us, student and 
teacher, to reach into the entirety of our personal acquired experiences for 
similarities  and  resemblances  to  what  we  are  experiencing 
(Campbell, 2016, p. 27). 
 
The bottom-bounded circle (in contrast to the porous top one) represents how 
novelty will remain on the outside, and unrelated to an organism’s internal world of 
experience (innenwelt) unless this basic receptivity to novelty is cultivated. This 
receptiveness is educated, not through detached observation, but through collectively 
(teacher and student) acting upon the environment/umwelt and being acted upon by it. In 
line with Peirce and Dewey, learning in this understanding emerges through the principle 
of habit. It is in this sense that we may follow Dewey and locate learning and education 
in the emergent growth of habits that enable future habit taking; “the result of the 
educative process”, he says, can only ever be a “capacity for further education” (1966, p. 
68), and Semetsky replies “The more an organism learns the more it still has to learn: 
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education means more education and becoming more developed signs” (Stables and 
Semetsky 2015, p. 81).101 
 
The learner tunes her perceptual-action to her surroundings through a process of 
being in-habit, through active doing-undergoing (to use another Deweyian notion). As we 
will be further elaborating, we can only realise the impact of firstness upon our learning 
and life through a rupture in the regularity of habit, and such rupture can only contribute 
to the growth of future habits (to learning) through a perpetual attunement to the 
unknown. It is quite directly, the creation of habits that enable future semiotic unfurling; 
the opening of possibilities and variations in our umwelt. 
 
The basic orientation of umwelt, reflects what anthropologist Tim Ingold calls 
an ‘ontology of dwelling’ (2000, p. 42, 2009, 2017).102 A ‘dwelling perspective’ takes as 
its starting point for understanding the human condition direct perceptual engagement 
within an historically specific environment. This approach represents a swift in thinking 
about learning as is often expressed in both constructivist and behaviorist accounts, 
which generally explain that a learner’s perceptual engagement is mediated through 
representations or schematic/formal reductions. The mind processes and constructs 
sense data into schemas or ‘ideas’. According to Ingold, these approaches reproduce an 
implicit nature/culture (and corollary mind/body dichotomy); the idea of a depersonalized 
environment which presents the raw materials that learners use to construct meaning out 
of. A theory of umwelt in contrast reminds us that learning occurs through co- 
participation in a shared environment; by ‘pointing out’ (indexing) significant events and 
possibilities in shared and overlapping phenomenal worlds (umwelten). 
 
The principle of assumed similarity 
 
What we are in fact describing through these basic accounts of how iconicity and 
indexicailty function within perceptual learning is another foundational aspect of 
edusemiotic pedagogy: to assume fundamental similarity instead of difference (see 
 
 
101 See Nöth in Stables et al. (2018, pp. 80–81) for a treatment and elaboration of my theory of 
indexical learning. 
102 Ingold himself has drawn significantly on the work von Uexküll (1957[1934]) as well as the 
ecological psychology of James Gibson (cf. 1979). 
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footnote 16). This is presented here as the Continuity Principle (CP). This orientation 
can only be explained through a relational (triadic) ontology, where emphasis is placed 
on the relations that bind people to the world around them. What is important in such 
iconic accounts of learning is “not the thisness of a that”, as in the western (/Aristotelian) 
notion of metaphor, but rather “that this is that” (Jackson as cited in Ingold 2000, p. 50). 
The continuity principle has major implications for how we as humans engage with the 
world around us. Ingold (2000, p. 50) explains how such a relational philosophy is 
especially present for those people anthropologists have traditionally called ‘hunter- 
gatherers’ and specifically within the Cree lifeworld, clearly perceptible in their relation to 
animals and the broader more-than-human world: 
 
Whereas Western thought sets out from an assumed dichotomy between 
the human and the animal and then searches about for possible analogies 
or homologies, the Cree trajectory… ‘seems rather the opposite: to assume 
fundamental similarity while exploring the differences between humans and 
animals’ (1989, p. 195) […] The move, if you will, is not from the literal to 
the figurative, but from the actual to the potential—for personhood, at root, 
is the potential to become a man, a goose, or any other of the innumerable 
forms of animate being. 
 
This assumed similarity is concurrently the dissolution of a prevalent 
culture/nature dichotomy in Western approaches to understanding cognition and 
learning. As Deely (2001, 2009) extensively tracked through the history of Western 
philosophy, this results from an idealist denial of relation (semiosis) as a modality of 
being in itself ‘over and above’ reductions to mind-dependent (ens rationis) or mind- 
independent being (ens reale). Such idealist and constructivist leanings implicitly 
suggest “that meaning does not lie in the relational contexts of the perceiver’s 
involvement in the world, but is rather laid over the world by the mind” (Ingold 2000, p. 
51). To recognize the role of mediation (thirdness) in learning, is to concurrently 
recognize how potential (firstness’) continually impact upon the present as a field of 
possibility (cf. Eco, 1979; Campbell, 2018b). In terms of the science of anticipation, this 
is the recognition that “the external world and the internal reality of integrated mental and 
physiological activity go into what is expressed in the anticipatory action—a realization 
from the large space of the possible” (Nadin, 2017, p. 156). Such a philosophical 
orientation has deep implications for pedagogy: helping to reveal an understanding of 
learning that doesn’t take as its foundation an “initial separation between human 
persons, (as meaning-makers) and the physical environment as raw material for 
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construction” (Ingold, 2000, p. 55). Such a philosophy of learning and teaching, suggests 
that knowledge of the world is not learnt through systematically building up and 
transmitting representations in the mind to account for sensory information, but rather 
through direct perceptual engagement with others in a shared world. That is, it is through 
the processes and habits of en-skillment that learners establish their basic perceptual 
relationships to their environment. It is these action-relationships that form the basis for 
the way we see and feel and move in the world. Ingold explains further: “knowledge of 
the world is gained by moving about in it, exploring it, attending to it, ever alert to the 
signs by which it is revealed. Learning to see then, is a matter not of acquiring schemata 
for mentally constructing the environment but of acquiring the skills for direct perceptual 
engagement with its constituents, human and non-human, animate and inanimate” 
(2000, p. 55). 
 
Thus, it is essential for edusemiotics to take seriously the reality of this world of 
direct relational entanglements, which is precisely what is presented to us in the rich 




As I have argued so far, the most fundamental place a Peircean edusemiotic can begin 
its search for foundations is with the phenomenal world that is sensibly and experientially 
available to the learner, the umwelt. Umwelt was a concept developed for ethology in the 
early part of the twentieth century by the Estonian-German scientist Jakob von 
Uexküll.103 As Sebeok (2001[1994], p. 144) notes the term umwelt itself “is notoriously 
recalcitrant to translation, although ‘subjective universes,’ phenomenal world,’ and ‘self- 
world’ variously approximate the author’s intent. However, ‘model’ renders it more 
incisively, especially in view of his credo that ‘every subject is the constructor of its 
Umwelt’ (Uexküll 1982, p. 87)”. The umwelt is the world that is actually available to an 






103 Cf. von Uexküll (1957[1934]). See Olteanu (2015, Ch. 1), Cunningham (1988) and Shank 
(1998) for a review of the concept’s relevance to education. 
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Correcting subject-object duality 
 
Applying John Deely’s “umwelt philosophy” (1990, 2001, 2004, 2010) to education, 
allows us to conceptualize learning—not solely as something subjective happening 
within the mind or skull of the learner, nor solely in the verification of objective truths 
radiating from some hypothetical operational environment—but rather, as relational 
signification processes radiating between the environment and organism. Such an 
orientation calls for an inversion of the modern dichotomy of subject-object relations. In 
this late Latin perspective, what is ‘subjective’ are the things that ‘are what they are 
regardless of what anyone thinks them to be’, while the term ‘objective’ here refers to the 
process by which “things” become objects within an organism’s umwelt. That is, objects 
are only objects if they enter within the objective awareness of the leaner; if they have 
significance and meaning to them. This helps to elucidate how edusemiotics is decidedly 
a rejection of nominalist leanings in contemporary scholarship. Learning theory must 
come to account for more than the ‘particular’ (and more than the mechanical universe of 
cause and effect, or secondness) to embrace the ontology of unactualized potential 
(firstness), and how potential is realized differently by different organisms, but is yet still 
generalizable in the form of habits (thirdness). Thus, edusemiotics purports to study, not 
psychological states, nor subjective mind-independent states, but rather, 
the relations that mediate learner and world: 
 
On the contrary, there are no such thing as psychological states 
disconnected from objectivity. Objectivity precisely depends upon 
psychological states which give the subjective foundation or ground for the 
relations which terminate in the publicly experienced interpretations that 
are precisely what we call objects. The key to the whole thing is relation in 
its unique being as irreducible to its subjective source always terminating 
at something over and above the being in which the relation is grounded 
(Deely 2004, pp. 19–20). 
 
Signs constitute a mode of ontology, that is, as per the scholastic semiotic of 
Poinsot (1985[1632]), not solely subjective, nor solely objective. They are supra- 
subjective, dependent on subjective mind-independent ‘things’ as fundaments for their 
signifying relationships, but in no way reducible to any dyadic order. Thus, we have 
the principle of suprasubjective relation (for more on the PSR and its relevance for 
education see Campbell, 2017; Olteanu, 2015). 
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Of course, sustaining these relations underlying the learner’s umwelt, is the 
protosemiosic interaction of Primary iconicity and primary indexicality. This coupling of 
iconicity and indexicality is already suggested by Uexküll’s functional cycle: An animal 
perceives its umwelt (and thus renders it meaningful) by acting, moving and reacting 
within it. It is through this circularity of action and reaction that the animal continuously 
attunes its internal perceptual systems to the outside environment (its innenwelt to its 
umwelt).104 
 
Figuratively speaking, every animal grasps its object with two arms of a 
forceps, receptor and effector. With the one it invests the object with a 
receptor cue or perceptual meaning, with the other, an effector cue or 
operational meaning. But since all of the traits of an object are structurally 
interconnected, the traits given operational meaning must affect those 
bearing perceptual meaning through the object, and so change the object 
itself” (von Uexküll 1957[1934], p. 10) 
 
Ecological approaches, as informed by umwelt theory, maintain the general 
understanding that perception is a process not strictly of detection, but rather 
of attuning to objects, and more specifically, of engaging in processes of semiotic 
objectification. “Every action that consists of perception and operation imprints its 
meaning on the meaningless object and thereby makes it into a subject-related 
meaning-carrier in the respective Umwelt” (Uexküll 1982, p. 31). Dewey (2005[1934], p. 
108) expresses it poetically in Art-As-Experience: “In their physical occurrence, things 
and events experienced pass and are gone. But something of their meaning and value is 
retained as an integral part of the self. Through habits formed in intercourse with the 
world, we also in-habit the world.” Unlike the directness of perception stressed by Gibson 
(1979), which could never fully account for symbolic or extensional forms of semiosis, 
an ecosemitoic (cf. Nöth 1998, 2001) approach maintains the primacy of the organism’s 
continuous involvement in the environment through the constant ‘reading’, anticipating, 





104 This reoccurring circular feedback loop of umwelt becoming innenwelt, is explained through 
what von Uexküll called the functional cycle. Although there will be no time to explain the enormous 
intellectual wealth of this model, the functional cycle can be understood as a particular incarnation 
of the proto-semiosic cycle of primary iconism realized through primary indexicality explored in this 




An umwelt-model of learning, requires a concept that accounts for the process by which 
an organism anticipates, both intuitively and deliberately, the world around it. Yes, we 
are again talking about abduction: 
 
As already explained, abduction is at its root an adaptive perceptual process by 
which an organism infers (subconsciously or consciously) a frame of reference, in the 
form of an action-possibility to account for both virtual (potential) as well as actual 
novelty. Failure to account for abduction in many dominant models of learning and 
cognition has resulted in the proliferation of an ill-informed pedagogical assumption: that 
one cannot educate for or teach these processes of subconscious intuitive cognition. 
This has, as I’ve argued elsewhere (cf. 2018c, Chap 6 of this thesis), seriously reduced 
the impact and relevance of educational research and arts education in particular. We 
know from ordinary experience, that our ability to respond intuitively and instinctively to 
the surprising events and experiences we are presented with is constantly being 
developed (or tuned) by our active perceptual activity in the world. That is to say that 
although abduction is largely sub-conscious and automatic, it is still alterable through 
conscious reflection and action (cf. Paavola, 2005). This is an important point, for the 
neglect of such primary (non-representational, non-conceptual) forms of semiosis (the 
kind represented by abductive inference) have resulted in the systematic devaluing of 
learning processes associated with the arts: processes like creativity, imagination and 
intuition. This devaluing has resulted in a diminishing emphasis on arts education in the 
design of curriculum and educational national standards (cf. Jorgensen 2003, Ch. 2). 
 
Peirce explains that Abduction is the process of exploratory and creative 
hypothesis and the only way to account for the growth of new knowledge: 
 
It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction 
does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the 
necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that 
something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; 
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. (CP 5.172) 
 
It is this distinction from deduction and induction that allows authors like Nesher (2001) 
to show that abduction is the only inferential process that properly accounts for learning 
as growth. A neglect of abduction in educational research leads to computationalism 
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(see Danesi, 1994, for more on the computationalist fallacy), where learning is 
considered the result of entailing information from baseline algorithms, often presumed 
to be implanted in the brain. This is the idea that there are basic inherent schematic 
structures that orient learning, like, to use a popular example, Chomsky’s theory of 
universal grammar. As abduction also produces new information, it is inherently 
creative; it begins with an imaginative act. However, this creativity is a matter of degree, 
depending on the level of innovation or riskiness behind the inference, for abduction is 
also the very “ground state of cognition” (Shank 1991, 1998), of coming to terms with 
environmental novelty in the broadest possible sense. That is to suggest that, at its most 
primary level, abduction is the very process that enables us to cognize the environment: 
to structure and perceive patterns and affordances from the amorphous continuum of 
sense experience. 
 
Abduction is exercised in action and movement, in a constant dynamic of 
reaction and anticipation (cf. Campbell, 2017). Edusemiotics maintains that this 
abductive capacity is not passive, and therefore cognition and learning are not passive 
activities, even when not explicitly conscious or intentional. And although this basic level 
of attentionality (cf. Ingold, 2017) may be what we could call subconscious, it is not 
fundamentally insusceptible to being transformed and developed in subsequent 
experience. This already thereness of our consciousness may not be explicitly learned at 
all, in the sense that it is neurognostic and present prior to birth (cf. Laughlin et al., 1990; 
Laughlin 1992, 1996), but being ‘already there’ does not exclude it from the fact that it is 
constantly being refined and adjusted through a constant engagement (a dialogue) with 
the umwelt we inhabit. 
 
What we are in fact talking about, is the very readiness to learn that an umwelt 
approach reveals, and the general importance of understanding and conceptualizing this 
for philosophy of education. It corrects ‘bottom-up’ approaches to learning that maintain 
the sequential transition from sense impression to concept, by emphasizing instead the 
essential circularity of the functional cycle. “It means that every stimulus presupposes a 
readiness to react, and it is this readiness that ‘selects’ as a stimulus a phenomenon of 
the environment which had been neutral up to that point” (Reybrouck 2012). Hence, 
behind even the simplest stimulus response events are actually complex anticipatory 
dynamics. In more explicitly Peircean terms, we can speak of a dormant thirdness in 
138  
what is seemingly an entirely pre-inferential process of stimulus–response sensory 




Recapitulation and Future Research 
 
We have now sketched the interaction of primary iconism and primary indexicality, 
demonstrating that (1) a sub-conscious and automatic level of attention and response 
(explained through the concepts of primary iconism and abductive inference) is essential 
to explain the fullness of ‘what happens in learning’, and (2) that mal-adaptation 
(indexical rubs) are necessary to develop and refine this basic perceptual capacity in 
learners. Attention to this primary stage, may help to bring nuance to many debates 
within learning theory, which as mentioned, often pit disembodied computational 
approaches against overtly idealist and constructivist approaches. 
 
The following schemas track the theory I have elaborated, demonstrating how 
these foundational pre-intentional semiotic processes form the basis for primary, 
secondary, and tertiary modelling systems (which, at least in the human use of signs, 
come under the purview of existential thirdness as they concern representational 
phenomenon). This is how largely sensorimotor processes form the embodied 



















105 Expressed by the general degree of sign stipulation (see Deely, 1990)—that is, signs being 
stipulated from their context of occurrence, and to this extent, more symbolic/conventional. 
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Figure 4.3. The circularity of iconic and indexical learning 
 
These two processes (underlying iconic forms being realized through indexical 
‘dynamical’ reactions which constitute a circular feedback loop) constitute the Proto- 
semiosic sustainment of umwelt. 
 
The organism, interprets/processes these initial proto-semiotic interactions 
through a process of perceptual habitualization. This is the process of how the organism 
adapts to environmental complexity by drawing upon previous cognition and perceptual 
activity (the generalizing tendency of Thirdness), thus forming what we can here for 
simplicity (with the risk of implying a bifurcation of sub-conscious and conscious 
processes) we call the surface level of cognition.106 
 
To reflect upon initial sensory impressions and the role of automatic pre- 
intentional consciousness involves realizing the imprint of primary iconism upon the 
surface level of cognition. Applied to a Peircean theory of learning this constitutes: 
 
• an [abductive] inferential movement, which is fundamentally an act of 
attending to our; 
 
• primary modelling system (PMS). This abductive learning is a process of 
consciously shaping our largely automatic/instinctual perceptual activity 
 
106 As informed by Danesi (1993), while fully recognizing that cognition, and indeed consciousness, 
has varying levels of awareness/absorption, warps and phases. See Laughlin (1992) for a summary 
of a neuro-anthropological account of consciousness. 
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through reflective and contemplative practice: this is how the organism 
discovers and shapes its umwelt. From here it is a logical (and pedagogical) 
task to study how these primary (iconic) modelling processes are extended 
into the environment through the; 
 
• [Secondary modelling system (SMS)]. And finally, how these indexical and 
iconic signs are gradually stipulated from their context of occurrence, through 
habitualised social conventions, and form the basis for the thinking-at-a- 
distance characteristic of (abstractive) symbolic thought, or the: 
 
• [Tertiary modelling system (TMS)] 
 
Semiotic analysis allows us to understand how primary perceptual processes 
form the basis for all forms of learning and modelling behaviour, and, in alignment with 
MST, conceptualize how these primary processes become extended into more 




Education is a shared human endeavour (as Ingold, advances in his 2017 
book Anthropology and/as Education).107 The process and rituals that determine how 
knowledge is passed down within a human community concern the discovery of shared 
meaning between generations. This meaning is expressed in objective relations that 
mediate the observer, the observing, and the observed, according to a triadic (semiotic) 
logic. Orienting around the notion of umwelt, edusemiotics as a research agenda is not 
concerned with understanding learning as/through internal psychological states, but 
rather learning as/through semiosis, as an ‘objective’ relation of complementarity, and 
continual emergence. Edu-semioticians focus on how signs, 
as suprasubjective relations, mediate learner’s relations to the world (PSR). Signs are 
not just considered here for their referential function –how they refer to things –because 
signs don’t only refer to things, but rather, a way of being in relation with an umwelt. 
Modernist philosophy (culminating in Kant) located being within the mind of the subject. 






107 See also my interview with Tim Ingold here: https://philosophasters.org/blog/2018/4/15/tim- 
ingold-on-improv-writing-and-the-future-of-education. 
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This basic consideration of umwelt and supra-subjectivity, as educational scholar 
Shank (1998) tells us, takes us right to the basic philosophical orientation necessary for 
edusemiotics: 
 
When we consider the world not as a compendium of facts but as a web of 
meanings… then we go beyond concepts like environments and settings, 
to concepts like the world as an umwelt (Von Uexküll 1982). An umwelt is 
a “lived world,” where the things we observe take on significance. It is our 
job to read those observations in order to determine their significances. 
This act of reading consists of treating observations not for themselves, but 
as signs of other things. Since we don’t know for sure what they signify, we 
can only guess. Therefore, if we live in a world of signs, our most basic 
actions consist in reading those signs. Therefore, the process of abduction 
runs through our very act of living in a world that makes sense. Where that 
sense breaks down, our abductions need to be explicit and reflective. 
 
It is clear, that through this emphasis on the reality and ontology of relation, 
edusemiotics purports an embodied and inquiry-driven approach to education. Although 
this article has focused primarily on the basic conceptual and philosophical frameworks 
of this new research movement, edusemiotics has tremendous implications for ‘actual’ 
educational practice, outside of the world of theory. In my own career and life this 
semiotic perspective has provided me with endless new ways of making sense of my 
own educational experiences as a teacher and student. Unlike analytic philosophy, the 
tradition from which the modern professional/academic incarnation of philosophy of 
education derives from, we are assuming no dichotomy of concept from image. (Hirst 
and Peters say this outright in their seminal text: “What is a concept? It obviously is not 
the same thing as an image” (2012[1970], p. 3). As we have been discussing, the image 
(or icon) is primal and foundational to edusemiotics, for semiosis always stems from 
such sensory-schematic beginnings. It is from a place of primary iconism that learners 
establish their modes of habitual responsiveness to the world. Of course, sign systems, 
as they become extended beyond these primary forms of modelling, becoming more 
abstracted and symbolic, can increasingly lead to error. “Semiosis explains itself through 
itself” Eco (1979) reminds us. 
 
This is essentially what has occurred in much formal schooling and educational 
theory, which, in the interest of operationalizing learning and exercising standardised 
control over educational processes, have essentially removed the embodied (iconic and 
indexical) aspects of learning. This means quite practically that embodied forms of 
learning and knowing, often associated with arts education in particular have been 
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increasingly devalued in favour of instilling competence in deductive forms of 
computation and inductive measurement. Through this lens, the teaching and curriculum 
of formal music education (as one example) has greatly suffered, often reducing 
complex and deeply layered musical experiences to a form of symbolic processing (i.e. 
standardized musical methods, such as the Royal Conservatory of Music in Canada). If 
the reader has taken anything away from this study it is hopefully that, from a biologically 
rooted Peircean edusemiotic perspective, symbols do not spring up out of nowhere and 
therefore cannot simply be shuttled around between mind and world. Rather, they 
emerge from a place of direct perceptual engagement in a historically situated 
environment. When we privilege the concept over the image we effectively divorce the 
body from the sign, perpetuating our Cartesian heritage and stripping learning of its 
experiential import. It is in this sense that edusemiotics represents a comprehensive 
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Indexical ways of knowing: an inquiry into the 
indexical sign and how to educate for novelty 
 
As to things invisible and things mortal, the gods have certainties, but as 
far as men may infer ... men must proceed by clues. 
 
—Alcmaeon (Eco, as cited in Sebeok, 1994, p. 51)108 
 
Clues, Clouds and Conjecture 
 
Alcmaeon, the Greek fifth century B.C. doctor, describes humankind’s most foundational 
form of knowing—the primordial epistemological unit written into footprints, stars, 
droppings, soil, fingerprints, clouds, texts, our bodies—the books of nature and culture in 
their multifarious manifestations. This refers to the procedure of obtaining knowledge by 
way of provisional conjecture, the reading of what C. S. Peirce called “indexical signs,” 
and what Sherlock Holmes called “clues.” As Carlo Ginzberg (1980) suggested in his 
essay “Clues: Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes,” it is this simple and innate 
epistemological model that we see embodied in humankind’s prehistory; “lurking behind 
the symptomatic model is the gesture which is the oldest, perhaps, of the intellectual 
history of the human race: the hunter crouched in the mud, examining a quarry’s tracks” 
(as cited in Bondanella, 1997, p. 110). 
 
Indexicality, as I present it in this discussion, is the modality of actuality, of cause 
and effect, of physical force. An index is something that indicates (literally indexes) 
through a contiguous relationship a particular experiential pattern. Indexicality marks the 
contextual domain of meaning construction that relies on actual existential relationships 
between objects and signs that exist apart from any sort of interpretative convention. 
According to the American philosopher C. S. Peirce’s (1868) doctrine of categories, the 
indexical sign is the domain of secondness (of resistance, action, contiguity, volition) and 
 
 
108 This citation I couldn’t help but call attention to; a beautiful intertextual meshwork of three of the 
world’s great men of signs. 
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thus the domain where subjectivity and consciousness are established. Much 
mainstream education (to speak generally) enters learning from what Peirce refers to as 
thirdness or the symbolic realm. We bypass attention to the activities and contexts out of 
which knowledge emerges (secondness) and often outright ignore the aesthetic (pre- 
conceptual) dimension of experience (firstness). 
 
Throughout this discussion, I will use Peirce’s categories to provide a conceptual 
lens from which to understand the learning process. This “way of knowing” centered on 
the indexical sign is very much in line with ideas from research in situated cognition 
(Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989). Common to both these approaches is the 
understanding that education cannot begin with the dissemination of determined and 
conventionalized conceptual knowledge. 
 
All knowledge is … like language. Its constituent parts index the world and 
so are inextricably a product of the activity and situations in which they are 
produced. A concept, for example, will continually evolve with each new 
occasion of use, because new situations, negotiations, and activities 
inevitably recast it in a new, more densely textured form. So a concept, like 
the meaning of a word, is always under construction. (Brown et al., 1989, 
p. 33) 
 
Peirce described secondness or the coming into consciousness through 
indexicality as a “brute force” (CP 1.24)109; a confrontation with the organism that it must 
struggle to come to terms with. Like Donna West (2015), I see this resistance, 
characteristic of secondness, as key to cognitive development and learning. 
 
As such, struggle and the “confrontitial,” incorporate the sudden and even 
startling physical experience so characteristic of Secondness. Struggle, 
effort and resistance materialize upon exertion in the physical surround, 
especially prominent in the child’s early investigative endeavors. (p. 2) 
 
This viewpoint finds strong parallels in the cognitive and neuro sciences: through 
structuring our cognized environments (the way a particular organism makes sense of its 
surroundings through its senses and culture), we realize the fallibility of our actions and 
beliefs felt through dis-adaptation from our operational environments (the more or less 
“real”/objective reality we hypothesize). We are thus forced to “suppose a self” to auto- 
regulate between our internal systems and these external resistances (see for example, 
 
109 The abbreviation “CP” as per convention refers to the 8 volume Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1935– 1966). The numerals represent volume and paragraph, respectively. 
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d’Aquili, Laughlin, & McManus, 1979, pp. 183–215). Because the index has the “being of 
present experience” (CP 4.447), it is a potent tool from which to understand our 
relationship to our bodies and the worlds, both semiotic and physical, that we navigate. It 
is in terms of our actions in the world that our relationship to our body is achieved and 
the indexical sign, being a sign that is directly affected by its object, is the site where this 
embodiment is received and understood. 
 
In this discussion, I propose that the indexical sign can be used to derive a model 
for active (touching-and-feeling) learning. The implicit processes involved in the subtle 
reading of indices can help us to understand how students adapt to novelty in the 
learning process. I will begin by surveying different iterations of this paradigm in a variety 
of incarnations, showing how indexicality emerges in many faces and guises. I suggest 
that by recognizing the indexical understanding implicit in all acts of semiosis, we might 
encourage a pedagogy focused on the openness inherent in the interpretative act, as 
outlined in Umberto Eco’s poetics of openness (1979; 1962/1989). Through recognition 
of the inferential and situated nature of signs, it is possible to view every sign as a matter 
of interpretation that demands the active participation of the addressee. It is this 
inferential model of sign functions (where a sign is seen as an instruction for further 
interpretation, p ⊃ q) that Eco says reflects the inherent openness of sign processes 
and textual interpretation. This inferential understanding of semiosis presents a 
challenge to the modern dominance of a “degenerate notion of linguistic sign” (1984, p. 
24) related by a reciprocal model of equivalence (p ≡ q). It is this understanding of the 
sign, based on identity and verisimilitude, where a word is simply equivocated with its 
meaning (human equals rational animal), that I argue perpetuates a widespread 
commitment to univocal and quantifiable approaches to education and interpretation. 
This is the belief, characteristic of Western society, that we can know the world from a 
God’s-eye vantage point—the myth of the knowing subject. 
 
Besides looking at how indexicality functions in human ontogeny and cognition, I 
will also examine the human capacity for modeling our world through aggregations of 
representations (Sebeok, 1994). Modeling systems (with their implicit recognition that the 
human is a semiotic animal) help us to conceptualize how novelty is assimilated in the 
learning process. I posit that how we come to terms with new experiences (and new 
stimuli generally) is of an indexical nature. I am specifically referring to the site (marked 
by contiguity, resistance, actuality) where “the new” comes from the outside (like a rain 
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cloud signaling the coming storm) and acts upon us. We can recognize the rain cloud as 
an experiential pattern (as a semiotic entity) or not; the rain is still going to bear down on 
us regardless of the success of our interpretations. This existential realness of indexical 
signs is precisely their power to function as a pedagogical tool, to help us deal with (to 
assimilate and accommodate to) novel stimulus. The concept of modeling helps us 
conceptualize the process in which the new stimulus is absorbed and integrated into our 
cultural/semiotic systems. In short, this paper explores what I call the indexical rub of 
learning, that initial friction or resistance felt when meeting a new experience. My hope is 
that this exploration can aid in the cultivation of a mindset in teachers, students and 
researchers that does not fear this resistance; rather, it uses it to propel positive 
absorption (in the Deweyian sense) and engaged learning. The nature of these 
explorations will not be systematic, but rather meandering and driven by curiosity. 
Through these examinations, I do not wish to present indexical learning with any 
architectonic or systematic ambitions. I aim to elucidate its educational value; a reminder 
of an alternative way of knowing that is implicit (although perhaps dormant) in any 
interpretative process. 
 
The Various Faces of the Index 
 
The Index and Human Ontogenesis 
 
There is undoubtedly an indexical element to all acts of communication. This is the index 
of a pointing figure, a shout or a cry, any proclamation that suggests “look here,” any act 
of ostension. These are our personal pronouns when we lack the same language as our 
interlocutor. It is this primary indexicality that lies behind every act of semiosis and is 
lurking in the gestural origins of language, in terms of both humankind’s prehistory and 
her ontogenetic development. For example, according to Jean Piaget’s (1951, pp. 270– 
286) theory of the pre-operational period, primary indexicality marks our entrance into 





110 I am not denying, as Piaget did to a certain extent, that the young child does not yet possess a 
developed sense of self; I am just saying this subjectivity is not fully immersed in semiosis (or 
thirdness as Peirce would say). 
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As fashionable as it is to burn the bridges that Piaget built for us, his pioneering 
work still offers us a way of conceptualizing a child’s development into a meaning- 
making semiotic animal. His stages of development, as much as they have been 
reworked and elaborated upon (especially in showing how a child does not necessarily 
obtain these skills in the neat temporal sequence that Piaget envisioned), do make 
visible how a child progresses into the semiotic realm. My aim here is to synthesize 
these fundamental Piagetian principles with Peirce’s ontological sequencing of firstness– 
secondness– thirdness (or, in terms of how signs signify their objects, icon–index– 
symbol)—each theory a mirror that may illuminate aspects of the other. The relevance 
and usefulness of Piaget’s conceptualizations of how the child makes the “transition from 
predominantly non-conventional to conventional (normative) signs” (Zlatev, 2009, p. 
194), is evidenced by many recent studies in the language acquisition of children and 
primates (see, for example, Nelson, 1996; Tomasello, 2003; Zlatev & Andrén, 2009). 
 
One of the basic principles of Piagetian theory is the conviction that, throughout 
all periods of human development, as McManus (as cited in d’Aquili et al., 1979) states, 
“all stimuli in the external world are defined and given meaning in terms of their 
relationship to existing internal structures” (p. 188). According to Piaget (1971), the 
human cognitive apparatus’ unique ability to contend with rapidly expanding possible 
worlds—the complexity of our semiosic processes—is rooted in our “organic 
autoregulation”.111 
 
Cognitive processes seem to be at once and the same time the outcome 
of organic autoregulation, reflecting its essential mechanisms, and the most 
highly differentiated organs of this regulation at the core of interactions 
with the environment, so much so that, in the case of man, these processes 
are being extended into the universe itself. (p. 34) 
 
This is to assert that the higher cognitive and semiosic processes are extensions of 
basic and fundamental biological functions. But what are these basic internal structures 
that form the foundation for a newborn’s signifying potential? If, as Piaget asserts, all 
cognition is the result of building upon existing internal structures, then a newborn 
cannot be a tabula rasa. In short, what constitutes our human signifying capacity? 
 
 
111 “Organic autoregulation” refers to the internal adaptive mechanism that allows biological 
systems to adjust to outside stimuli. 
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The answer lies in the first stage of ontogenetic development; the sensorimotor 
period: a newborn baby endowed with only her basic sensorimotor ability (essentially 
bodily reflexes and simple movements) constructs, or rather reconstructs, her structures 
of intelligence in response to her environment. Through an auto-regulative process of 
assimilation and adaptation, the human child achieves a certain level of mastery with her 
own sensorimotor apparatus and gradually transitions to the second stage of human 
development, the pre-operational stage. In this stage, the child, having fully assimilated 
an entire range of simple movements, is able to begin replicating gestures she sees in 
other organisms. These replicated movements and gestures eventually become 
“detached from specific contexts and form the basis for representation” (McManus, as 
cited in d’Aquili et al., 1979, p. 190). The child begins to communicate, not in any 
indexical or symbolic manner, but rather through “likeness,” through imitation; what 
Peircean semiotics would call an example of (relative) iconicity (see section 2.2).112 
 
The imitation of physical acts—as movement gradually becomes significant 
gesture—constitutes the first instance of the “semiotic act.” With the advent of language 
comes the dissolution of the embodied self into a sea of preexisting and exterior 
structures; “(d)uring this process reality is progressively de-centered from the 
phenomenological perspective of the child and constructed as a system separate and 
outside him” (McManus, as cited in d’Aquili et al., 1979, p. 190). This is the growing 
understanding in the child that they exist in a signifying and communicating world, where 
an outstretched arm is endowed with an infinite degree of meaning relating to context 
and a particular universe of discourse. Implicit in these first understandings is the 
indexical sign, a sign that contains a contiguous relationship between its signifier and its 
signified; a sign that is directly affected by its object (Sebeok, 1994, p. 53). Iconicity 
(firstness) may pave the way, but our first entry into semiosis is realized in the touching- 
and-feeling corporeality of indexicality. Here, signs are not conventional like they are in 
natural languages; they are entirely motivated by the power of contiguity. This is but 






112 I should specify that this form of comparative similarity is not the same as primary iconism, that 
moment of atemporal singularity (firstness) hypothesized to be the terminus a quo of the cognitive 
process. 
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organization are not the characteristics of the objects he encounters, but the effects of 
his actions on these objects” (McManus, as cited in d’Aquili et al., 1979, p. 189).113 
 
These Piagetian principles, synthesized by McManus, concur with Peirce’s 
assertion that we possess no powers of intuition and that cognition is only achieved 
through previous cognition as detailed by the first three points of Peirce’s “four 
incapacities”: 
 
1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of 
external facts. 
 
2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined 
logically by previous cognitions. 
 
3. We have no power of thinking without signs. (CP 5.265) 
 
I will be returning to these three points frequently throughout this paper. Both these 
schools of thought (Peirce’s and Piaget’s) insist that we construct and model our (real 
and possible) worlds not out of nothing, but through our unique species-specific sensory 
and cognitive abilities as well as the grains of resistance—the push back from our 
environments (Eco, 2000). 
 
The Index as a semiotic object 
 
The indexical sign is one of Peirce’s three classes of how signs signify their objects (the 
other classes being the icon, and the symbol), which is part of his larger tripartition of all 
experience into three categories of being: Firstness, the possible, defined by atemporal 
singularity; Secondness, the is, the existentially real; and Thirdness, the would be, the 
conventional and generalized world of semiotic determinations (Merrel, 1997, p. 27). 
 
The indexes’ most palpable incarnations are natural signs (if smoke then fire) and 
physical symptoms (red spots on the skin being symptomatic of measles). Indeed, it was 
the study of medical symptoms that birthed the formal study of semiotics with 
Hippocrates in the ancient world; an origin that cannot be overemphasized. Peirce states 
 
113 Because I do not have space to give a detailed literature review of semiosis in human ontogeny, 
I direct the reader to Zlatev (2009) who gives a detailed review of recent research that explores 
consciousness’ relationship to sign function. 
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that “an index … is a sign which refers to the object it denotes by virtue of being really 
affected by that object (CP 2.248). Because of this “direct dual relation of the sign and its 
object independent of the mind using the sign” (CP 3:361), indexical signs constitute the 
first realization of semiosis in the subject.114 Unlike the icon, which refers to its object 
through similarity and resemblance, and the symbol, which signifies through convention 
(and therefore only to general classes of object), the index is how we refer to actual 
states of the world. It is in this sense that “indexicality is an essential requirement for 
representation” (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 5), including the representation of our own self in 
relation to the world (as we shall see in the next section). 
 
Thomas Sebeok, in a lecture at the Imatra Summer School of Semiotics, 
demonstrated these three classes of signs by describing the following hypothetical 
environments. In this lecture, paraphrased by Juha Ojala (2009), Sebeok tells us to 
imagine a fast road going over a hill. Behind the hill, there is a school on one side of the 
road, and houses on the other. Children have the habit of crossing the road just under 
the top of the hill. This is dangerous, because car drivers cannot easily notice them when 
driving up the hill from the other side. Therefore, a traffic sign is set at the foot of the hill 
warning the drivers. Consider three options: 
 
• The sign is a picture of children walking right to left, hand in hand (as is 
customary in many European countries), with the commonly agreed-on 
framing and colors for warning. The desired effect is, of course, that the sign 
warns about the children and, hopefully, triggers the action (as an 
interpretation of the Sign) of the driver slowing the car down. It works for all 
those drivers who make the connection from the (not-so-illustrative) picture of 
children in a triangle (which form is arbitrarily chosen) to the predicted risk of 
hitting the children crossing the road. The drivers need to have the habit of 
action of slowing down and paying attention to children when perceiving the 
sign. In this case, the road sign is a Sign as an Icon, emphasizing the iconic 
aspect of the Sign and the category of Firstness. 
 
• The sign—be warned, this is the morbid part—is not a road sign, as regulated 
by traffic legislation. Instead, brake marks, wrecks of smashed cars and 
victims of the accidents are left by the road side to indicate the risk, pointing at 





114 As Eco says, referencing a central aspect of Peirce’s categories, “firstness can be precinded 
(logically) from secondness but cannot occur in its absence” (Eco, 2000, p.190). See also Ransdell 
(1979, p. 59). 
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an Index, emphasizing the indexical aspect of the Sign and the category of 
Secondness. 
 
• In the third option, the sign says: “Look out! Children at play!” For those who 
understand written English, it warns about the children, and hopefully, again, 
prompts the action of slowing the car down. Those who cannot read or do not 
understand English probably keep speeding. The road sign in this case is a 
Sign as a Symbol, i.e. in it, the symbolic aspect of the Sign and the category of 
Thirdness are emphasized. (p. 273-274) 
 
In this example, the different ways signs signify their objects is illustrated 
cogently. It also becomes clear that it is possible (and indeed probable) for one class of 
sign to contain elements of other classes to varying degrees. Ojala elaborates this 
gradient effect as it occurs in the above scene: 
 
Namely, the Symbol (of the category of Thirdness) includes aspects of 
Secondness (it has an actual existence as a sign, and assumed causal 
effects on other objects, etc.), and Firstness (it manifests qualities, such 
as the colors of the letters versus background, etc.). The Index 
(Secondness) includes aspects of Firstness (qualities of the marks, wrecks, 
and bodies), and also Thirdness (the representation of danger, the 
intended mediation between actual accidents of the past and prediction of 
the risk of future accident, etc.). Likewise, the Icon (Firstness) includes 
aspects of Secondness (actual existence as a sign, as above), and 
Thirdness (the negotiated representation of danger and the connection 
between past and predicted future, as above). (p. 274) 
 
This explanation reflects Eco’s (1976) approach in his A Theory of Semiotics 
when he rejects the project of creating a typology of signs in favor of a typology of sign 
functions, the idea being that a particular act of communication activates certain aspects 
of a sign while repressing others. “We classify aspects of signs not sign themselves, 
because “a given sign may –more often than not does – exhibit more than one aspect, 
so that one must recognize differences in gradation” (as cited in Sebeok, 1994, p. 43). 
 
Inherent in this emphasis on sign functions is the implicit understanding that 
meaning is never frozen but always activated through a particular universe of discourse; 
a belief that obviously carries much educational relevance. It also reminds us of Peirce’s 
insistence that the sign is irreducibly triadic. As Mihai Nadin (2015) said, in a lecture at 
the Tartu International Semiotics Summer School, “a sign cannot be anything less than 
all three components; the relationship between what is represented (Object), how it is 
represented (Representatmen), and what is the process of interpretation (Interpretant).” 
This leads him to insist that in this regard there is no such thing as indexical signs, for 
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they are only index to something else. Nadin recognizes signs as constructs that help us 
to deal with the constant dynamism of the universe; they present us with generalities as 
a means of capturing distinctions in the world.115 This is what this paper attempts to do; 
not to reduce complex relationships to either indices, icons, or symbols (to fall into the 
trap of vicious Peircean traidism like many well- intentioned semiotic studies) but rather 
to remind the reader of a potent indexical element in how these multifaceted 
relationships manifest themselves through us (the interpreters). Recognizing sign 
relationships as predominantly indexical, iconic or symbolic is really just a way to capture 
common experiential patterns, distinctions that help us better contend with our semiotic 
interactions. 
 
Coping with the new 
 
Jean Piaget and his many disciples have long insisted on the need for novelty in 
ontogenetic development. We have already established that human thought is auto- 
regulative, that is a result of the organism’s constant actions on and reactions to its 
environment: “human knowledge is a construction rooted in the most basic biological 
functions and out of which the structures of intelligence are constructed by man himself” 
(McManus, as cited in d’Aquil et al., 1979, p. 185). The organism adapts to and 
organizes its environment through an equilibration process of assimilation and 
accommodation. In order to create and update internal structures that better contend 
with an environment that is often in flux and presenting new challenges, the ability to 
process and contend with novelty is a necessity. Again McManus: “For transformation to 
occur dis-adaptation in some form must occur in the attempted match between internal 
structure and its environment” (p. 196). 
 
The active subject 
 
Anthropologists and cognitive scientists (e.g. Lancy, Bock, & Gaskins., 2009; d’Aquili et 
al., 1979) have shown how low stimulation and low complexity environments can cause 
phylogenic and ontogenetic stagnation. When an environment becomes overly 
homogeneous and no longer presents its inhabitants with dis-adaptation, the society is 
 
115 A perspective, it should be noted, at odds with the biosemiotic one, which sees signs as 
existentially existent entities and not conceptions of mind. 
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forced to either generate the lost complexity—to redraw its cognitive schemas in a new 
light—or to reinforce its existing societal structures in an attempt to better insulate itself 
against the unknown.116 Often, the individual organism or society takes this later route 
when it is overtly saturated with new stimuli. When faced with an overabundance of 
novelty, the organism shuts down—realizing that it can’t possibly process such a surplus 
of new information, it reverts into itself and simply reasserts its existing internal 
structures—reinforcing the boundaries of its world. The educational significance of this is 
clear: one of the principle roles of the educator is to be constantly striving to determine 
how much novelty the student can process before he or she hits this saturation point. 
 
One of the central tenets of this paper is that subjectivity and learning are 
established in an active (touching and feeling) subject. Through a Peircean lens, as we 
transition out of the indeterminacy of firstness—of singular and ungeneralized percepts 
to fully formed perceptual judgments, from initial sensation to the culturally determined 
conceptualizations inherent in the domain of thirdness—we experience the indexical 
core of secondness; here, at the footholds of thirdness (the exclusive realm of semiosis), 
there is a transitory state where we recognize the sensation, the dynamical object, as 
acting upon us, as resisting upon our being. This is the brute force Peirce spoke of; it is 
the wall we walk into and, through the shock of hitting our nose, realize that there is 
indeed a wall where we thought there was done (see Eco, 2000). This paper attempts to 
return attention to this particular domain of being, the site where we experience our 
first awareness of ourselves as those separate phenomenal beings called I, but also the 
site of what Ranciere (1991) calls universal learning; the groping in the unknown process 
that characterizes the child’s first knowledge and interactions. 
 
This type of indexical subject I am elaborating can be elucidated through what 
Damasio (1999) calls the neural self—the type of representation “of the person in the act 
of perceiving and responding to what is perceived” (Benson, 2001, p. 36). This is the 
“third party” representation of the organism interacting with objects in a dynamic and 
changing environment. According to Damasio (as cited in Benson, 2001), “[o]ur 
individual identity … is anchored on this island of illusory living sameness against which 
we can be aware of myriad other things that manifestly change around the organism” (p. 
 
 
116 Although it may seem rash I feel these two options are general enough to categorize the main 
phylogenetic possibilities of cultural/environmental stagnation. 
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36). When our conception/representations of self are static and unchanging (as they are 
for victims of anosognosia) we lose our ability to engage with and model our lifeworlds. 
Without this capacity for mentally envisioning active engagement with the world, the 
learning faculty is effectively destroyed. So, if it is out of this active dynamic subject that 
we construct and feel our way through the world, why should educational practice be 
established around the designation of static and determined knowledge? If, according to 
Damasio, our sense of self depends upon dynamic and malleable mental 
representations, why would the learning process be any different? What I am attempting 
to unravel gradually through this discussion, as we travel across disciplines and ideas, is 
that the ability to contend with novelty is a necessity for general human flourishing and 
central to educational praxis. Despite illusions of knowledge being something out there 
to be decoded (providing one can find the code)— something to be taken on authority 
(from somebody who already possesses it)—it is actually something felt through the 




As warned in my introduction, we now embark on what may appear to be a digression 
from our main topic, but as my friend and mentor Michael Ling frequently says “the 
shortest path between two points is often a digression.” Maybe this isn’t the shortest, but 
I do feel it reveals something important about indexicality not yet explored. 
 
We accommodate and assimilate “the new” by expanding or redrawing our 
cognized environments—by redefining our life worlds to incorporate new phenomena. 
This can be understood as a process of modeling.117 Modeling, in very general terms, is 
a way to establish relationships (congruencies and similarities) between two different 
systems. Interpretative semiotics informs us that the human being is a semiotic animal— 
that is an animal who can only know the “outer world” through a patchwork of 
 
117 Modeling is a term that, these days, carries many negative connotations. These criticisms, I feel, 
are rightly attributed to a rigid understanding of modeling as the solidification of experience and 
environments (how they become operational). This understanding does not convey the complexity 
and dynamism evident in the foundational work of Robert Rosen and Thomas Sebeok. Since such 
a detailed study is not possible here, I direct the reader to Rosen’s seminal books on the subject: 
Life Itself (1991) and Anticipatory Systems (1985). In particular, see his distinction between Natural 
and Formal systems. For more of Sebeok’s theory of modelling, see his paper “In What Sense Is 
Language a ‘Primary Modelling System?’” included in his 1994 book. 
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constructed representations. Indeed, the mathematician Felix Hausdorff made this 
assertion in the late nineteenth century: 
 
The human being is a semiotic animal; his humanness consists of the fact 
that instead of a natural expression of his needs and gratification, he 
acquired a conventional symbolic language that is understandable only 
through the intermediary of signs. He pays in nominal values, in paper, 
while the animal in real, direct values The animal acts in Yes and No. The 
human being says Yes and No and thus attains his happiness or 
unhappiness abstractly and bathetically. Ratio and Oratio are a 
tremendous simplification of life. (as cited in Nadin, 2014, p. 80) 
 
This insistence on the zoon semiotikon is better understood by looking at the 
mathematician Gödel’s definition of complex systems through the criteria of decidability. 
Nadin (2014) unpacks Gödel’s definition: “[A] complex system cannot be fully and 
consistently described. All other systems (those that can be unequivocally specified) 
qualify either as simple, or at most, complicated” (p. 78). In his paper “Semiotic Is 
Fundamental Science,” Nadin spells out how the living is characterized by complexity 
and dynamism. The world of the living is one that we can never know in its entirety. We 
observe a world in flux—just as I change through this observation, the world changes 
me. So, we formulate representations (semiotic entities) to account for this change; 
these representations are predictive and anticipatory in nature. There is an assumption 
(rooted in Galilean Physics; see Ginzberg, 1980) that the non-living is subject to law, that 
it can be completely described and predicted. This is what Windelbrand called the 
nomothetic. There is no geometry in nature (no triangles or geometric planes) but this 
does not mean geometrical constructs cannot help us contend with reality. Nadin (2014, 
p. 78) shows that the world of physics is no different: 
 
The non-living is subject to prediction. Indeed, the knowledge acquired over 
time and expressed in scientific laws supports a broad spectrum of 
successful predictive activities: the entire exploration of outer space is 
based on such activities; so are the most common uses of machines (cars, 
TV sets, computers, refrigerators, etc.). The laws of physics and chemistry 
underlie such practical endeavors. Prediction applied to the living, in the 
form of medical assessments, for example, corresponds to the misguided 
notion that since the laws of physics apply to everything material, they apply 
just as well to life. Some are successful, some are not. 
 
Thus, we come to construct our world through representations, selected patterns 
of experience of which signs are the media. This understanding of truth as construct is 
the idiothetic. The interactions we construct meaning out of are complex: “[S]ince the 
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living is characterized by complexity it follows that any formal representation, including 
the modeling of the natural system, can only be a reduction” (Nadin, 2014, p. 78). 
Semiotics provides us with the realization that we can only know the world through 
semiotic descriptions—this is the domain of meaning, and “(m)eanings do not have to be 
consistent” (Nadin, 2014, p. 78). We aggregate various systems of representations 
(those of chemistry, physics, and mathematics, for example) to contend with the 
constantly transforming complexity of the living. But these representations can only ever 
be partial. The living constantly exceeds our reach; it is changed the instant we try to pin 
it down. As Eco says “semiosis explains itself by itself” (1976, p. 71). Since we can only 
know and navigate our lifeworlds through these aggregated representations (models), 
the representations we construct must be flexible and porous enough to accommodate 
to the dynamism of our environments. In line with research from situated cognition, I 
believe that in order for this to properly occur (especially in an educational setting), 
attention and primacy must be returned to indexical signification. 
 
A theory of situated cognition suggests that activity and perception are 
importantly and epistemologically prior—at a nonconceptual level—to 
conceptualization and that it is on them that more attention needs to be 
focused. An epistemology that begins with activity and perception, which 
are first and foremost embedded in the world, may simply bypass the 
classical problem of reference—of mediating conceptual representations. 
(Brown et al., 1989, p. 41) 
 
Despite some common reductive interpretations, our models (natural rather than 
formal, see Rosen, 1985) are not primarily constructed on the conceptual level of 
thirdness. Rather, they emerge through “our fundamental awareness of sensory 
impressions” (Rosen, 1985, p.45) or percepts (firstness), and our actions in the external 
world (secondness). 
 
And now that we have our feet wet in modeling theory, we return our attention to 




In what follows, I present a formalization of indexical learning (building on the pioneering 
work of Jordan Zlatev in cognitive semiotics) that I feel can be useful for teachers and 
researchers to conceptualize how students adapt to novelty. To do this, I feel it’s 
necessary to reduce this complex process to its simplest semiotic components. 
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Zlatev (2009) has created a formula for conceptualizing the “barebones” 
conditions for meaning creation across all levels of life; from the single celled organism 
to the encultured human being. This conceptualization can be understood as a modeling 
relation: 
 
Extending the analysis presented by Zlatev (2003), where meaning was 
defined as “the relationship between an organism and its environment, 
determined by [...] value” (ibid: 258) the concept of meaning in the present 
theory presupposes (a) subject S, (b) a subject-internal value system V and 
(c) a world in which the subject (as being-in-the-world) is embedded, W. 
Thus a particular phenomenon within the world (p), which will necessarily 
transcend (i.e. go beyond) the subject, will have a given meaning M for S, 
according to the “formula” given in (1) and illustrated in Figure 1. In other 
words, the meaning of a given phenomenon, for a given subject, will be 
determined by the “type” of world (see below) in which both are embedded 
AND the value of the phenomenon for the subject. If either p falls “outside” 
W, or its value for S is nil, p will be meaningless for S. 
 
(1) M (p, S) = W(p) * V(p, S) … 
 
Subject S, world W (the borders of which are determined by the value- 
system of the subject, V), with phenomenon p, whose meaning is 









Building on Zlatev’s (2009) formalization and our previous discussion of modeling 
theories, it is possible to construct a conceptualization of how organisms (and 




Figure 5.2 How organisms adapt to novelty. 
 
As stated above, the organism constructs its cognized environment following the 
principles of fallibilism: through the grains of resistance experienced from the operational 
environment. It must be remembered that we have no direct powers of intuition (Peirce, 
1868) and that our modeling of the world is necessarily species specific (Sebeok, 1994). 
For these reasons, our modeled cognized environments (Ec’s) can never be in direct 
correspondence with our operational environments (Eo’s) but are rather bound in an 
asymptotic relationship. To assert that we can ever fully know our Eo’s is to be seduced 
by the great myth of the knowing subject—the idea that we can (with complete 
decidability) know the infinite complexity of the world of the living. To believe in such a 
final truth is to imagine that these asymptotic lines can converge. What we learn from 
Peirce’s pragmatism is that belief in an ultimate final interpretant, as he called it, is a 
regulative (almost religious) ideal to drive inquiry and truth seeking, quite regardless of 
whether or not this truth can ever be reached. 
 
Sebeok has posited that the way a human organism structures/models its 
innenwelt (inner model) after the umwelt (outside model) is iconic in saying a model is 
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“essentially a reductive analogy, and therefore ultimately a kind of icon” (Sebeok, 1994, 
p. 140). 
 
[T]he model is an icon, a kind of diagram, where the most pertinent relations 
are of a spatial and temporal order. These relations are not fixed once and 
for all but can be mixed and modified and fixed again, in correspondence 
(a resemblance relation) with the innenwelt … of the human organism. 
(Petrilli, 2003, p.71)118 
 
The novel stimulus radiating from the organism’s environment calls out to be 
dealt with—to be either absorbed or rejected. This is a relationship of contiguity and 
resistance upon our being. It is a relationship that if not directly physical is of a physical 
nature and thus can be understood as an indexical relationship (even if we cannot detect 
the object of this stimulus). Recognizing and calling attention towards this primary 
indexicality is the first step of education; realizing that there is something kicking us, 
bludgeoning us to react, something out there to adapt to and learn about (Eco, 2000). I 
see one of the principle goals of semiotics-informed pedagogy as fostering students’ 
ability to tolerate this space of ambiguity and indeterminacy felt when experiencing 
something new. 
 
So, to reiterate: indexical ways of knowing as an educational process is centered 
on two main processes, the first dominated by iconicity, and the second dominated by 
indexicality: 
 
Cultivating indexical spaces (or spaces sensitive to 
indexicality) 
 
Recognizing the indexical rub and not shying away from it. Recognizing that it is 
through this resistance, this dis-adaptation, that growing occurs. Just as it is through the 
 
 
118 The ethologist Jakob von Uexküll’s concepts of Umwelt and Innenwelt, used extensively in 
semiotic modeling theory (e.g. Danesi and Sebeok, 2000), can be understood in this study as 
mostly corresponding to the concepts of Eo and Ec (from the pioneering work of biogenetic 
structuralism; d’Aquili et al., 1979) respectively. It may seem odd to link together a concept of 
Umwelt—which Danesi and Sebeok (2000, p. 202) explain as “the domain that a species is capable 
of modeling (the external world of experience to which a species has access)”—with a concept of 
operational environment. Suffice it to say in the limited space afforded me that, according to 
Sebeok’s (1994) concept of primary and secondary modeling systems, a notion of operational 
environment is only possible as a regulative hypothesis within a species specifically human Umwelt. 
These concepts are linked so the reader may reflect on the connections between semiotics and 
neuro-anthropology. 
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tension inherent in the literary metaphor which bridges together seemingly disparate 
fields of discourses that language itself grows and transforms. 
 
Gathering Iconic Imprints. After a space and state of mind is created that 
enables the student to live in and tolerate this indexical rub they must raise themselves 
to the challenge of meeting it. This type of education requires us, student and teacher, to 
reach into the entirety of our personal acquired experiences for similarities and 
resemblances to what we are experiencing. 
 
So, building on Peirce’s foundational categories, learning must begin in 
secondness, return to the aesthetic primacy of firstness, and finally use this to inform the 
symbolic and cultural realm of thirdness. 
 
Indexicality towards emancipation 
 
Following Haulseldorf’s recognition that the human is a semiotic animal, we construct 
and search for vehicles of representations in order to process our changing environment. 
These representations can be culturally or personally rooted constructs. In fact, in 
Pragmatic education (following Peirce’s three gradients of clearness; see his 1992[1878] 
paper “How to Make our Ideas Clear”) they should be both, with the objective to instill 
beliefs in students that they are prepared to act upon. Through this process students find 
a way of capturing for themselves a particular “pattern of experience” they can return to 
for reflection. In The Ignorant School Master (1991), Ranciere, through his examination 
of the life of the revolutionary pedagogue Joseph Jacotot, reminds us that this process of 
“revealing intelligence to itself” (1991, p. 28) is always possible: “There is always 
something the ignorant one knows that can be used as a point of comparison, something 
to which a new thing to be learned can be related” (1991, p. 28).119 A semiotic approach 
to education is not overtly focused on instilling in students a specific form of competence 
or literacy, such as math or reading comprehension. Rather, it is about first and foremost 
nurturing students who possess an aptitude for dwelling in novelty, who are inquisitive 
and engaged learners; in achieving what Ranciere calls intellectual emancipation. When 
 
 
119 I have argued in previous work that the art object is particularly well suited for capturing these 
experiential patterns as it preserves an imprint of our initial aesthetic experience (our firstness 
moment) before it has been generalized through conventional language systems (cf. Campbell, 
2015). 
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this sort of emancipated learning is achieved, the student will be receptive to new 
knowledge including the sets of competencies society deems necessary. However, when 
a student’s resistance to novelty is too strong—when it is too insular, when it is too bent 
on updating its existing internal structures—learning cannot occur, just as meaning 
cannot be constructed if the organism does not recognize the  phenomenon  as 
occurring within their world as in Zlatev’s diagram. This is exemplified by the contrasting 
circles of bounded and porous lines around the Ec in Figure 2. A student’s worldview 
must be porous enough for him or her to see the transformative potential the new 
stimulus has to offer. This is why Danesi (as cited in Petrilli & Ponzio, 2005) states that 
the “semiotic capacities of the learner and the determination of his semiotic stage— 
rather than the subject matter to be learned—should be the focus of education” (p. 
229).120 
 
As Ranciere (1991) demonstrates, the teacher’s role is not to implant a static and 
preformed knowledge into an empty vessel, the ignorant pupil. To do this would simply 
perpetuate a hierarchy of intelligences: the teachers against the student’s. Rather, the 
educator must constantly “read” where the student is situated in her learning process, 
and from this determine how much direction and support she needs, all the while 
fostering in her the will and the belief that she has the capabilities of learning on her own 
(without the aid of a master explicator) as naturally as she acquired her first language. 
The only way to gauge this effectively is to join students actively in the learning process, 
and not stand idly by as a detached observer; to share in their struggles and tribulations, 
their successes and breakthroughs. Despite obvious differences in aptitudes and 
knowledge the teacher and student must start from a place of equality. The teacher must 
leave his or her intelligence “out of the picture” in order to allow the student’s intelligence 
to grapple with the new learning (Ranciere, 1991, p. 13). This process is exemplified by 
Ranciere’s dichotomy of stultification and emancipation, a useful conceptualization for 
any educator to hold in mind. 
 
There is stultification whenever one intelligence is subordinated to another. 
A person—and a child in particular—may need a master when his own will 
is not strong enough to keep him on track and keep him there. But that 
 
 
120 For a brief discussion of the implications of Sebeok's modelling systems theory for education 
see Petrilli & Ponzio, 2005, pp. 223-230). 
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subjection is purely one of will over will. It becomes stultification when it 
links an intelligence to another intelligence. (1991, p. 13) 
 
Finding a place in the literature 
 
It is important to emphasize that Peirce himself was experimenting with his ideas of the 
categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness throughout his career. In this study, I 
am most focusing on Peirce's later period of thought—what Torill Strand (2013) aptly 
calls his rhetorical turn — where, Peirce somewhat turned his focus away from logical 
sign-typologies as such, towards the action between signs, or semiosis (Peirce first 
introduced this concept in his Johns Hopkins Logic Seminar of 1883). Semiosis, as many 
scholars have shown, is the object of Peircean edusemiotic (for more on conceptualizing 
semiosis as learning, see Cunningham, 1987; Strand, 2013; Semetsky, 2007, p. 209; 
Nöth, 2010). Such a focus on semiosis recognizes that knowledge is “a process, not a 
static structure to be learned and remembered” (Cunningham, 1987, p. 214). Such an 
orientation guides us away from reductionist and behaviourist conceptions of education 
and “sensitizes us to the notion that cognition always involves an interaction between the 
physical world and the cognizing organism” (Cunningham, as cited in Nöth, 2013, p. 3). 
 
But how does this present study fit in with competing educational interpretations 
of Peirce's ideas? While admittedly, in recent semiotic literature there has been 
disagreement about how exactly to treat the category of firstness121 and its possible 
charge of givenism, we can see some agreement emerge around the connectedness of 
firstness to aesthetic experience. Similarly, we can see such congruencies emerge in 
recent edusemiotic and developmental treatments of secondness; where despite 
important theoretical distinctions there is notably more agreement than disagreement 
about what indexicality represents for learning; mainly the recognition that secondness 
and indexicality offer us insights into a not yet actualized “pedagogy of surprise” (Strand, 
2013, p. 801) that places lived experience in a central role (Strand, 2013; McCarthey, 
2010; Nöth, 2010, pp. 2–3; West, 2015). Notably, Colapietro (2013) recognizes the role 
of secondness and experiential learning through the Peircean notion of contrite 
fallibilism, quite synonymous with the Piagetian developmental recognition that learning 
 
121 One need only look at the different orientations of Semetsky’s (2005) study of how sub-doxastic 
aboutness—essentially pre-interpretative cognition —can help address problems of intentionality 
in education and philosophy of mind, and my paper “Educating Firstness” (2015) with its focus on 
firstness’ connections to aesthetic experience and the art object. 
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occurs through dis-adaptation. Perhaps the reason for such agreement is that Peirce 
himself frequently emphasized the educational aspects of secondness: 
 
The idea of second must be reckoned as an easy one to comprehend. That 
of first is so tender that you cannot touch it without spoiling it; but that of 
second is eminently hard and tangible. It is very familiar, too; it is forced 
upon us daily; it is the main lesson of life. In youth, the world is fresh and 
we seem free; but limitation, conflict, constraint, and secondness generally, 
make up the teaching of experience (CP 1.358). 
 
I follow Sebeok (and indeed Peirce himself, see CP 2.305) in insisting that 
iconicity and indexicality are closely related, while other authors –see Sebeok, 1994, p. 
88, for some examples of this – have sometimes polarized them. This is represented in 
Figure 2 of this paper, where the processes of modelling are clearly seen to contain both 
iconic and indexical components. 
 
We know that as early as On a New List of Categories (1868) that Peirce was 
stressing the complementarity of the categories. No doubt, Peirce has confused this 
complementarity at times even saying such loose statements as a sign “is either an icon, 
an index or a symbol” (CP 2:304). Following Peirce's swift in focus away from 
understanding of signs as ontological containers towards recognizing processes of 
semiosis, he would weed out any such thinking, and insist authoritatively on the 
impossibility of a pure sign: “[I]t would be difficult if not impossible, to instance an 
absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely devoid of the indexical quality” (CP 
2:306). 
 
But what’s new? 
 
But what, the reader may ask, is new in the approach to indexicality I am presenting in 
this paper? Like the scholars I have surveyed, I too recognize the pedagogy of surprise 
characteristic of the brute force of secondness. The novelty of my pedagogy of novelty 
can be summarized in three points: 
 
a) Emphasizing indexical learning’s place within three successive and 
intertwined stages of learning. It is common throughout Peircean edusemiotic 
scholarship to look at specific Peircean ideas in relative isolation, in order to explore 
what in each of them can be relevant and applicable to educational discourses. 
Unfortunately, many of these studies often fail to properly emphasize what I feel to be 
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the richest theoretical understanding Peirce's categories can bring: their inextricable and 
fuzzy nature. In my paper “Educating Semiosis” (in press), I survey the learning 
processes involved in each of the categories. This is what I have attempted to show 
through my exploration of Piagetian conceptualizations of ontogeny in Section 2.1: 
indexical learning’s role in the child's formative encounters with the world, displayed 
alongside iconic and symbolic processes. West (2015) has also explored indexicality 
from a similar ontogenetic standpoint. As Nöth (2010, p. 3–4) does well to demonstrate, 
Zellmer (1979) pursued a similar approach to Peircean edusemiotics that emphasized 
the successive and intertwined nature of the categories, and even drew a connection to 
Piaget’s developmental stages, as I have done here. 
 
Despite notable differences (specifically in what we emphasize in each category 
but also in how we present them linearly), Zellmer’s early study validates my own 
insistence that a Peircean edusemiotic should focus on what I have previously referred 
to as the palimpsest nature of the categories as they are involved in conceptualizing the 
learning process. This is what Nöth (2014) demonstrates in his paper “The Semiotics of 
Learning New Words,” through a careful analysis of a hypothetical lesson from Peirce 
about a child learning the meaning of the word “balloon”.122 Peirce demonstrates in this 
passage that the learning of any new word, and indeed by extension any new learning 
generally, necessarily involves all three categories. 
 
In sum, Peirce concludes that the proper method of teaching new words 
requires three signs in one. First, we must learn the symbol as a symbol, 
that is, as a law whose rules become habits which allow us to use and 
interpret the symbol in the future. Second, we must learn it indexically, that 
is, learn to identify individual objects which it denotes generally. Third, we 
must learn it iconically so that the symbol can evoke a mental image of it 
which conveys information about its qualities, its form, its materiality, how 
it functions, etc. It is well known that some methods of language teaching 
have failed because they focus only on one of the three modes of language 
competence involved. The method of pattern drill had its focus on the 
symbolic aspect of words only, the so-called direct method has its focus on 
the indexical aspect of words, and the audiovisual method has its focus on 




122 “A man walking with a child points his arm up into the air and says, ‘There is a balloon.’ The 
pointing arm is an essential part of the symbol without which the latter would convey no information” 
(CP 2.293). 
171  
Although I agree with Nöth’s analysis of Peirce's pedagogical example, I would 
also insist that there is a more primal level of indexicality, or brute secondness, involved 
in the child’s very receptiveness to the new concept of balloon that many edusemiotic 
inquiries (Nöth’s included) do not fully account for. To conceptualize what this primary 
indexicality involves, I argue, recognition of the animal’s lifeworld (hence my reference to 
literature from theoretical biology and Van Uexküll's concept of Umwelt). 
 
As an aside and a bridge to my next point: Zellmer also validates my use of what 
many will consider outdated Piagetian theory to conceptualize the processes of semiosis 
in the organism. Piaget's biological approach to development, as (West, 2015) has more 
recently demonstrated, in many respects parallels the Peircean triadic understanding 
that forces in the universe progress from states of pure potentiality (firstness) to 
complete generalization (thirdness). Following in the wake of these studies, I believe that 
Peirce's categorical schema can in fact supplement certain inadequacies in the 
Piagetian framework, specifically Piaget’s sometimes determinist tendency to present 
communication as a secondary process in development. Although it is common in 
educational discourses to pit Vygotskyian ideas against Piagetian ones, I agree with 
DeVries (2000) that Piaget is often mislabeled specifically in the judgement that his 
theory does not properly account for the role of social and semiotic factors. DeVries 
(2000, p. 6) insists that it is necessary to separate Piaget the epistemologist from Piaget 
the child psychologist, and that critics’ inability to distinguish these different roles leads to 
critical misreadings (DeVries, 2000, p. 40). 
 
b) By drawing connections to modelling theory and theoretical biology 
(Nadin, 2009, 2014; Rosen, 1991; Zlatev, 2009; Danesi & Sebeok, 2000), I attempt to 
create a barebones formula for indexical learning—a primary indexicality that 
marks the organism’s first encounters with the world—useful for pedagogical 
theorists. Incorporating a Piagetian biological approach to development enables me, in 
the spirit of thirdness, to find new relationships. Piaget’s ontogenetic framework has 
allowed me to connect these Peircean ideas of indexicality to biologically-oriented 
theories of modelling. My decision to explore the possibilities of an umwelt model of how 
the organism assimilates and adapts to novel stimulus can be seen as part of a 
biosemitoic turn in recent semiotic scholarship (Kull, 1999). I think edusemiotic scholars 
can learn much from these new understandings. As Kull (1999) points out, the 
biosemiotic perspective has the potential to simplify biological processes that remain 
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overly complex and convoluted in a classical determinist framework. Similarly, the 
biosemiotic perspective has the potential to reimagine certain aspects of the learning 
process that are not properly expressed under current constructivist or determinist 
frameworks. In short, Piaget has allowed me to build these bridges. 
 
c) And finally, by unshackling the index from the abstract domain of 
secondness, I attempt to address more directly the site of experiential learning; 
the recognition of indexical processes at work in larger semioses. Through my 
research and teaching, I have come to view indexicality itself more useful for 
conceptualizing the learning process than the broader domain of secondness. As 
expressed in Figure 2, by doing this we can see indexical processes at work in even the 
largely iconic processes associated with primary modelling (or the construction of an 
Umwelt), just as we can see indexicality at play in the more abstract and symbolic 
process of learning new words (as Peirce's above balloon example attests). The type of 
indexical learning I put forward in this paper is found in all these processes, and thus 
cuts across each of Peirce's categories. Indexical learning as I present it here is about 
recognizing and treating indexicality in all signification processes. 
 
Indexical learning in practice 
 
A student learning a melody by ear can serve as a great example of this educational 
outline. The student is presented with a melody they have never heard. The melody is 
longer and more complex than the student is used to. This is a crucial moment for the 
educator, as the student can easily be overwhelmed and resist the new learning, 
building up the walls of their world to block out the new stimulus. The educator’s task at 
this point is in preparing the grounds so that a student will be receptive and ready to 
tackle the new learning. Such a receptiveness involves students who are ecologically 
sensitive to their environments—who can read the subtle indexical markers of their 
environment and are secure and comfortable in the space of learning: the intellectual 
and physical environment/culture of the lesson. 
 
The teacher, being a master pedagogue like Jacotot, will have been 
incrementally increasing the student’s receptiveness to the indexical rub of new learning 
throughout their entire relationship. The student, through an iconic modelling process, 
will know how to break down the long melody into recognizable forms they have 
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encountered previously, such as recognizing a particular sequence of intervals, or even 
just a familiar melodic shape (i.e. ascending stepwise motion followed by a descending 
leap) they recognize from a piece they've studied previously. By gathering enough iconic 
imprints in the new melody the student will gradually feel comfortable creatively inferring 
(a process of creative inference, or abduction) the unfamiliar parts of the melody; the 
stepping into the unknown process of indexical learning. Through a continual process of 
fallibilism (their mistakes in recreating the melody), the student will learn how to 
recognize the brute force of indexicality as an important pedagogical strategy. By 
reflecting on the qualities-of-feeling of particular mistakes (the sensory dimensions of 
learning characteristic of firstness), they will learn to recognize in these errors iconic 
similarities; for example, a particular feeling of playing a third away from a melody 
(something young children do frequently when trying to sing unison lines) or singing flat 
or sharp in terms of intonation. As I have repeatedly said, and as Peirce himself 
frequently emphasizes (see section 3.5), iconicity and indexicality are closely intertwined 
in the learning processes; the student only realizes indexicality through iconic imprints. 
 
Once these indexical resistances (secondness) are modelled iconically 
(firstness), they can be conventionalized into general habits the student can return to in 
future learning opportunities (representative of the tendency of all things to takes habits, 
characteristic of the category of thirdness [CP 6.262]). This final step is the process of 
recognizing what John Poinsot called the stipulable sign in his Tractatus de Signis 
(1631–1635/1985); that is, the processes of signification themselves outside of their 
emergent contexts. To realize the process of semiosis at work in the universe is what 
defines the zoon semiotikon, “the animal that not only uses signs, but knows that there 
are signs” (Deely, 2000, p. 21), and to realize this potential is the goal of semiotic 
education, broadly. Thus, just as in Peirce's example developed by Nöth (2014) (see 
section 3.6 above), all three categories are present. A teacher/learner who is receptive to 
these intertwined stages of learning can view the learning process in multifaceted ways 
and see how all categories are always present (for in the pure possibility of firstness, 
secondness and thirdness are always dormant), thus escaping a static and syllogized 





What I have presented in this paper is nothing but a reminder of something we all 
implicitly realize: the site where learning occurs is messy, not easily determined, and 
entirely tied to the person doing the learning. This site is context dependent, marked by 
resistance, and realized through action, through doing, through establishing relationships 
to the knowledge we already possess— not through the passive consumption of 
preformed ideas. In a certain understanding, learning is a natural progression from 
firstness (the aesthetic and sensory core to experience) to secondness (realization in 
space and time) to symbolic generalization (inter-subjective representation and 
communication). But since firstness is not accessible directly (see Campbell, 2015), we 
must begin with the touching-and-feeling realness of indexicality and work our way 
backwards to uncover imprints of the qualities of feeling that form the bedrock of our 
perception. Only after this is realized can we return our attention to the conceptual realm 
(the general and conventionalized domain of thirdness). Although reflection on firstness 
is in itself unattainable, education must always try to mimic this progression as it 
represents our own immersion and entry into the world of semiosis through ontogenesis. 
 
These learning processes based on the subtle reading of indices are necessarily 
context related. The indexical sign is not conventional or symbolic, and although these 
patterns of experience can be captured in sign processes to inform future interpretations, 
they are still at their core born through our engagement with the world and not 
something culturally induced. Similarly, education informed by these indexical ways of 
knowing cannot be overtly based on a plan or archetype. My own teaching practice has 
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It is common knowledge that we humans can control and cultivate our initial sensory 
impressions through reflective practice and training. We always have the capacity to see 
and feel things anew: to “perceive resemblances even in things that are far apart” 
(Aristotle, The Rhetoric, 1992: 1412a11-12). This has already been well established by 
many ethno-semantic studies, notably the Robertson et al. (2005) study that showed 
rather persuasively how distinct cultural/language groups segment (and thus experience) 
the chromatic spectrum with surprising variation. But what these studies point to is 
already well known (intuitively and consciously) by the practitioners of those diverse 
human activities we broadly label Art: the artist can see qualitative possibilities in a blank 
canvas that the layman cannot; the experienced musician can hear inchoative musical 
possibilities radiate from a harmonic opening; the carpenter can do the same with a 
block of wood. Eco (2000, p. 223) elaborates on this ‘role of the artist’ in Kant and the 
Platypus: 
 
The work of the artist always tries to call our perceptual schemata into 
question, if in no other way than by inviting us to recognize that in certain 
circumstances things could also appear to us differently, or that there are 
alternative possibilities of schematization, which make some features of the 
object pertinent in a provocatively abnormal way. 
 
This is to say, that artists can increase and refine what the philosopher and 
scientist C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) called their abductive capacity throughout their lives: 
able to envision “alternative possibilities of schematization”, and work towards realizing 
these possibilities in action and perception. This shows us, as educators and theorists, 
that much of what we call learning isn't explainable as information processing or 
computation, but constitutes a more primary and embodied level of perceptual 
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engagement. That is, there is seemingly more going on than the shuttling around of 
information between mind and world: than ‘reasoned’ deductions checked through 
‘validating’ inductions. 
 
Our human ability to shape and influence our largely sub-conscious (CP: 
5.181)123 and automatic perceptual processes through reflexivity is not only possible, it is 
happening all the time, whether we like it or not. We are always inferring a frame of 
reference to account for environmental complexity. When we walk into a classroom we 
expect to see tables and chairs, but there is always the possibility that our inference, so 
automatic and habitual, was mistaken. Maybe in fact what we initially thought was a 
chair, upon further inspection turned out to be a sculpture made of wax. Another 
example: Because I take the Skytrain in my hometown city of Vancouver daily, I am also 
relatively comfortable navigating the Metro system in Montreal (a city I've never lived in). 
I realize, mostly unconsciously, that much of the urban environment is similar, at least 
enough to get me from one place to the other most the time. However, if I happen to 
grow up in rural Nunavut, and have perhaps never seen or taken a train, riding the 
Skytrain will be a very different reality. I will probably be more alert, more “wide-awake” 
to my surroundings, as Maxine Greene (1979) would say, and constantly searching for 
points of similarity between this new environmental complexity and what I already know. 
Finding the familiar in the new (the essential structure of abductive inference, as we will 
see) is central to revealing the possibilities inchoative within our first perceptual 
encounters, and thus central to aesthetic experience, broadly defined here for simplicity, 
as Baumgarten does in Aesthetica, as “the science of sensory experiences.” 
 
When the world we expect to be there fails to emerge — when the familiar fails to 
show itself in the new — our sense of aesthetic is called into question, and it is here at 
this site of de-familiarisation that we base our inquiry. I will contend in this text, that to 
foster learners who can reveal these inchoate possibilities to themselves, educators 
must cultivate educational settings hospitable to novelty, to the unexpected, to the other. 
This learning theory suggests an approach to pedagogy routed in what Tim Ingold 




123 The abbreviation “CP” as per convention refers to the 8 volume Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1935–1966). The numerals represent volume and paragraph, respectively. 
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“direct perceptual engagement”124 (p. 55) and co-participation in a shared environment. 
Arts practices (and artistic learning), as well as constituting the experiential grounds for 





In this paper, I argue that If we approach Umberto Eco's (2000) Kant and the Platypus 
as an educational text — as a book about how learning happens — then many of its 
highly technical discussions about the problem of determining a starting point (a 
terminus a quo) of the cognitive process, gain an enlarged importance. My thinking is 
that Eco's notion of primary iconism, understood as the primum of the perceptual 
process, can offer contemporary educational discourses with some needed conceptual 
clarity in regards to better understanding the role of pre-interpretative cognition in the 
learning process. Such considerations provide us with an entry point into the question 
‘what is the most basic form of semiotic-engagement (how we use and respond to signs 
and signals alike, cf. Stables 2006) that may be called learning?’ Attention to pre- 
intentional consciousness125 and pre-conceptual cognition is often neglected in 
educational research, which, through failing to properly conceptualize the beginnings of 
perceptual activity in the learner, often inadvertently privileges a disembodied approach 
to learning and curriculum that focuses on abstract symbolic processing and (epistemic) 
problem solving. Even to this day, many popular understandings and theories of learning 
focus on an enlightenment idea of rational autonomous subjects inquiring into 
autonomous phenomenon (Usher and Edwards, 1994, p. 24) — things that can be 
known apart from the knower. With such a conception, focus inevitably gets placed on 
conscious and involved information processing, while other phases of consciousness (cf. 
Section 3) — other ways of thinking and knowing —receive less consideration.126 To put 
 
124 Ingold (2000, p. 55) explains such a poetics in terms of a “logic of constructivism” vs. a “logic of 
discovery” (CP 5.172; 5.590): “Knowledge of the world is gained by moving about in it, exploring it, 
attending to it, ever alert to the signs by which it is revealed. Learning to see, then, is a matter not 
of acquiring schemata for mentally constructing the environment but of acquiring the skills for direct 
perceptual engagement…”. 
125 What Semetsky (2005) has called sub-doxastic aboutness. 
126 For contemporary examples, we can look to the rise of standardized testing in North American 
schools or perhaps even the recent Bologna accord effecting European universities, and the 
solidified and obdurate knowledge such standardization necessarily mandates. For more on the 
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it more technically: this debate on determining the terminus a quo of finite semiosis (the 
beginning of semiosis, or sign-action, in the organism), can help us, as educators and 
educational theorists, better understand ‘what happens in the learning process before 
such conscious and involved cognition comes into play’. 
 
By considering the sensory origins of semiosis, I aim to bring renewed attention to two 
neglected aspects of learning theory, specifically: 
 
1) The role of creative inference (or abduction) in defamiliarizing our 
conventional modes of schematization127 and bringing renewed attention 
to our formative sensory engagements (Firstness experience, cf. 
Campbell, 2018). And; 
 
2) an expanded account of consciousness, beyond what is merely actual (the 
here and now), that can also account for both potentiality, and 
anticipation/mediation. (represented by a Peircean (triadic) semiotic, cf. 
Section 2.2). 
 
I hope such recognitions can help reinvigorate interest in the role of intuition and 
sub- conscious phases of consciousness in theories of learning, and help sensitize us to 
the importance of “imagistic and non-verbal semiosis as primary constituents of learning” 
(Titone, 1994, p. 129). I will argue that, through this (edu)semiotic framework, 
educational researchers and practitioners might gain new insight into aspects of learning 
often associated with creative and artistic cognition that are not easily expressed through 
many theories of learning, and thus this research may be valuable for arts education 
research and advocacy. 
 
 
“educational costs” of this increased standardization see McNeil (2002). For more on how the arts 
can counter the (negative) effects of standardization in schools, see Eisner, (2002). Baker’s (2012) 
study “The Effects of High Stakes Testing Policy on Arts Education” — though, an example of the 
flawed approach of measuring the value in arts for their ability to positively impact general academic 
achievement — offers some empirical validation to the common assessment (Meier cited in Winner 
and Hetland, 2008, p. 31), that “Top down mandates may actually hinder this kind of culture of high 
achievements”. Also relevant to this conversation on the depreciated role of arts education in North 
American schools is the historical study (in the American context) “From Dewey to No Child Left 
Behind: The Evolution and Devolution of Public Arts Education” (Cole and Aguilar, 2010). 
127 This focus on abduction is particularly relevant as a response to the privileged place of deductive 
and inductive methods within educational research and formal education generally, see Shank 
(1991; 2008). For more on the theoretical details of abductive learning, and for what separates this 
from deductive and inductive learning, see Nesher (2001). 
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Understanding learning-as-semiotic engagement (cf. Stables, 2006; Stables and 
Semetsky, 2015) allows us to recognize that Eco’s inquiry into the beginning of 
perceptual semiosis, is also an inquiry into what constitutes learning. Although learning 
is, from a popular language perspective, always being deferred into the future, Eco 
displays that Peirce’s triadic account of consciousness does allow us to, in some sense, 
‘locate’ learning in the perpetual ‘opening up’ of virtual potentialities (Firstness’). This 
implies an educational philosophy that considers “a domain of mental structures and 
processes which influence experience, thought, and action outside of phenomenal 
awareness and voluntary control” (Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 21). It incorporates 
anticipatory dynamics (Nadin, 2010; Campbell, 2017b), and an “ontology that asserts the 
reality of potentialities not yet actualized, as Firstness” (Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 
24). This allows us to explore an aspect of learning consonant with what Dewey 
associated with pedagogical growth (see Dewey, 1916/2004; Campbell, 2017b); as the 
growth of habits that enable future habit making. Not habits that ‘close’ interpretative 
possibilities; but rather open them up! In Peirce’s triadic philosophy this is expressed well 
by the emergence of firstness (the possible) through a rupture in our habitual modes of 
being-in- relation to the environment (thirdness). This rupture is ‘felt’ by the learner 
through the encounter with resistance (secondness).128 
 
On a more global level, this inquiry is part of the growing edusemiotic movement 
(Semetsky, 2010; Stables and Semetsky, 2014; Semetsky, 2017; Semetsky and 
Campbell, 2018; Olteanu and Campbell, in press) that conceptualizes learning-as- 
semiosis, a conceptualization that understands that “relation is ‘ontologically basic” 
(Noddings, 2010, p. 390). This is a move beyond substance dualism (this or that), 
towards recognizing the logic of the included (rather than excluded) middle (this always 
becoming that) (cf. Semetsky and Campbell, 2018, p.124).129 My contention is that it is 
 
128 Here Peirce explains the categories directly: “First is the conception of being or existing 
independent of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of 
reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are 
brought into relation... (CP 6.32 1891; emphasis added)” 
129 The structure of this inquiry is as follows: In Section 2 we situate our study within common 
educational discourses: first, showing the implications our question about the ‘beginning of learning’ 
might have for common constructivist and positivist understandings; second, clarifying the ‘reading’ 
of Peirce this study relies on. In Section 3 we explain and explore our essential concepts and 
orientations. In Section 4 we apply these concepts to aesthetic education. In Section 5 we address 
how these pedagogical considerations relate to Peircean theories of sensory-perception, and 
address our thesis head on. In Section 6 we conclude the conversation by summarizing this study 
and addressing how this research project has implications for future Arts Ed advocacy. 
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precisely this triadic logic of the included middle that is lacking in much educational 
theory and practice, and that this conceptual lack functions through policy to diminish the 
role of arts education in curriculum design and implementation. Arts processes don’t 
translate well into substance dualism: the arts are embodied, sensual, but also cognitive 
and intellectual; artistic thinking and doing is intuitive, but also conscious and rational. I 
aim to show that the conceptual framework offered by edusemiotics is very much in line 
with the Arts and Arts education, for both draw no “experiential distinction between “what 
things are” and “what they mean to us” (Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 36). 
 
Situating ourselves in the literature 
 
Neither constructivist nor behaviourist 
 
So how do we, in a segmented and polarized field like education, navigate a course 
between information processing accounts of cognition — where learning is often 
reduced to the transmission of static and concretized schemata — and the, often 
watered down, idealist theories associated with progressivism? Winfred Carr (1997) 
unravels a few of the dangers of this latter pedagogical approach, which he notes, can 
easily drift into an unsettling solipsist place where the subject and their ‘constructed’ 
experience is worshipped above all: 
 
In the course of its transition from a politically subversive set of educational 
ideas into an uncritically accepted set of educational dogmas and practices, 
progressivism has become little more than a contrived rationalization for 
the postmodern view of education which proclaims that ‘experience is all', 
that the authenticity of the subject should be respected, that learners 
should not be required to read anything that they do not understand, that 
they should always be free to pursue endless opportunities for personal 
self-fulfilment and self-expression (p. 324). 
 
But the other side of this binary tightrope, the overtly materialist side, is clearly 
not an adequate answer, as it does not account for the complexity of human relations, 
and thus reduces, in both explanation and pedagogical practice, the educational 
experience. The problem is that on the one end we have a subject who can only know 
the world through private psychological states and on the other, a (pseudo-)scientific 
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understanding of learners ‘computing’ data from a depersonalized ‘operational 
environment’.130 
 
My thinking is that conceptualizing this initial moment of the perceptual process131 
is the missing link in many student-centred theories of education, especially those that 
get broadly lumped under the label’s constructivist or progressivist. What these theories 
often fail to consider is that although learners (in a sense) do construct meaning from 
their engagements with the world, the fact remains that they have been given something 
to construct with (Cunningham, 1988, 1998; Uden, Liu and Shank, 2001; Eco, 1990; 
2000). Therefore, many of these well-intended approaches can easily drift into 
solipsism10 and privilege a radical constructivism that can come to deny even a minimal 
realism. To address these conceptual inadequacies, this study posits the significance of, 
not a “logic of construction” but the “logic of discovery”, that is, abduction. 
 
But why is this relevant to the arts educational researcher or practitioner outside 
of the world of theory? Well, for two main reasons: 1) It is partially because of this 
theoretical vacuum that ‘informal’ educational practices — those that focus on learning 
as an act of discovery, creative inference, and self-exploration — are attacked by more 
conservative voices that see learning more solely as an act of rational computation and 
transmission. 
 
This conceptual lack can result in educational policy that effectively turns learning 
into an accountability tool; reifying learning from its experiential basis, “assuming that all 
activity that is assumed to lead to good outcome measures must therefore constitute 
“learning processes”” (Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 31). Some of the consequences 
of this operationalizing of learning is greater standardization in schools, including arts 
 
130 The kind hypothesized by a modern scientific/theoretical enterprise that cannot tolerate semiotic 
ambiguity: how the observer changes the world simply by observing it (Nadin, 2014). This account 
takes us beyond what is expressible in formal systems of representation—the reduction of 
phenomenon to completely describable axioms/production rules (Rosen, 1991). See Ferraroti, 
2003, p. ix-xxx, for the implications of this dichotomy for social science research. 
131 As we shall see shortly, to call this ‘a moment’ is clearly problematic as it implies a temporal 
quality which is already suggesting Secondness, but these embarrassments of speech are 
completely unavoidable when talking about the idea of a primary first, which Peirce reminds us is 
“so tender that you cannot touch it without spoiling it” (CP 1.358). My designation ‘Firstness 
moment’ is clearly a reflective act, and thus necessarily of Thirdness. 10 A symptom no doubt of 
following, in the wake of post-structuralism and deconstructionism, a fundamentally idealist position 
that finds its origin in Descartes’ radical split with the earlier scholastic history (a story that is 
historically detailed (at length) in; Deely, 2001). 
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classes themselves becoming more high-stakes and exam-based, as well as a reduced 
role for the arts and those learning processes associated with the arts (cf. Winner and 
Hetland, 2009). 
 
And; 2) because a lack of understanding on how the learner moves from a 
primary world of sensory-knowing to sign-mediated (re-)cognition (cf. Danesi, 2010), is 
probably one of the reasons why aesthetic experience132 receives so little consideration 
in formal school-learning. In short, without an understanding of the perpetual beginnings 
of embodied-sensory learning, we can't hope to escape from our inherited Cartesian 
conceptions of learning. Edusemiotic scholar Andrew Stables (2015, p. 31-45) explains 
that when mind and matter are seen as fundamentally distinct, learning is mystified and 
separated from experience, no matter where one might sit on the mentalist-materialist 
tightrope: 
 
Thus, the mind-matter dualism partly attributable to, and certainly 
exemplified by Descartes encourages materialist responses that both 
valorize mathematically-based conceptions of nature and society as 
predictable and controllable and devalue any conception of mentalistic 
activity. As a result, conceptual confusion can occur between positions that 
are “anti-Cartesian” in a thorough-going way (those that reject the mind- 
matter divide) and those that are materialistic and anti-subjectivist (that 
prioritise objectifiable matter over mind). (p. 32) 
 
I concur that such a research heritage has resulted in inadequate explanatory 
frameworks that adhere to a dyadic (and thus classically duelist) conception of the sign 
defined through binary opposition; “in which a term is understood in the context of its 
opposite” (Stables and Semetsky, 2015, p. 32). Thus, these frameworks privilege 
substance dualism on one hand — materialist and behaviourist responses that favour 
predictability and the rejection (or at least nullifying) of mental processes — and 
paradoxically, the opposite; the extreme expressionism that Carr spoke of (see also 
Olteanu and Campbell, in press). This substance mind-body dualism is at work in 
popular pedagogical assumptions that “take for granted the existence of an ‘educable’ 
inner intelligence distinct from a ‘trainable’ bodily organism, despite calls in the 
philosophy of education for more attention to the embodied nature of both knowledge 
 
132 Which Peirce frequently linked with the category of Firstness, cf. Gorlee (2009), and Campbell 
(2018), for the relevant Peircean analysis and aesthetic application. For more on the relevance of 
semiotics to Arts Ed, see; Smith-Shank (1995). 
187  
and teaching” (p. 33). This alas is a great impediment to arts education, as this 
inadequacy of explanation finds no connection between how the arts relate to (‘core’) 
school subjects, nor how artistic processes integrate sensory and embodied forms of 
knowing with more rational, cognitive (epistemic) ones. Thus, the creativity and 
interconnectedness that rules all learning — the fact that human beings are amazingly 
able to “understand things from a seemingly limitless number of perspectives” — 
becomes an obstacle to overcome (Cunningham, 1988, p. 4) for educational theory and 
curriculum. 
 
I bring up such issues in education only because they are the context I wish this 
current research project to be considered in, fully recognizing that I cannot fully honour 
such debates here and have for communication purposes perhaps over-simplified them. 
I argue that part of this communication gap is the problem of beginnings, of an inability to 
properly think about the emergence of perceptual learning. 
 
But which Peirce are we talking about? 
 
In the last two decades, there has emerged a body of research that has looked to 
Peirce’s pragmaticism for an embedded philosophy of education (Chiasson, 2001; 2005; 
Garrison & Neiman, 2003; Calapeirto, Midtgarden and Stand, 2005). To generalize, 
many of these studies have tended to focus on the scientific inquiry processes 
emphasized in Peirce's pragmatic method. In this scholarship, we find an educational 
approach that emphasizes the processes of right reasoning (CP 5.421) and analytic 
(critical) thinking strategies. For example, Chiasson (2001, 2005) has accomplished this 
to great results, developing a fully fleshed out educational program rooted in Peirce's 
pragmatic method that she calls engaged intelligence training. 
 
Although I find much value in this work, this is not the embedded philosophy of 
education I have extracted from Peirce's scholarship. Nor is it the side of Peirce that 
Umberto Eco emphasizes in his exploration into Primary Iconism in K and P. The Peirce 
that I and Eco explore is a post-1885 Peirce (Strand, 2013), in which, after first 
elucidating the concept of semiosis in 1883 (CP 5.829), his semiotics turned away from 
formal logic, becoming more existentially and cognitively rooted. Eco (2015, p. 511), in a 
late paper entitled The Threshold and the Infinite, explains his own approach to 
interpreting Peirce in K and P: 
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My starting point was in fact a suggestion made by Armano Fumagalli 
(1995: ch, 3), who saw in the post-1885 Peirce an almost Kantian return to 
the immediacy of intuition, antecedent to any inferential activity (the Ground 
is no longer a predicate but a sensation, and indexicality becomes the kind 
of experience which takes the form of a shock; it is an impact with an 
individual, which “strikes” the subject without yet being a representation). 
 
This less logic-based (post-1885) reading of Peirce has informed what has been 
called the “iconic turn” (Olteanu, 2015) in Peircean scholarship. This iconic turn has 
begun to seriously inform the emerging edusemiotic project, suggesting that “icons are 
the signs that afford learning, all signification having an iconic ground” (Olteanu, 2015, p. 
76). It is these primary aspects of experience that have been historically neglected by 
modernist educational approaches (cf. Olteanu and Campbell, in press), and are most 
relevant to understanding aesthetic experience. Using Peirce’s famous triad of icon- 
index-symbol we can say this move represents a turning away from explicit reliance on 
symbolic accounts of learning, to recognize more fully the embodied and sensory 
foundations of indexicality and iconicity. A symbol is a sign that signifies its object based 
on a learned (arbitrary) convention or habit. But behind every symbol is an underlying 
indexicality (signification based on direct presence and contiguity), and iconicity (signs 
that signify based on perceived similarity). Catherine Legg (Legg, 2017, p. 33-34) 
quoting Peirce, provides the following outline: 
 
Symbols, due to the repeatability of their defining conventions, give us 
general concepts. Indices, due to the brute actuality (directness) of their 
pointing function, connect us with particular objects in the world which we 
wish to talk about. If symbols give us the general and indices give us the 
particular, what is left for icons to signify? Icons, precisely due to the fact 
that their objects may or may not exist, enable us to exercise our 
imagination, and think about what is possible: “The value of an icon 
consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things regarded as if it 
were purely imaginary. The value of an index is that it assures us of positive 
fact. The value of a symbol is that it serves to make thought and conduct 
rational and enables us to predict the future” (Peirce, CP 4.448). 
 
In the interest of not burdening the reader with a long and perfunctory argument, I 
will simply offer up the point that much of this shuttling back and forth between cognitivist 
and behaviorist accounts can be better contextualized recognizing that this intrinsic 
dualism results from a failure to conceptualize the possible, and thus per Peirce, the 
icon. 
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Invention: The discovery of materials 
 
What is primary iconism? 
 
Warning: what you are about to read is confusing. Why? Because I am attempting to 
speak about a cognitive state that is devoid of intentionality (any notion of aboutness), 
outside of temporality, outside of sensation, and perhaps most alarmingly for analytic 
philosophers, outside of linguistic description. Such is the challenge assigned to any 
philosophaster133 who dares speak about beginnings134. 
 
Peirce struggled with this metaphysical dilemma just as Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Spinoza had before him. To speak of a Firstness, or primary iconism, as 
an auroral moment of cognition is something of a problem in a philosophical system (like 
Peirce's) that is fundamentally anti-intuitionalist, and based upon an inferential view of 
knowledge where “all cognition is the result of previous cognition”, cf.; Peirce, 1868. For 
Firstness is, by its very nature, related only to itself, a purely positive characteristic (CP 
5.44), a “potentiality without existence” (CP 1.328): “and therefore the icon is a likeness, 
not in the sense that it is like something else, but because it is the phenomenon that 
founds any possible judgement of similarity, without being founded by it” (Eco, 2014, p. 
512). To use a popular example from Peirce, primary iconism (which remember is a 
Firstness) can be understood as a pure and singular feeling of purpleness, before this 
purpleness has been recognized in relation to myself (Secondness) — as acting upon 
my sense organs in time and space — and before this sensation becomes related to the 
continuity of my lived experience (Thirdness). As this purple moves from being simply 
PURPLE (all that is, a monadic quale consciousness CP 2.221- 237), to purple as 
sensation in relation to some minimal conception of self, to merely this sort of purple in 
relation to my total continuous interpretative experience, that is; my way of perceiving the 
chromatic spectrum as informed and determined by all my past experiences as well as 




133 Cf.: www.philosophaster.org 
134 Speaking poetically about the reality of Firstness’, Peirce says: “Their very airy-nothingness, the 
fact that their being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody’s actually thinking 
them, saves their reality” (CP 6.455). 
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For our purposes, we are specifically interested in that ambiguous moment 
between the categories of Firstness and Secondness, between primary iconism and the 
shock of realizing yourself in relation to an (as-of-yet) amorphous ‘other’. I will argue that 
it is here, in this liminal space between Firstness and Secondness, between a (primary) 
iconism that is realized by the causal shock of (primary) indexicality, where the terminus 
a quo of learning can in some sense be ‘located’. This location I argue must be 
approached semiotically (and not psychologically, cognitively or neurologically) because 
this is not an empirically measurable ‘state in the mind/brain’, but rather a dynamic 
emergence of new action-possibilities (new Firstness’) from out of the regularity of 
habitual relations in a historically constituted environment. This locating of learning can 
be validated cenoscopically135 because at this threshold, just before cognitive awareness 
(just before realization in Thirdness) is the first instance of the perpetual process that we 
can influence through reflexivity, creative inference, and contemplative practice, even 
though these first impressions are by nature, fundamentally unknowable to us.136 Hence, 
my focus in this text on everyday experiences and perception and their fundamental 
similarity to those (supposedly) exalted acts of creativity associated with the Arts. Eco 
(2000, p. 114) elaborates this liminal zone where ‘sensation’ can be said to emerge: 
 
Feeling, pure Firstness, is the awareness of a moment of absolute and 
atemporal singularity; but from this first moment we already enter 
Secondness, we attribute the first icon to an object (or at least to something 
we are faced with), and we have the sensation, an intermediate moment 
between Firstness and Secondness, between icon and index. 
 
To better understand this terminus a quo of perceptual learning it is important to 
recognize that temporality itself is a constituent of the process of schematization 
(conscious realization in Thirdness), and not something itself existing in the pure 
potential that is Firstness (Eco, 2000, p. 115). As we've already alluded to, it is 
fundamentally misleading to speak about this atemporal singularity using language that, 
because of its indexical and iconic foundations (see; CP 5.119; Nesher 2001), requires 
conceptual metaforms. From cognitive linguistics, we learn that these metaforms — that 
 
 
135 That is, through what presents itself to every human’s normal experience, see; CP 1.238-242 
and the corresponding distinction with ideoscopic knowledge. 
136 “Our first impressions are entirely unknown in themselves and the matter of cognition is the 
matter of fact and what is not a question of a possible experience is not a question of fact. The 
impressions are grasped into the unity which the mind requires… by conceptions and sensations” 
(Peirce cited in Campbell, 2018, p. 78). 
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are necessary for communication (and even for mental- representation and extensional 
(abstractive) modelling) — themselves require notions of time and space (see; Danesi, 
2013; Sebeok and Danesi, 2000; Lakoff and Johnson; 1980).137 What we might 
tentatively call ‘the beginning of learning’ is merely in the process of becoming temporal 
in our own recognition of it. 
 
Clearly to speak about such a pure potentiality, which as Peirce frequently said 
“every description of it must be false to it” (CP 1.302), is to speak about an imprint left by 
an impresser that is no longer accessible to us. This is what leads Eco to approach this 
phenomenological problem from a textual semiotic perspective, concluding that all 
learning (even awareness of Firstness) must be attained through recourse to a text. This 
is “an organizing principle whereby an element can be identified insofar as it is not the 
other, which by evoking it, it excludes” (2000, p. 111). This is primary iconism as distinct 
from relative instances of iconism. It is, as Eco (2000; 2014) says, merely the 
presupposition to correspond 
 
An enzyme… selects its substrate from among a number of meaningless 
molecules with which it can collide: it reacts and forms a complex only with 
its partner molecule. This substrate is a sign for the enzyme (for its 
enzyme). The enzyme explores reality and finds what corresponds to its 
own shape: it is a lock that seeks and finds its own key. In philosophical 
terms, an enzyme is a reader that "categorizes" reality by determining the 
set of all the molecules that can react with it factually... This semiotics (or 
proto-semiotics) is the basic feature of the entire biological organization 
(protein synthesis, metabolism, hormonal activity, the transmission of 
nervous impulses, and so on). 
 
I contend that such a (primordial) primary iconism represents the basic structures 
of intentionality that sustain the learning and perceptual processes.138 It is not yet an act 
of inference (a syllogism) related to distinguishing between qualitative possibilities (like 
 
 
137 Danesi (2013, p. 34) explains: “A “metaform” can be defined as the form that is connected 
interpretively (semiotically) to a conceptual metaphor as a consequence of the metaphor being 
distributed throughout the cultural network of meaning— prior to any instance of indexicality and 
thus any correspondence to an object. The primary icon reaches out into the environment, not to 
demonstrate that its object exists (as the index does), but rather “to demonstrate that their object 
is... consistent [with its own internal structure], and thus possible” (Legg, 2017, p. 34). Prodi (1988, 
p. 55) explains this proto- semiotic reaction on the cellular level through the lock and key analogy: 
138 Adopting Sebeok’s Maxim that “Life is co-extensive with semiosis” it is possible to conceive of 
this basic level of learning-intentionality as being reflective of the basic anticipatory processes that 
distinguish life processes from physical/mechanical processes (cf.: Rosen, 1991; Nadin; 2010; 
2014; 2017). 
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the abductive inference). It is what sets the Ground (cf. Section 5) for the very possibility 
of conscious cognition, and indeed, per Peirce, consciousness and signification 
generally. 
 
Figure 6.1 Peirce’s triadic sign model and its relation to the categories, adapted 




The wholeness of three: Situating primary iconism in the 
categories 
 
Peirce’s categories are continuous and holistic. Despite segmentation for the sake of 
communication, they are one. “Therefore every cognitive phenomenon, even the most 
aurorally primal, must call upon all three categories.” (Eco, 2014, p. 514) Within the 
dynamic and continuous flow of signs that make up our conscious experience, we only 
ever infer the predominance of Secondness or Firstness. Peirce often stressed that the 
experience of semiosis is a simultaneous event.140 This is explained through his 
cosmological outline of the universes’ formation,141 an idea that anticipates big bang 
theories (cf. Campbell, 2017b). “Firstnesses “do not spring up isolated; for if they did 
nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another, and thus in a 
 
139 Notice how the popular Peircean trio [icon – index – symbol] specifically refers to how a sign 
signifies its object; that is only one set of the three (palimpsest) triads that stem from each leg of 
the tripod. 
140 In propositional calculus, this is expressed through what is called Peirce’s Law (also known as 
the principle of the excluded middle (cf. Semetsky, 2014, for the implications of this principle for 
edusemiotics. Also see; CP 3.384: ((P→Q)→P)→P 
141 For more on Peirce’s cosmology; the reader is directed to; Sheriff, 1994; and Turley, 1977. 
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kind of existence” (CP 6.199). So, although we cannot know Firstness in itself, this 
auroral moment of perception is directly a result of the continuity and already-thereness 
of our conscious experience.142 In a certain sense then, we can say that Thirdness is 
always inchoately implicit in Firstness: 
 
The emergence of Firstnesses through their being opposed to one another 
(Secondness) starting from the regularity of the habit (Thirdness) for Peirce 
is an event (CP 6.200), i.e. a singularity, a point at which something 
occurs… In this way the spontaneity of Firstness, whose irregular and 
singular nature Peirce underlines (CP 6.54) turns out to be nothing other 
than an infinitesimal deviation from the law and from the regularity on 
whose basis it is produced (CP 6.59). (Eco, 2014, p. 514) 
 
Thus, Firstness only emerges from out of a rupture (a primary indexicality) in the 
regularity of habits that make up our total experience (conscious and unconscious and 
imagined). It is these singular events that break through the wall of routine cognitive 
processing by demanding our attention and response. 
 
Our test of coherence: stimulus response engagements 
 
I raise the famous coffee pot example, which Eco elaborates in K and P (2000, 2.2.1). 
The sensation of Eco burning his hand on his percolator in a morning stupor is a rupture 
in the regularity of his morning breakfast routine. The question that demands to be 
answered from this example is ‘How do we, if, like Peirce, we are to deny the immediacy 
of intuition,143 account for the seemingly pre-inferential experience of stimulus-response 
engagements?’ And furthermore, where is something that could be called learning in 
such stimulus-response engagements that by their very nature seem entirely pre- 
inferential and sub-doxastic? 
 
I believe that accounting for these primary perceptual encounters is the main test 
of validity for the learning theory I am putting forward in this study. I argue that it is these 
seemingly pre-cognitive aspects of perception that need to be accounted for by any 
account of learning that is rooted in experience and the learner’s actual embodied 
 
 
142 For more on the neuro-phenomenology of consciousness, including the details of the intentional 
nature of conscious experience, see; Laughlin, d’Aquili, & McManus, 1990; Laughlin 1992a. 
143 This is the understanding that we possess no (Gibsonian-like) direct perception; that we must 
come to know the ‘thing in itself’ only through semiotic mediation which constitutes an umwelt- 
anticipatory dynamic (cf.; Peirce, 1868; Nadin; 2017). 
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actions and sensorial engagements in the world. Eco (2014) makes the point that a 
stimulus-response event is, in the sense Peirce intended, not a cognition at all, and in 
terms of our conversation, not yet learning. We are not yet ready to attempt a full 




Realizing firstness through abduction (iconic learning) 
 
I now attempt a sketch of how primary iconism functions within a broader Peircean 
theory of learning. As I have argued elsewhere (2018), the formation of aesthetic 
experience within consciousness is particularly well suited to this task. This 
understanding of Firstness emerging as a rupture within the regularity of habitual 
interactions with the environment (Thirdness) provides a conceptually nuanced way of 
thinking about what constitutes aesthetic experience. Following closely Dewey’s own 
approach (Art-as-experience,144 cf. 1934/2005), I feel that aesthetic experience must be 
approached as a mode of sensory-perceptual engagement, and not a form of 
disinterested reflection, as is so often implicitly and explicitly implied by much aesthetic 
education scholarship and its corresponding notions of pedagogy. 
 
With this understanding, education principally concerns, not the enculturation of 
students into an established ‘body of knowledge’ and codified interpretative procedures, 
but rather the cultivation of a learner’s primary receptivity to the unknown. This is what I 
(2016) have called the “pedagogy of novelty”, implicit in Peircean thought. This 
pedagogy concerns replicating this natural proto-semiotic interaction of Firstness- 
through-Secondness, Primary Iconism through Primary Indexicality—a realization of 
potential through the actual. This involves not a teaching/learning of schemata, but 
rather a teaching/learning of dwelling, or attuning to (Ingold, 2000, p. 51). It involves 
fostering students’ receptivity to novelty, to the indexical rub (Campbell, 2016, p. 17) of 
new learning. It is through such a process of primary indexicality that we are thrust into 
 
 
144 Although inadequate to account for aesthetic experience as a philosophical definition, Dewey’s 
approach is pedagogically relevant, as Shusterman (2003: 405) has argued, for its “‘directional’ or 
motivational value by directing us toward the value of aesthetic experience” and for “challenging 
the rigid division between art and action or real life.” 
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embodied semiosis. There can be such rubs in the act of reading, such as a sudden 
moment of introspection felt as an animating jolt through our body. This is like the sort of 
embodied recognition of getting on the wrong train and only noticing when you feel your 
body launched in the wrong direction, or like playing an unintended note or chord in the 
context of group improvisation. But through this rub one may realize new harmonic 
possibilities; new openings to something other and new. 
 
This site of instability, as the singular (Firstness) is born from out of the continuity 
of experience (Thirdness), is what I have previously called a Firstness Moment (2018). 
This is a site of defamiliarization where our regular perceptual processes are called into 
question by the brute force resistance of indexicailty, and we are forced to creatively 
rearrange existing interpretative responses to account for environmental novelty. It is 
through attuning to the feeling of the unknown that we discover (not construct!) new 
ways of distributing the sensible, new phases of consciousness. This understanding of 
pedagogy is thoroughly triadic in its orientation. It cannot be “accommodated within the 
terms of a dichotomy between the material and the mental, between ecological 
interactions in nature and cultural constructions of nature” (Ingold, 2000, p 57). 
 
For Dewey, the essence of art lies in its ability to emphasise these primary 
(Firstness) aspects of experience that “always precede the categorical rigidity imposed 
on us by reflection” (Eco, 1962/1989, p. 26).145 Art-as-experience is thus the emphasis of 
an underlying (Firstness) totality: “this quality of being a whole and of belonging to the 
larger all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live” (Dewey cited in Eco, 
1962/1989, p. 26). For our direct purposes, this evocation of totality is the principle point 
I will take from Dewey’s aesthetic. 
 
My contention is that this discussion on the proto-semiotic interaction of primary 
iconism and indexicality can offer clarification of the (somewhat suspect) absence of 
psychological clarification in Dewey’s aesthetic, and perhaps escape some of the 
trappings of his philosophy’s romantic and naturalist foundations. 
 
This underlying totality is realized by the learner through a process of iconic 
learning (cf. Legg, 2017; Campbell 2018). This is where the learner strives to realize an 
imprint of this primary iconism in their encounter with the art-object, to reflect, not on 
 
145 This quote is from an analysis of Dewey’s Art as Experience. 
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those unknowable (proto)semiotic interactions (primary iconism), but rather, on the way 
such Firstnesses impress upon the surface level of cognition (Thirdness). This is a 
contemplative process that consists in bringing renewed attention to qualitative 
possibilities inchoative within aesthetic encounters: a practice that artists engage in 
intuitively through the very process of making and doing art. In this understanding, the 
transformative potential that many say is definitive of aesthetic experience results from 
the way the experience arranges known materials and percepts in unfamiliar ways. I 
have argued (2018), that this transformation occurs through being-in-habit with an arts 
practice (Thirdness). The continual doing-undergoing of a practice attunes the artists to 
rubs and resistances (Secondess), where through this encounter with the new they may 
experience an awareness of presence (Firstness moment). 
 
Figure 6.2 The palimpsest nature of the categories 
 
This focus on art-as-experience (broadly conceived) is justified through the 
central principle of Peircean category theory that “firstness can be precinded (logically) 
from secondness but cannot occur in its absence” (Eco, 2000, p.190). This is the idea 
that “we only know the potential through the actual, and only infer qualities by 
generalization from what we perceive in matter” (CP 1:429). Since Firstness does not 
appear out of nowhere, but rather through a rupture in the fabric of Thirdness, we can 
only experience glimpses of Firstness through establishing a firm basis of habitual 
relations. Real creative freedom (the kind any skilled practitioner cultivates) comes not 
from volition, indexical force, but from “dwelling in habit” (cf. Ingold, 2017). 
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This iconic approach to aesthetic education is a reminder that even these 
intangible experiences called Firstness moments —a ghostly memory146 of the 
unconscious pathways we find as we realize our first impressions— are still driven by 
our propensity and conditioning for form-making. Even with aesthetic experience, 
meaning always possesses some reference to purpose, and attention drives perceptual 
processes in a significant way.147 This is not some purposelessness (Kantian) aesthetic 
object in our awareness. This is an active and motived teleological/semiosic event! 
 
I now turn to an explanation of how this process of revealing the impact of 
Firstness upon conscious experience occurs. For this imagining, we need the notion of 
abduction. 
 
Realizing firstness through abduction 
 
Abduction in one sense is synonymous with the learner’s level of perceptual awareness, 
their way of acting within and attending to the environment. This basic act of discovering 
and taking in the world follows the logical form of abduction for, the simple reason that 
 
[i]t is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction 
does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the 
necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that 
something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; 
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. (Peirce, CP 5.172) 
 
Semetsky (2014, p. 20) expresses the form of abduction as follows: “If A is B, and C can 
be signified by B, then maybe A is a sign of C. As a hypothesis-bearing statement, 
abduction asserts its conclusion only conjecturally…” Thus, we can begin to see how 






146 See the ‘ghostly reflection’ of the Firstness plane in Figure 2. 
147 Laughlin (1998) demonstrates how novelty functions in the structuring of experience in the 
context of meditation instruction, presenting a great example of this basic pedagogical orientation: 
“When you are all comfy and settled into the awareness of the sphere of sound, then shift your task 
to paying attention to new sounds as they appear in the sphere. Notice how they “demand” your 
attention. You will be working with novelty. So watch how your mind maps redundancy onto the 
novelty. Watch how the recognition process happens. Watch how meaning reaches out to meet the 
sounds, and how meaning and sound-form merge so that it isn’t just a sound of X (bird, truck, voice, 
etc.).” 
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creativity, intuition, and imagination generally. Abduction merely suggests a possibility, 
and thus an icon (a possible structural resemblance). 
 
Abduction is in large part expressed in the action of skills and the processes of 
enskillment. Skills are established habitualized ways of being in relation to an 
environment (Ingold, 2000), and thus constitute the way our consciousness is structured 
and formed within Thirdness. This understanding of abduction-through-perceptual-skill 
reveals a fundamental insight from neuro-phenomenology (Laughlin, 1990; 1992a; 
1992b; 1996): that consciousness forms around intentional objects. This literature 
suggests that much of the structure of consciousness and the perception of the 
environment involves the level of engagement and absorption involved in action- 
processes (like making a fire, or playing music, dreaming, or engaging in any form of 
ritualized behavior or event). 
 
Eco explores this same idea (cf. 2014, p. 520; 2000, Ch. 6) through the 
perceptual issue of distinguishing figures from background. The conclusion is that “once 
the level of pertinence has been decided—or the level of interest with which I focus on 
things—not only do negotiable objective impossibilities become evident, but also starting 
points from which my inferential activity begins” (Eco, 2014, p. 521). This question of 
cognitive negotiation has important implications for re-understanding the teacher-learner 
dynamic. Teaching that strives to emphasize experiential learning processes is not in 
actuality about delivering specific knowledge-content, but rather about fostering 
increased degrees of perceptual awareness within dynamic processes of doing and 
making. It also emphasizes that learning begins at the level of intentionality (or what 
Ingold (2017) prefers to call “attentionality”). For learning (as semiotic growth) to occur at 
all it must be seen within a field of possibilities significant to the student (there must be 
some ability to see the familiar in the new). Addressing these starting points where 
inferential activity begins involves the cultivation and refinement of the learner’s 
abductive capacity, essentially the capacity, and learned presupposition, to imagine 
things anew. 
 
The way in which we cognize novel experience involves responding to the 
objective criterion we are presented with (the grains of resistance felt through the 
directness of the indexical rub). Dwelling in the unknown experience allows us to fully 
199  
draw upon our total semiotic awareness to discover an iconic resemblance. This is a 
point of relation that at least asymptotically ‘maps’ the unknown. 
 
Chiasson (2001, p. 76) explains how this process of creative abduction, is always 
motivated by the shaping of conditional purposes, of goal-directedness, or meaning- 
towards-purpose, and action-towards-meaning: 
 
Relationships come from making connections between things. Peirce 
believed that all actual and all potential relationships already exist and we 
are discovering these when we inquire into some matter [the pure 
possibility of Firstness]… we make relationships by relating the qualities of 
things to one another for some purpose. In doing this we construct general 
categories. General categories allow us to make sense of things, to make 
sense of the world. However, they can limit us as well. 
 
Abduction then, is a reaching into the vast space of the possible (Firstness), to 
anticipate the future (Thirdness), and thus maintain and establish the continuity of my 
experience in the ongoing present. As Peirce frequently emphasized, Abduction is 
behind humanities greatest creative achievements, but also the most banal and 
fundamental acts of perception.148 The level of creativity in the abductive inference has 
to do with the level of riskiness involved in the inference: how far we are willing to leap 














148 Although defining and exploring ‘what is creativity?’ is not the immediate task of this paper, as 
we shall see, an expanded notion of creativity is central to Peirce’s theory of perception, and 
represented by the concept of abduction explored in this text. This theory sees creativity on a 
continuum (based on the level of ingenuity of the abductive inference), but nonetheless something 
that is central to all perception (including basic forms of sensory engagement). This is what 
separates this notion of creativity from scholars like Csikszentmihalyi (1999) who sees creativity as 
connected to the symbolic domain of a culture (p. 6). This latter approach to creative learning was 
recently advanced by Gardiner (2017) in this journal. 
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Figure 6.3 The spiraling of semiotic consciousness (adapted from Cunningham, 
1988) 
 
Summary of firstness concepts 
 
To summarize my steps so far, I have explored three angles from which to approach this 
topic of beginnings: 
 
a) Firstness (the general metaphysical category); 
 
b) primary iconism (Firstness as a proto-semiotic component in the 
formation of experience); and 
 
c) abduction (the fully semiotic and inferential movement that allows the 
learner/organism to realize an imprint of such primary iconism) 
 
Considering these three approaches to thinking about Firstness can reveal 
important understandings about the learning process and are of general methodological 
value to researchers. These interrelated concepts have allowed me in my own 
teaching/arts practice to think more carefully about our most automatic and routine 
perceptual processes, especially in the context of music-learning (which constitutes the 
experiential grounds for much of this research). 
 
The conscious-logical aspect of abduction constitutes a very small aspect of this 
more general (and ubiquitous) semiotic process. Experience teaches us that these 
(Firstness) processes are often so ritualized in everyday cognition that it often takes the 
encounter with novelty, through a defamiliarizing event (a firstness moment realized 
through indexicality), that they become noticeable to us, and thus pedagogically 
significant. Neuro-anthropology (cf. D’aquili et al., 1979; 1990) has shown us that 
‘traditional’ societies have various ritualistic means of renewing awareness to these 
primary aspects of consciousness. In a modern technocratic society, arts processes 
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represent some of the best windows into these often- neglected modes of being that we 
have available. 
 
Implications of theory for music learning 
 
I know as a musician that it is through continual practice and contemplation that we can 
influence, and in some sense shape, these transformative possibilities inchoative in 
(musical) experience. This is an abductive process, where we sensitise ourselves to 
different phases of consciousness (Laughlin, 1992a, p. 19) and modes of being (Peirce’s 
categories). For example: the mindset necessary for group improvisation is a phase of 
consciousness that musicians learn to cultivate. It is what I (Campbell, 2017b), following 
Nadin (2009; 2014; 2017), describe as an anticipatory mindset, where the improviser not 
only reacts to what other musicians do and play, but attempts to realize the relational 
stream of the music as it flows and fluctuates dynamically in the active doing-undergoing 
of music-making. With this anticipatory conceptualization, the music-maker does not 
simply respond to musical signals already played or written (in a manner often implicitly 
and explicitly linked to mechanical causation) but rather anticipates future states of the 
music, and through this anticipatory action, re-models their relationship to the past, and 
indeed the present.149 This anticipatory dynamic is, per Nadin, fundamentally creative: 
“creativity: reaction will not do, the cause lies in the future”.150 This dynamic of reaction 
and anticipation explains how skilled improvisers in a group setting (say, a jazz 
ensemble) are somehow able to collectively anticipate ideas that no one in the group 
has yet played. This is to say that general directions in the music were inchoative and 
un-actualized within previous semiotic states, and then collectively anticipated by 
different musicians in the act of merging together their collective efforts. Semiosis 
requires time, for a sign’s meaning is always extended into the future, and past. 
 
This tells us something very important about Peirce’s scholastic realism and its 





149 This is a perspective that “the external world and the internal reality of integrated mental and 
physiological activity go into what is expressed in the anticipatory action — a realization from the 
large space of the possible” (Nadin, 2017, p.156) 
150 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjwVzOcQcU4 
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well as potentials are admitted to have causal efficacy151 upon the learning process. This 
expanded understanding of learning necessarily calls upon all three Peircean categories: 
Firstness (the possible), Secondness (the is) and Thirdness (the would be) (Merrel, 
1997, p. 27). The art of playing music is not explainable in a computationalist theory of 
learning, where musical- phenomena are reduced to baseline axioms (formalized modes 
of representing and perceiving music) from which musical information can be inferentially 
entailed. In music, and perhaps in all art, this deductive and inductive reasoning (the 
encoding and decoding of formal systems, cf. Rosen, 1991), is never all that is going on. 
In music, we also realize that something may be. 
 




I now address what these pedagogical considerations bring to a Peircean theory of 
perception. It is here, at the interstices of perception and learning theory, that I can 
finally address the question: “How does learning-as-semiosis begin?” This involves 
looking in more detail at that auroral moment of perceptual awareness realized through 
the brute force of stimulus-response encounters. I return to Eco’s coffee pot: 
 
But as soon as I become aware of pain and cry out, I assume that pain as 
a point of departure in an upward direction, to find out what it is and what 
caused it, and not in a downward direction, to understand how my brain 
processes the external stimulus. I consider that quale beneath a molar 
respect and capacity. (Eco, 2014, p. 523) 
 
Learning takes place in the molar (and not molecular) realm, which is to say that, 
although, for all practical purposes we may be a brain, learning reaches out into the 
world, not down into the recesses of our neurogostic structures (D’Acquili, Laughlin, & 
McManus, 1979; Laughlin, 1992a;1996, p. 363). This insight is consistent with what in 
the domain of neuro- anthropology has been referred to as the symbolic function (cf. 
Laughlin 1992a, 1997), which put very simply refers to “the property of the nervous 
system by which partial information about the operational environment derived from the 
 
151 Edusemiotic scholar Olteanu (2015, p. 75) explains: “What happens when learning, is that 
structures of signification (what needs to be apprehended) have to settle on already existing 
structures of signification: a learner [a good example of iconic/abductive learning]. In their 
interaction, these signs will find their own compatibility and the probability for this to happen in the 
same manner in two different cases is too small to be considered”. 
203  
senses is associated neurologically with a far greater field of cognitive associations” 
(Laughlin, 1998). These insights about the brain provide another window from which we 
can access the claim by many semioticians (including Peirce) that sensory perception 
itself is abductive in structure. Proni (1990, p. 106) expresses this perspective clearly: 
 
The hypothetic inference of the sensation is two-thirds written (the 
premises) by the nature of our sensorial system: it's a hypothesis, but our 
conscious intervention is limited simply to drawing the conclusion, which is 
obtained in an automatic manner… The laws of logic construct the form of 
the sensation, but it's content, that which arrives from without, is not part of 
it: the feeling is the material quality of the perceptual sign. 
 
This is the understanding that even complex acts of symbolic modelling, the kind 
privileged in behaviourist/materialist approaches, have a very real objective criterion 
rooted in the internal structure of the icon, and the ‘unmediated immediacy’ of abduction. 
This tells us that we are not Cartesian bodies impressed around by mechanical forces 
that, at a higher stage of intellection get processed and cognized, but rather, have the 
innate capacity to attune and adapt our sensory perception to the environment we 
inhabit. Abduction suggests that organism-environment complementarity is not only 
present but also the very ‘ground’ or foundation for future semiotic unfurling. This 
essential complementarity is in fact what is conceptualized by the very notion of Primary 
Iconism; that, before any encounter with an object, every sign-using lifeform projects 
(even the mono-cell, as argued by most bio- semioticians) its own internal structure into 
the world, and it is this projection that forms the basis for any future found ‘likeness’ 
(relative iconicity). When we teach schemata as being disconnected from lived 
encounters, as we do when we teach univocal and predetermined interpretative 
solutions to educational problems, we effectively destroy the body in the sign (Danesi, 
1998). This is to work against what is referred to in Modelling Systems Theory as the 
natural learning flow principle that sees learning as a ‘flow’ “from iconicity to 
connotatively and symbolicity, i.e., from concrete, sensory modes of representation (and 
knowing) to complex, abstract modes…” (Danesi and Sebeok, 2000, p. 171). This body 
does not experience things on a quantitative level, it doesn't separate primary from 
secondary sensations, sensation from concept. Experience starts from the senses and it 
starts from a totality. Again, Eco (2014): 
 
In other words, if, cosmologically speaking, there is never perhaps a 
Firstness that is not the result of a previous Thirdness, cognitively speaking 
there is a limit to our perceptual abilities, which experience as undivided 
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something that, cosmologically speaking, is in posse capable of being 
further divided. What is in posse belongs to cosmology. What is in actu 
belongs to the agent subject (p. 526). 
 
This is an important methodological point. Considering the categories 
metaphysically is the only way Peirce (or anyone for that matter) can conceptualize the 
impact of possibility upon the unfolding present. However, although necessary 
philosophically, we do not experience the world from such a metaphysical vantage point. 
In terms of empirical measurement, a phenomenon can always be broken down into 
smaller (molecular) components, while the impression of primary iconism, like art-as- 
experience, in actu presents itself as a manifest totality to the learner, a totality, as Proni 
tells us, “two thirds written by the premise”. But what exactly constitutes these two thirds 
that provide the ‘Ground’ of signification. 
 
The Ground, and ‘locating’ where learning begins 
 
The Peircean concept of Ground is where the various threads of this study come 
together. The Ground is a concept that (although changing in meaning several times 
throughout his life) was important to Peirce’s sense of (Scotus inspired) scholastic 
realism.152 Petrilli and Ponzio (2005, p. 29) explain the Ground as the first and dominant 
perceptual materials that spring up in semiosis: 
 
If I say, ‘this stove is black’, the immediate object ‘stove’ is considered in a 
certain respect – it’s ‘blackness,’ which is the ground of the interpretant (cf. 
CP 1.551). From this perspective of the phenomenology of perception..., 
the ground is undifferentiated material that is gradually differentiated in a 
certain respect through a process by which it eventually becomes a sign 
for an interpretant. 
 
The ground is “differentiated” by a deep-level abductive process, but as we have 
already discussed, such powers of differentiation emerge through processes of ‘dwelling 
in habits’ of relation. This is a top-down explanation that recognizes that Firstness is only 
realised through engaging in practices of emergent patterning, or Thirdness. What we 
learn from Peirce’s semiotic philosophy, is that both top-down and bottom-up 
 
152 Here Peirce (CP 2.228) incorporates the ground into a description of his sign model: “A sign… 
is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses 
somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands 
for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of 
idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representation”. 
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explanations are required to describe perceptual learning. The concept of Ground points 
to this hybrid approach (cf. Reybrouck, 2015, for a detailing of this within the context of 
musical perception). 
 
In K and P (2.8.1) Eco makes clear that the Ground is a Firstness; “we are still 
before the encounter with something that resists us; we are about to enter Secondness, 
but are not there yet” (p. 100, 2.8.). For educational purposes, I feel the Ground (not the 
term “ground” itself, which can easily confuse things153 but what the concept aims to 
describe) can be extremely useful. For one thing, it helps us describe the ambiguous 
channel that primary iconism must cross until it can become realized as sensation 
(Secondness), and only as a sensation acting upon a nervous system and recognized by 
neural networks can this sensation be related to previous cognition and properly enter 
the flow of semiosis (or Thirdness). This is the bottom- up explanation. But it seems that 
to honour the kind of scholastic realism that Peirce's later (post-1885) semiotic strongly 
rests upon, the Ground, although firmly within Firstness, already possesses certain 
inchoative possibilities for activation. In this sense the Ground then “is an idea, a 
skeleton plan, but if it is such, it is already an immediate object, a full realization of 
thirdness” (Eco, 2000, p. 103). 
 
Are we simply resorting to Platonic conceptions of innate learning at this late 
point in the argument? How is a Firstness, which is necessarily singular and not related 
to anything already a blueprint for future realizations, and thus modus ponens purporting 
future forms of schematization? I think this is because the Ground cannot be understood 
solely on the cognitive level, as a psychological state within the awareness of some 
organism. To even conceptualize Firstness at all, we must step outside of the cognitive 
and enter the metaphysical realm, not in some vain hope of transcending our biological 
embeddedness, but because it is only from such a vantage point that we can approach 
the learning/perceptual process non- deterministically (not as an axiomatic reduction, cf. 
Campbell, 2017b). We must do this, Peirce believed (even as far back as his early 1866 
Lowell lectures) because our first impressions are entirely unknown in themselves, but 
do however, preserve themselves as imprints upon (and thus affect) conscious 
 
153 By Ground, we do mean in a certain sense the ground or foundation of the cognitive process, 
but as we shall see, it cannot be exclusively considered cognitively, but also, must be treated 
metaphysically, that is, in regards to Peirce's categorical outline. 
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experience. Learning in this estimation is essentially the ability to realize these 
possibilities in the signs that we use and respond to, not to realize things as they are, but 
rather, things as they might be, and things as they will become. 
 
In K and P Eco reiterates a point he had made back in 1979, that, “from a certain 
point of view, Ground... and Meaning are the same thing” (2000, p. 117). Which is 
essentially to say that even in primary iconism, meaning, and thus the possibility of an 
immediate object (the outline or plan of future schematization) is already in some virtual 
form present within the reality of Firstness. This is perhaps why Peirce spoke about “the 
fugitive meaning” (CP 6.455; 6.530) contained in Firstness experience, and why Eco 
(1979) repeatedly insisted that “a sign was an inchoative text”.154 It is my belief that 
these same “fugitive meanings” are the power and significance behind what is commonly 
called aesthetic experience. Thus, aesthetic learning is in its broadest sense simply the 
“opening up” of qualitative and interpretative possibilities in the ongoing continuum of 
experience. 
 
Some descriptions of the Ground exclude memory/culturally informed content, 
instead suggesting that Grounds are furnished only by sensory information. Such an 
approach is like Gibsonian (1979) theories of direct perception, which hypothesize an 
information-rich sensory field, that an agent perceives directly, unmediated by habitual 
processes of schematization and action in an environment. To make this demarcation, 
seems to me less the result of a rational- logical (deductive/inductive) operation and 
more the result of a longstanding culture/nature divide in Western culture. But if we take 
art-as-experience seriously, we know that these first salient impressions, that from out of 
some amorphous sensorium jump out and call to be dealt with, can be, in some capacity, 
known and discovered. So already by the time we get to talking about Grounds we are 
already talking about sub-doxastic cognition, that although pre- intentional has the 
“mysterious power of guessing right”. Semetsky (2005, p. 232) explains: 
 
Any talk ‘of unconscious mental phenomena that are in principle 
inaccessible to consciousness is incoherent’ (Searle, 1884, p. 550). The 
abductive suggestion ‘comes to us as a flash. It is an act of insight’ (Peirce, 
CP 5. 181) which is fallible but still has a mysterious power ‘of guessing 




154 Cf. Campbell 2017a, for a chapter dedicated specifically to this passage. 
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As mentioned, the power of abduction is for Peirce the power of intuition, human 
creativity, but it is also paradoxically the baseline or “ground state of cognition” (Shank, 
1991). Within the “abductive suggestion”, unconscious reactions and interpretations 
converge to impact upon the learner’s ongoing perceptual engagement in the world. 
How such intuitive understanding is realized emerges not through scientific logico- 
deductive steps, but rather in “perceptual skills that emerge, for each and every being, 
through a process of development in a historically specific environment” (Ingold, 2000, p. 
25). I have suggested in this paper that artistic processes provide an ideal experiential 
stage for understanding and studying these creative-intuitive aspects of learning and 
cognition, and that behind these skill-processes are anticipatory dynamics, which 
manifest themselves through attending and attuning to the environment. Eco suggests 
how this inescapable intentionality of consciousness impacts upon our selection of 
Grounds: 
 
If it can be granted that for Peirce the Ground is what I referred to as primary 
iconism, let us bear in mind that the Ground is an element, a marker, a quality that is (for 
whatever reason) being isolated and considered in itself. By whom is it isolated? 
 
Potentially isolable, it becomes isolated when a subject isolates it, from a 
certain point of view, and at that point it becomes the terminus a quo of an 
inferential process, in an upward and not downward direction --- toward the 
series of relationships, in other words, that bind that spot to me and to my 
perceptual interests… (2014, p. 528) 
 
So, although, Primary iconism may have a cosmological basis (and this basis is 
the only way we can come to even think of what is a pure potentiality) it can only ever be 
experienced above a certain threshold of intelligibility, the point it enters the ongoing flow 
of experience. The ground helps us demarcate that liminal space where mind- 
independent ‘stimulus-info’ begins entering-into-relation with the organism: a minimal 
threshold of perceptual-semiotic engagement. 
 
Implications of study and suggestions for future 
research 
 
Although there certainly is a neurological basis to the event of burning ourselves, Eco 
points out that the process transpires in an upward, rather than a downward motion. We 
don't reach down into our brains to determine what neurologically caused us to feel a 
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given sensation in such-and-such a way. Rather, one reaches upwards to see how such 
Firstness functions within the regularity of our intentional experience: that the world we 
expected to be there, does in fact arise. Thus, attention to primary iconism (and the 
primary indexicality in which such Firstness is realized) is central to a heuristic vision of 
education that doesn't relegate sensible embodied experience to a depreciated place, or 
artificially segment body from mind. 
 
But what does considering Firstness as un-actualized potential really tell us about 
how perception happens, and for that matter the perception of art-as-experience? If, on 
a subjective basis, anything can be said to resemble anything else, how does iconic 
learning give teachers, students, and researchers anything concrete to work with? 
Symbols after all can be pinned down and reduced into axioms, and indexes actually 
point something out to us through an experience of co-presence. It is on this perceived 
subjectivism that the creative and imaginative learning associated with the arts have 
been discredited and challenged. Ironically according to Peirce, it is icons and not 
symbols, that give reality its structure and ‘realness’. In fact, it is always the primary 
modelling characteristic of the iconic sign that provides signification with it’s objective 
basis, or Ground, and this is because “what is most characteristic of it is that “its parts 
are related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves 
related (CP 3.363)” (Legg, 2017, p. 33). Therefore, we can see how the essential aspect 
of the icon, is not in fact likeness, but rather structural resemblance. The organism, 
through moving and acting in the environment, forms patterns of relationship, based on 
its own level of awareness of its internal structures and processes. This objective basis 
of iconic signification represents what Peirce calls diagrammatic reasoning, and it is this 
‘mapping’ of the new through the known that gives our knowledge of the world shape 
and dimension. In fact, we get a much better picture of iconic signification by 
considering, not a picture (the standard analogy), but rather a diagram: As Peirce notes: 
“Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks, it is only in respect to the 
relations of their parts that their likeness consists” (CP 2.281). Iconic learning transcends 
mimesis or resemblance, to incorporate relational-correspondence. This is in fact what 
the artist does, as exemplified by the Eco quote we began with. They attune themselves 
to their world, by entering into relation with it. Thus, the importance of routine habitual 
practice in the Arts. The artist establishes Thirdness by this ‘dwelling in habit’, and 
through this dwelling they perceive new resemblances and resistances. The success or 
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impact of artistic expression lies in the artist’s ability to show ‘someone else’ this 
previously unrealized potential in things. Legg (2017, p. 34) tells us that “strictly speaking 
icons are the only signs of the type that can “show” anything, since showing someone 
must involve presenting some kind of intelligible structure (not in the case of the index, a 
mere pointing at something, or in the case of the symbol, a continuation of an already 
established and defined habit)”. This is the deep-rooted attention to iconism that (for 
Peirce) makes artists, and not the scholar-scientist, the true gatekeepers of meaning. 
 
Fundamentally, Eco’s discussion on primary iconism as the terminus a quo of 
perceptual semiosis, reminds us that although learning may only be fully realized in the 
realm of Thirdness, it has a tripartite nature that extends beneath our everyday modes of 
cognition and intellection. An edu-semiotic perspective seeks to bring attention to how 
Firstness and Secondness are always dormant within Thirdness. It is about expanding 
consciousness in educational discourses beyond the processing of symbolic, 
conventionalized, obdurate knowledge to recognize the aesthetic bedrock of Firstness 
and its embodied realization in Secondness (the palimpsest nature of the categories, cf.: 
Figure 2). 
 
I believe that part of the reason why it is a continual struggle to argue and justify 
the need for creative/artistic learning in an age of high stakes examination and 
increasing standardization is partially because of an inability to conceptualize and 
account for cognition and learning outside of problem-solving (epistemic) forms of 
computation. These embodied and sensory forms of knowing emphasized by the arts, 
are not easily accounted for by many theories of learning with their strong focus on 
abstract symbolic processing, and reductionism (Danesi, 1993, pp. 47-70). 
Unfortunately, Ken Robinson’s (2006) definition that “creativity is the process of having 
original ideas that have value” does nothing much to describe how creativity, not only 
aids, but is also dominant in perception and learning generally—how it functions 
holistically and experientially, not tangentially. 
 
In their well-known study, Winner and Hetland (2009) presented research on why 
the arts should not be advocated for only in terms of how they positively impact student 
core subject competencies. In this study, these authors found that the arts encouraged 
the development of cognitive skills not emphasized within standardized forms of 
curriculum and thus advocated 'art for art's sake'. I commend these authors’ work in 
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combating a rising tide of standardization, although I add that a more heuristic 
understanding of learning will better reveal the centrality of creativity and artistic thinking 
underlying all perceptual engagement. Accordingly, Arts Ed advocacy should be focused 
not on showing how the arts offer something that core subjects do not – nor for how Arts 
Ed can positively influence general academic performance — but rather by emphasizing 
the Peircean understanding that all learning and perception is at root inherently creative 
(following the basic structure of abduction). It is a generative act of discovering 
qualitative possibilities within perception. What I am saying is that such pleas will likely 
remain pleas unless more work is done in demonstrating the centrality of “creative, or 
poetic, cognitive activity” (Titone, 1994, p. 128). Such a task no doubt involves the ability 
to synthesize broad and diverse subjects and disciplines (such as; aesthetics, 
philosophy of education, biology, developmental psychology, anthropology, 
neuroscience, etc.). Because of its intrinsic transdisciplinary nature (Deely and 
Semetsky, 2017) I believe semiotics, and more specifically edusemiotics, will be a fruitful 
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Aligning semiosis with the living has been the great contribution of Thomas Sebeok’s 
(1991, 1994, 2001; Danesi and Sebeok, 2000) biosemiotic project. In fact, this central 
idea has been referred to as Sebeok’s Thesis by Kull, Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (2011, 
p. 2). This has encouraged some scholars and researchers in the emerging field of 
edusemiotics155 to similarly align semiosis156 with the learning process. 
 
Within the edusemiotic understanding, learning is not strictly developmental, 
constructivist, or behaviourist, but rather based on an interaction of complementarity 
(between an organism's cognized environment and its operational environment).157 To 
conceptualize something that is not in the mind-brain of the learner, nor an act of 
(Gibsonian-like) direct perception of external objects, requires a conceptualization that 
can tolerate ambiguity, under-determination and vagueness. In short, it involves the 
difficult task of describing learning outside the lens of the reductionist process of 
fractionation; i.e., “the reduction to components whose behavior is aggregated in the 
behavior of the whole” (Nadin, 2017a, p. 154). This is the understanding that learning 
 
 
155 For some recent introductions to edusemiotics, see Nöth’s (2010) thorough literature review, 
Semetsky’s (2010) edited anthology outlining many different approaches to edusemiotics, of which 
Nöth’s article is included; see also (Strand, 2013; Campbell, 2015a, 2016) for the relevance of 
Peirce’s categories for philosophy of education, as well as two recent introductions (Semetsky and 
Deely, 2017; Semetsky, 2017). The term edusemiotics was coined by Marcel Danesi (2010) in the 
forward to the above-mentioned volume edited by Semetsky. It must be noted, of course, that 
educational semiotics has been studied (in various capacities) at least as far back as Morris (1946). 
156 Semiosis is the action between signs (CP: 5.473), this is a triadic process that contains (1) a 
sign, (2) its object, and (3) an actual or potential interpretant, that is in no way reducible to any one 
of these three parts. Sebeok (1991, p. 83) states that semiosis “particularly focuses upon the way 
that the interpretant is produced, and thus concerns what is involved in understanding or teleonomic 
(that is, goal-directed) interpretation of the sign”. 
157 For the distinction between cognized and operational environment, see D’aquilli et al., (1979), 
and theseresearchers’ broader bio-genetic structuralism project (1974), which may be considered 
a notable precursor to modern biosemiotic developments. 
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constitutes a complex interaction (see Section 2.2), that is, an integrated embodied 
process characterized by continuous change and therefore not something that can be 
broken down into parts — with the expectation that these parts can be consistently and 
completely described and used to construct formalized models that purport to explain the 
whole of the natural occurring phenomenon. Rather, it is required within such a 
framework that learning be explained as a relation mediating observer and observed. 
 
The American theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (whose work has been 
championed and developed for applications in semiotics, computer science, and artificial 
intelligence by Mihai Nadin) emphasized in three major books (Rosen, 1978, 1985, 
1991) that the dynamics of the living were not being properly accounted for by the 
dominant methods of (what he broadly called) the Newtonian paradigm (see Section 2). 
He explained that the reductionist approach has – despite its successes in describing 
and inquiring into the properties of matter (which of course all organisms are embodied 
in) – proven inadequate to account for the complexity of living things. This is because 
the living organism anticipates a future state of being, and through such anticipatory 
action remodels its relation to the present, and indeed the past. Such a dynamics of 
anticipation simply does not occur in inanimate matter. 
 
In the world of educational research, we see a similar inability to conceptualize 
the complexity of the learning process. Within both (more or less) constructivist and 
(more or less) positivist learning theories we see the same logic of materiality operative 
in the deterministic worldview of Newtonian causality. Nesher (2001) for example, has 
shown that the logic of computationalism cannot account for learning. Within such 
frameworks one can make inferential entailments based on a set of production rules 
(deduction) and check the validity of these inferences in external phenomenon that are 
themselves encoded into formal systems (induction). But one cannot account for the 
growth of knowledge, represented by abductive inference and the process of learning 
generally. The fact that most of the world’s formal education systems rely heavily on 
standardized forms of evaluation is a symptom of an inability to conceptualize learning 
outside of both positivist and constructivist accounts. Rather, learning is nothing but a 
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state of transformation: a process of becoming, and not strictly an act of information 
processing or computation.158 
 
In earlier work, I used John Deely's (1990, 2000, 2001, 2009) interpretation of 
Poinsot’s late medieval semiotic (1632/1885) to put forward an understanding of 
learning, where learning is conceptualized neither as a psychological state attained 
inside an organism, nor in the perception of a mind independent reality, but as the 
learner’s supra-subjective capture of relations that mediate organism and environment. 
Defining learning as semiosis is in part a recognition that the species-specific world of 
the organism (it’s Umwelt159) is not a world of things so much as it is a world of semiotic 
objects: of signification processes within the organism’s awareness. Learning is thus not 
a form of information processing, but rather the growth of semiosis within the organism; 
that is, the recognition of relations that enable receptiveness to novelty and continual 
adaptation and future growth (Campbell, 2016). This is a reminder that the world of living 
beings is a world of (qualitative) meanings and not of (quantitative) data, represented 
metaphorically by the semiotic web that Sebeok spoke of: “a web woven of sign 
relations, at whose nodes alone stand the objects of experience as experienced, 
whatever be their further status as ‘physical’ or ‘real’ independently of the experience 
within which they are given” (Deely, 2000, p. 17). 
 
This article argues for a perspective of learning rooted in the dynamics of living 
beings. This calls for a theoretical perspective that transcends the realist/idealist divides 
that plague educational theory,160 offering a possible middle way between the 
constructivist emphasis on mind dependent reality (ens rationis), and the positivist 
emphasis on mind independent reality (ens reale). Deely’s (2004, p. 19-20) words are 
useful here in explaining the futility of reducing learning to an internal psychological 
mechanism while explaining the notion of objectivity that his semiotic is built upon: 
 
On the contrary, there are no such thing as psychological states 
disconnected from objectivity. Objectivity precisely depends upon 
psychological states which give the subjective foundation or ground for the 
 
158 See Cunningham (1987, 1988, 1998) and Shank (1995) for how semiotics can offer a middle 
way between constructivism and behaviourism in educational research. 
159 The famous concept developed for ethology by the Estonian/German scientist Jacob von 
Uexküll (1864- 1944); see von Uexküll (1934/1992) and Kull (2011), for a historical detailing of the 
concept and its relevance for semiotics and biosemiotics. 
160 See Carr (1997), for a subtle reading of this divide, in the context of philosophy of education. 
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relations which terminate in the publicly experienced interpretations that 
are precisely what we call objects. The key to the whole thing is relation in 
its unique being as irreducible to its subjective source always terminating 
at something over and above the being in which the relation is grounded. 
 
Such a theoretical approach must be able to account for interactions in states of 
becoming, and thus calls for a broader sort of causality than computationalism allows. 
This is the recognition that the integrated dynamics of reaction and anticipation, of living 
creatures — as well as semiosis generally — are expressed in action. In this spirit, the 
aims of this article are to suggest possible answers to the following three questions: 
 
1. How can the processes of learning be re-conceptualized outside of a 
Cartesian/Newtonian framework that seeks to reduce the natural world to 
immutable axioms that can be modelled within purely formal and syntactic 
(as opposed to semantic) systems? 
 
2. What is the relationship between the continuous flow of semiosis and the 
triadic relations that Peirce saw as fundamental to the origins of life, and 
the anticipatory processes that theoretical biologists (like Rosen and Nadin) 
use to define living organisms? 
 
3. Is it possible to develop a theory of learning that can account for (a) 
potentiality, (b) teleological (goal-directed) processes, an (c) the 
complementary (or mediation) of subject-object, mind-world, culture-nature, 
inner-outer, and therefore recognize processes of signification themselves 
as essential constituents in learning? 
 
These points can be grouped under one grand and (I'll admit) ostentatious question 
which takes us to the heart of this inquiry: How can we imagine learning that reflects the 
complexities and dynamics of living beings. 
 
To address these questions, I will explore the combined relevance of two 
theoretical perspectives — anticipatory biology, and the edusemiotic understanding of 
learning as semiosis — for informing conceptualizations of the learning process. In 
Section 2, I explore Nadin and Rosen’s notion of G-complexity, and how this contributes 
to an understanding of anticipation as being definitional of living systems. In Section 3, I 
address Peirce's notion of semiosis as it is embedded in his categorical system and 
overarching cosmology. Section 4 considers the confluences and differences between 
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semiosis and anticipation and Section 5 how these two conceptions (taken in union) can 
influence edusemiotic understandings of the learning process. I will close the article by 
articulating some of the pedagogical implications of this comparison by drawing upon my 
personal experiences as a musician and music educator. Following Deely’s philosophical 
delineation of the relational quality of semiosis, my goal is to demonstrate that learning 
itself is necessarily a relational interaction that refuses to be segmented to one side or 
the other of the binary tightrope: not something out there in an hypothesized operational 
environment, nor locked away within internal psychological states. 
 
Complexity and the living 
 
The “modelling relation” 
 
Rosen (1991), in his seminal work Life Itself, demonstrates that the persistent trend 
towards formalism in mathematics radically shaped the trajectory and shape of 
contemporary physics. With his broad knowledge of the history of Western science, 
Rosen explains how mathematical truth has come to possess two distinct iterations in 
modernity: semantic truth (i.e. reference to some external referent) and syntactic truth 
(i.e. coherence between the propositions that make up a mathematical system). These 
two different notions of truth, Rosen shows, are very much opposed to one another. The 
formalist school asserts that problems arise when mathematics must consider semantic 
factors, and argued instead that “[s]emantic truth could always be effectively replaced by 
more syntactic rules” (1991, p. 6 [italics in original]). With this underlying logic, the goal 
of mathematical inquiry is to create formal systems that can be entirely and consistently 
described without reference outside of the system: “The mathematical world is embodied 
in precepts but exists independent of them. “Truth” in the mathematical world is likewise 
manifested in, but independent of, any material embodiment and is thus outside of 
conventional perceptual categories like space and time” (1991, p. 6).161 
 
A syntactic formal system requires three things: (1) a conventional symbolic 
alphabet, (2) a finite set of rules for combining these symbols into formulas, and (3) a set 
 
161 But why does mathematics seek such absolute formalism? Rosen (1991, p. 29) explains that 
this is because this is what mathematicians have come to consider beautiful. In other words, it is 
aesthetics that drives this quest for the complete decidability of mathematical systems: 
“Mathematics seeks the smallest set of conditions under which mathematical truth obtains, because 
this is the most elegant, the most parsimonious, the most illuminating, in short, the most beautiful”. 
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of basic axiomatic production rules from which anything inferred by the system, not 
expressed in the production rules, can be inferentially entailed (Rosen, 1991, p. 6). 
Through a long and elegant argument that runs the length of the book, Rosen 
demonstrates that this tendency for reduction into formal systems “is exactly parallel to 
the mechanical picture of the phenomenal world as consisting of nothing more than 
configurations of structureless particles, pushed around by impressed forces” (1991, p. 
7). Such a view of the world represents what Rosen has referred to as the Newtonian 
Paradigm. Simply put, this is the view that there is an observable and underlying order to 
the universe and that our formal systems can consistently and completely describe the 
natural world. What this amounts to is essentially nothing less than the way that we in 
modernity do science. This is encapsulated by Rosen’s famous modelling relation 
(Rosen, 1985; 1991): 
 
Figure 7.1 The modelling relation (adapted from Rosen, 1991, p. 60) 
 
 
A full description of the enormous implications of this diagram will not be provided 
here, but a brief description should be useful: arrow 1 represents the reality the observer 
perceives through percepts (objects within their awareness). The formal system 
represents a computational structure that, through inferential entailment (or implication; 
arrow 3), tries to in some way represent (analogously) the causality perceived in the 
natural system. The natural system must be encoded (arrow 2) into the formal system; 
that is, certain perceived features or aspects of the natural system are, through 
measurement162 made to conform to the production rules devised in the formal system. 
Finally, we decode (arrow 4) the implication event (the inferences/implications arrived at 
 
162 See the exhaustive treatment of all that is implied in this concept of measurement by Rosen 
(1978). 
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through our formal system) and check to verify how this conforms to the causal 
inferences perceived in the natural system. When this procedure is successful – when 
our formal systems seem to (at least asymptotically) match up – we have established the 
following: 1=2+3+4 
 
This is the understanding that the form of causality perceived in the natural 
system has been modelled through formal inference. Rosen says that the prevailing 
ideology of the Newtonian Paradigm has made the modelling relation so taken for 
granted that it is often operative (to greater or lesser degrees) outside of the awareness 
of most scientific practitioners. His general criticism is that much modern experimental 
science has come to consider its task as simply being the “fitting of models”, without 
stopping to consider the underlying creative act involved in the very translation of 
encoding and decoding operations. The “dictionaries” we create to encode and decode 
the two systems are themselves independent of both formal and natural systems. This is 
what makes establishing a modelling relation as much an art as it is a methodology: 
 
The first matter of importance is to note that, from the standpoint of the 
formalisms being compared, the encoding and decoding arrows… are 
unentailed. In fact, they belong to neither formalism, and hence, cannot be 
entailed by anything in the formalisms. The comparison of the two 
inferential structures… thus inherently involves something outside the 
formalisms, in effect, a creative act, resulting in a new kind of formal object, 
namely the modelling relation itself. It involves art. (Rosen, 1991, p. 54) 
 
This is to say that there are always semantic elements that cannot be accounted 
for by syntactic elements alone, that formal models will never completely be able to 
describe the complex behaviour of the world, and that in fact, the encoding and decoding 
of models is, in a certain understanding, the construction of linkages between sign 
systems. This is a process/activity that Rosen associates with aesthetic sensibilities. The 
ideology that the universe itself can be adequately described by such formalisms is the 
belief that the universe is a mechanistic (and thus simple, as opposed to complex; see 
Section 2.2) system, and thus something that can be separated from the observer (the 
scholastic notion of ens reale). 
 
But what specifically is this complexity that exists within living organisms that the 
reductionist worldview is not accounting for? What, to reference Nadin, makes the rock 
different than the cat when we drop it off a building? 
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Complexity and anticipation 
 
In stark reply to this persistent and ubiquitous trend towards formalism, Gödel, in his 
celebrated incompleteness theorem (Gödel, 1931), demonstrated that the most 
fundamental theory of mathematics, number theory itself, cannot be completely 
formalized and explained through number theory alone (that such a mathematical 
system cannot be reduced to a set of base-line axioms from which every variable can be 
described through processes of inferential entailment). Rosen (1991, p. 35) explains the 
ingenuity of Gödel's theorem as follows: 
 
Gödel showed how to represent assertions about Number Theory within 
Number Theory. On this basis, he was able to show that Number Theory 
was not finitely axiomatizable. In other words: given any finite set of axioms 
for Number Theory, there are always propositions that are in some sense 
theorems but are unprovable from those axioms (unless, of course, the 
axioms are inconsistent to begin with – in which case everything is a 
theorem). 
 
Rosen, and modern anticipatory scientists like Mihai Nadin, who has for decades 
championed the often-neglected genius of Rosen, use the incompleteness theorem to 
describe biological life through the threshold of complexity (Nadin, 2014a). With this 
understanding, the difference between the living and the non-living is the difference 
between “undecidable complexity and decidable complication” (Nadin, 2017a, p. 154). 
According to Gödel’s theorem: 
 
[A] complex system cannot be fully and consistently described. All other 
systems (those that can be unequivocally specified) qualify either as simple 
or, at most, complicated. Within this view, complexity is not a matter of 
scale. Moreover, it does not accept degrees (the empty formula of “higher 
complexity” and the like). Since the living is characterized by complexity, it 
follows that any formal representation, including the modeling of the natural 
system, can be only a reduction. (Nadin, 2014b, p. 78) 
 
Following this reasoning, we can assert that because biological systems are 
undergoing continuous change, and defined through an anticipatory dynamic, no natural 
(living) system can be completely described by a formal model. Nadin (2010, p. 111) 
explains that what we are in fact describing when we study life through the reductionist 
framework, is physical processes, but not “life itself”: 
 
Indeed, all living entities, from the monocell, to vegetation, to insects, to the 
most complex forms (the human being, for instance) are embodied in 
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matter. The laws of physics (themselves subject to progressive refinement 
as our knowledge about the world advances) apply without any exception 
to the living, without fully expressing its more complex behavior. Therefore, 
one has to conclude that they explain only the unambiguous physics of life, 
but not life itself, in its ambiguous expressions. 
 
Here we are clearly presented with something different then the mechanistic 
world represented by the Newtonian Paradigm; this is a world of flux and transformation, 
where every action and indeed every act of mind, models a possible virtual future and 
through this anticipatory action, remodels the past, a world where the observer is 
inextricably tied up in their observations: 
 
Within physics-based explanations, the current state of a system is 
determined by its past and is deterministically well defined, i.e., non- 
ambiguous. An anticipatory system is a system whose current state 
depends not only on previous states, and eventually its current states, but 
also upon possible future states. (Nadin, 2010, p. 112) 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Anticipatory system as unity of reaction and anticipation (adapted from 
Nadin, 2010, p. 112) 
 
The goal-oriented dynamics of anticipation – which Nadin (2017) highlights is the 
domain of meaning, not of data – does not reduce neatly to algorithms or syntactic rules, 
and thus any such attempts at completely decidable descriptions can only be futile in 
understanding what is distinctive about life-processes. Even if such descriptions were 
possible, the Rosen/Nadin argument informs us that they would lack consistency, for the 
simple fact of the interactivity of subject-object relations. This is the recognition that “the 
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external world and the internal reality of integrated mental and physiological activity go 
into what is expressed in the anticipatory action – a realization from the large space of 
the possible” (Nadin, 2017a, p.156). Determinist accounts cannot account for potentiality 
(outside of probability), nor the impact of the virtual (how something not materially 
present, still affects the present). 
 
Along the lines of these ides, I would like to propose that the process of learning 
may be understood as a “G-complex system… endowed with self-evolving anticipatory 
processes in which past, present, and future are entangled” (Nadin, 2017b, p. 21).163 In 
the context of applying anticipatory science to medicine, Nadin (2017b, p. 19) writes “A 
G- complex system is characterized by the fact that its information level is always higher 
than the information received from the environment; that is, a G-complex system 
generates information”. This feature, I argue, is equally applicable in helping to 
distinguish the process of learning as a form of continuing adaptive growth (explored in 
Section 5.2), in opposition to the more narrowly “complicated” processes of computation. 
This insight into learning theory allows us to re-imagine the space of possibilities within 
the learning-teaching dynamic. An approach to learning rooted in the physical sciences 
(the Newtonian paradigm), emphasizes unitary descriptions. G-complex systems 
however are unique (Nadin, 2017b, p. 20), and thus undecidable. If we take the following 
statement from Nadin (2017b, p. 19) and simply replace the word medicine and 
physician with ‘education’ and ‘teacher’ respectively, we can gain insight into how 
anticipation can function as a fundamental pedagogical orientation: 
 
What a [teacher] “takes in” from [teacher] education... is quite different from 
what, on account of creativity (itself based on interaction), is expressed in 
the practitioner’s activity. If only the effort of individualization were to be 
considered, this would already confirm the idea. Anticipation-driven 
[education] is by necessity individualized, because the living is infinitely 
diverse. All machines are the same; no two persons are. 
 
As Rosen has made clear (1991, p. 20), the Newtonian Paradigm gave the 
western world one of its most persistent and ubiquitous metaphors: the human being as 
machine. Although the world of matter (the non-living) may be well explained by the 
mechanistic- reductionist method of Newtonian physics, the world of the living is not. For 
 
163 This anticipatory dynamic can be expressed mathematically as: “x(t) = f(x(t—), x(t), x(t + 
)” Where “x(t—) is previous state(s), x(t + ) is future state(s), and x(t) is present state” (Nadin, 
2017b, p. 21). 
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the living is a world of interaction; by simply observing, the observer is changed and they 
themselves change the observed. This complementarity of observer and world, is absent 
from “the machine metaphor (supported, of course, by the corpus of modern physics) 
[and what] … ultimately drives, and justifies, the reductionism so characteristic of 
modern biology” (Rosen, 1991, p. 21). 
 
Part of my argument in connecting semiosis with a theory of anticipation is that 
the non-reductionism that is a result of considering seriously the modelling relation (and 
thus the complementarity of subject-object relations) reflects a triadic orientation. This 
point takes us nicely to our next topic, the details of Peirce’s triadic semiosis, which I 
argue is the primary underlying theory that allows us to approach learning as an 
anticipatory dynamic and concurrently a process of semiosis. 
 
A short account of Peirce’s triadic philosophy 
 
I propose that regardless of how it may be articulated, the recognition of a relational self- 
generated world – an autopoietic world of intertwined networks and processes – requires 
a triadic (hence non-dualistic) orientation. But what specifically constitutes such a triadic 
perspective? Three things: (a) the ability to account for: the possible (Firstness), defined 
by atemporal singularity; (b) the is (Secondness), the materially and existentially actual; 
and (c) the would be (Thirdness), the anticipatory and habit-taking process of mediation, 
with a first and a second coming into relation (Merrel, 1997, p. 27). The following popular 
“black board” analogy from Peirce illustrates this tripartition of experience. The black 
board is a continuum of pure potentially. Its two dimensions will signify an infinite and 
indefinite potentiality: 
 
I draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of those brute 
acts by which alone the original vagueness makes a step towards 
definiteness. There is a certain amount of continuity in this line. Where did 
this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the 
blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous... The whiteness is 
a Firstness --- a springing up of something new. But the boundary between 
the black and white is neither black or white, nor neither, nor both. It is the 
pairedness of the two. It is for the white the active Secondness of the black: 
for the black the Secondness of the white… We see the original generality 
like the ovum of the universe segmented by this mark. However, the mark 
is a mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with 
another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency 
between the two, but no further progress beyond this can be made, until a 
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mark will stay for a little while; that is, until some beginning of habit has 
been established by virtue of which the accident acquire some incipient 
staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. 
 
The habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as 
such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity… 
 
The whiteness or blackness, the Firstness, is essentially indifferent as to 
continuity. It lends itself readily to generalization but is not itself general. 
The limit between the whiteness and blackness is essentially 
discontinuous, or antigeneral. It is insistently this here. The original 
potentiality is essentially continuous, or general. (CP 6.203-207)164 
 
This long passage helps illustrate how, according to Peirce’s cosmology, chance 
occurrences give way to the generalizing tendency, i.e. to habit formation (see also CP 
6.262). Potentiality is impossible to comprehend unless it is realized as acting upon (the 
brute force and dynamical nature of dyadic interactions), and to realize such Firstness 
through Secondess is to introduce mediation and thus reference to “abstential 
processes” (Deacon, 2012): to something not present that despite its immateriality still 
impacts and affects the present. Mediation requires that the organism is forming a 
relation to the environment, and thus, that it means something to it. Kull (2009, p. 82) 
similarly explains the Peircean triadic sign model through reference to anticipation and 
abstential phenomena: 
 
The sign vehicle, or representamen (or sign, sensu stricto), stands for an 
object. This is the relation that is created by semiosis. The object, thus, has 
an interesting duality – it is both there and is not there – because it is both 
connected and anticipated. The relation of standing for is possible owing to 
the absence of what is referred to (the object) and, concurrently, there 
cannot be semiosis without the existence of a reference (an object)... 
Semiosis is what makes anything plural. 
 
This can be understood as a reaffirmation of Sebeok’s Maxim, for, as Kull also 
goes on to suggest in this interview with Magnus and Tønnessen (2010), the emergence 
of plurality is also the emergence of life, for to mean is to be plural. Since semiosis is 
necessarily a continuous flow or process, semiosis and the creation of meaning are also 
dependent on plurality.165 
 
 
164 The abbreviation “CP” as per convention refers to the 8 volume Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1935– 1966). The numerals represent volume and paragraph, respectively. 
165 “M [Interviewer]: What kind of plurality are we talking about? K[ull]: The difference between 
anything meaningful and anything that has no meaning can be described as a difference between 
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Relevant to our previous discussion on defining the living through anticipation, 
Peirce connects the irreducibly triadic nature of the universe to the problem of the origin 
and evolution of life itself: 
 
[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world 
is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life 
first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of 
pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the 
suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. (CP 6.322) 
 
This is in line with biosemiotics, which examines “the processes and 
consequences of habit-making via sign activities in living beings” (Affifi, 2014, p. 73). 
Biosemiotics rests upon the hypothesis (expressed by the above quotation) that “there is 
a semiotic core seeding the emergence of biological systems, from cells to ecologies” 
(ibid, p. 74). Part of this orientation concerns the “processes and consequences” of 
semiotic habit-making (the emergence of Thirdness) that enable growth (in terms of both 
ontogeny and phylogeny) to occur.166 The dynamics of organic life are approached by 
the biosemiotic project as mutual webs of habit, or what Hoffmeyer (2008, p. 15) calls 
semethic interaction: “Whenever a regular behavior or habit of an individual or species is 
interpreted as a sign by some other individuals (conspecific or alter-specific) and is 
reacted upon through the release of yet other regular behaviors or habits, we have a 
case of semethic interaction”. This is essentially how an organism’s action in the world 
effects (through a constantly evolving anticipatory dynamic) how the organism will 
continue to act, and how through these actions the environment itself changes (by 
incorporating the actions of the organism into it and breeding semiosic plurality). 
 
So, to recapitulate, Peirce believed that all forces progress from (1) states of pure 
chance, or potentiality (Firstness) to (2) states of dyadic (material) resistance, the 
Firstness of pure potentiality realized as something, and therefore asserting itself upon 
something else in terms of this initial potentiality possessing some permanence or 
 
the unique and the plural, or one and many. Everything that has meaning is plural. M: So what is 
unique or unitary, what is only one, cannot be meaningful, because being meaningful implies 
multiplying of what is meaningful. K: The problem is that it is almost impossible — or at least quite 
hard — to imagine something that completely lacks meaning. On the other hand — this is exactly 
what physics has to do. M: A non-semiotic approach would treat an object of biology as one 
objectified object only, and not as a plurality, and would thus lose a lot of the meaning involved…” 
(2010, pp. 77-78) 
166 The concept of pedagogical growth is central to Affifi’s (2014) conception of biological pedagogy, 
and will be explored in Section 4. 
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duration (Secondness), to (3) states of relation, regularity, and generality (Thirdness). 
This progression from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness – which Peirce recognizes 
as the flow of semiosis itself – is effectively the self-generating “tendency of all things to 
take habits.” In a similar sense learning, in its most biologically simplistic form, can be 
understood as the tendency of habit taking (of forming relations between percepts, both 
sensory and culturally informed) that enables the growth of future habit-making.167 
Learning, in this understanding, is the realisation of qualitative potentiality (Firstness) 
through the material and dyadic resistance of coming into contact with some exterior- 
other (Secondess), and connecting this fallibilistic interaction with the continuity of our 
experience (Thirdness). How we notice and make use of these initial sensory 
engagements (Firstness-through-Secondness) determines how we form habits that we 
will project into the future (Thirdness) in an anticipatory dynamic. But since, according to 
Peirce, all experience consists in Thirdness, with only the imprint/memory of Firstness 
and Secondness, then it follows that all thought, all cognition and all experience is in 
signs (Peirce, 1868). This is synonymous with Peirce's assertion that experience itself is 
irreducibly triadic. A representatmen (or signifier) signifies some object (be it a physically 
existent thing or a thought-thing). But semiosis does not merely terminate in the 
organism’s mental representations, as the more analytic perspective maintains (Deely 
and Semetsky, 2017). Rather, the sign reaches outwards to something other than itself, 
always to a new sign that can be further interpreted: to the wider world of semiosis and 
the web of relationships that constitute the world of the organism. With this innovation, a 
sign (or representatmen) signifying an immediate object (the object as actually present in 
the sign) no longer terminates in the private “idea” of some interpreter, but rather enters 
a vast web of sign relations that can be understood (again in relation) to a (hypothetical) 
global universe of semiosis.168 
 
This is the perspective Floyd Merrell (1997, p. 11) puts forward in his zen-style 
dialogue between three actors; Alpha, Omega and the Master — each in themselves 





167 Donna West (2016) has, in this journal, recently advanced a similar understanding in the context 
of childhood development. 
168 “[I]t Is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents it, 
from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient but not immediately present Object” (CP 8.343). 
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the process of semiosis: “Must not the addressee and addresser also enter the 
equation?” The Master responds by emphasizing the future memory of the interpretant: 
 
While the components of the sign tripod are democratically situated, I would 
suggest that it is the location of the mediating interpretant that ultimately 
provides for meaning. As Alpha put it, meaning is not in the sign, the skull 
of the addressee or addressee, the air ripples between them, the object to 
which it relates, or black marks on white. Rather, relations between the 
components of the sign make way for, and engender, meaning. Although 
the object of the sign in a certain sense determines the sign, it is by way of 
further determination of the sign - it's relation to the interpretant - that it 
means something for someone. Peirce qualifies this further determination 
as an interpretant, or translatant, of the sign, which in turn engenders 
another sign. There are no ‘facts’ of the matter – or pure – unmediated 
signs. Rather, the destiny of a sign demands that it be interpreted in 
(translated into) another sign. 
 
The interpretant169, as it constitutes the relationship of a first to a second, is 
representative of the experiential realm of Thirdness, the modality of being in relationship 
to something else where semiosis and (per the biosemiotics perspectives of Hoffmeyer 
and Affifi) life itself occurs. “A Sign... is a First which stands in such a triadic relation to a 
Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, 
to assume the triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object” 
(CP 2.242). Since a relation is never stagnant or determined (it is always becoming, 
being either sustained or destroyed) the interpretant (like the anticipatory dynamic) is 
always re- imagining and mediating our relation to the past, and present; it is in fact the 
way new possibilities (Firstnesses) are realized. 
 
A brief comparison 
 
In the previous section, we established that within a Peircean framework the physical 
world is one of dyadic processes of interaction and reaction (characteristic of the domain 
of Secondness) while the world of living things is irreducibly triadic. This is because the 
living being is constantly bringing itself into relation with its embedded and emerging 
ecologies. In this sense, we can say that effective anticipatory dynamics is parallel to 
effective semiosis, that is, being able to “read” and make use of the signs within one’s 
Umwelt and thus to create habits that enable the future growth of habit — habits that are 
 
169 It should be specified that Peirce devised multiple forms of interpretants (CP 8.343). These 
nuances of interpretant theory will not be addressed here. 
232 
 
open and receptive to future semiosis. Deely (2000, p. 36) summarizes this fundamental 
Peircean notion, while describing the “supra-subjective” nature of semiosis: 
 
The relations in which signs consist according to their proper being as signs differ 
from physical relations in nature in having of necessity (or "in principle") three terms 
united rather than only two. In other words, it suffices for intersubjective instances of 
relation to be dyadic, whereas the suprasubjective instantiations of relations as signs 
(which realize the indifference in the nature of relation to provenance from physical being 
as such) must always be triadic. A car can hit a tree only if there is a tree there to be hit; 
but a sign can warn a bridge is out whether or not the bridge is out, or, for that matter, 
whether or not there is even a bridge there at all where the sign "leads us to believe" 
there is a defective one! 
 
Both concepts (semiosis and anticipation) are defined through teleology170; the 
sign, like all living things anticipates a future state of being. The rock will always fall the 
same way, adhering to the same laws of gravity and resistance; the same cannot be said 
for a person or a cat. 
 
This outward potentiality contained in the sign – modelled by a theory of unlimited 
semiosis – reflects the anticipatory drive of organisms and can thus be associated with 
the biosemitoic project that asserts that semiosis converges with the emergence of life. 
Additionally, it reflects that all learning is a potential for transformation that is expressed 
in anticipatory action. It is revealing how remarkably similar anticipatory biology is with 
the Peircean perspective. Still, we must ask, if the two can be fully equated. To some 
semioticians, such as Nadin, semiotics concerns problems of representation and of how 
knowledge is inevitably tied up in the forms it takes. In this school, semiosis is 
approached not so much as a cosmological force, but rather a construct within the 
understanding of the observer (Nadin, 2014b). But within Peirce’ doctrine of synechism 
(and concurrently Deely’s (1990) more recent speculative theories of physiosemiosis) 







170 Ransdell (1977, p. 163) reminds us that Peirce conceived of his own semiotic “as precisely the 
development of a concept of final cause process and as a study of such processes”. 
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be thought of as a necessary component in the emergence of organic life from in-organic 
matter.171 
 
Peirce’s synechism refuses to consider mind or consciousness as something 
distinct from physical matter but also from the general universal flow of signs. In contrast, 
Nadin, in the interest of experimental science, would rather say something more specific. 
Peirce apart from opening the door for future semiotic inquiry, does not help us in the 
here and now locate what is distinctive about organic lifeforms. Honing in on the 
integrated dynamics of Anticipation has allowed Nadin and Rosen (and others) to focus 
on observable experimental phenomena that are, at least at our current level of analysis, 
clearly distinctive of biological lifeforms.172 This research does not require Peirce's 
metaphysical and cosmological theories, although it does require semiotic analysis 
generally, specifically, the ability to account for the qualitative (meaning-driven) 
dimensions of adaptation (Kull, 2009). This said, and as I have argued elsewhere 
(Campbell, 2015a, 2016), Peirce’s categories provide a relatively intuitive conceptual 
framework for considering often neglected aspects of teaching and learning. So, 
although Peirce’s broad metaphysical considerations might hurt the applicability of his 
philosophy (to both education and experimental science) his general emphasis on the 
irreducibly triadic nature of consciousness and experience is important. Also important is 
aligning semiosis with the process of learning, and this is what we turn to next. 
 
Implications for edusemiotics 
 
Thirdness is learning 
 
In the remaining sections I will argue that, in the interest of philosophy of education, 
aligning semiosis and anticipation can be conceptually useful in demonstrating one of 
the basic premises of edusemiotics: how learning can be understood as semiosis. 
 
As we have discussed earlier, formalization requires the reduction of 
phenomena/processes into baseline production rules (or algorithms) from which 
 
 
171 This is expressed by the following often quoted Peircean quotation: “All this universe is perfused 
with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (CP 4.539). 
172 Nadin’s (2017a, 2017b) recent applications of Anticipatory science into neuro-science and 
medicine respectively are good examples of this applicability. 
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information not expressed in these rules can be inferentially entailed: “there is always a 
set of parts, into which any material system (and in particular, any organism) can be 
resolved, without loss of information” (Rosen, 1991, p. 21). This requires a process of 
fractionation, which rests upon a notion that parts can be isolated from their emergent 
contexts and interactions, adumbrated and then used to derive information about the 
whole phenomenon/process. In semiosis because past states effect the present just as 
much as possible future states, such a reduction is effectively impossible for it would 
imply a dyadic (and hence non-triadic and non-dialogic) sign model (a structuralist model 
of signifier-signified, or expression plane-content plane). Similarly, Rosen believes that 
no structural (syntactic) modelling can describe the complexity inherent of the Living: 
 
Just as nobody has been able to characterize an organism in terms of a 
discrete list of properties, no one has been able to characterize a “natural 
language” (let us say English) in terms of a list of production rules. Indeed, 
if it were possible to do this, it would be tantamount to saying that a (natural) 
language can be completely characterized by syntactic properties alone, 
i.e., made independent of any semantic referents whatever. (1991, p. 43- 
44) 
 
This is because the “code” of a semiotic system is not purely self-referencing or closed, 
but defined by triadic and constantly evolving sign-processes. 
 
An edusemiotic model of cognition and learning, as opposed to an information- 
processing model (for the distinction, see Cunningham, 1987, 1998) insists upon an 
open system: that is, a complex system, in the technical sense used in this study. A 
triadic sign model tells us of the impossibility of reducing the complexity of the living to 
formalizations; semiosis does not function in a closed circuit, for the simple fact that the 
sign is triadic and not dyadic. It is only with such a triadic model that we can escape the 
dichotomous foundations emblematic of modern philosophies, as diverse as determinism 
(with its glaring mind-body problem) and even contemporary phenomenology, with its 
explicit subject-object distinction (Deely, 2001, 2009). John Dewey long insisted on the 
inadequacy of such approaches for understanding learning and educational contexts, 
reminding us time and time again that “[s]ubject and object antithetically defined can 
have logically no transactions with each other” (Dewey 1958 [1925], p. 239). To remedy 
these dualist conceptions in education is in many ways the central task of the emerging 
edusemiotic project. As Semetsky says (citing Nel Noddings), this task is to recognize 
that “relation is ‘ontologically basic’ (Noddings, 2010, p. 390) and therefore defies stable 
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substances as the furniture of the world presupposed by the analytic tradition” 
(Semetsky, 2014, p. 494). 
 
In terms of Peirce’s categories, the being of relation is Thirdness. Thirdness, in a 
Peircean edusemiotic, is a concrete learning objective. It is in fact the goal of learning in 
its broadest sense. Torill Strand (2013) has even declared that “Thirdness is learning”, 
for what is learning but the ability to make relationships between objects within 
experience — to realize the habit-forming and generalizing tendency of semiosis? To 
reference Peirce's famous article (1868), it is the place where we reach beyond a basic 
perceptual acquaintance with an object (the first grade of clearness, in a certain sense 
characteristic of Firstness) and beyond a formal abstract formulation (conventionalized 
symbolic knowledge) towards an understanding of the relationships between the object 
within my awareness and such a mental formulation.173 It must be stressed that 
Thirdness is not limited solely to abstract symbolic modelling, just as Firstness is not 
solely iconicity, and Secondness is not solely indexicality. This is important because 
much formal education adheres to an implicit learning theory that emphasizes symbolic 
formal systems often in place of (or completely severed from) their embodied iconic and 
indexical foundations. The Thirdness we are alluding to here is more general and 
experiential than what is called by modelling systems theory (Sebeok and Danesi, 2000) 
the tertiary modelling system, or “the modelling system that undergirds highly abstract, 
symbol-based modelling” (p. 201). Thus, we have the Edusemiotic focus on experiential 
learning processes which involves realizing that behind every formal symbolic system 
there is a sensory beginning, and that learning involves action in and to the world 
(Semetsky, 2014). As Dewey (1916/2004, p. 34) reminds us: 
 
To ‘learn from experience’ is to make a backward and forward connection 
between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in 
consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an 
experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes 
instruction – discovery of the connection of things. 
 
A triadic orientation is similarly about recognizing all aspects of experience, not 





173 For the educational implications of these three grades of clearness, see; (Campbell, 2015b). 
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Anticipation is central to this understanding of living-learning, since it is always 
expressed in action (not in stable structures or substances frozen synchronically). 
 
This experiential focus amounts to the recognition of the irreducibly triadic nature 
of semiosis (ex. CP 5.473) — as opposed to the dynamic reactions of brute force, cause 
and effect that is characteristic of Secondness and the physical world. In this 
understanding Thirdness adheres neither to realism nor idealism, neither to mind- 
independent being, nor mind-dependent being, but occurs prior to any sort of 
dichotomization such a philosophical distinction implies: the observer and the observed, 
inner and outer, nature and culture. In regards to these limiting polarizations 
anthropologist Tim Ingold (2009) asks: 
 
Can there be any escape from this shuttling back and forth between 
enclosure and disclosure, between an ecology of the real and a 
phenomenology of experience? So long as we suppose that life is fully 
encompassed in the relations between one thing and another – between 
the animal and its environment or the being and its world – we are bound 
to have to begin with a separation, siding either with the environment vis- 
à-vis its inhabitants or with the being vis-à- vis its world. 
 
The reach beyond the subjective-objective barrier lies in the relational dimension of 
semiosis. When our focus is turned away from sign vehicles (signifier-signified, 
representamen-immediate object) to the relations between signs and signification, we 
can escape such dichotomizations that work against the continuous flow in which 
experience presents itself to us. And now, finally, we can justify why Peirce’s categories 
of existence are needed in education. This is because quite simply, experience is not 
reducible to existents or non-existents, between an “ecology of the real, and a 
phenomenology of experience” (ibid.). Potentiality and future mediation are always 
weighing upon our learning in the world. 
 
Our ability to recognize what Deely (1990) has called the stipulable sign — the 
signification processes explicit in signs “apart from its context and circumstances of 
utterance” (CP 5.473) — is to effectively understand the learning process as complex (in 
the Gödelian sense), not as it occurs in distinct contexts or iterations or as attached to 
any particular knowledge content, but for its constantly evolving potential. This is 
because learning is itself a relation; it cannot be fully understood as a psychological 
state in the mind-brain of the learner, nor in the objects they are trying to understand, but 
as Deely says echoing Poinsot, something radiating “over and above them” (2009: 69). 
237  
Because the essential content or being of the sign is relative, the key to 
understanding what is proper to the sign is the notion of relativity, relation, or relative 
being. Without this content, the sign ceases to be a sign, whatever else it may happen to 
be. Stripped of its Thirdness, the sign slips back into the dyadic order of mere actual 
existence or, perhaps even further, into the monadic order of mere possibilities and 
dreams beyond which there is nowhere to go. (Deely, 1990, p.35) 
 
The orientation that the living is complex and thus cannot be described 
(completely and consistently) through symbolic/formal reductions validates the 
edusemiotic perspective that learning be observed and conceptualized through 
signification processes that mediate subject-object, mind-world. Thus, edusemiotics 
studies virtual phenomena: immaterial “supra-subjective” relations that although 
possessing subjective/material fundaments (of the order of Secondness), transcend 
“over and above” such spatial- temporal terminus, reaching both forwards and 
backwards in time. Adopting the notion of subjectivity and objectivity revealed by 
semiotic analysis,174 Deely (1990, p. 100) describes the type of objective reality that 
edusemiotics purports to study: 
 
[A]ny attempt to restrict semiosis to cognition falls short at the level of 
theory for the reason that nature and culture mutually penetrate one 
another in the constitution of experience, so the objects of experience also 
reveal themselves more suited to some significations than to others in any 
given context or inquiry. The objective sphere reveals itself as neither 
closed nor closable upon itself absolutely […] The full semiosis of 
experience, thus is never merely actual, but is suffused at every moment 
with elements and factors passing in and out of varying degrees of actuality 
and consciousness through the virtualities that remain in their own right 
semiosic (whether rooted primarily in the psychic or the physical side of 
subjectivity. 
 
Less technically this is to say that edusemiotics addresses not directly the 
material effects of learning (brain states, material learning outcomes) but rather how 
learning is displayed in the sign-processes that learners use, and how these sign- 
processes enable (or disable) the learner to continually grow and flourish within their 




174 Where a subject is ‘what it is independently of what anyone thinks it to be’, and thus of the order 




The Deweyian pedagogical concept of growth informs our comparative study of triadic 
semiosis and anticipation. Affifi (2014) has incorporated this aspect of Dewey’s 
educational philosophy within the purview of biosemiotics, to inform an approach to 
learning that he calls biological pedagogy. As we learn from Peirce’s cosmology, 
semiosis is unlimited and continuous, so semiotic-habit formation cannot be merely the 
operationalizing of behaviour and action. For Dewey, growth is about the formation of 
habits that will engender a receptiveness to novelty. Affifi (2014, p. 76) explains: 
 
For Dewey, growth occurs when possibilities open up for an organism, 
thereby “enhancing its ability to participate in its environment” (Gouinlock, 
1972, p. 238). It is the process of developing habits that allow the organism 
to interact more spiritedly, responsively, and openly to arising 
circumstances. By contrast, a lack of growth limits possibilities of 
encounter, as the organism relies on preformed habits that stultify, ossify, 
and close it off to novelty… growth is predicated on habits that enable future 
habit-forming, whereas the restriction of growth occurs when existing habits 
monopolize the operational domain (see, for example, Dewey 1916, pp. 44- 
48). 
 
In a similar sense, anticipation as a pedagogical concept is about furthering the 
growth of future habits that enable the organism to better navigate and expand the 
meaningfulness of its Umwelt. For a sign to be a sign, “reference to the future (in a third 
element, the interpretant) is essential … regardless of whether the thirdness is actual 
here and now or only virtual and “waiting to be realized” (Deely 1990: 34). Thus, the 
interpretant is related to and dependent upon anticipatory dynamics, in the sense that 
both can be understood “as a process or form of becoming… over and above the 
essential structure that nevertheless makes signification (as the production of meaning 
or sense) possible in the first place” (Deely and Semesky, 2017, p. 2). Interpretants do 
not emerge as deterministic stimulus-response reactions separated from the world in 
which they occur (as the formalist maintains) but are always contextual and meaning- 
driven (they function as objects within the web of relations that make up the Umwelt of 
the learner). For example, the same stimulus — the howl of a male wolf — can signify 
very different things, whether it occurs on a recording, in a city, in the desert, and 
whether I am a female wolf, a human, or a sheep. In fact, such an alignment (between 
anticipation and interpretation) has recently been made by Nadin (2017a, p. 158), when 
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he argued for a less quantitative, more semiotic (meaning-based) approach to 
understanding life: 
 
To be successful (in the evolutionary sense), action (through which 
anticipation is expressed) has to predate, not to follow, changing 
circumstances. Ergo: Evolution is predicated upon successful anticipatory 
action driven by the meaning of change in the world, not by quantitative 
variations. No living entity measures—it interprets. Measurement is a 
human activity associated with the construct called numbers, which define 
quantities. Interpretations, in a variety of forms, are part of the dynamics of 
life. 
 
And if we recognize that the living itself is defined by anticipation then it follows 
that the potentiality for full-fledged semiosis is implied in all living things. It is in this 
sense that signs contain a future-memory as well as a past one: realizing the inchoate 
qualitative potential in interpretants is akin to realizing their potential for growth. Aligning 
semiosis with learning is similarly about realizing such potential for transformative growth 
in learners themselves. 
 
Deely elaborates this future memory of semiosis in his seminal essay Evolution, 
Semiosis, and Ethics (Deely, 2010, p. 79) — he might as well be describing anticipation: 
 
Chance itself becomes assimilated in its outcomes to the various 
processes of semiosis whereby the meaning of what exists now is 
influenced by what the “now” has made possible that was not possible in 
earlier “nows”. That influence of the future which determines the present 
relevance of whatever is “past”, according to the ever changing boundary 
between “real” and “unreal”… is the essence of semiosis, the distinguishing 
feature which separates Thirdness as an action of signs from Firstness as 
‘pure possibility’ and Secondness as possibility concretely determined by 
physical interactions here and now. 
 
To recognize how this “action of signs” mediates the “possible” with the “here and now” – 
again to recognize the stipulable sign – is effectively to recognize learning as semiosis. 
To reflect on and bring awareness to this stipulability is in fact the objective of every 
educator. For the educator (against popular belief) is not simply the conveyor and 
gatekeeper of semiotic content, or knowledge — a teacher’s job is not simply to ensure a 
student’s familiarity with already determined curricular objects. This is the reductionist- 
mechanistic perspective towards learning we see reflected in much formal training. The 
educator, in actuality, teaches students to be in relationship — to an object or objects 
within their awareness, whatever that object be a literal (subjective) physical object like a 
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guitar, carving knife, or iPad; or to an object of thought, such as a philosophical concept, 
a mental representation, or a mathematical object, like the variable x which already 
possesses a purely relational identity to begin with. Student and teacher alike, learn from 
these relationships, which (in itself) involves some degree of stipulation and abstraction, 
in the sense that the student/teacher must recognize that there are signs, and not merely 
use them.175 These relational processes always emerge from a situated sensory 
encounter with the environment (Firstness through Secondness); but, to carry this 
beyond the world of accumulated information, that is, to learn from these sensory 
beginnings, we must bring these perceptual signs into relation with our acquired 
experiences. The interpretant, as it is not strictly a mental mode of being (it is not a 
specific interpreter!), is essentially what mediates “the difference between objective and 
physical being, a difference that knows no fixed line” (Deely, 1990, p. 27). The learner 
utilises the stream of interpretants within their experience to form the foundation for 
habits that will (ideally) enable future habit making, habits that are rooted in embedded 
ecologies. 
 
So, to recapitulate: the process of learning itself can be conceptualized as an 
interaction and immersion in the continuous flow of semiosis (CP 1.412) in which all our 
relations with the world present themselves. To do this is to realize the universe of 
discourse for its constant flux: signs becoming new signs in a process of unlimited 
semiosis. Conceptualizing learning in this way is to recognize the palimpsest nature of 
experience (Campbell, 2016). To realize the aesthetic/sensory potentiality of Firstness, 
and the brute realization of Secondness in every interaction, even though experience is 
necessarily of the nature of Thirdness. Learning, in this understanding, exists on a node, 
a sign in the process of translation into a new sign, but a sign not yet become, a sign 
that is always becoming. To imagine learning as something to be attained and 
possessed is to ignore that learning is a continual stream or process, and diminish it to a 
knowledge- object (a signifier-signified dyad, a closed circuit, not a triadic and out 
reaching sign). Learning is not something dug out of the ground, something unearthed, 




175 The fact that humans not only use signs (as all animals do) but know also that there are signs 
is what makes us, according to Deely (2005) “the semiotic animal”. 
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Of course, one can fall out of equilibrium with learning. To conceptualize learning 
in such a relational way requires an analog that is poly-dimensional as well as 
flowing/continuous. Sound and wind come to mind: a sailor can harness the power of the 
wind to guide her boat; she can enter into balance with it, just as she can fall out of 
balance and find the same wind working against her vessel. If we approach learning with 
this conceptual analog, learning is something achieved by attuning oneself to the 




Reflections of a music teacher 
 
As a way of applying the above analysis and of tracking the scholarly journey you have 
kindly embarked upon with me, let me draw upon my experiences as a music teacher. 
 
Many musical methods – such as, to use a Canadian example, the Royal 
Conservatory of Music (RCM) – deal primarily with mechanics already encoded into 
formalized systems. Students are taught the separate components of music: scales, 
chords, arpeggios, repertoire, theoretical rudiments, etc., as they are embedded within 
formalized sign-systems of harmony and notation. Even ear training is often approached 
in such a content driven manor, as students are generally drilled on interval recognition, 
and the ability to recognize individual chord qualities before they approach learning an 
actual piece of music by ear, or attempt to realize music already in their memory on their 
instrument. In the context of Rosen’s Modelling relation, we can say that instead of 
aligning learning with the student’s actual perception and experience of music-making, 
these more formal approaches generally begin with musical phenomena already 
determined through highly abstract formal systems. From these formal systems students 
are explained “basic axioms” from which musical information can be inferentially 
entailed. With a relational approach to music learning, the mechanics are inevitably dealt 
with but they are principally the medium through which the learning takes place, and in 
this sense, secondary to the primary goal of learning to be in relationship with some 
other. This “some other” can be many things; it can be the students’ embodied 
relationship to their instrument — how they hold the instrument, how they care for it, how 
they play it — or it can be a musical object within the awareness of the student, such as 
a melody the student is learning by ear, or a new mode they are becoming acquainted 
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with, etc. Again, fundamentally an edu-semiotic approach is routed in experiential 
learning. 
 
Susan O’Neill’s theory of transformative music engagement (TME) is very much 
in line with this basic orientation. Such a theoretical lens involves “[s]hifting our 
thinkingabout music learners from being to becoming”, providing “a framework for 
engaging music learners as active agents in their own musical development” (O'Neill, 
2012, p. 164). O'Neill (2012, p. 164) explains such a shift in thinking: “Whereas the idea 
of being a music learner suggests a bounded and static entity, with a nature that is 
prescribed, determined, or unchangeable, becoming a music learner is infused with 
notions of unfolding, openness, and dynamic potential”. Related to my argument here, a 
theory of TME involves a turning away from positivist expectations in music education 
that tend to view learners “from within a deficit versus talent/expertise framework” 
(O'Neill, 2012, p. 166), following the standards and expectations characteristic of “formal 
conservatoire approaches to music learning” (p. 169). 
 
As a jazz/improvising musician I know that being in relationship with the music 
you are actively creating is the primary objective of improvisation, whether in a group 
context or solo. All students of improvisation know these moments when your ears are 
wide open and receptive to the present moment, something that could somewhat 
misleadingly be linked with the psychological concept of flow (Shernoff et al, 2014). And 
conversely, all musicians know the shock to be returned from this transcendent relational 
state by a slip of the fingers, a mistakenly placed note, that all at once sends you hurtling 
back to reality. This is the fallibilistic “dynamical” reality of Secondess (CP 5.50, 5.484). 
 
The experiential aspect of learning (embodied by Thirdness and semiosis 
generally), is of course not reducible to any “complexus of dyadic relations” (CP 2.274). 
That is, semiosis-as-experience is “not a drawn out series of steps” but an immediate 
cognitive event, that involves “not only the brute actuality of interaction between two as a 
pair, but also the interpretation of this interaction” (Quay, 2016, p. 83-84), no matter how 
automatic, pre-rational/instinctual, or anticipatory this interpretant-process appears to be. 
All this by way of saying that Thirdness as a pedagogical value must have a memory of 
the aesthetic pre-cognitive dimensions of experience embodied by the monadic 
consciousness of Firstness, and the embodied knowing of Secondness. But since all 
experience occurs in Thirdness, so must learning. The goal of a Peircean edusemiotic is 
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thus to begin with the stipulable sign (taking notice of signification processes as 
embedded in specific learning-contexts and emergent perceptual encounters), and in a 
sense work backwards to realize the other categories as inchoately contained in this 
Thirdness. 
 
When, in improvisation you realize such an awareness of all categories – the 
proper goal of a Peircean edusemiotic – you are better able to anticipate the music’s 
developments. You transcend the reactionary state of just trying to find a comfortable 
pocket, just trying to react sufficiently to the info the other musicians are sending your 
way. When in relationship to the music, you are in a state of pure Thirdness, you are 
comfortably in step with semiosis, able to anticipate interpretants as they emerge, able to 
“hear ahead”, but also aware of the underlying sensory/qualia driven aspect of the music 
(Campbell, 2015a) as well as responsive to the embodied “indexical rub” (Campbell, 
2016) of coming up against the unknown. The sign possesses a future memory, and is 
thus not reducible to a logic of cause and effect, nor to a computational model of 
cognition. In musical situations, this future memory is experienced poly-dimensionally, 
and at various levels of temporality. The ensemble collectively creates a localized 
ecology – an ecology in various states of flux. A bebop tune like Donna Lee is 
progressing at a more rapid pace than a monotonous dominant drone, but both are in 
flux, for this is the nature of semiosis. Analogously, this is the nature of the living. Each 
musician is constantly trying, to the best of their ability, to merge and be in harmony, in 
equilibrium, with this constantly becoming collective ecology, in the scholastic way of 
speaking characteristic of Deely: to realize a being proper to relationship. 
 
Implications and directions for future research 
 
The orientation to define learning as semiosis, as noted by Cunningham (1987, p. 214), 
sensitises us to an understanding that learning, and cognition generally, is always 
concerned with “an interaction between the physical world and the cognizing organism”. 
This is a pertinent reminder for education: that, no matter how abstracted, extensional or 
symbolic/conventional our knowledge-systems become, learning always has a sensory 
origin. This is why Danesi (1998) suggests, in his monograph on Thomas Sebeok's 
semiotic, that we must never lose “the body in the sign” (Danesi, 1998). Learning is 
something that living things do to constitute their relationship to the world. As such, 
learning can be thought of as an extension of the complexity inherent in the living. 
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Learning in this understanding is not the application of a single model of the world (an 
act of computation), but rather the ability to form and realize the signification processes 
underlying all our interactions (mental, physical/mechanical, perceptual etc.). 
 
I have here argued that the logic of the semiosis (embodied by the interpretant 
function) in many ways parallels the anticipatory logic that Rosen espoused in his 
important works in theoretical biology. This alignment is also in line with one of the 
principle insights of biosemiotics: that “the intentional aspect of sign processes… 
parallels the teleological-teleonomical aspect in life processes” (Kull, Emmeche, and 
Hoffmeyer, 2011, p. 15). As noted by these three leaders in biosemiotics, “Rosen’s 
approach is a path towards biosemiotics” (2011, p. 10). Following this study, I would also 
insist on the need for future biosemiotic and edusemiotic studies to consider and 
collaborate with contemporary research into anticipatory systems (as in the Ante Institute 
out of the University of Texas). 
 
Together these perspectives – edusemitoics, anticipatory systems, and 
biosemiotics can build bridges across the humanities and the “hard” sciences, for all 
these perspectives seek to better understand the immensity of meaning inchoate in this 
concept/process of learning. To address our inquiry-questions from earlier (see Section 
1), such a collective and integrated theoretical understanding transcends the causal- 
determinist perspective and provides a lens from which to understand the complexity of 
the living by accounting for forces that traditional Newtonian physics cannot, such as 
 
• continuous fluctuation and change; 
 
• inchoate possibility (Firstness) and as well as future mediation (Thirdness) 
having the ability to impact upon the present; 
 
• a continuity between ens rationis and ens reale and thus the requirement for 
using many different representational models to explain phenomenon; 
 
• complementarity of subject-object relations and thus the recognition of 
relationality (or semiosis, or more narrowly of interpretative processes) as a 
tangible force in our engagements with the world. 
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Realizing these points are, as I see it, the goal of pedagogy that strives towards 
recognition of being (that is, ontology) in its fullest sense. The perspectives I have 
explored – Peirce’s triadic semiotics, his categorical system, and a theory of anticipation 
as definitional of living beings – all realign the processes of learning with the complexity 
of life. They inchoately explain that if the living is not reducible to a deterministic logic 
then neither is learning. What I propose is (in the spirit of Peirce’s pragmatism) a 
regulative ideal for an educational framework that recognizes the triadic nature of 
consciousness and learning. Recognizing the ways in which the possible and the 
anticipatory influence and determine how learning occurs is essential for a pedagogy 
that realigns with the dynamics of life. Such a triadic approach, I would insist, is the only 
way learning can realign with experience and be conceptualized (in the Deweyian 
sense) as a form of growth, outside of reductions to either constructivist notions of mind- 
dependent reality, or positivist conceptions of mind-independent reality. Like life- 
processes, learning is not reducible to even an aggregation of systems, for as we have 
seen, a complex system is not ever entirely describable. Learning constantly exceeds 
being realized in any single state or in any formal system; it constantly spills over any 
singular representation of the world. Hence, my emphasis on exploring an aggregation 
of different perspectives and approaches. Hopefully this study – by bringing things into 
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Main ideas and themes 
 
Conceptualizing curriculum, teaching, and learning around the 
unfolding event 
 
To escape the limitations of a narrow and calculative performativity – and with it the 
reduction of education to what can be easily measured and accounted for in terms of 
‘outcomes’ and ‘effective techniques’ – I have proposed in these articles that learning 
and teaching can be reconceptualised around the centrality of significant events that 
emerge from within the present-unfolding of pedagogical practices. 
 
I have primarily studied this through the ecological lens of post-Peircean 
(bio)semiotics, arguing that approaching the dynamics of living (and learning) as broadly 
expressed in semiosis (sign-action) provides exploratory possibilities for developing a 
non-reductionist theory of learning, that implicitly implies a theory of teaching and 
education more broadly. Theoretically, this orientation is pragmatic and useful as it 
provides a conceptual framework to account for how organism-environment relationships 
grow and change on a qualitative (meaning-based) level. One way this is accomplished, 
conceptually, stems from the expanded temporality offered to us through Peirce’s 
categories and his mutually supporting pragmatism and synechism (cf. Campbell, 2020; 
Esposito, 2005). We have also observed how a concept of event often enters Peirce’s 
writing. For example, in the same early article “Some consequences of four incapacities” 
where Peirce famously discussed his idea that “every cognition is determined logically by 
previous cognitions” and that “we have no power of thinking without signs” (1868, p. 
141), he also engaged an event-focused description of learning and cognition, 
suggesting that cognition is “never an instantaneous affair, but is an event occupying 
time” (1868, p.147) 
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I will now take a moment to recapitulate the basic dynamics of this educational 
approach, using limited technical language and keeping my analysis close to the 
question of what happens within the educational process? 
 
Observe three familiar sites of (semiotic) activity: 
 
The Learner; The Teacher, and; That Which is To Be Learnt (TWITBL)176 
 
From this event and practice-focused perspective, Teacher and Learner are not 
substantive, static entities, but rather enacted roles that only emerge in relation to an 
evolving relationship with TWITBL. Following from this, a teacher –or professor for that 
matter – is not something you are, a stable identity, but rather something you become; 
particularly, when you have something to teach or profess (as Greta Thunberg and many 
of her generation have shown, in relation to environmental issues). Learners and 
teachers thus conceived, are not ontologically bounded entities – rather, they are 
processes and roles enacted within the context of significant practices and events. What 
is enacted is simply a way of being in relation to TWITBL. 
 
I have argued that this contains basic implications for how we understand and 
value (cf. Chap 3) the work of teaching and learning, suggesting that knowledge 
exchange, the transmission of a corpus of representations, the preservation and 
administering of stable identities (learners being learners, teachers being teachers, and 
researchers being researchers, disciplines being disciplines) – this is not ultimately what 
pedagogy is concerned with. Instead, pedagogy principally hinges on enacting 
significant relationships to TWITBL through events that occur in a dynamic, continuously 
unfolding taskscape – an evolving field of meaningful possibilities for action and 
response, framed by collective meaning-making practices. 
 
From such an internal perspective on pedagogy, an event is a dynamic 
reconfiguration of experience, that calls out to be dealt with in the context of an unfolding 
continuum of practice. It is important to stress that, although TWITBL is emergent and 
enacted, we as educators, must still be able to articulate what it is, and what it should be. 
 
 
176 I am referencing a recent analysis around these three sites conducted in Stables, 2019a. I will 
be engaging with this article throughout this concluding chapter. The actual phrasing “TWITBL” is 
used in some, primarily British, educational discourses, and we’ll observe it in this chapter also 
employed by Richard Pring (2004). 
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Through the values and actions we embody within our educational practice, we are 
continually both posing and being confronted by the question: “Is what I desire, 
desirable?”.177 In fact, I would claim that such an orientation perhaps requires renewed 
attention to our pedagogical and curricular practices – what we decide to “place on the 
table” for us and our students to study (cf. Masschelein & Simons, 2015, p. 88) – 
precisely because these forms and invitations for meaning-making are not passed on to 
teachers and learners from the outside, from specialists, academics or government, but 
from within enacted events/practices. 
 
I have also tried to show through these articles that this basic pedagogical 
orientation is consistent with and follows from what we know and can observe about 
teaching and learning from anthropology – mainly the foundational insight that 
educational processes are not chiefly about administering or transmitting ready-made 
information, “prior to its application in particular contexts of practice” (Ingold, 2013, p. 
13). Rather, the anthropology of education consistently reveals that teaching channels 
learning-through-practice (Chap 2), and accordingly the teacher’s job is not to ensure 
or determine that learning happens, but only that learning could happen. Ultimately, this 
changes how we describe the educative process: through engaging in practices, 
teachers do not so much force or manipulate student’s attention toward desirable 
outcomes or ways-of-doing-things, but rather, simply provide opportunities for students 
to form their attention and to grow into knowing. Ingold (2013, p. 13) explains this basic 
insight, and how it informed his own approach to teaching and practicing anthropology: 
 
we learn by doing, in the course of carrying out the tasks of life. In this the 
contribution of our teachers is not literally to pass on their knowledge, in 
the form of a ready-made system of concepts and categories with which to 
give form to the supposedly inchoate material of sensory experience, but 
rather to establish the contexts or situations in which we can discover for 
ourselves much of what they already know, and also perhaps much that 
they do not. In a word, we grow into knowledge rather than having it handed 







177 See Biesta’s (2015) talk “Being at Home in the World” (accessed: May, 4th, 2020): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUXSxGD8WmE 
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These simple recognitions orient us toward a philosophy of pedagogy that hinges on the 
possibility and propensity for educational practices to bring about (to enact) significant 
events for students. 
 
Observe that the commitment to practices in such accounts of social learning is 
taken as primary – recognizing that what makes activities educationally significant must 
do with how they frame and open-up possible experience through our dwelling-in 
collective practices (cf. Ingold, 2017; Ross & Mannion, 2013). I argue with many others 
(cf., Carr, 1995, Pring, 2004, Stables, 2016), that learning is in large degree an empty 
concept without practices. Observe that this is a basic experiential fact as much as it is a 
theory of learning, in the sense that no single activity makes sense in itself –meaning 
rather only emerges in continuity “within a broader spectrum of activities that have a 
unifying purpose” (Pring, 2004, p. 28). Practices are then, in a sense, what bring 
continuity to events and through this, make experience educational. 
 
An educational emphasis on events implicitly implies a resolving of the theory 
and practice bifurcation: qualitatively exploring and reflecting on practice involves the 
ability to recognize some singular experience as significant within the ongoing flow of 
experience, and thus implicitly, a sense of what is worthwhile and valuable to learn. A 
mode of responsiveness, a way of being in habit with the world, and thus perceiving it 
and moving within its possibilities and constraints – this is embedded within the 
continuing act of being-in-practice. An event-focused account also implies, more 
basically, that we ourselves are implicated and involved in these events. As educational 
researchers, this implies an ethics, or at least a broad ethos, that because learning (and 
teaching) are generative acts, taken in the doing, we must, at least in some capacity, 
directly enter into the messiness and indeterminacy of these unfolding events and 
practices. It is in this sense that scholars, such as Biesta (2016[2013]) have argued that 
educational processes be recognised precisely for their riskiness and essential 
indeterminacy. Pring (2004) refers to this vital union of events and practices in a 
discussion on teacher-practitioner (action) research: 
 
To pick out a particular event as an action logically implies reference to the 
intentions of the agent, and, through a clarification of those, to the 
theoretical framework of ideas to which the teacher is committed [...] To 
focus the analysis, by contrast, upon the meaning of educational theory 
and to trace from that analysis the connection with educational practice, as 
researchers have traditionally tried to do, does not do justice to this 
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conceptual union between thought and action which analysis of ‘practice’ 
would seem to demand. [emphasis added] (pp. 129-131) 
 
As Pring explains in this passage, to look for reasons for actions is not to look for 
causation, or to ask why certain things happened the way they did. Recognizing events 
as significant within the continuity of an educational or artistic practice doesn’t directly 
cause things to happen in a simple deterministic manner. Nevertheless, events do 
reconfigure our relationship to the present-unfolding and thus our relationship to the 
future. An event, thus conceived, is a process that we recognize as being significant, 
either retrospectively or ‘in the moment’, precisely because it frames our ongoing 
engagement in practices. 
 
This is, in fact, the way I first began thinking about the educational encounter and 
process early on – through my childhood, developing a musical practice, and later, a 
scholarly writing practice. Engagement in practices, whether overtly educational in their 
aims or not, implicitly or explicitly carry values and meaning for the participants, and thus 
a supposition (maybe an unformed hypothesis, but still a meaningful ‘form’) of what is 
valuable to learn and how best to learn it. Following the likes of Carr (1995), and 
recapitulated in Pring (2004), we can understand educational practices as “a range of 
activities which cannot be seen in isolation but which are intelligible from an educational 
point of view because they encapsulate not only what should be learnt but also how that 
which is learnt should be transmitted” (p. 28). I would simply want to sub out the word 
“transmitted” in this passage with ‘enacted’. This modification requires that we recognize 
that our educational aims and values are always changing as our relationship to TWITBL 
is constantly changing. Engagement in practices, is how we, as teachers, may be said to 
channel (but not ensure/determine) learning, as a richness of meaningful response. This 
has been conceptualized in these articles, ecologically, as a growth of locally and 
immediately meaningful interpretative possibilities (interpretants or affordances) in an 
environment – a modification of sign-relations that, in a particular field of activity and 
action, open up possibilities for an organism’s future and sustained semiotic 
engagement.178 Accordingly, what we ‘offer up’ as teachers are simply proposals for 
 
178 This is further elaborated in Campbell, Olteanu and Kull, 2019 (p. 372): “[...] Hoffmeyer (2010) 
postulated that “one of the few general trends that can be ascribed to organic evolution is the 
tendency towards the production of species exhibiting more and more semiotic competence or 
freedom in the sense of locally meaningful interpretants” (p. 196). Such an increase in semiotic 
freedom can be described as the growth in the logical richness of decision-making. Semiotic 
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action and collective exploration, that in no way determine, or even ensure, that learning 
will happen – but are, nevertheless, oriented toward its possibility, through our 
continuing engagement in practices. It is in this sense that I have argued with 
anthropologist Michael Ling (see Chap 2) that “[l]earning precedes teaching, insofar as it 
goes on without formal teaching, often enough, and, that effective teaching has to be 
shaped by an understanding of learning, first and foremost” (Ling, personal 
correspondence).These ideas also resonate and perhaps extend further with Biesta 
(2015), who argued that learning is only one possible outcome of teaching – and that 
when learners are positioned differently to learning it opens up different ways of being in 
relation to the world and therefore different ways of existing. We observed along with 
Biesta in Chapter 2, some of the ways that the language of learning has become 
increasingly individualized and commoditized and the ways in which an overt focus on 
learning as the primary or even the only goal of teaching and education puts the learner 
at the centre of the world, with a range of consequences. It is easy to see that being at 
the centre of the world is inherently un-ecological. I suggest that a broader bio-semiotic 
outlook that sees learning as distributed throughout the meaning-making processes of 
an ecosystem might recover a way to exist in what Biesta (2017) calls a grown-up 
relationship to the world, “to be in the world without occupying the centre of the world” (p. 
37). 
 
So, to reiterate, this event and practice-focused educational philosophy is part of 
a long tradition and not necessarily original. Still, I have argued throughout these essays 
that semiotic philosophy provides us with a comprehensive framework to understand and 
think deeply about the subtle notions implicit in such a pedagogical orientation that are 
often not sufficiently conceptualized or integrated philosophically. I argue that this 
involves effectively conceptualizing how learning emerges, not through static 
transmission or top-down deliveries, but through the continuity of shared experience and 
shared practices. The strength of this particular conceptualization of educational 




freedom refers here to the complexity of choice an organism has for channeling learning in a way 
that sustains meaningful relationships within its umwelt (see also Stjernfelt 2006, p. 23). This is not 
necessarily or simply an increase in choice, but rather growth of meaning. As Peirce posited, “And 
what is growth? Not mere increase!” (CP 1.174)”. 
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afforded through conceptualizing learning-as-semiosis across both mind/body and 
nature/culture bifurcations (Campbell, Olteanu & Kull, 2019). 
 
Artists and makers 
 
As presented throughout these articles, this philosophy suggests a curricular and 
pedagogical orientation that incorporates and takes notice of the practices of creative 
practitioners – artists, scholars, researchers, crafts-people, doers and makers of any 
kind – and asks how this is and can be interpreted in the context of creative and 
exploratory pedagogy. 
 
One of the central insights revealed by the work and practices of makers (cf. 
Ingold, 2013) is that there is no such thing as complete knowledge or understanding. 
The craftsperson isn’t concerned with perfectly reproducing an ideal model/archetype, 
but rather continually enacting their craft – in this moment, in this place, with these 
materials. Consequently, the maker is not so much directly concerned with innovation 
but rather how to go on learning (Chap 2.1) within an unfolding taskscape. Sennett 
(2008) reminds us that the exaltation of innovation in modern consumer societies rests 
upon a persistent industrialist notion that talent and creativity are scarce commodities – 
notions, we should add, not at all in line with the way makers engage in and learn 
through being in practice, nor the social reality of “maker societies”. Innovation as a 
primary and driving aim, is however, not co-extensive with the generative and ongoing 
act of making. Craftspeople are not interested in executing their craft one single time, 
perfectly – for, if they were, they would never be able to develop the requisite skills and 
perceptual discernment necessary to perform their craft in the first place. Craft is never 
complete, it is rather the flow of one movement into the next, over and over, 
continuously, and it is precisely through such established practices of habituation that 
“freedom within the event” resides (cf. Ingold, 2017; Manning, 2016). Remember, 
knowledge is not possessed, it is enacted (Hoffmeyer, 2018). 
 
Andrew Stables has located this clearly for pedagogy as the Complete/Correct 
Understanding Fallacy (Stables, 2019a). Because our relationship to knowledge is 
always changing, being re-interpreted every time our previous experience and 
conditioning encounters a new context/occurrence, what we “place on the table” for 
collective study (TWITBL) cannot be completely or determinately understood or 
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misunderstood – but only increasingly inquired into and explored. This principle effects 
the roles of both teacher and student. Inevitably, the teacher brings to the educational 
encounter their own way of doing things, a personal and acquired way of approaching 
their field of study – quite simply, a way of being in relation to practice. The student does 
not simply reproduce (or fail to reproduce) this perspective/relation, as this is impossible. 
Rather, they bring their own horizon of experience to the encounter. Of course, the 
student, is likely less experienced and familiar with the field of study than the teacher 
(but by no means necessarily). Yet, from a meaning-based (semiotic) perspective, this is 
not an issue to be overcome, but a central and important part of the educational process. 
We as teachers all know the way students can suddenly shed light on an all too familiar 
topic, simply by approaching it with a beginner’s mind – revealing new ways of 
understanding long taken for granted processes and concepts. Indeed, many of my early 
papers, amateurish in many respects, possessed an aspect of this guessing, meaning- 
seeking, indeterminacy – and herein, I would claim, resides their nascent value. 
Remember, it was such a beginner’s ignorance of the Greek language (and 
consequently, also Greek conceptions of the sign and signification) that enabled 
Augustine to see the potential of the sign as an educational concept (see Chap 1.1; 
Olteanu & Campbell, 2018). Such improvising, grappling, creative methods are often 
behind a great discovery and a significant educational moment (and this is exactly what 
is described pedagogically in these articles through the Peircean notion of abductive 
inference, see Chap 4 and Chap 6). 
 
Pedagogically, this has a range of implications. It implies that knowledge is never 
simply correct or incorrect, right or wrong, and furthermore, that problem-solving is not 
something distinct from problem-finding (Sennett, 2008, p. 33). Again, this is what is 
revealed by the work of makers and artists, in the sense, that the emergence of choice 
and possibility comes from dwelling in problems and resistances (see Chap 5), not 
swiftly and dogmatically discarding their relevance and importance for learning – as the 
educational model of a multiple-choice exam denotes, for example. 
 
Such also speaks to the nature and evolution of the investigations that make up 
this dissertation: while I am clearly after something with these articles, some aim, I think 
it is safe to say that they are, each of them, inherently imperfect trying attempts – which 
is to say they are essays. Together, they showcase a logic of discovery, the imperfect 
making of scholarly artefacts, distinct from a logic of representation. Precisely because 
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of this, they embody materially a kind of scaffolding of my own learning and scholarly 
activity, and hence reflect an important insight of ecological and semiotic learning theory, 
well characterized by the following passage from Kull (2015), that “[…] organisms would 
hardly be able to make reasonable decisions without their bodies together with their 
ecosystems embedding earlier experience helping them to direct their future choices” (p. 
232). It is in this sense that we write, not to reveal what is concealed in our skulls, but 
rather to think. Thinking, is not as often assumed, antecedent to the doing – whether that 
be writing, research, or teaching. Thinking is to be led out (2.3), to follow endings into 
new beginnings. I’ve discussed these exact ideas around the craft of musical 
improvisation, as well as writing and research, in an interview-discussion (Ingold & 
Campbell, 2018) with Ingold: 
 
CAMPBELL: As an improvising musician and a teacher of improv I am 
interested in the process by which improvisers realize potential and 
variations in music-making, not from predetermined inputs outside of the 
activity, but through entering into relation with an unfolding musical 
event/ritual. I've also seen how many educational endeavours can fall short 
because of a general inability to conceptualize this essential doing- 
undergoing, where, as you point out, 'real' freedom resides. You 
demonstrate that this is also what happens in anthropology, when 
ethnography (making studies of people) becomes its central preoccupation, 
in place of dynamic forms of participant observation (communing and 
corresponding with others). [...] Could you talk about the role this "freedom 
from within" - this improvisational movement - has in your own scholarly 
craft and practice? 
 
INGOLD: Most of my scholarship these days takes the form of writing. As 
in any creative activity, I commence a project of writing with only the haziest 
notion of what it is to be about and of how I shall proceed. And I always feel 
hopelessly unprepared. All I have to go on are my earlier writings, texts I 
may have read that are still preying on my mind, conversations which might 
have sparked off a train of thought, and observations of things or 
happenings that may have caught my attention. I am thrashing around 
inside of all of this. The concordant processes by which thinking crystallises 
into thought, and by which disorderly words settle into syntactically regular 
patterns, are among the great mysteries of the writer’s craft. Long after a 
piece of work is finished (if it is ever finished) I can look back on it in 
astonishment and wonder, ‘was that me?’, ‘did I really write all that?’ Writing 
is something I definitely do – it is not being done to me – and yet in the 
doing I surrender myself to it: I am inside the writing process, not directing 
it from outside or above. I don’t so much decide what to write as write what 
falls or comes to me. Where exactly it comes from, I don’t know. And the 
biggest problem, always, is how to convert a line of thought and words that 
is coming to a close, and that looks like it will go no further, into a new 
opening. Indeed, writing is not about progressing from beginning to end. 
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Quite to the contrary: it is a constant struggle to turn endings into 
beginnings. It is precisely in this perpetual beginning that its freedom 
lies.179 
 
It is in this sense that I have argued throughout these essays for the educational 
importance of thinking seriously about how learning is enacted from within the 
continuities of sensory engagement and perceptual flow – the intimate coupling of 
perception and action that is, as we shall see in the following sections, of the essence of 
craft-skill. We can say, to quote the title of one of Ingold’s lectures, that “to learn is to 
improvise a movement along a way of life”.180 So, with that, I should stress once more 
that this openness of pedagogy-toward-events, although not essentially concerned with 
either competition, innovation, or ‘productive outcome’, is not in fact aimless, but instead 
aims after a creative freedom within practices (a richness of response) – where the end- 
result of education is not something to be deduced from principles (or competencies, or 
skills) imposed context-independent, but from cleaving the event from within (cf. Ingold, 
2017; Manning, 2016). As Ingold illuminates, this is a freedom that comes from dwelling 
in habitual relations, from being in-habit with events and places – not a “hollow freedom” 
as an act of volition imposed retrospectively – the implementation of a pre-existing form, 
template or method. 
 
Again, what makes practices properly educational is the recognition of meaning 
emerging through continuity, and the further implication that there are no fully objectified, 
and finished types of knowing – only opportunities for further study and further 
exploration. When understanding and ‘learning’ is reduced in educational practice to 
being simply correct or incorrect, knowledge is seen as static and fixed. This is simply 
not the reality of being in practice and how people cultivate freedom within a craft. With 
the work of makers and artists, logos is not defined in opposition to praxis, and episteme 





179 This interview is reproduced in full in Appendix A, along with an interview by Canadian poet and 
philosopher Tim Lilburn. 
180 Held at the LSE Department of Anthropology, April 27th (2010). (Accessed, May 4th, 2020): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDaaPaK-N5o&t=26s 
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Skill, going beyond analytic understanding 
 
Historically, this philosophical orientation towards observer-independent formalisms 
stems in large part from the influence of the linguistic-turn upon 20th century philosophy, 
which results from an epistemology that sees the verbal (linguistic) as fully 
encompassing, framing, and mapping, all pre-verbal experience – expressed variously in 
intellectual movements towards semiotic structuralism, the influence of Chomsky’s 
Universal Grammar, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Exploring the structures 
and implicit functions of such a modelling relation has been a major goal of this thesis 
(see Chap 7.2). Bourdieu (1990[1980]) highlights this type of research-relationship in his 
famous work of sociological theory The Logic of Practice: 
 
The illusion of the autonomy of the purely linguistic order that is asserted 
in the privilege accorded to the internal logic of language at the expense of 
the social conditions of its opportune use, opened the way to all the 
subsequent research that proceeds as if mastery of the code were sufficient 
to confer mastery of the appropriate usages, or as if one could infer the 
usage and meaning of linguistic expressions from analysis of their formal 
structure, as if grammaticality were the necessary and sufficient condition 
of the production of meaning [...] [my emphasis]. (p. 33) 
 
What Bourdieu speaks to here has also been, I believe, one of the central oversights (or 
let-downs) of much analytic philosophy of education (often associated with the 
foundational work of R. S. Peters) – which has, in the pursuit of completely and 
decidedly reducing complex educational processes to sets of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, subverted the social conditions of meaning, the local and temporal aspects of 
knowing-in-place/practice. 
 
Clearly prior mastery of the code is not how practice proceeds or unfolds in situ. 
The person of practical wisdom, the maker-artist, does not begin by seeking out first 
principles or a defining archetype before embarking on their tasks. Their type of freedom 
comes not from principles or sovereign rights, not from methodology, but from 
collectively enacted skill. Skill is not defined here in the precise, analytic sense 
presented by Robin Barrow (1987, 1990), namely “a capacity that is discrete and can be 
perfected through practice and exercise” (1990, p. 24). Observe how in Barrow’s 
definition, skill is narrow and “discrete”, i.e., not directly continuous with broader forms of 
life, but rather, distinct, but still narrowly transferable to other domains, however, only, 
within firm limits and boundaries. Indeed, this is exactly what Barrow intended and 
261  
emphasised in his definition – arguing that the concept of skill be retained only for very 
specific and what he calls transferable capacities, like dribbling a ball or juggling (1990, 
p. 24), rather than being interpreted vaguely and synonymously with ability in general, as 
was increasingly becoming the case in curriculum discourse and policy of the era (a 
critique, we should note, stemming largely from psychology’s increased stranglehold on 
education and the shortcomings of cognitive psychology’s notion of skill, not at all 
dissimilar with my Peircean critique on the limits of psychologism). 
 
However, I argue that if we adopt such an analytically narrow and restrained 
definition two important implications arise: firstly, skill cannot appear as a type of 
knowledge in its own right – that is, if we accept knowledge in its classical conception as 
justified, true, belief – and secondly, following from the first, skill becomes associated 
with a kind of rote, bodily training (that can be “perfected through practice and exercise”) 
consequently allowing a persistent mind/body fallacy to enter our pedagogical thinking; 
the notion of an educable mind, distinct from a trainable body-automaton (see 8.2.2). 
The big problem here, I argue, is that this is not how skill presents itself in the process of 
of acquiring skill, that is, of enskillment – not expressed in “the improvisation of 
movement along a way of life”, but the transference of a static template/schema – 
leading to another embedded supposition that skill is simple and easy to discern and 
assess, in the sense that people claim ‘you either have skills or you don’t’ (riding a bike 
is a skill you either possess or don’t possess). Skill, in this restricted analytic conception, 
seems disconnected from the higher faculties of rationality and decision-making, that 
are, in this line of philosophical thinking, considered definitively characteristic of humans, 
as distinct from brute animals (Barrow & Woods, 2004, pp. 21–25). We might also 
observe that this understanding is not consonant with the word’s etymological family 
tree, which precisely concerns the kind of knowledge and knowing of people who make 
things, and not those who stand back and observe: disconnected from the kinds of 
knowing as discernment, emphasised in the Old Norse skilja, “to divide, separate, 
distinguish, decide” (Ingold, 2017, p. 42) or, its relatives, such as the “Proto-Germanic 
skaljo- "divide, separate" (source also of Swedish skäl “reason,” Danish skjel “a 
separation, boundary, limit,””181 or the PIE root of all these words in skel, meaning "to 
cut". Ingold (2017) elaborates these etymological connections, through the example of 
 
181 From (accessed May, 4th, 2020): https://www.etymonline.com/word/skill 
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woodcutting, drawing upon the event-focused philosophy of Canadian philosopher/artist 
Erin Manning (2016): 
 
In woodcutting the decision emerges from this correspondence of timber 
and metal, and from the forces pent up in each as they strike up an 
engagement. It is a decision taken in the cutting, not in advance of it, and 
it alters the course of the event, as Manning puts it, ‘in the event’. In so 
doing it introduces a variation, not in the movement itself, but in the way 
movement moves. [...] Every decisional cut – be it in woodwork, walking, 
singing or writing – entails a differential in the way of movement-moving 
that eventually takes it in this direction or in that. This is what skill is about: 
not imposing exterior form on compliant matter but finding the grain of 
things and bending it to an evolving purpose. (p. 42) 
 
We will return to this issue of skill a bit later in our discussion on music and music 
education (8.2.2). Suffice it to say here that skill – as Ingold, Manning, Sennett, and 
myself all explain it – is about being inside the knowing, not outside of it. It is not about 
knowing the code and applying it, but an embodied and situated experience of being-in- 
practice. This is a type of knowing precisely and definitively concerned with continuity, 
not discreetness and transferability. The basic idea: knowing how to “go on learning” 
(Chap 2.1) within a form of living, is about finding directionality in the doing, and, put 
simply, teaching is about channeling this directionality. 
 
I have observed throughout, that this educational philosophy can, if 
misinterpreted, be accused of feeding into simplistic constructivist conceptions of the role 
(or lack thereof) of teaching and teachers (see Chap 3.3). Hence, some additional 
clarification on the role of the teacher in these accounts is helpful: this emphasis on 
purpose through collective practice, is not to deny the reality, that, as a teacher, it is 
often entirely necessary to scaffold the learner’s attention and activities – to narrow, in a 
certain sense, the frame of focus and action, until the learner can eventually evoke, 
enact, and most importantly, participate in the activity/process independently, as in 
Vygotsky’s celebrated zone of proximal development.182 The way practices are 
presented and carried out in the classroom by teachers provides pathways, forms 
(mediating artifacts in the Vygotskyian tradition) for the sustainment of collective study. 
This is a basic implication of semiotic theory, that is often, as Stables (2012) notes, not 
 
 
182 We can say with the likes of Jan Masschelein that such a pedagogical orientation is not about 
manipulating or forcing attention, but rather, engaging in practices that “make attention possible”. 
See, for example, the following interview (retrieved, April 2020): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPK3Fffu1DI 
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fully recognized in education: “[i]t is an important truth little acknowledged in educational 
theory that that which makes knowledge and understanding possible – our interpretive 
frameworks including our assumptions and prejudices – is also that which limits them” 
(p. 46). However, we must again here emphasize that, central to this event-centered 
account, these forms and constraints (scaffolding structures) are not passed on from the 
outside, but from within enacted and shared “forms of gathering” (Masschelein & 
Simons, 2015, p. 85) that find their purposes through the continuity of pedagogical 
practices. Following from this, we as teachers do not, strictly speaking, possess 
knowledge nor precisely do we scaffold a route for our students to achieve or arrive at 
this knowledge. Rather, we enact it in relation and co-participation with our students.183 
 
Knowledge is evoked in the very moment of use – when the phenomenal present 
meets a situation of logical incompatibility, where more than one possible response 
opens-up to the organism (see Kull, 2018). Here, at this juncture is a possible richness of 
decision-making, where learning-as-choice can emerge (cf. Kull, 2018). This is the 




In his recent, previously referred to article “Semiotics and Transitionalist Pragmatism” 
(2019a), Andrew Stables articulates the broad educational significance of 
conceptualizing the sign as a feature of an event versus an understanding of the sign as 
a pre-existing representation. He observes that not just any kind of semiotics is suitable 
philosophically – semiotics, “[w]here it is employed as an applied discipline in textual 
 
 
183 This is, however, not the same thing as prescribing the same educational methods/practices 
simply because they are the standard, inherited, prescribed or conventional way of doing things. 
The use of the word convention here is deliberate, as it sheds light on one of the main aspects of 
the semiotic theory of learning that I outline: from a Peircean learning theory, signs in general (and 
symbols in particular) are the result of habit-formation, – “whereby a self that dwells in its own 
practices is recursively generated by them” (Ingold 2017, p. 22). – again, not the reduction of 
complex phenomenon to a set of conventional (or, arbitrary) signification rules (rules of decoding 
and encoding), from which learning can be determined and measured (chap 7). Habit-taking is thus 
what binds nature-culture divisions. I have argued through Part 2, that such a narrow conception 
of learning as (human) symbolic processing or computational learning, leads to a devaluing and 
lack of emphasis on embodied, pre-verbal forms of knowing. Peirce’s conception of the symbol is 
grounded in signification becoming stable and conventionalized through the regularity of habit – not 
specifically in the kind of symbolic processing implicitly or explicitly associated with the human 
capability of thinking at a distance, or signification that can be abstracted from its context of 
occurrence (see 8.2.1 and 8.4.2). 
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studies, [...] often rests on representationalist assumptions, and where it is conceived 
theoretically, [...] often rests on a strong foundation of Cartesian mind-body dualism” (p. 
786). As we have seen with Augustine, a notion or concept of sign (some way of thinking 
about organism-environment mediation) is often at the root of educational philosophies, 
whether it is overtly acknowledged or not. Stables explains that the orientation in some 
semiotic theory – often associated with a dyadic conception of the sign defined through 
difference and binary opposition, characteristic of semiology and language-centered 
structuralism – is still, implicitly or explicitly, at the epistemological root of many 
educational conceptualizations that stress that TWITBL is a stable, substantive entity, 
and thus by inference, “can be learnt and taught about... in isolation: that is, the 
curriculum can be atomised and stepped, and progress against curricular elements that 
can be validly measured” (p. 784). 
 
In contrast to such representationalist approaches, I have argued that one of the 
main insights a non-dualistic conception of the sign brings to education resides in 
recognizing that the event of signification cannot be ensured, and thus pedagogy 
requires bringing renewed attention to the present-unfolding. With this, comes the 
important corollary recognition that such pedagogical events are, in large part, either 
harmed or destroyed by a rapacious desire for managerial control in education. Stables 
(2019a) explains how a conception of the sign as a representation of a pre-existing entity 
(objects, or data/information) is not only a theoretical issue, but has major implications 
for the way we understand the work of learners and teachers: 
 
Thus the teacher’s subjectivity is not considered (or is considered as 
potential interference: the teacher requires skills, not judgement), and the 
student either ‘understands’ (gets right) or ‘does not understand’ (gets 
wrong) the concept being taught, [...] Meanwhile, the subject matter –that- 
which-is-to-be-learnt – is reduced to inertness and is not open to 
interpretation. The subjective must be repressed so that the objective can 
be acknowledged. If, however, the sign is regarded not as a gloss on, but 
rather as a really existing element of reality, free from specific attachment 
to a noumenal discrete entity (whether conceptual or material), the 
subjective-objective bifurcation can be dissolved. (pp. 783-784) 
 
Education and pedagogy oriented toward enacting meaningful experiences (events) 
involves recognizing the ontological reality of signs, that is, relations, over and above 
reductions to mind-independent or mind-dependent reality. Hence my focus in these 
articles on a revised (late scholastic) semiotic conception of objectivity, as that which 
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enters within the ‘objective’ awareness of some organism (that is, carries meaning within 
their species-specific umwelt. See Chap 4 and 7). 
 
Meaning emerges from out of the continuity of experiences. Furthermore, 
meaning is never static but the result of a changing set of relationships, enacted by the 
learning-subject themselves. Because of this essential flux there can never be complete 
understanding or complete misunderstanding in educational encounters. However, and 
as will be discussed further in section 8.4, this does not imply a relativist pragamatism 
where truth is only “what is useful to believe” as James famously asserted to Peirce’s 
dismay, and where semiosis seems to solely and explain itself through itself (cf. Eco, 
1979). Recall, that Peirce’s philosophy rests on a scholastic realism, which has been 
discussed in chapter 3.3 (à la Eco) as a kind of minimal realism – which implies that, to 
return to the ‘cutting’ metaform, although there may be many variable ways to ‘make the 
cut’, there are still real grains that determine how and in which direction we make these 
cuts. Semiosis is a continuous process and as such, it is continually unfolding, as the 
organism’s relationship to the environment is always being actively readapted. 
 
I have argued that the flow and directions of teaching and learning must be 
receptive to this essential flux and indeterminacy. This implies, as Stables explains, that 
complete understanding or knowledge is impossible, and furthermore, that “TWITBL can 
never be taught or learnt in isolation: the greater the effort to atomise the curriculum, the 
more reduced the opportunities for learning; TWITBL can never be fully understood or 
fully misunderstood, but merely increasingly explored” (Stables, 2019a, p. 784, emphasis 
added). Stables’ Correct/complete Understanding Fallacy puts into perspective the 
messy and imperfect realities of being-in-practice and, as I’ll argue further in section 8.3, 
the necessity of fluid transdisciplinary inquiry in education. Certainly, one can be more 
successful or less successful in their practice, but one is only incorrect if we recognize 
success as the attainment of a pre-defined archetype (i.e. as in classical idealism or the 
narrow performativity of much top-down educational policy and curriculum). Recognizing 
the sign as a feature of an event requires the corollary recognition, that, as Peirce says 
in a cogent expression of pragmatism: “A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its 
receiving an interpretation” (CP 5.569). It represents just one point along an unfolding 
continuum of semiosis, the potential (firstness) becoming actual in our ongoing 
experience (thirdness). This site, where something can emerge, not from nothing, but 
from our being in practice and being in-habit, is the phenomenal site of much of my 
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philosophical analysis in these essays, precisely because I believe and argue that its 
conceptual and practical potency has been neglected by much educational theory and 
research. 
 
To review our broad outline: a conception of the sign as a feature of an event 
implies the direct participation of both the learner and teacher within the unfurling events 
of an educational practice. Learning, thus conceived, is not passed down through static 
information or representations (rules for encoding and decoding), but rather, channeled 
and enacted within the continuity of being-in-practice. As such, it cannot be determined 
or implemented from the outside, from top-down mandates. In fact, it cannot be ensured 
at all. As I’ve continually argued in these articles, this implies the importance of 
developing a philosophical-educational framework that can describe and account for 
processes of emergence, continuity, and change, non-deterministically. As I have noted 
through these essays and reiterated here with Stables (2019a), not any kind of semiotics 
is suited for this task, and I am proposing that we should follow and take notice of the 
ecological orientation and framework of (Peircean informed) biosemiotics. I have 
implicitly and explicitly suggested that educational philosophy, rather than analytically 
reducing educational dynamics to concise sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
should inquire to understand these phenomena and concepts on a broader continuum. 
This research program (“of seeking continuities where discontinuities have been thought 
to be permanent”, such as human/animal, mind/body, language/experience, etc.) is, I 
have maintained, precisely what is offered to us through Peirce’s doctrine of continuity, 
or, synechism (see Chap 1 and 4, and what I call the Continuity Principle for 
edusemiotics). Furthermore, part of a synechist perspective toward education involves 
acknowledging that, because teaching and learning unfold in particular places and times 
with particular gatherings of people, as processes they are always historical and 
temporal, and thus, our relationship to what we are studying, to TWITBL, is continually 
open to re-interpretation. 
 
Connections to knowledge and practice 
 
Each of these articles (throughout Part 2, in particular) in some way highlight the 
foundations of this pedagogical orientation in my own career as a musician and music- 
teacher. As such, I will now take a moment to further explain and situate some of these 
insights and perspectives in reference to music learning and music education. Through 
267  
this application and presentation, I will aim to further contextualize and explicate how this 
meaning-based and ecological orientation toward learning contributes to contemporary 
knowledge on learning theory, education, as well as semiotic theory and philosophy 
more generally. 
 
Music learning as semiosis – something more primary than 
symbols 
 
In his book Ways of Listening (2005), Eric Clarke puts forward what he calls an 
ecological account of music perception. He says in the introduction (p. 4) that “[m]any 
previous approaches to musical meaning have adopted either a linguistic or a more 
generally semiotic perspective, rather than the perceptual approach that I adopt here”. 
He goes on to describe perception as “the awareness of, and continuous adaptation to, 
the environment”, which is to say that the object of such an ecological approach is not 
“musical meaning that arises out of thinking about music or reflecting on music”, through 
re-presentations or symbols, but rather through the sustaining relationships that mediate 
organism to environment, as expressed through the organism’s direct perceptual 
engagement (as famously presented in the ecological psychology of Gibson, 1979). 
 
The type of semiotic approach that Clarke is critiquing here is undoubtedly the 
anthropocentric variety associated with linguistic structuralism, stemming from the legacy 
of Ferdinand de Saussure. I must again stress, that this is not illustrative of the much 
more expansive Peircean approach, of which my theory and philosophy of education 
derive. One of the basic principles of linguistically oriented structuralism is that signs are 
given meaning through their embeddedness in larger sign systems. The signifier – the 
English word ‘tree’ for example, doesn’t signify an actual tree in any motivated way – but 
only refers to an object-signified through an ‘arbitrary’ social convention. Associating the 
former linguistically dominated semiology with semiotics in general is a result of following 
what Thomas Sebeok calls the pars pro toto error (see Sebeok, 2001) – mistaking our 
human linguistic modelling as being emblematic of sign processes in general (a part for 
the whole). 
 
However, there is reason for Clarke’s avoidance of semiotic accounts, and this is 
precisely exemplified by the autonomous notion of musical meaning implied in the notion 
that the sign is a pre-existing entity explored in the previous section. Indeed, an over 
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emphasis on mental representation and symbolic computation seems to create more 
problems than it solves when it comes to accounting for the fullness of musical 
experience.184 
 
The action/process of musicking relies upon both symbolic forms of cognition, as 
well as primary and embodied forms of modelling that our definitively pre-symbolic in 
nature. Music can, and is, represented and communicated symbolically, but this is not 
chiefly how music presents itself within our perception. We can say with Reybrouck 
(2015), that there is with musical perception, “an element of sense-making or 
semiotization, that addresses two [separate but related] approaches: symbolic thinking 
and sensory experience” (p. 5). From an experiential perspective, perception of musical 
phenomenon is continuous and proceeding in time. It is experienced as part of an 
ongoing flow of perceptual signs, and relies upon multiple sensory systems. On the other 
hand, the symbolic modelling of music (i.e., notation) “reduces temporal unfoldings to 
single representations with an all-or-none character, which lend themselves to symbolic 
computations” (Reybrouck, 2015, p. 5). This is notably a top-down process that, in one 
sense, makes communication more directly efficient, by making indeterminate and 
complex sensory-signification processes more determinate and thus, general. 
Reybrouck clarifies that these two approaches are complementary and not opposed in 
music, and it is possible to think of this kind of symbolic thinking as being essential to re- 
cognizing sound as patterned and musical in the first place. As evolutionary musicologist 
Gary Tomlinson (2015) explains, “music may be described in the broadest sense as 
organized acoustic informational flows not in themselves symbolic but always 
constrained by the surrounding operation of symbols” (p. 177). 
 
Symbolic processing relies upon the application of discrete labels that can be 
interpreted outside of the perceptual flux. The conversion of musical phenomena into 
symbols is essentially the reduction of complex acoustic and social events to 
representations, or atemporal ‘production rules’ from which information can be 





184 This is still too often the approach taken by much social semiotic analysis. See Olteanu and 
Campbell (2018, p. 252) for a short critique, with reference to the relevant literature. Cf. Campbell 
et al., (2020) for connections and analysis of the relation between biosemiotics and social semiotics. 
269  
The problem here is that musicking always involves embodied agents creating 
and perceiving it and does not proceed outside of time. 
 
Skill, not rudiments 
 
In terms of our broader conversation, I am proposing that theories and practices of music 
education should be able to account for ‘emergent signification processes’, explained 
outside of information processing accounts (often conceptualised through a narrow, non 
Peircean notion of symbolic learning) and a discussion of cognitive ability, or 
developmental stages. These accounts of learning and teaching fail to recognize that 
pre-determined categories of understanding and ability, often and frequently in practice, 
function to confirm what teachers and society think already, “to see what we think”, 
rather than, as Masschelein says (in the earlier referenced interview, see fn. 183) “to put 
our thinking to the test” of the world. This has sadly been my own experience in formal 
education: early on labeled a dyslexic and slow learner, and subsequently, suffering all 
the various associations and subtexts that often accompany such labels through the 
ways my teachers engaged with me. As Stables (2019a) articulates, escaping the 
limitations of prescriptive theories of development and learning is indeed implied by 
recognizing the sign as a feature of an event: 
 
This means that the teacher’s task is not first to evaluate the developmental 
readiness of the child, but rather to find ways of encouraging the student to 
explore the relations that constitute the subject matter, using professional 
judgement in a more flexible way to make best guesses about activities that 
the student might find interesting. The direction of travel here is quite 
different: teacher introduces student to subject matter via student’s initial 
responses to it, which prompt teacher to guide (not instruct) student in 
further exploration of that-which-is-to-be-learnt. (p. 785) 
 
This reflects my own approach to teaching creative improvisation ensembles, such as 
my role as a teacher-researcher in the CMPP (see section 1.2). I also believe this is why 
I arrived at, independent from my philosophical research, an intuitive event-focused 
approach to teaching musical ensembles, and subsequently, my teaching in general. 
The cultivation of a shared musical taskscape – from which new sonic possibilities 
(affordances) can be revealed through significant events – requires sensitivity as 
teachers to the unravelling of collective meaning-making processes: the way previous 
experiences grow and build upon one another through dwelling in shared practices. 
“Professional judgement”, with such an approach to teaching and learning as Stables 
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describes, can’t help but be flexible and emergent in the act – reflecting again the 
practices of makers and artists. 
 
This implies a different curricular orientation to much conservative music 
pedagogy. Musical representations are not instilled from outside the student’s 
experience but discovered and formed collectively within the act of habitualized music- 
making processes. What emerges from such shared experience are not general 
concepts, but generalized possibilities rooted in singular events that we have 
experienced together in class. This receptiveness and responsiveness to the unknown – 
to open flights of signs not yet determined – is central to learning to improvise and it is 
central to what I have described in these articles as a pedagogy of novelty. Curriculum in 
this understanding is, in large degree, emergent, but, as discussed earlier (8.1), this isn’t 
to imply that TWITBL does not possess emergent structure and form: in many of the 
creative ensemble classes I teach including the CMPP, call and response activities 
naturally lead to more open-ended and exploratory improvisational activities, and this 
naturally occurs proportionately with the classes collective ability to absorb, adapt to, and 
anticipate new experiences. 
 
The basic argument of much edusemiotic research, that both the life and learning 
process can be approached through semiotic-engagement (Stables, 2006) implies a 
collapsing of distinctions between ‘knowing’ (or intentionally) interpreted signs, and 
‘unknowing’ automatic responses to signals. This orientation helps expose some of the 
lingering body/mind dualism implicit in much conservative pedagogy, specifically in 
regards to the discontinuity between conceptual/theoretical knowledge and embodied 
and pre-verbal knowing. This is exemplified by the conversion of embodied musical-skill 
(technique) into formalized rudiments. Again, important in this basic conceptualization is 
that we don’t “differentiate between a ‘mind’ that processes ‘signs’ and a body (in the 
broadest sense) that responds unthinkingly to ‘signals’” (Stables & Semetsky, 2015, p. 
147). 
 
As touched on earlier, this dualism is both implicitly and explicitly operative within 
conservatory-style music education practices, which often “take for granted the existence 
of an ‘educable’ inner intelligence distinct from a ‘trainable’ bodily organism” (Stables & 
Semetsky, 2015, p. 33). The implied model of music-learning is: concepts and musical 
information are encoded in formal symbolic systems to be decoded by the ‘higher’ 
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cognitive faculties, while actual technical acumen is largely represented as a rote bodily 
process that is educationally transmitted through systems of rudiments. The body is 
dumb and severed from the higher processes of intellection. It is with these higher 
conscious and rational processes (and decidedly not more embodied and intuitive forms 
of perceptual ‘knowing’) where artistry is philosophically ‘located’, often signified in the 
ideal form of the master composer and the text-based composition. Musical cognition in 
this estimation is largely a deductive process of computation, internalized by an 
underlying and instinctive bodily automatism, that mainly learns through rote repetition 
and conditioning. The embodied aspects of music-making are certainly present, but they 
are severed and disconnected from symbolic aspects of learning. 
 
This is regrettably the way ear training and theory are often approached in formal 
classical programs such as the Royal Conservatory of Music (RCM) method in Canada: 
where the emphasis is placed heavily on recognition drills (interval, chords, etc.), and 
melodic and rhythmic dictation.185 Such approaches inevitably focus on the mechanics 
and skiils of ear training as they are translated and represented through western 
systems of music notation, as well as highly systematized programs of rudiments and 
theory. 
 
For example: to perform well on an RCM Harmony Grade 3 exam, the student 
need not even be able to hear baroque (choral) harmonies in the style of Bach, but 
instead (and I've seen many students and teachers adopt this exact approach) simply 
memorize certain baseline production rules (algorithms) and from these, derive 
(deductively) certain necessary musical inferences. The students in these cases will 
write Bach-style choral harmonies, but not consider aesthetic and qualitative 
components of harmony and composition, nor necessarily even ‘hear’ (that is, embody) 
or imagine their creations in any meaningful way. Unfortunately, such focus on 
mechanics and computation often comes at the neglect of the ways in which sound and 
 
185 See the account in Jorgensen (2003, pp. 35-40), of the national standards movement and its 
effects in proliferating ‘a banking model’ in music education; see also David and Jordan (2007) for 
a tracing of the “learning-pathways” of the typical western classical music student; cf. the interesting 
history and development of the RCM in Schabas (2005). Finally, see the theory of transformative 
music education (TME) put forward by O’Neill (2012), and the application to edu-semiotics in 
Campbell, 2017, pp. 19-21). Related to my argument here, O’Neill’s TME involves a pedagogical 
turning away from positivist expectations in music education, which tend to view learners “from 
within a deficit versus talent/expertise framework” (O'Neill, 2012, p. 166), following the standards 
and expectations characteristic of “formal conservatoire approaches to music learning” (p. 169). 
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music are actually perceived and felt by learners,186 and are thus generally divorced from 
the activity of playing music itself.187 
 
Thus conceived, rudiments (whether they are conceived in terms of instrumental 
technique or theory) are not pathways for musical growth and development, but rather, a 
sequential series of calculations to be deductively enacted, and once mastered can be 
narrowly transferred to other (higher) domains of musical knowledge. I have been 
continually arguing throughout this thesis that adhering to curricular models of these 
sorts is to assert implicitly that “there can be no direct transmission of information from 
one context of enactment to another without rules of encoding and decoding that are 
themselves context-independent” (Ingold, 2017, p. 10). These encoded representations 
of musical phenomena are (to reference Freire’s banking-model) deposited into the 
passive pupil, taking no consideration of the local and singular dimensions of education 
nor the continuity of experience characteristic of an educational/artistic practice. 
Although no doubt derived in origin from traditional forms of social learning –of keeping 
skills alive from one generation to the next— these standardized and instrumentalized 
methods of teaching do nothing to recognize that “[n]either verbal [or musical] sounds 
nor graphic marks… come with their meanings already attached; rather, they gather their 
meanings, in the same way that things do, from their enrolment in the shared experience 
of joint activity” (Ingold, 2017, p. 11).188 
 
In terms of the Peircean framework I have articulated, the emergence of new 
firstness from the regularity of habit, of thirdness, represents the enacting of learning as 
 
 
186 That is, a more phenomenological perspective on music learning, such as theorized in Ford and 
Green (2015), or in van der Schyff et al., (2016), for example. 
187 The ecological approach I’m presenting, as informed by biosemiotics and the corresponding 
Modelling Systems Theory (Sebeok and Danesi 2000) recognizes that all human knowing is initially 
grounded in sensory interactions and embodied forms of cognition. Thus, before we have symbolic 
representations, we have iconic and indexical forms of knowing that are rooted in our species- 
specific embodied morphology. These are affective and quality-driven action-habits, that gradually 
become more self-referential and general through continual use, eventually forming the basis for 
more abstractive and conceptual modelling – the “thinking at a distance” so characteristic of modern 
humans, with their capacity to not only use signs, but to know that there are signs. (cf. Tomlinson 
2015, p. 15). 
188 Learning to hear and perceive music, not as/through symbols or notes, but as sonic/vibrating 
events in a shared signifying environment (see Reybrouck, 2013, 2015), is a process that both 
student and teacher jointly engage in. Therefore, it is logical to assume that approaching and 
conceptualizing music pedagogy more ecologically may help us as teachers develop less striated 
and bounded music-learning ecologies (as presented in O’Neill, 2017) for students. 
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“a richness of decision making” that is cultivated through being-in-practice. To return to 
Ingold (2017), this is not a process by which we learn solutions to problems outside of 
the event, but rather, how to “cleave the event from within” (Ingold, 2017, p. 42). This 
orients us to the ‘cutting’ metaform (cf. Danesi, 2013) revealed by the PIE origins of the 
‘skill’ concept, discussed earlier. The woodworker remains a fitting example: It is only 
through entering into habit with the wood, and the extension of the body through tools, 
and the ‘cutting’ movement itself, that this activity becomes intimately integrated with the 
perception of action-possibilities within the woodworker’s phenomenal world (umwelt). 
“The skilled woodworker cuts the wood, not as mere matter to be succumbed to our 
volition, but through following its natural grains.” Remember from earlier: “It is a decision 
taken in the cutting, not in advance of it, and alters the course of the event… ‘in the 
event’” (Ingold, 2017, p. 42). 
 
We can see how such an approach to education, rooted in collective enskillment 
processes is not coextensive with the broad and over-reaching ‘skill-talk’ of many a 
curriculum document, nor Barrow’s discreet and precise analytic definition. Rather, 
enskillment is precisely non-discreet and concerned with establishing continuity: 
continuity from one moment to the next, between teacher and learner, and ultimately 
between learner and their part in a changing ecology of relations. Technique, content, 
knowledge, are not extrinsic or outside of these rituals and events. They are not in this 
sense re-presentations of knowledge at all, but rather, moments of presence that 
emerge within a shared signifying environment, and a shared taskscape – where 
through collective doing-undergoing, knowledge, and also attention, presence 
(nowness), becomes possible. I have also shown that such an internal pedagogical 
perspective, ‘within the event’, exposes the overt dualism of traditional academic models 
of social learning, that separate mind from world, body from mind, and importantly 
knowledge from knowing/doing. Ingold’s (2000) words help illustrate this important 
distinction as it is expressed in his classic The Perception of the Environment: 
 
Traditional models of social learning separate the intergenerational 
transmission of information specifying particular techniques from the 
application of this information in practice [...] Now I do not deny that the 
learning of skills involves both observation and imitation. But the former is 
no more a matter of forming internal, mental representations of observed 
behaviour than is the latter a matter of converting these representations 
into manifest practice[...] Through repeated practical trials, and guided by 
his observations, he gradually gets the ‘feel’ of things himself [...] in this 
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process, each generation contributes to the next not by handing on a 
corpus of representations, or information in the strict sense, but by 
introducing novices into contexts which afford selected opportunities for 
perception and action [...]. (pp. 353–354) 
 
Through engaging in practices together, students learn what it means (and what it feels 
like) to cleave the event from within. That is, these rituals of practice present 
opportunities, affordances, for getting inside the process – this helps students learn, not 
established protocols for action/response, nor representations, but more directly, how to 




So far in this concluding chapter (section’s 8.1 and 8.2) I have outlined the central 
aspects of the philosophy of educational practice implicitly and explicitly sketched in 
these articles through the framework of event-focused education. This focus on three 
familiar sites (Teacher, Learner, and TWITBL) has helped me to keep my analysis 
focused on the actual work of teachers, learners and what they choose to study 
(recognizing that this choice is continually being taken with each new educational 
experience and encounter). Important in such a conceptualization is that it remain non- 
prescriptive, and thus describe the educative process openly and generally, with 
attention to the most basic signifying dynamics being continually sustained through 
teacher, learner, and TWITBL. 
 
Note that this broad-spectrum orientation is not to imply that this account of 
educational practice does not contain normative assessments. There are, rather, clear 
values and orientations being expressed, regardless of the fact that they are essentially 
non-prescriptive. For example, I have tried to articulate these pedagogical values 
through a reinterpretation of Umberto Eco’s poetics of openness, as detailed in Chapter 
3, which is in itself a radical commitment to engaging critically with what we “place on the 
table” to study, as both artists and educators. I have also tried to describe this 
pedagogical responsiveness through the lens of musical improvisation, to better 
understand teaching and learning as an improvisatory act (see Chap 7.6). I argue with 
Ann Chinnery (2015) and Gert Biesta (2017) for a particular kind of pedagogical 
responsibility, that involves being in and with the world without being the centre of the 
world, and that questions the essential taken-for-grantedness of those totalising orders 
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that decide (often in advance of educational events) what kind of knowledge and 
learning styles are acceptable and desirable to reproduce. As Chinnery (2015) observes, 
this involves questioning what voices and perspectives are being forced into the 
margins, into precarity: 
 
Pedagogical responsibility as a response to precarity thus means that we 
need to examine the educational systems, policies and practices that 
render some students unnecessarily vulnerable, and which categorize 
certain ways of being as inherently at risk. It is not about denying difference, 
but rather about what we do with those differences. (p. 8) 
 
I have also maintained that the arts show a path toward acknowledging and enacting this 
kind of pedagogical responsibility – not inherently because they provide opportunities for 
self-expression, but rather because they present a way of sustaining ongoing dialogue 
with the world. Biesta (2017) explains: 
 
The ambition [with art-making] is not to master or domesticate – which 
would ultimately lead to the destruction of the reality one is encountering – 
but to come into dialogue, to establish dialogue, to stay in dialogue. 
Encountering the reality of paint, stone, wood, metal, sound, bodies, 
including one’s own body, encountering resistance, in order to explore 
possibilities, meet limits and limitations, and out of this create forms, 
establish forms, and find forms that make existing-in-dialogue possible, that 
is what I see in the doing of art. (p. 66) 
 
The connections here to ecological thinking (remember Bringhurst and Zwicky’s (2019) 
“thinking like an eco-system” and their related notion of “poetic thinking”) are made 
apparent if we bring in Jan Zwicky’s distinction between domesticity and domination: 
“Domesticity involves use, but does not equate use with domination – it is, instead, the 
way a technological animal can express itself in relation to its environment without 
domination” (Zwicky, cited in Bringhurst & Zwicky, 2019, p. 35). Art and making 
processes present a way of being from which we can come to live in and with resistance 
without domination; to stay in that liminal space without succumbing to either world- 
destruction on the one hand or self-destruction on the other (Biesta, 2017, p. 65). 
 
Following from this event and practice based account, I have also emphasised 
that close attention to the anthropology of education and the practices of makers and 
artists demands a corresponding learning-theory that doesn’t separate embodied skill 
from intellectual/conceptual knowledge, and consequently, doesn’t see knowledge itself 
as narrowly symbolic/computational but rather semiotic, relational and ecological. I have 
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shown throughout these articles how a Peircean informed, bio-semiotic theory of 
learning, is useful in addressing certain theoretical and philosophical deficiencies in 
other accounts of educational practice, which tend to be either materialist-behaviorist 
leaning or simplistically constructivist-idealist. Important in this conceptualization, I have 
argued, is a refined notion of symbolic signification (and consequently any conceptions 
we form of symbolic cognition) as revealed through Peirce’s late semiotic philosophy, 
which doesn’t see symbolic processing as narrowly human (associated with ‘cultural’ 
learning) and disconnected from the broader ecological continuum. In Section 8.4 we will 
reflect more deeply on what exactly is significant to take notice of in this 
reconceptualization of symbolic-learning that is revealed by late Peircean philosophy. 
 
I will now explore some future possibilities and implications of this research, 
before going on to address possible limitations and criticisms. 
 
Implications and possibilities for future research 
 
transdisciplinary teaching, environmental literacy and 
education 
 
A Peircean informed philosophy of education, meaning-based and ecological in its 
approach, has a range of research implications. In this section, I’ll argue that by focusing 
on what things mean for experiencing subjects, and not what things supposedly are in 
an abstract and formalized definition, semiotic philosophy can serve to function as a 
bridge between science and arts-based education with strong implications for 
environmental literacy and education and even, as we’ll discuss in conclusion, 
local/community based, place-based and Indigenous approaches to pedagogy. 
Of course, focusing on what things mean for experiencing subjects is the aim of 
most qualitative research, and phenomenological and social semiotic research in 
particular. However, I have throughout these essays followed and highlighted a different 
(biological and ecological) tradition of semiotic research, that is, in several important 
respects, divergent from the text-based and language-centered approaches 
characteristic of much social semiotic research. Social semiotics derives from the 
foundational research of Halliday (1978) on the socially situated uses of language. In the 
ninties and early noughts, scholars associated with the New London Group extended 
Halliday’s work and semiotic theories on language-use, to other (non-linguistic and pre- 
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verbal) modes of signification, while still preserving to a large degree Halliday’s original 
emphasis on sign-processes associated with human linguistic modelling such as 
abstract-conventional signification and combinatorial complexity. This kind of thinking 
and methodological approach is highlighted in the following passage from the editorial 
article “Multimodality: methodological explorations” (Flewitt et al., 2019): 
 
Hodge and Kress (1998), and Kress and van Leeuwen (1996, 2006) draw 
on Halliday’s theorization of how people exchange meanings through 
socially situated uses of language, but they extend the focus beyond 
speech and writing to consider all semiotic modes with the same attention 
to detail for each mode. A key focus for multimodal research in this area is 
systematically to document and map the relationship across and between 
modes in texts, interactions, social practices, artefacts and spaces. The 
methods used in a social semiotic approach to multimodality therefore 
involve breaking down the object of study into its component parts, working 
out how the components – or modes – work together to make meaning, 
and understanding in what ways particular modal choices are shaped by 
the interpersonal, social and cultural contexts of their use. (p. 3) 
 
This turn towards multimodality is indeed fruitful and important in educational discourses. 
However, we must note that biosemiotics challenges the implicit glottocentrism of social 
semiotics, by considering animal learning and environmental modelling (rooted primarily 
in processes of iconicity and indexicality) as a common frame for understanding 
semiosis (meaning-making) in general. 
 
The interrelated ecological-educational conceptualizations researched in these 
articles directly entail these understandings by explaining and emphasizing processes 
and dynamics by which organisms engage, interact, and co-develop within their broader 
eco-systems. The future relevance and importance of this nexus of biological and 
educational theory that I have focused on in this collection is well exhibited by the fact 
that over the last several decades a set of conceptual tools have begun to be shared 
and utilized by both the life and the social sciences. As mentioned in the introduction, I 
have recently, with Kalevi Kull and Alin Olteanu, developed a conceptual framework that 
seeks to redefine cognitive/learning concepts as part of a transdisciplinary theory of 
knowing (Campbell, Olteanu & Kull, 2019). We have identified these as the shared 
ecological/educational conceptions of scaffolding, affordances, resources and 
competences, and the more foundational concepts of umwelt and learning. Part of this 
work involves redefining socio-culturally defined semiotic terms (such as, in particular the 
concept of resources, as stemming from social semiotics, and of scaffolding, from social- 
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constructivism) within a more general and all-encompassing biosemiotic framework – 
hence our sub-title “extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics” (Campbell, 
Olteanu, & Kull, 2019). 
 
The integration of these variously used ecological and educational concepts into 
a transdisciplinary framework stemming from both the social and life sciences will, I 
believe, constitute an important contribution to educational research, which is currently 
grappling with the need for more ecological and environmentally minded approaches 
(Affifi, 2017; Fazey et al., 2007; Gough & Stables, 2012; Lloro-Bidart & Banschbach, 
2019). Recently, many semioticians and educationalists have observed that modern 
educational practice in itself requires strong transdisciplinary inquiry that fluidly 
integrates many subjects and approaches (e.g., Deely and Semetsky, 2017; Ingold, 
2017; Seif, 2017). My next step as a researcher, will be to explore the implications of this 
biosemiotic framing of learning for educational research, theory and praxis, specifically 
through: creating interdisciplinary frameworks and approaches for curriculum and 
pedagogy (e.g., Nikitina, 2006; Ross & Mannion, 2012); exploring ways of fostering 
interdisciplinarity in university teaching and research (e.g. Kull, 2008; Lattuca, 2001; 
Olteanu et al., 2018); and bridging arts and science teaching through outdoor and 
environmental education (e.g., Bunting, 2006). 
 
As will be unraveled through this last chapter, this research provides 
conceptual/philosophical possibilities for weaving science education, arts education, and 
Indigenous place-based knowledge into holistic educational programs and curricular 
approaches. Precisely through its broad ecological approach, this research suggests 
strong implications for re-vitalizing often bounded and atomized classroom subjects, 
mainly through emphasizing that knowledge is never fully abstract, but always rooted 
and enacted within experiential encounters (events) that occur in/through locally- 
meaningful places and practices. 
 
For instance, Grade 6 students may spend class time learning about a river’s 
ecosystem. Arguably, this knowledge will be learned at a deeper level if connected to a 
specific river in the school’s community that students and teachers can actively explore 
and experience together as a class. Further pedagogical opportunities can be gleaned if 
the significance of this river to a local indigenous group is taught by a community elder, 
or explored through arts-based inquiry (songs, dances, drawing, etc.). People, after all, 
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enact science—and people are not merely rational processors of abstract knowledge but 
arational (more than rational) meaning-makers (Stables, 2019b). Within a meaning- 
based (synechist) approach to educational research, special emphasis must be placed 
on the way continuity is enacted between differing pedagogical practices and the 
broader learning ecologies students inhabit – see the work done by O’Neill (2017) in this 
area, and recent biosemiotic informed educational research on school-design and school 
experiences (Daniels et al., 2019). 
 
One of the central points of this research is that attention to learning as 
environmental modelling (meaning-making across nature and culture) is frequently 
neglected in educational theory and practice, with its often-implicit anthropocentric 
assumptions that privilege symbolic processing, and the types of human(-cultural) 
learning associated with it. Following my stay at Tartu (see Chap 1.2.2), supervised by 
ecologist Timo Maran, my most recent research has begun to more directly turn to the 
fields of environmental education, environmental literacy, and environmental humanities. 
 
Ecosemiotic (ecological semiotics, a branch of biosemiotics) developments 
(Maran & Kull, 2014; Maran, 2018; Nöth, 1998, 2001) highlight and suggest new 
approaches and orientations for environmental education, specifically in emphasizing the 
dynamics and importance of humans’ (sign-mediated) relations to animals and the 
environment. As a Cree elder put it, in the context of a public talk on declining northern 
caribou populations and what can be done about it – “don't worry about the caribou, 
worry about the human, worry about our relationships”. 
 
By approaching meaning-making processes ecologically, these 
conceptualizations may be of service in developing a strong sense of environmental 
literacy, whereby students recognize their place and impact in a wider ecology of 
relations and cultivate the conceptual toolbox to adequately interpret and engage with 
these relations (see Stables & Bishop, 2001). See Table 1, below for a summary of this 
distinction between weak and strong conceptions of literacy and the importance of a 




Table 1. Summary of strong and weak conceptions of environmental literacy (adapted from Stables & Bishop, 
2001, p. 94) 
Strong environmental literacy  Weak environmental literacy 
Broad view of literacy (literacy as semiotic-
engagement)  
Narrow view of literacy (literacy as reading and writing) 
Broad view of text (everything can be seen 
as text)  
Limited view of text (e.g. landscape cannot be seen as 
text). 
Environmental literacy is broader than 
environmental education. 
Environmental literacy is subset of environmental 
education. 
 
If life and learning are understood as semiotic-engagement, then environmental 
literacy constitutes all the interpretative competences for meaning-making in relation to 
environmental phenomena and issues. This literacy/competency is undergoing constant 
change through the learning/life process itself. This suggests an approach to 
environmental education that could transcend narrow disciplinary boundedness and 
“incoherent cross-curricular approaches that reduce environmental education to one 
subject among many [...]” (Stables & Bishop, 2001, p. 96). For example, Stables (1998) 
early on argued that the arts and humanities have not been traditionally incorporated into 
conceptions of environmental literacy, stemming from and also contributing to a weak 
sense of literacy – where environmental issues, and human (sign-mediated) 
relationships to the environment are viewed as not fundamentally open to interpretation, 
or involving the direct experiences and meaning-making of learners.189 
As Timo Maran (2020 [in press]) has explored in his recent chapter “Applied 
Ecosemiotics”: “by analysing sign processes, semiotics has a very special contribution to 
offer to other environmental humanities for understanding the roots of human induced 
environmental change”. Timo goes on to outline that ecosemiotics locates three main 
activity centers within the ecosemioticsphere: “Semiotic potentiality of the material 
environment; 2. Communicative relations between individuals and groups belonging to 
different biological species (including humans); 3. Human cultural texts with their 
structure and memory”. These three activity centers combine into two main contact 
zones, “1. The material environment as a vehicle of mediated communication; 2. Cultural 
representations of environment as means for social communication” (see Table 2). My 
 
189 “An environmental education which runs independently of an exploration of cultural, aesthetic, personal 
and even irrational views of the environment will prove insufficient to our needs, as it will harness not 
‘hearts and minds’ but merely part of the mind, in a limited range of contexts, and with a limited view of the 
Earth as essentially mechanical and liable to breakdown (the catastrophic view of nature) but not to 
improvement. The development of a strong conception of environmental literacy thus has the potential to 
result in an increased care for the world in a way that conventional models of environmental education 
alone cannot” (Stables & Bishop, 2001, p. 96). 
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hypothesis, informed by my conversations with Timo, is that this framework is of practical 
educational relevance: by focusing on these sites of activity and contact zones (as well 
as their corresponding conceptual tools190) students may interpret and make sense of 
different, and often contradicting, environmental texts, discourses, and meta-languages, 
as expressed variously for instance in: environmental policy; media and journalism; in art 
and popular culture; in curriculum discourse; in environmental social movements; and 
within Indigenous(/long-standing) cultures, etc. Each of these signifying systems imply 
different ways of relating to the more-than-human world. Students need to be receptive 
to the kind of cultural cover up of environmental issues, as Maran calls it, that can occur 
within highly self-referential, positive feedback systems (i.e., symbolic systems). 
Traditional environmental education and literacy does not adequately or sufficiently 
emphasize the importance of being able to recognize, interpret and engage with this 
essential multiplicity of environmental communication. Here, I argue, that ecosemiotics 
and ecological (biosemiotic) learning theory has strong methodological potential: first 
and foremost by offering a transdisciplinary and pedagogy-guiding 
conceptual/philosophical framework, but also, potentially even a method for 
conceptualizing and conducting new forms of qualitative research (see, for instance, 
Maran’s (2020) “event-repertoire analysis” as an example of qualitative, observer- 







Table 2. Types of ecosemiotic activity centres, their contact zones and the placement of conceptual 
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190 See table 2 for interesting and educationally relevant ecosemiotic concepts, such as for 
example, “semiocide”, or, the destruction of the signifying environment and communicative 
mediums necessary for the life of non-human species (such as, for example, many small animals 







Local, Indigenous pedagogy 
 
 
Besides these connections to environmental education and literacy, I strongly believe 
that this research has relevance and connections to emerging practices of Indigenous 
and local pedagogy. What I offer here in this section and further in section 8.5 in relation 
to Indigeneity represents a kind of preliminary thinking of what I hope will become a 
much larger project. This orientation is driven by the understanding, articulately 
presented in Hern, Johal and Sacco’s (2018) Global Warming and the Sweetness of Life, 
that any understanding of an “ecological politics, the politics required to answer global 
warming, must acknowledge that the domination of other-than-humans and the land is 
made permissible by the domination of humans by humans” (p. 94). This is to assert that 
the projects of decolonization, indigneous land soverighty, and ecology are essentially 
interconnected. 
My contention is that such a way of thinking through education, and how humans 
enact it from the inside, could in effect contribute to a de-colonized and locally-based 
approach to educational practice and curriculum, particularly relevant in a settler nation 
like Canada (cf. Battiste, 2019; Greenwood, 2019; Stables, 2019b). 
 
Before launching into the specifics, I should mention, that, though not detailed 
explicitly in these articles, the twin work of de-colonizing the self and the exploration of 
pedagogy-as/through-place has been a fundamental aspect of this research journey. 
 
284  
This is, in short, the difficult contemplative work involved with coming to terms with the 
intellectual and spiritual poverty that comes from being a settler and living in settler 
culture. At a basic level, I think this has always been upsetting to me, born and raised on 
the West Coast of Canada— how we are often completely dim to the land we inhabit and 
living next to mountains, rivers, and places, with their names and stories removed, 
unaware of their broader spiritual, ecological and historical significance.191 
We have already observed that “forms of gathering” and “study” are always 
enacted in and through places – notably places with their own stories, peoples, histories 
and unfolding trajectories. To study in places involves looking, not only outwardly, but 
also at our own internal resonances and conflicts with the places we dwell in. Therefore, 
I would argue that (critical) pedagogies of place (cf. Bowers, 2008) must confront not 
only the outward manifestations and legacies of colonization (often proliferated through 
schooling) but also, the arguably more foundational work of de-colonizing the self. Part 
of this work involves acknowledging what has been rejected or silenced through the 
school and through education. Lilburn (2017, p. 5) says, referencing the words of poet 
Robert Duncan, “[t]he community that is the school of the truly formed self […] is very 
large […] This is a gathering that includes everyone, especially ‘all-the excluded orders’ 
[…]”. 
For some scholars and activists, fully acknowledging the ongoing legacies of anti- 
indigeneity, land-theft, and displacement (as well as the concordant exploitation of the 
natural environment), deeply entrenched in settler cultures, necessitates a moving away 
from place-based education to land-based education in environmental education 
research (see Scully, 2012; Greenwood, 2019, p. 368). This shift is well observed by the 
2014 special issue of the journal Environmental Education Research, “Land and 
 
191 Interviewing and dialoging with people has been an integral part of how I have come to address 
this spiritual lack, along with being a fervent student of PNW anthropology and art. See, in 




Also, see my interview with poet-philosopher Tim Lilburn (reproduced in Appendix A), who says, 
contrary to top-down mandates such as the Truth and Reconciliation commission, that we are, as 
of yet, still in a stage of “pre-conversation” — unable to even dialogue with this land and the people 
who have taken care of it for millennia, until we reach deep into our own interiority as well as our 
own spiritual and contemplative traditions. See https://philosophasters.org/blog/2019/8/12/an- 
interview-with-tim-lilburn-interiority-place-de-colonization). 
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education: Indigenous, post-colonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and 
environmental education research” (Tuck et al., 2014). 
Land education, these editors observe, calls us to more explicitly recognize 
indigenous connections to land as central to environmental education, to recognize “both 
the role of Indigenous cosmologies in practices of land education, as well as the 
necessity of centering historical and current contexts of colonization in education on and 
in relation to land” (p. 1). Calderon (2014), in his contribution to this special issue, 
accentuates the problem clearly, stating “land education takes up what place-based 
education fails to consider: the ways in which place is foundational to settler colonialism” 
(p. 33). 
That place is foundational to settler colonialism and functions through settler 
culture – particularly in obfuscating and erasing the lived realities, knowledge and 
educational practices of indigenous peoples – is indeed important to understand and 
grapple with, and I will return to this issue again in Section 8.5. However, what I am 
further emphasizing is that behind the immigrant or settler’s inherently distorted notion 
and perception of the place/land they have come to inhabit, is a profound inability for 
what Lilburn describes as autochthonicity – an inability to be in the world as if it were 
home. This kind of more foundational, contemplative and interior work is vital for the 
meaningful possibility of decolonized, land-based education. This is decolonization as 
soul work (Greenwood, 2019). 
To be in the world “as if it were home” involves acknowledging the significance of 
land; not only rhetorically – as through for example, land acknowledgements – but also 
existentially and spiritually. Place-based pedagogies must deeply confront issues of land 
rights and sovereignty but also, the entangled and overlapping histories and ecologies 
that make up our personal relationships to place. 
If this is your land than where are your stories? (Chamberlin, 2003). I remember 
relearning that “the Lions” – the majestic twin peaks visible from most of Vancouver – 
were “the Sisters” for the local Squamish peoples, and symbolised a peace treaty that 
occurred between the Squamish and the northern Haida people after twin sisters married 
Haida twins, ending a multi-generational feud between the nations. I remember first 
reading about this in E. Pauline Johnson’s (1913) book of stories told and retold by Chief 
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Joe Capilano, Legends of Vancouver. This continuity was important to me, as I formed a 
relationship with the legacy of Haida art spread throughout the city, in particular the awe- 
inspiring collection at the UBC Museum of Anthropology and the Bill Reid sculptures 
spread throughout important city buildings (e.g. YVR Airport, Simon Fraser University), 
and especially, when I later had a chance to travel to Haida Gwaii in my adulthood. For 
instance, more recently I have formed a relationship with the language itself, as well as 
classical Haida poetry and storytelling, in particular the work of the blind, poet Ghandl 
(see Bringhurst, 2000). 
Central to this conceptualization, is an expanded notion of pedagogy and 
schooling – where education is primarily about establishing connections to land and local 
community. Through cultivating a (synechist) understanding of education, as a 
continuing human practice, Indigenous pedagogical orientations like a notion of place- 
as-pedagogy, (or landscape-as-pedagogical-text) appear as central, not peripheral, to 
the educational enterprise. 
As already touched on, this research has involved me turning to the 
anthropology of education and to reflect on and study seriously the educational 
practices of Indigenous peoples. This line of inquiry is not in anyway new. For instance: 
in the 1943 article “Our Educational Emphases”, anthropologist Margaret Mead poses a 
very simple and direct inquiry, asking what constitutes education in “the broadest 
sense” of the term (p. 633), as a continuing human activity and process. More 
specifically, Mead is asking, how, and from what basis, can we understand the 
educational processes of traditional Indigenous societies as continuous with the forms 
of education practiced in modern industrialized society? Not what separates or 
distinguishes, but rather, what connects the child in Manhattan with the child in a South 
Pacific tribe? For Mead, the primary connection is that, “both [children] have everything 
to learn” (1943, p. 633, [emphasis added]).192 In Mead’s account, education is premised 
on the pragmatic and concrete realization of a regulative ideal. Not a utopian ideal, but 
an open-ended aim to guide us in our pedagogies, the basis of which can be expressed 
in the simple aphorism ‘anyone can learn anything’ – or, put differently, we don´t know 
what children (or people 
 
192 “Despite the tremendous difference in what the New York infant and the New Guinea infant will 
learn, there is a striking similarity in the whole complicated process by which the child takes on and 
into itself the culture of those around it. And much profit can be gained by concentrating on theses 
similarities...” (Mead, 1943, p. 633) 
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generally) are capable of learning. This is for Mead the necessary and basic pedagogical 
and generative commitment and responsibility, which is simply, a love for the young and 
a love for the world. To hold knowledge, to study it, is to take care of it.193 
The focus of Mead’s early 20th century critique is clear and direct, and it rings 
true to this 21st century historical moment: for her, it is precisely this basic pedagogical 
creed that has been co-opted by technocratic educational reforms, which demand that – 
due to a host of colonial, industrial, economic, and societal pressures – learning be 
productive and teachers (in particular) be accountable to this productivity. Mead argues 
that pedagogical processes in human societies are broadly defined by the fact that an 
emphasis on learning is more primary and foundational than an emphasis on teaching 
(existentially, but also culturally and biologically). By contrast, she observes that in 
modern globalized society “our concepts of education have been shaped by the will to 
teach, convert, colonize, or assimilate” (1943, p. 63) students, rather than to channel or 
foster the process and action of learning itself. Based on the ethnographic insights of her 
time, Mead concludes that the consistent meaning of education in human cultures is to 
create forms of continuity (in particular, intergenerational forms). Mead explains that, in 
stark contrast to the pedagogical practices and aims of colonial education – which 
enforce standardized modes of thinking and doing and radical forms of dis-continuity 
between family, community, and environment – this kind of pedagogical continuity is 
performed and enacted in the service of encouraging adaptive responsiveness to 
future uncertainty by connecting learners with the (locally) meaningful knowledge and 
practices of their community and place. Mead’s approach, like the educational 
philosophy that I present in these pages, requires that we recognize the essential 
continuity of learning, teaching, and schooling. 
To outline the significance and continuity of this conceptualization with 
Indigenous practices of education, and in particular the notion of pedagogy-as-place, I 
will briefly 
 
193 We can observe these values at the intersection of anthropology and education in Ingold’s recent 
title (2017) Anthropology and/as Education, and his proposal that the telos of anthropology is 
ultimately educational. See my interview with Ingold about this book and his views on education 




describe and reflect on a particular and time-honored enacted school/pedagogy, one 
only 160km from my home in Vancouver: The sacred Stein River Valley – where two 
great rivers meet, the Fraser and the Thomson — is recognized, by many peoples of the 
Pacific North West, interior as well as coastal, as an important pedagogical and spiritual 
site/school (see, for example the rather extensive ethnographic account in York, Daly, & 
Arnett, 1993; cf. Wickwire, 2019). People travel to this mountainous valley from all over 
the region to suspend themselves from everyday life and its demands (in the sense of 
scholé, or time free from the demands of productivity, cf. Masschelein & Simons, 2013); 
to study, through a variety of practices (fasting, praying, learning about plants and 
wildlife, engaging in practices of collective dreaming) at local sites of significance. This is 
the basic idea that dwelling-in and the coming to know important local landscapes and 
ecologies – etched with significance through continual human involvement and practices 
– is central to the educational enterprise. These significant places represent sites of a 
learning-course or curriculum and contain essential knowledge (curricular materials) that 
students learn from – as part of their progress through graduated educational stages, 
with the aim of eventually obtaining an important societal and worldly position (a 
healer/doctor, a shaman, a hunter, etc.). Pedagogy is enacted in place, through 
accessing shared modes of dwelling in an environment of significance. Living, thus 
conceived, is not reified or separated from learning: “Living is semiotic engagement 
(Stables, 2006), a process of engaging with signs, each of which has different 
significance for us. Signs operate in space and time, and when spaces are occupied and 
used at particular times they become places. We are always in places: places are the 
sites for the events that constitute our lives” (Daniels et al., 2019, p. 3, [emphasis 
added]). 
In the Stein River Valley, some of this place-based knowledge is accessed and 
enacted through interpreting and contributing to the dozens of often hidden rock-writing 
sites, that mark caves and remote sites throughout the valley: painted onto the rock with 
red ochre paint, by previous students; establishing pedagogical continuity and offering 






Figure 8.1 Klu'bist, ‘Nlaka’pamux pictographs, Stein River Valley. York, Daly, & Arnett 
(1993, p. 156). 
This sign-system displays a mainly pictographic (iconic) orthography, although one with 
a complex system of symbolic (combinatory and self-referential) syntax, and therefore in 
some respects analogous to hieroglyphic writing. The positioning and spatial-temporal 
arrangement of lines, shapes, characters, and symbols, contain/index important 
information about the narrative structure and content of each writing-site/text. 
Louis Phillips (Nlaka’pamux elder, Lytton, BC) recalls this particular educational 
practice of rock writing and this enacted site (or school) of learning, touching on many of 
the themes we have discussed: 
 
K’ek’awzik is over here, across the river, behind these hills. Can’t see it 
from here. Powerful place. It’s our school… K’ek’awzik is where you 
graduate from… Our young people were sent up there to K’ek’awzik for ten 
days. No food no water. If they stuck it out, they come out, graduated. [A 
making public; establishing societal continuity.] The mountain, that place 
talks to you. Some it doesn’t talk to. Some are not successful. Sometimes 
it’s like that place doesn’t want to teach anybody. [Learning and teaching 
can’t be fully determined and reductively delivered.] It hides away in rain 
and snow and fog. Even in summer time. That Wendy Wickwire and her 
husband, they wanted to take youngsters – 14 or 18 year old in there, as a 
learning thing. That place didn’t want them. Either it wasn’t ready for them, 
or they weren’t ready for it. You were looking for those footprints, in the 
rocks. It’s the same. Either you’re ready to see them, or they just don’t want 
to be seen now, not today. Sometimes they are ready to be seen, 
sometimes not. 
 
When you go in any time to train, and you stay ten days, you listen to what 
nature says to you. You listen and learn and you can come out strong and 
protected. That’s real Indian education. Kids today go to school. They don’t 
know anything about listening to the land. Wherever you go in the 
mountains, the plants and herbs tell you what they are good for. You tell 
them what you need to know. Talk to each other. Every tree in that place 
has something to teach. [Learning from the more-than-human world; 
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ecological education.] You stay and learn all there is to learn in that place. 
Next time you go somewhere else and talk to all the plants in that place. 
You get knowledge and grow strong. K’ek’awzik is the place our young 
people went to learn […] Did they write their learning on the rocks? 
[Establishing continuity through curricular materials.] Maybe some did, in 
some of the places. [Learning cannot be determined or ensured.] Lots of 
writings in this country [The importance of forms for meaning-making]. 
 
Some come to me now and want to be Indian doctors. You want to be an 
Indian doctor? They want answers right away. I laugh at them. Tell them 
to go out and sit on the mountain… 
 
For training to be an Indian doctor, it takes close to four years of going out 
and staying up in there. You go to a place and stay without food and water. 
You build your sweathouse there and you go in and spend the night. You 
learn there too. You can sing, you pray in the sweathouse. In the morning 
you put on your clothes and travel around that place and listen to the plants 
and the living things (Do this for about ten days). [Shared practices in 
environments/places of local significance] 
 
The next time you do this, you go five or six miles further. Do it again and 
learn all there is to learn at that place. You stop one time on top of 
K’ek’awzik, after that on M’kip and other places. It’s powerful too. Then you 
move up the valley, five or six miles maybe, all the way up to Cottonwood, 
learning the power of each creek and the peaks in the area. After about 
four years you are trained. You have your powers. You tap into the power 
of the river and all the creeks and mountains. When you come back you’ve 
learned a lot of what the land can teach you. (Phillips, as cited in York, Daly, 
& Arnett, 1993, xvi) 
 
Quite obviously, much formal educational practice has not followed Mead’s call, and has 
failed to take seriously or even recognize the importance of Indigenous, place/land-
based educational practices and what they can offer educational thinking. It would be 
misguided and ignorant not to associate this obdurate lack of attention with the more 
general and comprehensive denial of indigenous educational systems, vital to the 
process and aims of colonization. With this, I have suggested, comes a rejection of local 
knowledge and pedagogy (cf. Stables, 2019b). Clearly, the “school” Phillips speaks of, 
and its accompanying practices (praying, fasting, collective dreaming, rock writing and 
reading, learning from the plants and animals, etc.) is not to be compared to the kind of 
genocidal indoctrination Canadian indigenous peoples were forced to endure in the 
infamous residential school system. Some would probably object to Philips and Annie 
York’s referral to these sites as types of school in the first place. If school is, to follow a 
morphological approach (Masschelein & Simons, 2013, 2015, 2019), primarily the 
enacting of a type of space-time-matter arrangement, it is always connected to and 
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happening in significant places. Thus, such significant environmental/cultural sites, 
without having walls or administration, are I would maintain, a kind of school in which 
forms of study can be enacted. 
Unfortunately, I will not be able to elaborate at all fully on these rich, land-based 
educational traditions. Suffice it to mention here, that a whole new perspective on these 
Salishan (interior and coastal) practices and their relationship to colonization (and thus 
the prospect/promise of decolonization) is unveiled, if we consider these educational 
practices, not as part of a “essentialized cultural practice”, but rather as historically 
contingent acts (Arnett & Morin, 2018); critical educational interventions used to preserve 
and communicate cultural teachings and place-based knowledge in anticipation of the 
arrival of European settlers to the West Coast of North America (see Arnett, 2016). 
 
In the final section (8.5) I will return to touch on how discourses and practices 
around decolonization have been significant, both philosophically and existentially, to 
me, but also in terms of the broader research journey chronicled through these articles. 
However, a quick side stop is first in order to address more fully some possible 
theoretical lacks and misconceptions that could arise in relation to this research 
orientation. 
 
Some Limitations and Possible Critiques 
 
The charge of givenism 
 
In many ways the greatest obstacles to the theory of learning that I have outlined resides 
in conceptualizing how the possible weighs upon the present-unfolding in a way that can 
escape the charge of givenism. The charge of givenism is often weighed against any 
theory that tries to address the reality and impact of firstness. Givenism refers to the 
existence of taken for granted axioms within a philosophical theory, such as for example 
the supposed discontinuity between mind-body, nature-culture, etc. assumed as given in 
many common philosophical frameworks. Alin Olteanu (2019) has recently turned his 
attention directly to this common reading of Peirce, in the context of some renewed 
interest in the relevance of pragmatism for philosophy of education, in part stemming 
from Colin Koopman’s (2009) call for a new wave of ‘transitionalist’ pragmatism. To 
quote Alin at length: 
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Peirce himself often openly criticized modern dualism and what is now termed 
givenism (e.g. CP 5.381-2). Also, it is a common consensus among Peirce 
scholars that his semiotics entails an isomorphism of mental and material 
processes (e.g. Pape, 1997), dismissing body/mind dichotomies. Nevertheless, in 
some regards Peirce is suspected of accepting givenist assumptions (e.g. 
Koopman, 2009). I consider that what might appear to be a supposition of a 
priorism in Peirce is rather a lucid and critical assumption that at each point within 
the stream of existence a knowing subject finds herself to start from something. 
This primum cognitum is not a logical or ontological a priori but, as Peirce 
explained, the simplicity of spatio-temporal existence.” (Olteanu, 2019, pp. 788- 
789) 
 
From a Peircean perspective, cognition, begins with a fundamental irritation of trying to 
make sense of a structure that is more complex than what can directly be derived from 
present experience. Such a charge is the result of denying the phenomenal present into 
our modelling of reality. Here, I have argued for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the temporality of experience, or, “a notion of experience more comprehensive than that 
of modern empiricism” (Olteanu, 2019, p. 793). 
I have argued throughout that learning starts from the continuity of our 
interactions with the environment, not from nothing – and this is precisely what I have 
attempted to address in Chap 6 of these essays. As Alin goes on to argue, such a 
perspective, generally derives from the influence of the linguistic turn upon late 20 th 
century philosophy, which results from understanding the verbal (linguistic) as mapping 
the pre-verbal (reflective of the pars pro toto error mentioned earlier, 8.2). Herein lies 
another feature of what is often called neo-pragmatism, as distinct from the earlier 
experience-based pragmatism, associated with Peirce, James, and Dewey. Peirce’s 
philosophy precisely involves recognizing that experience, if it is considered as 
proceeding along a continuum, cannot be reduced to component parts. Reality itself is 
complex (chap 7), and thus not reducible to determinism. What may appear as givenism 
through a neo-pragmatist lens, upon fuller analysis, in fact appears simply to be a 
recognition of the reality of chance (what Peirce called tychism), and thus the reality of 
firstness – regardless of the fact that firstness can never be directly located or isolated 
within the ongoing flow of experience (see Chap 6). Remember, symbols are not the 
result of a production rule, but the result of habit-formation, that is, tendencies. This 
involves a rejection of substantialism and with it the rejection of the necessity of definite 
probability, central to recognizing reality itself as evolving along a continuum 
(synechism), in the sense “that a given species of event considered as belonging to a 
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given genus of events does not necessarily have any definite probability”(CP 5.21, 
[emphasis added]). Olteanu (2019) explains further that this insight, stemming from 
Peirces’s synechism and mutually supporting pragmatism 
 
leads to Peirce’s revolutionary idea, arguably the same which Einstein was 
later concerned with, that universals (laws) are, actually, tendencies. That 
if something is universal it means that it tends to happen and not that it 
happens every single time in the same identical way. The latter is 
Newtonian mechanistic modernity, from which Peirce distanced himself in 
a number of regards. (p. 796) 
 
MST Implying a hierarchy of signification – another form of 
givenism 
 
This issue discussed above, in fact connects to another possible charge of givenism 
against some features of the philosophy I have articulated. These articles have made 
some alignment to Sebeok and Danesi’s MST (modelling systems theory) as a 
methodological orientation. As explored, mainly throughout Chap 4, MST has 
popularized a reading of Peirce where “representational activities” are “undergirded by 
three different, but interrelated, modeling systems present in the human brain, 
corresponding grosso modo to what Charles Peirce (1839-1914) called firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness” (Sebeok & Danesi, 2000, pp. 9-10). Modelling here, has 
mostly been thought of as ascending from simple, basic sign types to complex ones. In 
chapter 4, this assumed progression was referred to as the Natural Learning Flow 
Principle. 
It must be addressed that, while clearly relevant and applicable in a range of 
cognate research areas (particularily, within the burgening field of cognitive semiotics as 
an empricial discipline, cf. Zlatev, 2009, 2013), philosophically, this method can entail the 
further acceptance of an unexamined a priori correspondence between complexity of 
cognition and complexity of signification. This naturally leads to a perspective that sees 
the abstract and combinatorial complexity of human language (explored earlier as 
symbolic learning) as the natural apex of meaning-making and semiotic evolution. 
It needs to be said that, such a methodology, though clearly Peirce-inspired, is 
actually contrary to Peirce in several respects – particularly, in regard to this 
presupposed hierarchy of complexity, from icon to symbol, and with it a non-Peircean 
view of symbol as a sign abstracted from its context of enactment. Although, I will not be 
able to go fully into it here, such a temping reductionism of Peircean theory can result in 
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a dualist and language-centered perspective that places embodied experience on one 
side of the binary tightrope (and with it, icons and indexes) and human language (and 
symbols) on the other. 
In a recent co-authored article called “Naturalizing Models: new perspectives in a 
Peircean key” (Olteanu, Campbell, & Feil, 2020), we engage in a discussion with regards 
to the methodological and theoretical limits of this approach, drawing from Peirce’s late, 
post-1900 philosophy. In this article, we derive a more fully Peircean perspective, that 
affords understanding the practice of modelling as a reciprocal interplay between (top- 
down) decomposition of complexity into simple signs, and the (bottom up) recombination 
into further complexity. Here, I will just represent a brief summary of the argument 
advanced in this article as it pertains directly to Peirce’s late thought. 
Much of this theoretical orientation, involves recognizing the primacy of iconcity in 
signification. As has been discussed in Chap 6, this recognition carries significant 
implications for how we conceptualize the arts and creative learning in relation to formal 
education. In a rather nuanced contrast to the 1, 2, 3 (discrete) reading of modelling 
characteristic of MST, for Peirce, it is icons and not symbols that give reality its structure 
and ‘realness’ (see Chap 6). The organism, the learner, through moving and acting in 
the environment, forms (and enacts) prior habits of relationship, so that its actions in the 
environment become more in tune with its needs (Hoffmeyer, 2007). This process of 
habit and relationship formation stems from the organism’s embodied morphology, and a 
basic presupposition to correspond to the world, represented by Eco’s notions of primary 
iconism (explored in Chap 6). According to Peirce, it is the primary modelling 
characteristic of the iconic sign that provides signification with its objective basis, or 
Ground as he called it, and this is because what is most characteristic of the icon is that 
“its parts are related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are 
themselves related (CP 3.363)” (Legg, 2017, p. 33). Peirce stated directly that an icon is 
a sign “… from which information may be derived,” (Syllabus 1903, CP 2.309). This is 
what we might call Operational Iconicity (Stjernfelt, 2014, pp. 206-211). Divergent from 
the common relativist definition that an icon signifies based on similarity or resemblance, 
the operational notion of iconicity asserts “icons as the only sign type able to provide 
information. This is why all more complex sign types must involve or lead to icons in 
order to convey information” (Stjernfelt, 2014, pp. 207- 208). This is to assert that 
Iconicty is a central part of signification, and is thus, consequently for learning theory, not 
simply a stepping stone to the thinking at a distance characteritic of symbolic cognition. 
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The icon is embedded within existing (primarilly embodied and biological) forms. It is in 
this sense that learning is situated in the relationship between the organism’s 
phenomonal world (umwelt) and the environment it corresponds with. Later on in the 
Syllabus, Peirce explained that “An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility involving a 
possibility…” (CP 2.311). Stjernfelt (2014, p. 208) elaborates this formula, and how it 
actually refers to both notions of iconism: the first possibility refers to the icon as being a 
possible sign of what resembles it, as it is emphasized in a particular semiotic process 
(only later connected to an object or class/genus of objects through an index, combined 
to assert a truth-claim functioning within a proposition). The second possibility however, 
refers to “the fact that similarity characteristics defined by the first possibility in 
themselves involve possibilities that are not explicit and that may be further developed” 
(p. 208). 
Therefore, as discussed in chapter 6, according to operational iconicity, the 
essential aspect of the icon, is not in fact mere likeness, but rather structural 
resemblance. Perhaps the clearest example of iconic signification then, is not the classic 
picture or drawing, but rather a map, or model. Put simply, “Icons are thus signs with 
implicit information that may be made explicit” (Stjernfelt, 2014, p. 208) in future 
(potential) semiotic unfurling. This is in itself a recognition of the reality of firstness, as 
poential (and thus virtual and “absential” (Deacon, 2011) phenomena, impacting upon 
the actual-unfolding. This objective basis of iconic signification characterizes what Peirce 
calls diagrammatic reasoning. It is this iconic ‘mapping’ of the new through the known 
that gives our experience shape and dimension, and allows us to derive meaningful 
‘truth’ from our interactions with the environment. 
As mentioned, for Peirce, cognition and learning begin with a fundamental 
irritation of trying to make sense of a structure that is more complex than what can be 
derived from present experience (hence the importance of recognizing the indexical rub 
as a pedagogical concept). The argument is that symbols are embedded in icons – that 
the esse in futuro characteristic of the symbol – with the power of bringing together in 
continuity previously unconnected signs through the establishment of habit – was there 
in the very beginning in the icon, albeit, in general, unarticulated shape. Thus, while any 
type of semiosis supposes or leads to growth, it is most accurate to claim this about the 
habitual use of icons. That is to say with Peirce that “symbols grow” (CP 2.302). From 
this understanding we can arrive at new understandings of the continuity of human 
language with pre-verbal forms of signification: “semiotic compositionality can be said to 
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rely upon the progressive de-structuring of the parts and components of propositional 
structure, to achieve greater combinatory possibilities” (Olteanu, Campbell, & Feil, 2020, 
pp. 191-192). Such lines of inquiry are actively being forged in a range of research 
areas, such as the evolutionary and biological account of the twin development of music 
and language in homo-sapiens and our hominin ancestors offered in Tomlinson’s (2015) 
A Million Years of Music. A fully symbolic competency that may bypass indexical and 
iconic embodiments, could be seen to “find its highest degree of articulation in human 
language”, however, a fully Peircean perspective, requires that we recognize this as “an 
important achievement rather than a possible starting principle...” (Stjernfelt, 2014, p. 
159). 
Herein lies the basic power of the edusemiotic perspective: considering learning 
as the growth of signification broadly across nature and culture (semiosis) means that 
that we can account for learning without reducing it to anthropocentric, gluttocentric, 
mentalistic or computational accounts. Therefore, it is imperative that any theory or 
method that implictly or explictly asserts human symbolic cognition as a kind of 
philosophical, developmental, or evolutionary apex must be carefully unpacked and 
engaged with – including in fact my own connections to MST. Again, from a post- 
Peircean biosemiotic perspective, semiosis and perception are not to be equated – 
perception is dependent upon semiosis, but semiosis represents a more primary 
process, that is hypothesized by biosemiotics to be co-extensive with the life-process (as 
opposed to non-living, inanimate matter). This distinction between perception (and thus 
related notions like consciousness) and semiosis is not to imply that these signification 
processes occur separated from their very real embodiment in an organism – as Clarke 
indicates in his diagnosis of semiotics (or more properly, semiology) and its usefulness 
to understanding musical perception ( see 8.2.1). I am arguing instead that this bio- 
semiotic perspective recognizes that human experience occurs within an expanded 
temporal unfolding and, as such, learning cannot be reduced to a form of synchronic 
reductionism, which translates experience into symbols. Olteanu and Stables (2019, p. 
421 [my emphasis]) clarify further why this type of anti-psychologism is important in 
semiotic theories of learning: 
from its beginning, biosemiotics was defined by [Thomas] Sebeok […] as a 
modelling theory and, while useful for cognitive theories as well, it does not 
impose any particular assumption about cognition. Thus, from this 
perspective, a theory of learning does not necessarily imply a discussion 
on cognition. An educational theory and system can conceive learning in 
terms of signification only. 
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A Final Reflection 
 
Who am I? 
 
The final limitation I’ll draw attention to is simply the limitation of being myself, and living 
in the society and time that I do. This clearly follows from other limitations, the reality of 
spatial-temporal situatedness that Peirce’s philosophy calls us to notice. However, this 
is, in itself, not exactly a limitation; rather, the simple reality of semiosis – that all 
signification necessarily occurs through physical forms and mediums (an interpretant 
needs a representamen to be sustained into the future), and that all significant 
information, anything that means something to some organism doing something, is 
necessarily the constraint of something.194 I am constantly trying to dialogue the 
limitations of my own perspective with the recognition that my place in a broader ecology 
of relations is not something to be transcended, but a central part of what makes me who 
I am. This is the never ending hermeneutic labour of being a scholar-in-relation. It is also 
the reason I engage in scholarly and artistic documentary and interviewing, mostly 
through the site/organization which I co-run (philosophasters.org) – interviewing around 
a dozen or so artists, scholars, and community organizers, over the last several years. 
 
So, who am I? 
 
I’m from Vancouver, born and raised on Commercial Drive, in East Vancouver. As 
should be clear by now, continuity and commitments to land and place are an important 
part of my personal and scholarly journey. This has recently been documented in an 





194 This is essentially a description of the basic requirements for interpretative competency, as 
defined recently, in a lecture at the University of Tartu (2019), by Terrence Deacon: “Interpretation 
is defined as a process that changes state with respect to intrinsic signal features because of their 
association with some extrinsic features potentially able to directly or indirectly affect the future of 
this interpretative disposition”. Semiosis, as a type of second order causation, is dependent on 
physical constraint, for the basic fact that information is embodied in physical forms. As Pearson 
says, to interpret is to be confronted by a complexity that requires “acting on the habits embodied 
in the constraints” so that an organism’s actions in an environment become more in tune with its 
needs (Hoffmeyer, 2007). Deacon (2019) continues this thinking when he claims “all sign info, 
anything we take as being a significant something in the world, is the constraint of something”. This 
basic biological principle is central to the bio-existentialist pedagogy outlined here. Learning 
requires constraints, for this is how signs grow and meaning is channeled. 
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of dwelling”.195 Apart from 5 years’ residence in South Burnaby, most of my life has been 
spent living “along the no. 20 line” – to reference the name of the streetcar line (now 
bus) along which this streetcar-suburb was constructed, and the title of Rolf Knight’s 
(1980) history of the neighborhood. 
 
I am also a life-long pedestrian – who has never learned to drive. Walking and 
hiking are an essential part of how I discover meaning in my world and it has deeply 
informed the way I live and experience my life. I was fortunate to grow up sheltered from 
the voracity of North American car culture, in a central and walkable neighborhood. I 
continue to walk on average, two hours a day, and more if I can. I’ve never been entirely 
comfortable around cars and car culture – the ways in which auto-mania creates isolated 
and disconnected people and communities. It has often appeared to me that the umwelt 
of a driver is distorted – the result is that sprawling, disjointed, built environments have 
expanded across Turtle Island to correspond to this disjointed perception, with massive 
ecological and social consequences. Walking has been a way for me to cultivate the 
unique aesthetic feeling of space and time that stems from the human umwelt and my 
own embodied morphology. With walking, I believe we can enact community and place – 
the conviviality of encountering neighbours (animals and humans) and enacting forms of 
gathering in public space. 
 
I strive to live my life in accordance with my philosophizing. 
 
But how did this philosophizing passion and scholarly journey begin in the first 
place? Writing has always been a means of inquiry for me, of learning. I wrote to learn 
about the world, to discover myself in-relation. I think this is the reason I started 
engaging in scholarly writing in the first place. As a music student craving words and 
books in a predominantly sonorous environment – I would read an exciting quote and be 
compelled to write it out in my notebook, and concurrently continue the path of the quote 
myself. Not the prose itself but rather the chain of interpretation this little slice of text 
induced in my reading of it. All I was doing at this early stage was reading: literature, 
poetry, philosophy, music theory, musical scores, biography, auto-biography, anything. I 
was reading and simply writing about what I read. I started gradually reading more 
 
195 Retrieved (April, 2020): https://philosophasters.org/articles/2019/6/25/vancouver-accelerates- 
thirty-years-of-dwelling 
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contemporary scholarship and copying it. I couldn’t see what was fundamentally different 
from the way I wrote from the way Eco, or Peirce, or Kundera, or Illich, or Levi, or 
Calvino, or Langer, or Miłosz wrote (an incomplete list of some early influencers). In my 
ignorance, I saw a continuum of what was fundamentally the same basic inquiry 
process: all either of us could do (me or these venerable scholars and authors) was write 
about what we read, and write about the ways in which we lived through and with the 
things that we read. All that separated me from them was a unique acquired experience 
and a distinct cultural and historical prejudice – a different set of reading and listening 
under my belt. 
 
It was in this sense that reading and writing became inseparable activities, and in 
fact, completely indistinguishable from one another; to read was to write and to write 
was to read. To write, to do, to read, to undergo. Novice and stumbling as it was, the 
process was vindicating. Soon, a strange mass of writing amassed in notebooks and 
files, and with it a strange feeling of accomplishment: a kind of guileless protestant 
satisfaction with the very act of production itself (probably understandable from a 
musician whose preferred musical practice had been prominently improvisational). 
 
I would even venture to say that this strange form of writing-reading intertwined 
process/action is not essentially different than the practiced skill of playing-thinking 
improvised paths through song-structures. At least, I did not perceive them as different. 
My scholarly reading and writing practice was entirely based on the way I practiced 
music. This has indeed influenced my current (far less technical) musical practice 
routine, which is concerned primarily with learning (and, in a sense, re-learning, after 
years of formal training) how to play music by feel: to perceive and re-cognize sounds 
through the way my body engages the instrument; the ‘habits of feeling’ developed 
through movement around the fretboard, or sensing the vibratory force of the string, or 
responding to the signs and signals radiating from an unfolding musical event. 
 
Finally, learning, as I’ve alluded to, also involves struggle and despondency: 
 
Philosophy and education for me, like Socrates suggests in the Republic (book VII, 
518d), is the process of turning the soul around. It is how I have come to understand 
myself in relation to a world that can often be alienating and disheartening. As an 
educator, I’m interested in how we can practice a pedagogy of hope within global 
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structures that often seem (and are) repressive, reductive, impersonal, and 
instrumentalized. These days, I often see my own students and friends flirting with 
cynicism, anxiety, and despair, but I realize this may be, as Tim Lilburn (2017, Ch. 2) 
says “The Start of Real Thinking”. Still, it can also be predominantly paralyzing and self- 
defeating. My experiences as a young person have often been disillusioning: to wake to 
a world that feels decidedly not my own — a world created for others, with a different set 
of opportunities and values that I can’t seem to fully make use of — a world that seems 
to be the final spinning out of cycles and processes that were created long before I was 
born. These cycles will ensure our collective eco-destruction and societal disintegration, 
we’ve been told from a young age, but still, they are, paradoxically, all that is afforded to 
us as young people. A mass dis-imagination machine (as Henry Giroux might call it) is at 
work: media tells us every day to imagine the end of the world; not the end of our current 
globalist trajectory. 
 
There is also the crushing existential weight of colonialism and the 
impoverishment of settler culture, I touched on earlier. This was something I was 
confronted with close up, living near the Downtown Eastside (DTES) and attending a 
school with a large urban Indigenous demographic (Britannia).196 Maybe there is some 
hope suggested from the fact that we seem to have entered a new stage in Canadian 
Settler-Indigenous relations, represented by the movement, and calls, for Truth and 
Reconciliation. 
 
But are we on the road to reconciliation? Just this morning, a few blocks from my 
home in East Vancouver, I watched protestors in solidarity with the Wet’suwet’en of 
Northern BC, forcibly arrested by the RCMP, for resisting the construction of a pipeline 
through their sacred territory. We must ask, are we even in a place where conversation, 
let alone reconciliation, is even possible? This is a central point in Lilburn’s (2017) 
recent Contemplation and Place. He says, contrary to top-down mandates such as the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that we are, as of yet, still in a stage of “pre- 
conversation” — unable to even dialogue with this land and the people who have taken 
care of it for millennia, until we reach deep into our own interiority as well as our own 
spiritual and contemplative traditions. This is ongoing and continuous work for me. As 
 
196 When I was a child, my father, Bart Campbell worked and volunteered in a soup kitchen and 
drop-in centre in the DTES. These experiences are chronicled in his book, “The Door is Open” 
(2001). 
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Western Canada is still defined by many through the extraction of resources and wealth, 
and not our commitments to contemplation and place, how do you sustain hope that this 
conversation is even possible? In an interview (Lilburn & Campbell, 2019 [reproduced in 
Appendix A]) I conducted with him, Lilburn sheds some perspective on this dilemma: 
 
Colonialism has many causes – greed, racism, a rampant will to power. I 
would add to this list certain epistemological allegiances and the deficits 
in one’s being-in-the-world they foster. European culture’s post-Cartesian 
proclivity for a certain form of knowing, a certain form of what many take to 
be cognitive rigour, has caused the closing down of the contemplative 
tradition in European thought. This has meant, because of the pedagogical 
attachments that mark this seemingly lost tradition, that conversation, 
attention, interior transformation have undergone a complete loss of 
philosophical significance. It is not surprising that settler culture does not 
comprehend where and what home is, since it does not know how to see, 
to take in, individualities and their relationships. So, yes, people like me are 
in a state of “pre-conversation” in the matter of reconciliation, hoping to 
learn, if one is lucky, intellectual humility—Keats’ negative capability—so 
that a space may grow in the self where the actual world might appear. 
Another aspect of the pan-cultural injury, or poverty, in which folks like me 
live is that, not truly taking in where I am, I cannot be bound to that place, 
making autochthonicity difficult, if not impossible, for me. Placeless even 
when at home, I cannot occupy the larger self, which is the atomic self 
leagued to, elongated by, the joy and sufficiency of one’s place. I float over 
a land I do not know, in an intellectual tradition offering no sapiential rooting. 
Anxiety, fret, drifting are to be expected under these conditions. 
 
The question this poses for education and educators is: has this “pan-cultural poverty” 
been sufficiently acknowledged, not only within our institutions, but more foundationally, 
by ourselves, to even speak about truth and reconciliation, or for that matter 
decolonizing and place-based education? Pedagogically, being receptive and open to 
place involves confronting the pain and anxiety caused by this rootless-drifting – our own 
discontinuities and disillusionments with land and place. 
 
Such rootless, drifting, anxiety clearly connects to the restless desire for 
accumulation central to a capitalist way of being. Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar 
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson remarks in interview, that “[d]evelopment is re lated to 
anxiety because accumulation is never enough in capitalism. Which ultimately is about 
shame – this idea that Indigenous people and our societies, our knowledge is less 
developed than Western ideas is a very prevalent, Canadian idea” (in Hern, Joha l, & 
Sacco, 2018, p. 69). Earlier, in this same interview with Matt Hern and Am Johal, 
Simpson reflects on her relationships to her ancestors and remarks on how another way 
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of being in the world, not linked to extractivist logics, is suggested by Indigenous political 
systems and traditions: 
 
My ancestors didn’t bank capital as a way of maintain security, as a way of 
mitigating fear and anxiety – they banked relationships. My ancestors had very 
intimate and strong relationships with the land, with plant nations and animal 
nations and neighboring families and neighboring Indigenous nations. In times of 
hardship they relied on those relationships. They couldn’t bank capital; they 
couldn’t kill 600 moose and have a rainy-day fund. They had to rely on a different 
way of being in the world. 
It’s a different relationship with the world. In Indigenous political structures, 
You’ve got systems of governance that mirror how I govern myself in the world. 
That same system of values and processes governs how you make decisions as 
a family and then amplifies across scales – that’s a much different relationship 
with the world. It’s more difficult for me to think about how to transition from a 
capitalistic-greed-accumulation model based on violence than thinking about 
regenerating the system of my ancestors. The sites where I see this happening 
are in families. It’s small collectives and these islands of resistance [...] My kids 
are growing up very different than I grew up. They’re growing up more embedded 
in the Indigenous systems that I’m talking about, so the questions they’re going to 
ask and the answers they’re going to find are different. The idea behind 
Indigenous resurgence and on-the-land education is that you re-embed people in 
this system. You grow humans up in this nest of relationships, and there’s a shift 
that occurs that we can’t really predict because of the disconnect created by the 
violence of colonialism. (p. 65)  
 
How do we embrace that which is truly emergent and uncertain; teach what has not yet 
been taught? The importance and value of this logic of relationality and improvisational 
becoming is one thing these essays have tried to unravel. Similarly, like Lilburn and 
Simpson, through my teaching, scholarship, musicianship, and living, I have 
endeavoured to cultivate a space, an opening, “where the actual world can appear” – not 
a hidden world of ideal forms, or decided outcomes, but real resonant relations 
stemming from my embodied experiences in places of significance. 
 
In the face of this rootless drifting and anxiety I am continually inspired by human 
creativity. I can only hope, that here, in this liminal place – brought into even sharper 
focus with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, where our current values and structures 
present themselves as being manifestly unsustainable and a new order and new values 
have not yet fully shown their form – here is nothing but opportunity. 
 
Increasingly sterile and standardized institutions and policy can be reconsidered 
from a perspective that is rooted, not in top-down implementations from outside, but in 
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terms of how people find meaning and agency in their local communities and local 
situations. Indeed, the city, the village, land, place and the community itself, are 
ultimately the sites for such re-imaginings – for their structure and potency frames and 
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Talking with Tims 
 
‘Talking with Tims’ has been an important part of this research journey. 
 
Please enjoy the following two interviews with Tim Ingold and Tim Lilburn, both originally 
published on philosophasters.org, and edited by Marion Benkaiouche and myself. 
 
Educational freedom, the craft of writing and the university 
– an interview with Tim Ingold 
 
Tim Ingold explores the entangled relations between human beings and the 
environments they inhabit. Over the last 30 years, he has written and taught widely on 
how embodied processes of enskillment (learning to hunt-fish-forage, weave or 
sing, making and expressing art and craft alike) fundamentally determine and shape the 
diverse ways in which we perceive, understand, and 'dwell' in the world. 
 
An anthropologist by training, Ingold has explored such diverse things as the use, 
expression, and centrality of ‘lines’ in human culture, the inter-connections between 
anthropology, archaeology, art and architecture (the ‘4 A’s), and, in this most recent 
book Anthropology of education (2017), the fundamental equivalence between education 
and anthropology. Here he argues that “there is more to education than teaching and 
learning, and more to anthropology than making studies of other people’s lives” for both 
are more primarily processes of 'leading life' and 'studying' with others in a shared world. 
 
In this interview, Cary Campbell asks Ingold about his own personal entanglements with 
the processes and ideas he explores in his research, and what led him to his recent 




CAMPBELL: In this new book "Anthropology and/as Education", you talk much about 
the distinctive type of freedom that education (as a process of leading life with others) 
necessitates. You've said that "Education... is about what it means not just to live life but 
to lead it. The word comes from the Latin compound ex (out) plus ducere (to lead). Thus 
to educate is literally to ‘lead out’." Obviously, this is quite different from the dominant 
(strong) sense of education, which emphasizes the instilling and transmitting of socially 
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approved knowledge into the mind of the novice (as in the latin educare). Without going 
too far into it here, the type of educational freedom you describe is a freedom from 
"within the event", from "dwelling in habit", not a "hollow freedom" from outside, as an act 
of volition imposed on events retrospectively. It is the freedom to embrace the essential 
indeterminacy and openness (the 'weakness', as Biesta says) of educational  
encounters. 
 
As an improvising musician and a teacher of improv I am interested in the process by 
which improvisers realize potential and variations in music-making, not from 
predetermined inputs outside of the activity, but through entering into relation with an 
unfolding musical event/ritual. I've also seen how many educational endeavours can fall 
short because of a general inability to conceptualize this essential doing-undergoing, 
where, as you point out, 'real' freedom resides. You demonstrate that this is also what 
happens in anthropology, when ethnography (making studies of people) becomes its 
central preoccupation, in place of dynamic forms of participant observation (communing 
and corresponding with others). 
 
I have a few interrelated questions that follow from these observations. 
 
Could you talk about the role this "freedom from within" - this improvisational movement - 
has in your own scholarly craft and practice? 
 
INGOLD: Most of my scholarship these days takes the form of writing. As in any creative 
activity, I commence a project of writing with only the haziest notion of what it is to be 
about and of how I shall proceed. And I always feel hopelessly unprepared. All I have to 
go on are my earlier writings, texts I may have read that are still preying on my mind, 
conversations which might have sparked off a train of thought, and observations of 
things or happenings that may have caught my attention. I am thrashing around inside of 
all of this. The concordant processes by which thinking crystallises into thought, and by 
which disorderly words settle into syntactically regular patterns, are among the great 
mysteries of the writer’s craft. Long after a piece of work is finished (if it is ever finished) I 
can look back on it in astonishment and wonder, ‘was that me?’, ‘did I really write all 
that?’ Writing is something I definitely do – it is not being done to me – and yet in the 
doing I surrender myself to it: I am inside the writing process, not directing it from outside 
or above. I don’t so much decide what to write as write what falls or comes to me. Where 
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exactly it comes from, I don’t know. And the biggest problem, always, is how to convert a 
line of thought and words that is coming to a close, and that looks like it will go no 
further, into a new opening. Indeed, writing is not about progressing from beginning to 
end. Quite to the contrary: it is a constant struggle to turn endings into beginnings. It is 
precisely in this perpetual beginning that its freedom lies. 
 
CAMPBELL: As someone who as devoted great attention to the ways in which 
processes of enskillment (like writing and research) are central to the way humans act 
and perceive their environments, could you speak about your own personal relationship 
to skill and craftsmanship, scholarly, artistic, or otherwise? 
 
INGOLD: Do I practice what I preach? Sometimes I feel like a bit of a fraud, since in 
many of the fields of craft that I have written about, or used as examples, I have no skill 
at all. In woodwork, pottery, weaving and calligraphy, I am a complete novice. I am a 
useless cook. I can walk, but so can just about everyone else! Outside my own 
scholarship and writing, there’s really only one thing I can do that is not common to 
almost everyone, and that is play the cello. I have played the cello since I was twelve 
years old, and it has hugely influenced the way I think and write about things. Actually, 
there was a gap of about twenty years, while our children were growing up, when I 
scarcely touched the cello. I played the piano instead. But now it is the piano that sits 
forlorn and neglected. It is virtually impossible to keep both instruments going 
simultaneously, not only because there is never enough time to practice even one, but 
because the cello (as a gestural instrument) and the piano (as a digital instrument) entail 
entirely different ways of being. To keep both going is like trying to be two completely 
different people at the same time. But writing, too, is a skilled craft, and it is about the 
only other skill I have. I used to write everything by hand, and must have been among 
the very last to transition to the horribly named ‘word processor’. I found – and still find – 
the idea of writing as processing words utterly abhorrent. But nowadays I find that I am 
writing at the keyboard more and more. I feel rather ashamed of this. Because I know I 
am doing it for one reason alone: that I am pushed for time. It is a short-cut. And that is 
not a good reason. There should be no short cuts. Writing should be allowed to take its 
time. 
 
CAMPBELL: Do you have any observations or insights into how we might practice this 
"improvisational creativity", this freedom from within that is revealed by the "perceptual 
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acuity of practitioners" (p. x) in a academy and educational climate that increasingly 
strives to ‘pin things down’; to operationalize learning, teaching, and knowledge 
production. That is, to reference Ch. 3. Of your book, how might we resist these pulls of 
the Major over the Minor in our lives, practices, and jobs? 
 
INGOLD: It is becoming more and more difficult to do this. The educational 
environments in which we work are increasingly dogmatic and oppressive, and worse 
still, dogma and oppression are being delivered in the name of freedom and creativity! 
This is a travesty of both. Our universities are now at crisis point – perhaps they have 
even passed that point. Those who pretend to ‘lead’ them have much to answer for. But I 
have learned two things. The first is that we cannot wait for others to turn the system 
around on our behalf. We have to do it ourselves: in what we do, how we teach, what we 
write. The amount that any one of us can achieve might seem small, or merely local in its 
effects. But together, we can change the world. The other thing is that the current system 
is manifestly unsustainable. If it is not already collapsing around us, it very soon will. 
That’s why we have to start thinking now about the kind of educational future we want. It 
is no good simply waiting for the collapse to happen. By that time it will be too late. Only 
recently, and none too soon, has this sense of urgency really begun to take hold, not just 
in my generation but in younger generations as well. They are our future. 
 
CAMPBELL: What sparked your more explicit turn to educational philosophy for this 
book? I know from my own circles that your work has been read by educationalists for 
some time, and clearly there is much relevance in your research into the questions we 
ask in education. But here in this book, you finally address these questions head on, and 
turn explicitly to educational philosophers like Masschelein, Biesta, and obviously, 
Dewey. Could I ask you how this "educational" turn came about in your work, and how 
you came to see education as being central to the aims of anthropology? 
 
INGOLD: This is something that had been growing on me for a while. It came particularly 
from my experience of teaching the ‘4 As’ course (Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and 
Architecture). This was a deliberate attempt to introduce principles of studio-based 
learning, common in art schools, into anthropology. I taught the course, on and off, from 
2004 to 2011, and then it morphed finally into a book, Making. It was the first time I had 
tried to put into practice my idea of anthropology as an art of inquiry, which is both 
speculative and experimental, and in that sense opposed to descriptive ethnography. 
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The penny really dropped, for me, when I was challenged to explain what anthropology, 
so conceived, would deliver in terms of concrete results. Ethnography yields 
monographs, studies of this or that people that others can read. ‘What does your kind of 
anthropology produce?’ I was asked. And my answer was that such anthropology would 
be worthless if the anthropologist, transformed by his or her field experience, did not also 
teach, thus transforming others in their turn. Teaching is not an add-on to 
anthropological practice, I argued, but an integral part of it. What anthropology produces, 
then, is a new generation. It must therefore be a practice of education, not of 
ethnography; one in which research and teaching are absolutely inseparable. It was then 
that, quite by accident, I bumped into the work of Jan Masschelein, and realised that his 
rethinking of what education could be held the key to what I was after. I think it was Jan, 
in an email, who put it to me that what I really wanted to prove was that anthropology’s 
fundamental imperative was educational. And it was he who gave me the sense of 
education – as a leading out into the world calling for attention and exposure – that I 
needed to prove its purpose for anthropology. The new book started from there. It led 
me to Biesta – whose work I also came across by accident when we both found 
ourselves at the same conference in Norway – and thence, through Biesta’s writings, to 
Dewey. Of course I had known of Dewey’s work, but I had not before read it properly. It 
was a revelation. 
 
CAMPBELL: You also try to rethink conventional conceptions of the university and the 
academic discipline in this book: reimagining disciplines and their corresponding paths of 
inquiry, not as diced up and divided "fields of study", but rather as "a tangled mesh of 
ongoing pathways or lines of interest" (p. 74). Do you see space emerging in the modern 
academy for this sort of "anti-disciplinary interdisciplinary" you speak of? And 
correspondingly, do you see avenues for encouraging the broad and open-ended notion 
of "study" you articulate in this text, in both the academy and formal education more 
broadly? 
 
INGOLD: So far, I see very little space for this kind of thing within the universities. 
People who are doing it are forced to the margins, or outside altogether. Of course 
everyone is banging on about ‘interdisciplinarity’. There’s money and space for that. But 
all interdisciplinarity does is to reinforce the notion of the discipline as a bounded territory 
of knowledge. The important thing, as you say, is to think again about the real meaning 
of study. The issue of interdisciplinarity arises precisely because conventional ways of 
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thinking about study are defective. They suppose that study is about the acquisition of 
knowledge content rather than about the cultivation of skills for attending to the world 
and to what is going on there. However, even in the increasingly micro-managed 
university of today, it is possible – under the radar, so to speak – to do things differently. 









Placeless drifting, colonization and reconciliation as interior 
journey – an interview with Tim Lilburn 
 
Tim Lilburn is a Canadian poet, philosopher, and essayist — from Saskatchewan, and a 
longtime West Coast resident (Victoria). He is the author of several critically-acclaimed 
collections of poetry, including Kill-Site, To the River, Moosewood Sandhills, and Orphic 
Politics. 
 
The dialogue that follows expands upon themes and ideas presented in his 2017 book of 
essays, The Larger Conversation: Contemplation and Place, which details the interior 
and contemplative aspects of de-colonization and ecological philosophy-as-practice. I 
first reviewed the book for subTerrain magazine and afterwards struck up an extended 
conversation with Lilburn, some of which you will find below. 
 
 
Campbell: In “Contemplation and Place”, you speak at length about how the proposed 
reconciliatory conversation between settlers and indigenous peoples in Canada can 
have no hope of occurring without a recognition of the deep spiritual and intellectual 
poverty that afflicts North American settler culture. At a basic level, I think this has 
always been upsetting to me, born and raised on the West Coast — how we are often 
completely dim to the land we inhabit; living next to mountains, rivers, and places, with 
their names and stories removed, unaware of their broader spiritual, ecological and 
historical significance. You say, contrary to top-down mandates such as the Truth and 
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Reconciliation commission, that we are, as of yet, still in a stage of “pre-conversation” — 
unable to even dialogue with this land and the people who have taken care of it for 
millennia, until we reach deep into our own interiority as well as our own spiritual and 
contemplative traditions. 
 
As an educator, I’m interested in how we can practice a ‘pedagogy of hope’ within global 
structures that often seem (and are) repressive, reductive, impersonal, and 
instrumentalized. These days, I often see my own students and friends flirting with 
cynicism, anxiety, and despair, and I realize this may be, as you say, an important first 
step (i.e. chapter two in your book entitled “The Start of Real Thinking”), but it can also 
be paralyzing and self-defeating. As Western Canada is still very much defined by many 
through the extraction of resources and wealth, and not our commitments to 
contemplation and place, how do you sustain hope (or, rather what keeps you from 
despair) that this conversation is even possible? 
 
Lilburn: Colonialism has many causes – greed, racism, a rampant will to power. I would 
add to this list certain epistemological allegiances and the deficits in one’s being-in-the- 
world they foster. European culture’s post-Cartesian proclivity for a certain form of 
knowing, a certain form of what many take to be cognitive rigour, has caused the closing 
down of the contemplative tradition in European thought. This has meant, because of the 
pedagogical attachments that mark this seemingly lost tradition, that conversation, 
attention, interior transformation have undergone a complete loss of philosophical 
significance. It is not surprising that settler culture does not comprehend where and what 
home is, since it does not know how to see, to take in, individualities and their 
relationships. So, yes, people like me are in a state of “pre-conversation” in the matter of 
reconciliation, hoping to learn, if one is lucky, intellectual humility—Keats’ negative 
capability—so that a space may grow in the self where the actual world might appear. 
 
Another aspect of the pan-cultural injury, or poverty, in which folks like me live is that, not 
truly taking in where I am, I cannot be bound to that place, making autochthonicity 
difficult, if not impossible, for me. Placeless even when at home, I cannot occupy the 
larger self, which is the atomic self leagued to, elongated by, the joy and sufficiency of 
one’s place. I float over a land I do not know, in an intellectual tradition offering no 
sapiential rooting. Anxiety, fret, drifting are to be expected under these conditions. 
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I wonder if there can be some joining of traditional contemplative practices and teaching 
at the post-secondary level. I’m mulling over this possibility these days in an essay I am 
working on called “Contemplative Practices, Contemplative Pedagogies.” For me, 
because of my background and reading, most of these practices come from the Platonic 
tradition in its Christian, Islamic, Judaic and Neoplatonist forms, but other sources of 
interior shaping are also possible. The conversation I yearn for is a long-shot, but hunger 
tells me there might be a way. 
 
Campbell: You also speak about the need for a pedagogy of attention, a deep sensorial 
“feasting attention”. Today, it seems that so often, and perhaps increasingly so with 
technology, our attention is being taken away from where it needs to be, from the places 
we dwell in and the relations that sustain us. As a teacher yourself, is this something you 
notice with your students, and if so, how do you cultivate and awaken people to what it 
even means to be attentive (something, I think I myself have only recently begun to 
understand)? 
 
Lilburn: Hunger is the great teacher. Plato tells us (Symposium) that eros is half lack, 
half cunning. This description works for philosophical eros, political eros, eros connected 
with attachment to and identification with a place, as it does with most sorts of longing. 
Hunger and ingenuity: I have confidence in these powers to draw at least some of us 
along. Also, it’s important to remember that the savouring of haecceity is deeply 
delightful. Eros and sorrow, in my view, are ways ahead, and one should resist any 
persuasion to abandon them. 
 
Campbell: One reason, why I have been attracted to your work, is how you show 
philosophy-as-practice, emphasizing, as Socrates-through-Plato did, that philosophy is 
what turns the soul around. But I still often wonder, what is the place of philosophy and 
philosophers in this hurried and fractured historical moment, where people seem to be 
left with little time for philosophizing or even realizing what it is and what it does? 
Furthermore, philosophy has become institutionalized and its wisdom increasingly 
fragmented and dispersed through different fields and specializations. 
 
At the risk of posing a stupid question, how do you describe and explain the significance 
of philosophy for the everyday, as something that we can live with, and something that 
can be a part of us? 
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Lilburn: Philosophy is fulsome attention – which can occur in a moment – and 
conviviality, the willingness to engage in conversation about what one notes and what 
one yearns for or most deeply fears. That’s a pretty light toolkit. The monastery, says 
Zen, is wherever you are. The same could be said about contemplative philosophy and 
the hermeneutical circles that grow from it. 
 
Campbell: As the North American university has become increasingly corporatized and 
globalized, and as someone who works in college and university settings, do you think 
that the university can continue to be a site for the sustainment of wisdom traditions and 
meaningful practices? And furthermore, in your estimation, what kind of study and re- 
search is needed for this to occur? 
 
Lilburn: Can the sort of undertaking I have been describing go on in the academy? 
Only, I think, on the edges, behind the surrounding shrubbery. Because the erotic, 
contemplative interiority I’ve been talking about and what gets us there, are 
transgressive, heterodox, not just in a university context, but throughout the culture. But 
there are pockets of practitioners here and there in most institutions, as I am sure you 
have found, and a handful of students are acutely aware of the philosophical poverty at 
the center of their lives and the thought-world they inhabit. Pandemic anxiety reports this 
poverty to us daily. 
 
Campbell: As we stand at the precipice of an uncertain and deeply frightening global 
climate emergency, there has been a lot of increased talk and writing about ecology and 
what it should offer us. In my estimation, much ecological writing lacks significance for 
two main reasons: it doesn’t seem to stem from or be rooted in a recognition of self (and 
the journey of becoming we undergo); and furthermore, the actual dynamism displayed 
by living eco-systems doesn’t seem conveyed in the structures and form of the texts 
themselves. Your writing seems to possess both these qualities -- through your 
emphasis on interiority but also the bringing together of diverse themes and voices from 
throughout time, history and place. 
 
Can I ask you what the ecological essay means for you, and the extent to which you 
think writing as a practice can mirror or, in fact be ecological? 
 
Lilburn: [to attempt an answer-in-progress:] I do believe more careful thinking around 
gardening, and the political economy that arises from community gardens, needs to be 
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done, focusing possibly on what sort of citizenship might be appearing within this activity. 
I also suspect more thought should go into what could be called dialectic, Plato’s 
meaning of it, and its maieutics, or could be called “spiritual direction,” this inquiry 
leagued to the thinking about gardening. I also like Peter Maurin’s/Dorothy Day’s notion 
of the agronomic university. But aside from all this, I have nothing sure to offer. I capture 
much of this rumination on gardens and maieutics (I hope) in a new essay: “interiority 
and Climate Change,” which is still in design. 
 
